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This is a study of hudud - Islamic 'fixed penalties' - as they appear in Iranian law and 
courts. It first presents the codified laws and underlying elements from Twelver Shi‘i 
law (as interpreted by the Iranian legal community) governing the penalties of 
stoning for adultery, amputation of four fingers for theft, and execution for sodomy 
and certain variants of fornication (illicit carnal congress between unmarried males 
and females). It subsequently observes how these laws and concepts are used in 
practice by analysing previously unavailable court documents pertaining to theft, 
sodomy, fornication and adultery trials. It thereby seeks to discover opportunities for 
avoiding these hadd (singular of hudud) penalties, which are termed ‘irreversible’ 
because they change the condemned irrevocably by killing or maiming them. 
 
The material collected suggests several patterns characterising the application of 
hudud in Iran. The law itself provides so many opportunities for lenience that in most 
cases, irreversible penalties could theoretically be avoided. However, the law is often 
so vague that judges have enormous discretion about how to interpret and apply it. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that the codified law is underlain by Shi‘i texts which 
jurists, judges and lawyers acknowledge as the true and authoritative source of law. 
The law’s vagueness necessitates recourse to these texts, but different texts and 
interpretations thereof can be used in court, leading to unpredictable sentencing. 
Furthermore, in the cases analysed it was commonplace for laws to be contravened 
outright. Socioeconomic forces also affected, or were revealed by, some of the cases. 
As well as many opportunities for lenience, the law contains fundamental obstacles 
to it, many of which are difficult to abrogate in an ‘Islamic Republic’ because they 
originate from authoritative Shi‘i texts. Some jurists suggest ways to overcome even 
these, one being Khomeini’s doctrine whereby state interests can override Islamic 
orthodoxy to protect the Muslim community and hence Islam itself. 
 
The project serves as a ‘handbook’ of codified Iranian hadd law in light of its 
underlying Shi‘i concepts as understood by Iranian legal specialists. Through a 
systematic analysis of hadd cases, it shows how these ideas are applied in practice, 








The fees for this project were paid by an Arts Faculty Award from the University of 
Edinburgh, for which I would like to express my gratitude. 
 
I am also grateful to the following individuals from the University of Edinburgh: my 
supervisor, Andrew J. Newman, for his patience and understanding; Kate Marshall; 
Alex Thomson; Linda Grieve; Elizabeth Goodwin-Andersson; Liam Forbes; Louise 
Wilson; Andrew Marsham; Anthony Gorman; Eberhard Sauer; Catherine Keltie; 
Janet Grant; and Cait Webb.  
 
Additionally I would like to thank Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Lindsay Farmer, and Ali 
Ansari for helpful advice. 
 
Then there are those who helped me to obtain primary materials, mostly inside Iran 
but sometimes by linking me to individuals in Iran. Though I am deeply indebted to 
them because my research would have been impossible without their assistance, I 
might create problems for them or their families by revealing their identities. I shall 
thank them individually, letting them know how crucial their help was and how 
much I admire them. 
 
Finally I would like to extend personal thanks to my parents; Niccolò Stiozzi Ridolfi; 
Monika Pohle Fraser; Saeko Yazaki; Rafiq Mahmood; Stephanie Solomon; Christine 
Haunz; my flatmates and other friends in Iran and Edinburgh; Marie Louise 
Wammen; Rebecca Stengel; and my husband’s parents and sister. They all supported 
me in various ways as I struggled with my research. As for my husband, Koh 
Fujinaga, he made innumerable photocopies, ordered countless interlibrary loans, 
never became angry, and never complained about frequent post-midnight dinners 
when I had to ‘finish a thought’. Without his affection, I would not have had the 




Table of Contents. 
 
1. Introduction.        1. 
1. General nature of the project.      2. 
2. Organisation.        3. 
3. Sources and restrictions.       5. 
4. The role of this project with respect to existing studies.   6. 
5. Background information.       11. 
5.1. Shi‘i law and basic terminology.      11. 
5.2. State structures.        15. 
5.3. Velayat-e faqih.        16. 
5.4. The adoption of Islamised laws.      17. 
5.5. Democracy and authoritarianism.     19. 
5.6. A note on juristic texts.       25. 
 
Part I: Background.        27. 
 
2. Hudud in the law.        29. 
1. Shi‘i law and codified law.       29. 
2. No crime without law.       30. 
3. Judges and lawyers.       30. 
4. Law codes, general regulations and appeals.    31. 
4.1. The fragmentary nature of the penal code.    35. 
5. Hudud in codified and Shi‘i law.      36. 
5.1. Hadd crimes and their punishments.     37. 
Table: some aspects of hudud in the penal code.    39. 
5.2. Repetition of hadd crimes and execution.    41. 
5.3. Execution methods and protocol.     42. 
6. Proof.         46. 
6.1. Confession.        47. 
6.2. Revocation of confession.      50. 
6.3. Testimony.        50. 
 viii 
6.4. ‘Elm-e qazi: the judge’s ‘knowledge’.     54. 
6.5. Evidence other than confession, testimony or ‘elm.   59. 
7. Criminal responsibility.       59. 
7.1. Bulugh.         60. 
7.2. Doubt and ignorance; ignorance as a defence.    62. 
7.3. Ikrah (coercion) and ezterar (distress).     64. 
8. Haqq Allah and haqq al-nas.      67. 
9. Suqut, repentance and pardon.      69. 
9.1. Tabdil (commutation) and takhfif (attenuation).    75. 
Concluding remarks.        76. 
 
3. Principles.         77. 
1. Basic principles.        77. 
2. The general (‘amm) and the particular (khass).    80. 
3. Lenience.         81. 
3.1. Against lenience.        82. 
4. No investigation of crimes ‘against chastity’.    83. 
5. The qa‘edeye darr’ or ‘axiom of removal’.    83. 
6. Maslahat and other forces for accommodation.    85. 
6.1. Qa‘edeye molazeme: the reasonability of commandments.  85. 
6.2. Maslahat.         86. 
6.3. The axiom against causing hatred of the faith.    89. 
6.4. Hudud were intended to be applied sparingly if ever.   91. 
6.5. Islam is compatible with human rights.     92. 
Concluding remarks.        95. 
 
4. Crime-specific regulations.      97. 
1. Extent of penetration and testimony to it.     98. 
2. Mahduroldamm status.       99. 
3. Zena.         100. 
3.1. The punishment of children born through zena.    102. 
3.2. Incest and rape.        103. 
 ix 
3.3. Rape and murder of underage girls.     105. 
3.4. Ehsan.         109. 
3.5. Marriage, coercion, and criminal responsibility.    116. 
3.6. Pregnancy cannot prove zena.      118. 
3.7. Stoning for adultery.       118. 
4. Sodomy.         121. 
4.1. Alternative punishments for sodomy.     123. 
5. Theft.         124. 
6. Moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard.      126. 
Concluding remarks.        129. 
 
Part II: Case studies.       131. 
 
5. Theft cases.        133. 
Case 1: amputation sentence carried out.     133. 
Case 2: the dangers of collaborating with the authorities.   136. 
Case 3: who removed the loot?      141. 
Case 4: collaboration in theft prevents the hadd.    146. 
Case 5: patterns in written files also emerge in court.   147. 
Published rulings.        149. 
Concluding remarks.        150. 
 
6. Sodomy cases.        155. 
Case 1: acquittal is replaced by a death sentence.    155. 
Case 2: blurred boundaries between haqq Allah and haqq al-nas.  158. 
Case 3: murder victim is claimed mahduroldamm through lavvat.  160. 
Case 4: execution of a minor despite invalid ‘elm and stay of execution. 162. 
Published rulings.        168. 
1. Incidence of death sentences      169. 
2. Rape versus consensual sodomy.      169. 
3. Proof.         170. 
4. Use of uncodified Shi‘i law.      171. 
 x 
5. Rape claimants prosecuted.      172. 
6. Haqq Allah.         172. 
7. Double jeopardy and authorities’ involvement.    172. 
8. Repentance.         173. 
Concluding remarks.        173. 
 
7. Published zena rulings.        179. 
1. Type of penalty: incidence and appeal result.    179. 
2. Appeals and authorities’ involvement.     180. 
3. Subjectivity and appeal bias.      181. 
4. When are lawyers introduced?      182. 
5. Evidence used.        183. 
6. Ehsan.         185. 
7. Rape, age and male bias.       186. 
8. Use of uncodified Shi‘i law.      190. 
9. Lenience in use.        190. 
Concluding remarks.        192. 
 
8. Fornication cases.        195. 
Case 1: execution despite evidence of psychological disorders.  195. 
Case 2: death sentence for incest with rape claim and enkar.  202. 
Concluding remarks.        209. 
 
9. Adultery cases.        213. 
Case 1: stoning sentence despite belief in valid marriage.   214. 
Case 2: interpretability of coercion in adultery.    218. 
Case 3: confession motivated by promises of lenience.   223. 
Case 4: commutation of stoning to hanging because of maslahat.  228. 
Case 5: hanging for rape takes precedence over stoning for adultery. 230. 
Case 6: widely varying judicial opinions.     233. 
Case 7: stoning sentence based on co-defendant’s confessions.  239. 
Case 8: are ‘illicit relations’ and ‘adultery’ two different charges?  243. 
 xi 
Case 9: coerced confession.       247. 
Case 10: mahduroldamm status and the unreliability of confession.  250. 
Case 11: belief in mahduroldamm status prevents qesas.   256. 
Case 12: a straightforward acquittal.       258. 
Case 13: a straightforward stoning sentence.     259. 
Concluding remarks.        261. 
 
10. Conclusions.        269. 
1. The incidence of irreversible hadd penalties.    271. 
2. Legal interpretability and judicial discretion.    273. 
3. Legal infractions.        276. 
4. Socioeconomic dimensions.      278. 
5. Institutional obstacles to lenience.      279. 
6. Final observations.        285. 
 
Bibliography.         289. 
 
Appendices.         355. 
Appendix 1: selected original documents with translated excerpts.  357. 
Appendix 2: glossary.        383. 






In recent years, the issue of stoning in Iran has attracted attention in the international 
media and condemnations by human-rights organisations and international 
authorities. Other ‘Islamic fixed penalties’ (hudud; singular: hadd), including 
execution for sodomy and hand amputation for theft, have received similar censure. 
However, despite the trickle of information about specific cases and some translation 
of relevant laws, apparently no unified study of Iranian hadd trials, based on primary 
sources such as court documents, is available to an Anglophone audience. Nor is 
there any ‘handbook’ to which such an audience can turn to understand the laws used 
in these trials, their current interpretations, and their origins in Islamic texts, in 
whose light they could be reformulated.  
 
This project seeks to fill these lacunae by providing this information in a unified 
manner, using Iranian laws, juristic texts, and primary sources, notably court 
documents, to present a more comprehensive account of Iranian hadd law in theory 
and recent practice. It also seeks to discover what opportunities defendants have to 
avoid these amputation or execution penalties, and which obstacles they face (these 
being the questions that prompted the research). In so doing, the project presents 
previously unavailable raw data, background information, and analysis in an attempt 
to add to the current understanding of what Iranian hadd laws are, how they are 
interpreted by legal specialists in terms of their Islamic origins, and how they are 
used in court. 
 
The project identifies four major patterns characterising hadd prosecution in Iran. 
These are: the discretion with which laws are interpreted and applied, facilitated by 
the simultaneous operation of Shi‘i law1 and the codified law which is ostensibly 
based on it; judicial authorities’ frequent infractions of laws; social circumstances 
affecting, or revealed by, prosecution; and the presence of institutional obstacles to 
leniency in the legal system. The first pattern also shows that many legal concepts 
are not ‘set in stone’ and are discussed extensively by jurists and possibly legislators 
                                                
1 For details on hudud and Shi‘ism, the prevalent form of Islam in Iran, see section 5.1 below, which 
also discusses terminology. 
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(as observed for example in the differences between the 1991/96 penal code and its 
proposed replacements). The fourth illustrates the difficulty which arises when laws 
must comply with scripture (or, generally, any text) which is presented as impervious 
to changing circumstances. This immutability has been contested even within Iran 
(see section 5.5 below and chapter 3, section 6 and subsections), but remains 
dominant, hindering reform. Rigidity coexists with interpretability2: considerable 
flexibility is possible within the dominant ‘scriptural immutability paradigm’, and the 
extant system even allows ‘workarounds’ for any remaining obstacles to reform, but 
flexibility is currently at the regime’s discretion. 
 
1. General nature of the project. 
 
Hudud are inalterable penalties decreed for certain crimes by Islamic law, and, 
through its Twelver Shi‘i variant, enshrined in Iranian law. Some hudud consist of 
flogging. Others involve execution or amputation of limbs, and these are termed 
‘irreversible penalties’ here because, by maiming or killing the condemned, they 
prevent resumption of their previous lives.  
 
This project focuses on the irreversible penalties of stoning for adultery, amputation 
of four fingers for theft, and execution for sodomy, incest and the fourth instance of 
fornication3 as presented in Iranian law and criminal trials. It seeks to understand 
how these hudud are manifested in theory (the law and its Shi‘i roots) and practice 
(trials) in Iran, and to identify opportunities in Iranian (i.e. codified) law and Shi‘i 
law to avoid these penalties, as well as obstacles to such avoidance.  
 
Hudud are the chosen subject of this project because their non-negotiability makes 
them more difficult to avoid than negotiable penalties, while their scriptural origins 
                                                
2 Ferrari discusses different models for adaptability of divine law. Islamic law, he observes, has 
historically favoured interpretation over legislation, but the evolving human agency involved 
nevertheless permitted considerable adaptability. (References in footnotes are all to sources listed in 
full in the bibliography). 
3 Zena, illicit carnal penetration between males and females, exists in several variants. Fornication is 
zena by unmarried individuals. Adultery is zena while being married and having ‘access’ to a spouse 
(a condition termed ehsan). Incest is zena with blood relatives, and rape is coerced zena. Sodomy, 
instead, is penetration between males. 
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make them practically impossible to abrogate outright according to the dominant 
notion of scriptural immutability. Hudud, unlike ta‘zirat (discretionary penalties), 
cannot be modified because of extenuating circumstances or other considerations; 
nor can they be waived by injured parties or their heirs and potentially commuted 
into pecuniary penalties, as with injury or murder4. Questioning their validity, or 
abrogating them, could contradict the constitutionally enshrined (articles 2, 4) notion 
of God as legislator. 
 
The object is therefore to identify opportunities for leniency despite these obstacles. 
The discrepancy between prima facie severity and potential leniency makes for a 
more interesting analysis than would be possible for a less challenging law. From a 
human-rights point of view, irreversible hadd penalties are also a priority as targets 
for the reduction of suffering. 
 
This is not a statistical study: only the officials of the Iranian Judiciary are in a 
position to know how many hadd sentences are issued or implemented, and they do 
not choose to disclose these figures5. It is also not an attempt to capture the essence 
of Islam or Shi‘i law, nor a study of how juristic ideas developed over time. Instead it 
seeks to describe how hadd law is understood by the present-day Iranian legal 
community (jurists, judges and lawyers), how it is applied and sometimes negotiated 
in court, and how alternative interpretations of legal elements, recognised by Iranian 




The project has two Parts, I and II, devoted to theory and practice respectively.  
 
Part I (chapters 2-4) aims to describe the current legal and conceptual framework 
surrounding Iranian hadd trials. It explains Iranian hadd laws and modern jurists’ 
                                                
4 For a recent example: Mostafaei, “Dard”. 
5 Sadr, “Raftar”; Qazi, “Aya mojazat”; Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation; Abrahamian (1999), 
215; Mir-Hosseini, “Iran”, 100. For similar secrecy about non-hadd executions: ICHRI, “Iran’s secret 
hangings”, “Iranian Judiciary”. 
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conceptions of their Shi‘i origins, using contemporary Iranian scholarly publications, 
and, where appropriate, pre-modern works which they cite. Media sources and texts 
in other languages are used when they add perspective or necessary detail. 
 
Part II (chapters 5-9) analyses 24 recent unpublished theft, sodomy, fornication and 
adultery cases, supplemented by 166 published rulings regarding the same crimes. 
The published rulings are included because they elucidate features of the unpublished 
cases or the legal framework. However, being only rulings rather than multiple 
documents as the unpublished cases are, they provide only limited information. Also, 
they were published in Iran and therefore passed through two arbitration processes: 
the publisher’s selection, and the censor’s approval which would have been required 
for publication. This, therefore, is not a sample of freely available rulings and cannot 
reliably represent the overall situation regarding Iranian hadd trials. The numbers it 
generates are perhaps indicative, but not authoritative.  
 
The rulings are nevertheless useful by confirming some mechanisms observed in the 
unpublished cases. Furthermore, several (not all) published cases were harvested 
from prisons by lawyers seeking ‘death-row’ prisoners to represent pro bono. This 
may over-represent the incidence of death sentences, as these cases were selected for 
presence of the death penalty. The published rulings may counteract this bias. 
 
I found no case files for the hadd crime of ‘insurrection’ (moharebeh), which can 
carry irreversible penalties (death or amputation of hands and feet), but Part I 
describes moharebeh laws. 
 
Part I is necessary for understanding Part II, and several mechanisms and legal 
interpretations discussed in Part I resurface in Part II. Since Part I aims to provide a 
reasonably comprehensive account of the current Iranian hadd framework, it also 
describes laws and mechanisms which do not appear in the cases.  
 
Appendices consist of a glossary (including acronyms for law codes) and some 
reproductions of court documents with salient portions translated.  
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3. Sources and restrictions. 
 
The materials for this project were gathered in August-September 2004 and 
November-December 2007; some were sent to me after 2007 by contacts whom I had 
met in 2007. I spent years creating the networks of contacts which led me to these 
documents. This was perhaps the most challenging, and certainly the most time-
consuming, aspect of the project.  
 
The unpublished court documents were obtained partly (2004) through court 
authorities, following lengthy and intense negotiation, and mostly (2007 and later) 
through individuals involved in the trials. Some cases, being internationally known in 
terms of basic facts rather than legal details, are potentially identifiable through their 
‘stories’. Others went unreported, apparently even in Iran, or are known only 
superficially. However, to protect those who made the documents available I have 
chosen a uniform privacy policy, omitting such details as names and case numbers, 
though this may be futile for better-known cases6. 
 
The scope of this project was severely restricted by difficulties obtaining primary 
sources7. I was a lone foreigner with no standing and no contacts, and therefore on 
the one hand a suspicious character, and on the other, easily brushed aside. Access to 
institutions and materials was hindered at every turn, and I was frequently suspected 
of being a spy or a scandal-mongering foreign journalist. Several judges expressed 
the ideas ‘we are not barbarians who cut off hands, as the foreigners think’ or 
‘stoning does not happen any more (it is foreign propaganda)’. There was no 
available guidance about how to find the necessary documentation, who might have 
                                                
6 Hilhorst and Jansen, “Fieldwork in Hazardous Areas”, 3-4: “By sharing data, risks can develop for 
informants [and] assistants... Avoiding harm overrules the norm of transparency of (raw) data as 
researchers are in the first place bound to protect the security of their respondents”. 
7 Several scholars describe difficulties of research in Iran, including the advantages of being Iranian 
and disadvantages of being foreign or investigating subjects deemed ‘political’. Karadsheh, 265-6 and 
footnote 197; Littauer; Suleiman/Anderson, 151-2, 154-6, 163, 165-6; Fazaeli, 14-5; Hegland, 578; 
Loeffler, 635-7; Rouhani, 690-1; Nadjmabadi, 604; Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 17; Osanloo, “Doing”, 
680-2; Iran Emrooz; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 10 (the last source describes an established Iranian 
journalist’s difficulties obtaining documents or access to courts). 
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access to it, or how to contact them. Only in winter 2007 and thereafter did I obtain 
most of the case documents, despite years of earlier attempts and failed strategies. 
 
Some doors remained closed notwithstanding my efforts, and possibly the most 
important was access to trials. As described in chapter 2, section 4, all trials for 
offences ‘against chastity’ must, by law, be conducted privately, and authorities have 
the discretion to hold any trial privately. Iranian lawyers who attempted to allow me 
into trials were denied permission (and also admitted that this type of trial is 
uncommon), and with one exception (theft case 5), the only trials I saw, in the court 
whence I later obtained some documents, were incomplete or, however interesting, 
unrelated to hudud. 
 
Consequently this project must rely on analysis of written documents and, where 
possible, supplementary information from involved parties. Given the paucity of 
available documents, this cannot be a quantitative project based on vast amounts of 
data, revealing the overall incidence of these penalties or popularity of any legal 
mechanism. It can only be a qualitative study with a tentative quantitative dimension. 
It can show how laws and concepts are used, but not, with any certainty, how often. 
This provisional quantitative element provides a suggestion of possible incidence of 
penalties or mechanisms, which could be further investigated in future. 
 
4. The role of this project with respect to existing studies. 
 
There appears to be no ‘handbook’ available to Anglophone scholars regarding 
Iranian hadd law or its relationship to Shi‘i law; nor is there a unified account of 
hadd trials analysed through primary sources (court documents). This project seeks 
to fill these gaps, thereby contributing new material to the study of Iranian law. 
 
Existing academic studies intersect with this project in various areas, but none seems 
to cover the same ground in the same depth. This does not mean that existing works 
are defective, but merely that this project’s focus differs from theirs. 
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A few studies disseminated outside Iran deal with Iranian criminal law. Some of 
these paraphrase portions of codified Iranian law, mostly from the penal code, 
sometimes with brief descriptions of Shi‘i texts or facts about criminal cases not 
necessarily related to hudud. Others delineate the structure of the Iranian judicial 
system or describe specific issues in penal law, again not necessarily related to 
hudud8. As far as can be determined, none is based on court documents or Iranian 
legal treatises, presents a systematic account of Iranian hadd laws or cases, or 
provides the level of detail and analysis offered here. 
 
For example, Entessar, “Criminal law and the legal system in revolutionary Iran”, 
covers hudud only on pp. 96-7. Rezaei, “The Iranian criminal justice under the 
Islamization project”, similarly mentions hudud only on pp. 59 and 67-8. Rahami, 
“Development of criminal punishment in the Iranian post-revolutionary penal code”, 
provides some basic hadd-related facts on pp. 595-7 and 600-1. Kusha, The Sacred 
Law of Islam, gives a basic overview of the categories of Islamic criminal law (60-1, 
67), describes the post-revolutionary Islamisation of laws, paraphrases some articles 
of the Constitution, and lists types of courts (142-57). It enumerates some crimes and 
punishments, including hudud (160-2, 275-80), and lists stonings reported by Iranian 
newspapers between 1980 and 1997. Studies of Iranian criminal law available 
outside Iran apparently do not go into detail about hudud or supply case studies. 
 
Some texts, often associated with human-rights organisations, describe Iranian 
contraventions of international human-rights standards, sometimes through hudud, 
particularly stoning. They supply basic information, including some legal 
background, about one or more publicised hadd cases, using information available 
online or through the media9. At the more comprehensive end of the spectrum is 
                                                
8 Examples: Asli; Rahmdel; Ghassemi; Gontowska; Entessar; Rezaei, “The Iranian”; Rahami, 
“Development”, “The Constitution”; Lawyers’ Committee; Alasti; Farkhondeh; Ghodsi, “Legitimate 
defence”, “Murder”; Mir-Hosseini, “Iran”, “Criminalising”, “Sharia”; Brajer/Rahmatian; Arjomand, 
“Shari‘a and constitution”; Shams Nateri; Picheca; Mahmoudi, “The informal”, “Alternative”; 
Gholami; Attari et al; Kusha; Tamadonfar; Habibzadeh; Tabari (Keyvan). Mohammadi (Majid) 
discusses the Iranian Judiciary’s political dimensions (chapters 5-6). Baqir as-Sadr displays the greater 
jurisprudential context of the principles in chapter 3. 
9 Examples: Amnesty International, “Iran: end”, “Iran, the last”, “Death penalty”, “Iran: demand”, 
yearly Iran reports; Terman; Terman/Fijabi; Iran-e Azad, “Stoning”; ICAS, “Islamic judiciary”, “The 
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Amnesty International’s “Iran: end executions by stoning”, which Mir-Hosseini 
(2010) deems “the most comprehensive and reliable study” on stoning10. It provides 
translated excerpts from the penal code and another Iranian law code as appendices. 
On pp. 3-13, it describes some laws and presents known stoning cases in a few 
sentences each. 
 
Again, Mir-Hosseini usefully describes the problems of such research: “There is little 
statistical or other data available on court practices in criminal cases and convictions 
related to sexual offences. The government and judiciary have so far declined to 
disclose the relevant information… The criminal courts… are carefully kept away 
from the public eye, and press coverage and reporting of cases are highly controlled. 
The available information comes from human rights activists, both inside and outside 
Iran, and international organisations”11. These are the barriers which this project 
seeks to overcome by going beyond second-hand sources and analysing first-hand 
materials, whose elusiveness has so interfered with the systematic study of Iranian 
criminal cases. Obviously the restrictions perceived by Mir-Hosseini and others 
(section 3) hamper this endeavour, but this project makes at least some inroads into 
acquiring and analysing these materials and providing more detailed background 
information than was previously available to an Anglophone audience as far as can 
be determined. 
 
With respect to existing studies, therefore, this one endeavours to investigate hudud 
in Iran in greater depth in terms of both background information and collected case 
studies. It seeks to provide a systematic account and analysis, based on first-hand 
material, of collected hadd cases, whether known to the media (as some adultery and 
sodomy cases are, though without much legal detail) or completely unreported. It 
concentrates not only on stoning cases but also other hadd cases, including theft 
cases, discussed less by the media and international organisations (all the theft cases, 
and several non-theft cases, reviewed here were unreported). It discusses not only the 
                                                                                                                                     
Islamic Regime”; Mir-Hosseini, “Criminalising”, “Iran”; Eghtedari; other reports or calls to action by 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, EU and UN (see bibliography). 
10 Mir-Hosseini, “Iran”, 100. 
11 Ibid., 100. 
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‘stories’ of the cases, but also their legal details, and lawyers’ and judges’ differing 
interpretations thereof during trials. To maximise understanding of these debates and 
interpretations, it provides background information regarding relevant legal and Shi‘i 
concepts which resurface in court and can sway the opinions of judges. It thereby 
also serves as a ‘compendium’ of Iranian hadd law in light of underlying Shi‘i law as 
perceived by modern-day Iranian legal specialists. 
 
By doing all this, the study seeks to provide an overview of the ‘toolbox’ of concepts 
available when individuals are prosecuted for hadd crimes, and how these are used in 
practice, to identify opportunities for avoiding irreversible penalties. In the course of 
this analysis, the project discovers various overarching patterns in the interpretation 
and application of hadd law in Iran, as discussed earlier. 
 
Of existing studies, this project is most similar in format to Mir-Hosseini’s Marriage 
on Trial (1993), which analyses divorce cases in Iran and Morocco. Though a study 
of family law rather than penal law, it analyses relevant laws and provides case 
studies as this project does. The most striking difference between Mir-Hosseini’s 
project and this one is of course my inability to attend trials or obtain statistically 
significant numbers of court files because of the sensitivity of the subject matter. 
Therefore the statistical element of Mir-Hosseini’s study must perforce be absent 
from this one, and so must the details of court interaction.  
 
However, some patterns found by Mir-Hosseini also appear in hadd cases. These 
include judges’ discretion to interpret the law, often in view of underlying Shi‘i 
elements, to issue rulings irrespective of codified law, and the importance of judges’ 
personal attitudes. In penal cases an additional element emerges. The case studies 
suggest that startlingly often, judges go beyond idiosyncratically interpreting laws, 
and simply ignore or contravene them outright. 
 
The nature of the subject matter means that this project has potential practical 
relevance in the field of human rights. The UN, the EU, human-rights organisations, 
and international governments have mostly emphasised the Iranian human-rights 
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record’s incompatibility with international standards of human rights, rather than 
Iran’s own legal system and its potentially lenient elements. International 
organisations have exhorted Iran to comply with foreign laws12 which do not have 
the same ‘clout’ in an ‘Islamic Republic’ as laws attributed to Islam (though Iran has 
signed some international treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
to which it expressed reservations regarding compatibility with Islamic laws).  
 
There is a case for arguing pragmatically that it would be more effective to appeal for 
leniency through the Iranian regime’s own laws than to expect it to comply with a 
system of principles whose independent validity it does not officially accept (unless 
they can be rendered compatible with its conception of Islam). This observation has 
been made by (inter alia) Mir-Hosseini, who also notes human-rights activists’ 
frequent unfamiliarity with the details of Islamic law13. The Iranian legal and human-
rights community is already alive with discussions of how new interpretations of 
Islamic sources could accommodate human rights, as observed throughout the 
project (see especially section 5.5 below and chapter 3, section 6). This ferment has 
promoted some legal change (such as mothers’ conditional custody of children: 
chapter 3, section 6.2, and section 5.5 below) and could potentially bring more. 
 
Given these conditions, this project seeks to break new ground by offering heretofore 
unavailable information about the nature and practical implementation of hadd law in 
Iran, since the pursuit of knowledge is valid in its own right, but also by presenting 
modern-day Iranian legal specialists’ ideas regarding opportunities for leniency 
whose Islamic pedigree would render them more digestible by the Iranian regime 
than those of entirely foreign or secular origin. 
 
                                                
12 For example, International Observatory for Lawyers; Amnesty International, “Iran: end”, “Iran, the 
last”, “Iran: reports”; Council of the EU, three Declarations in bibliography; Human Rights Watch, 
“Letter to His Excellency”, “Letter to UN”; Meydaan, “Practice”; WLUML, “Iran: Sakineh”; 
Associated Press, “Canadian”; James; Dehghan; Price, “UN committee”; European Parliament; Alasti, 
20-3; UN Resolutions 65/226, 64/176, document A/C.3/63/L.40. 
13 Mir-Hosseini, “Criminalising”, 22, 40. See also: Cherif Bassiouni; Ahmad, 10-1, 13; Ford, 503; al-
Zuhili, 275; Baderin, “Introduction”, xiii, xiv-xvi, xix-xx, xxiii-xxiv, xxxiii; Tamadonfar, 218; Kar, 
“Iranian law”, 8-13; Baderin, “Islam”, 9, 11-8, 20, 24; Ghahremanpour, 180, 182, 186; Keddie, 319-
20; An-Na‘im, “Islam and human rights”, 96; Shah, 883; Ford, 525, 530, 532; Copinger-Symes, 59-
61; Osanloo, “Whence”, 43-4. 
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The project thereby straddles various disciplines. For example, it concerns a subject 
which is of interest to human-rights organisations, but provides more detail regarding 
Iranian (codified) and Shi‘i law than they usually supply; it has a theoretical analysis 
of Shi‘i legal concepts classifiable within ‘Islamic studies’, but with an emphasis on 
practical application and current relevance associated with the social sciences. By 
blending these domains it seeks to provide a detailed and reasonably comprehensive 
picture of what is happening in reality together with its theoretical underpinnings. 
 
5. Background information. 
 
Some readers may be unfamiliar with the basic facts of Shi‘ism and the attempts to 
codify its laws in Iran following its 1979 Islamic revolution. The following sections 
therefore provide background information about the environment in which Iranian 
hadd laws and trials exist. This includes an introduction to the general nature of 
Shi‘ism and Shi‘i law, emphasising the need to distinguish between scripture and the 
jurisprudence based on it; an introduction to the concept of hudud; a description of 
state structures and the codification of Shi‘i law, particularly criminal law; and an 
account of how the political environment can affect the possibilities of legal reform. 
 
5.1. Shi‘i law and basic terminology. 
 
Iran’s official and majority religion is Twelver Shi‘ism14 (hereinafter shortened to 
‘Shi‘ism’, though there are other varieties of Shi‘ism). ‘Shi‘ism’ – adjectival form: 
‘Shi‘i’ or ‘Shi‘ite’ – refers to the phrase shi‘at Ali, the ‘faction of Ali’, indicating the 
Shi‘i belief that after the Prophet Muhammad, the rightful leaders of the Muslim 
community were his cousin and son-in-law, Ali, and his male descendants, termed 
‘Imams’ (leaders). The twelfth of these, often termed the ‘Hidden Imam’, went into 
hiding or ‘Occultation’ (gheybat) in 941 AD, and remains alive but unavailable to 
govern or make legal pronouncements. Hence the term ‘Twelver (Ithna‘ashari) 
Shi‘ism’, since we are still, according to this doctrine, in the reign of the Twelfth 
Imam. Shi‘ism differs from Sunnism (from sunna, ‘tradition’). Most Muslims 
                                                
14 Constitution articles 2, 12. 
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worldwide adhere to one of the four legal schools of Sunni Islam. Sunnis believe that 
the Prophet gave indications whereby his friend and father-in-law Abu Bakr should 
succeed him as leader or ‘caliph’ (from khalifa, successor) of the Muslims, and that 
the ‘caliphate’ derives from the community’s allegiance rather than any special right 
of the Prophet’s lineage to rule15. 
 
Because the Iranian state sets itself the goal, enshrined in the first four articles of its 
Constitution, of complying with Shi‘i Islam in all respects including law, it is 
necessary to grasp the basics of Shi‘i law in order to understand the cases in Part II 
and their theoretical background in Part I. 
 
The Qur’an (‘recitation’), considered the word of God as revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad, is the most important text for all branches of Islam. A minority if its 
verses are legal; the circumstances of their revelation (asbab al-nuzul) are often 
crucial to their meaning or interpretation, and some abrogate (naskh) others. 
 
Also important is the sunna (tradition): reports of the behaviour and statements of the 
Prophet and (only for Shi‘is) the Imams, variously called ahadith (singular: hadith), 
akhbar (singular: khabar), and most often in modern Iranian legal treatises, revayaat 
(singular: revayat). These ‘narrations’, as they will be called here, usually include an 
isnad or sanad: a ‘chain of transmitters’ having the format ‘A told B told C that the 
Prophet said or did such-and-such’. Narrations can be evaluated, inter alia, by the 
reliability of their transmitters. Narrations may therefore have greater or lesser 
authority, and equally authoritative ones may contradict each other. Narrations have 
legal authority because the Prophet, his daughter Fatima and the Imams are 
considered ma‘sum: infallibly sinless (often described in the plural: ‘the Ma‘sumin’). 
Nothing they said or did contradicted God’s will, the only question being whether 
their behaviour was accurately transmitted (and understood). 
 
The Qur’an and narrations are the nusus – ‘(authoritative) texts’; singular: nass – of 
Shi‘i law. The term ‘scripture’ will be used here to refer to these texts. However, 
                                                
15 See Momen, Halm, Tabataba’i, Waines (155-72), Williams (192-8), Rippin (vol.1, 103-16), and 
Stewart (165-74) for basic presentations of Twelver Shi‘ism and its differences from Sunnism. 
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following Occultation, humans have had to extrapolate scripture to real situations 
(including those not explicitly covered by scripture) without additional authoritative 
pronouncements from an Imam. The resulting jurisprudence – fiqh, a jurist being a 
faqih – is understood to be human and fallible, and it is important to distinguish it 
from scripture from the outset. Sometimes current Iranian legal specialists, ranging 
from judges to jurists, refer to scripture and fiqh together as shar‘, the term which in 
English is rendered as ‘shari‘a’, indicating ‘Islamic law’. Often they do this when 
distinguishing the codified law (qanun) from its uncodified origins, namely scripture 
plus fiqh. However, technically the shari‘a includes scripture but not fiqh, which is 
derivative, human and fallible. In this study, wherever it is necessary to refer to 
scripture and fiqh together, whether to paraphrase an Iranian legal specialist’s unified 
mention of them, to distinguish them from codified law used in court, or to indicate 
that a legal concept is supported both by scripture directly and by fiqh (for example 
in the elaboration of its details), the term ‘Shi‘i law’ will be employed. 
 
In current Shi‘i thought, fiqh is the result of ijtihad (‘effort’): the extraction of legal 
rulings from scripture by a mujtahid (one authorised to perform ijtihad) through 
principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) themselves elaborated from scripture; and 
the sources of Shi‘i law are presented as the Qur’an, the sunna, ijma‘ (the consensus 
of jurists), and ‘aql (reason)16. Reliance on reason is associated with the tenet 
whereby God is reasonable and just (chapter 3, section 6.1). 
 
A jurist is also termed mufti, meaning ‘one able to issue a fatwa’ (legal ruling), and 
the act of soliciting fatwas is istifta’. The current mainstream Shi‘i position is that 
every mujtahid should elaborate rulings independently based on scripture, not on 
other jurists’ opinions. This is because any fatwa, however earnest, is potentially 
flawed, and reliance on potentially flawed rulings to create other potentially flawed 
rulings magnifies the possibility of error. Anyone other than a mujtahid is a muqallid 
(‘emulator’), from taqlid, ‘emulation’, and must follow the rulings of a mujtahid. 
Such is the emphasis on fresh scriptural interpretation that taqlid of a dead mujtahid 
                                                
16Momen, 184-8; Newman, Formative Period, xiii; Entessar, 94. 
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is forbidden, since that jurist is unavailable to elucidate his rulings17. This conflicts 
with the Iranian state’s task of codifying ‘Islamic law’ because codification 
crystallises some interpretations, excluding others18. (The codified interpretations are 
often from the fiqh manual Tahrir al-Vasileh of the deceased Ruhollah Khomeini, of 
whom more in sections 5.2-4).  
 
Since jurists’ opinions vary, fiqh is not a list of definite provisions so much as a 
collection of spectra, some narrower and some wider, within which most jurists’ (for 
the present purposes, most current Iranian jurists’) opinions lie. Therefore, for any 
point of law, the spectrum of current Iranian legal opinions will be described 
alongside the opinion chosen for codification. 
 
Both Sunni and Shi‘i jurists have evinced from scripture that there exists a category 
of crimes called hudud, plural of hadd – a word generally meaning ‘limit’, 
‘boundary’, ‘restriction’, ‘extent’ or ‘level’. Hadd crimes are regarded as those for 
which scripture (the Qur’an and/or narrations) prescribes ‘fixed penalties’: penalties 
whose intensity or method cannot be changed once the crimes are ascertained and 
proven to be haddi (the adjectival form of hadd). Hadd penalties include stoning for 
adultery and hand amputation for theft, but most hudud involve a prescribed number 
of lashes of the whip. The origins of the hadd category include the Prophetic 
narration “God has established a hadd (boundary) for everything and a hadd 
(penalty) for those who transgress this hadd (boundary)”19. Jurists have elaborated 
various features of hudud as opposed to other categories of crime; these minutiae will 
be explained in chapter 2, sections 5 and 5.1. Though the category hudud has 
recently been questioned, most jurists accept it, and the Iranian penal code follows 
the common format of both pre-modern (such as the Lom‘e and the Sharh-e Lom‘e) 
                                                
17 Mohammadi (Abolhassan; hereafter, ‘Mohammadi’), 345-51, 355; Halm, 67-71, 101-5; Tabataba’i, 
122; Khomeini/Curzu, 183, point 1; Niknam, “The Islamization”, 18; Martin, “Religion”, 43-5; 
Kamrava (2008), 169; Arjomand (1980), 156, Turban, 13-4, 163, 167, 184, “Introduction” to 
Authority, 5-9, 16-7; Bakhash, 73; Gleave, 24-8; Menashri, 121, 123; Newman, “Khomeini”, 573; 
Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 7; Cole, “Shaykh”, 83-4; Dahlén, 70-6, 87-90; Amanat, “From ijtihad”, 124-
5; Walbridge, 4-5; Picheca, 40, 45; Keddie, 19-20, 310; Khatami, 145; Constitution article 2. 
18 Shacht (“Problems”, 260) observes: “traditional Islamic law, being a doctrine and a method rather 
than a code … is by its nature incompatible with being codified, and every codification must subtly 
distort it”. See also Griffel, “Introduction”, 4, 13, 15; Filali-Ansary, 64; Ford, 36-7; Arjomand, 
“Shari‘a and constitution”, 160; Tamadonfar, 208. 
19 Sharh-e Lom‘e, 61; Gilani, 106; Arabiyan, 60; Mo’meni, 152; Shahrudi, 64-5. 
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and contemporary (such as Khomeini’s Tahrir al-Vasileh) Shi‘i fiqh manuals by 
containing a hudud section.  
 
5.2. State structures. 
 
The Iranian revolution of 1979, under the leadership of Ayatollah (high-ranking Shi‘i 
jurist) Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-89), replaced the modernising but repressive Shah 
(king) with an ‘Islamic Republic’: a state proposing to comply with Twelver Shi‘i 
Islam while acknowledging popular sovereignty, including such democratic 
institutions as a constitution, elections and a parliament. The events leading to the 
revolution, the reasons why it assumed an ‘Islamic’ form, and post-revolutionary 
history have been documented in great detail elsewhere20. For the present purposes, it 
is important to understand how the structure of the Iranian state influences the nature 
of laws and the chances of legal reform. 
 
The structure of the Islamic Republic is as follows. The head of state is the Leader 
(rahbar), in conformity with the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the 
jurist), of which more below. He appoints many crucial figures including the chief of 
the Judiciary and the heads of the armed forces and the national broadcasting 
networks. Members of parliament (Majles-e Shura-ye Eslami, ‘Islamic Consultative 
Assembly’) are elected by popular vote, as is the President. However, candidates are 
screened, and often disqualified, by the Guardian Council (Shuraye Negahban). This 
committee, composed of six clerics nominated by the Leader and six lay jurists 
nominated by the head of the Judiciary who is himself nominated by the Leader, is 
constitutionally charged with authoritatively interpreting the constitution, overseeing 
elections, and ensuring that laws approved by the parliament comply with Islamic 
law and the constitution. It can veto laws for being un-Islamic or unconstitutional. It 
can thereby thwart popular and parliamentary efforts to reform laws, and in practice 
has tended to disqualify reformist candidates, often on flimsy grounds, and veto 
reformist laws. Its veto can be overruled by the 28-member Committee for 
Discerning the State’s Benefits (Majma‘-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam), often 
                                                
20 Concerning the revolution: Abrahamian, Iran between two revolutions. For post-revolutionary 
history and politics: Keddie, Modern Iran; Mir-Hosseini, “Sharia”. 
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translated as ‘Expediency Council’ (see section 5.4 below), appointed by the Leader, 
who populates it with change-resistant conservatives. The Leader is chosen, and his 
activities are confidentially, hence unverifiably, monitored, by the Assembly of 
Experts (Majles-e Khobregan), composed of 86 mujtahids popularly elected from 
among candidates pre-screened by the Guardian Council, itself controlled by the 
Leader as above21. Therefore all popular input is subordinated to symbiotic, mutually 
replenishing unelected institutions. 
 
The attempt to fuse divine and popular sovereignty permeates the Iranian 
Constitution, some of whose articles proclaim the latter, some the former and others 
both, while some declare male-female equality which is contradicted by laws (see 
e.g. chapter 4, section 3.5) mandating inequalities. Several scholars have noted the 
difficulties in reconciling scriptural immutability (see section 5.5 below) with the 
equalities and rights associated with humanistic law22. Current state structures and 
practices, notably velayat-e faqih, subordinate the ‘republican/democratic’ element in 
‘Islamic Republic’ to what is presented as the ‘Islamic’ element. Crucially, this 
system does not necessarily gauge ‘Islamicity’ as loyalty to Islam, but as loyalty to 
the arguably new doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which not all Muslims share. 
 
5.3. Velayat-e faqih. 
 
Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih means political rule by Shi‘i mujtahids or, 
where possible, by the most learned of them: the vali-e faqih (guardian jurist) or vali-
e amr (guardian of affairs), in other words the Leader: a position held by Khomeini 
until his death in June 1989 and thereafter occupied by Ali Khamenei23.  
 
                                                
21 Constitution articles 62-4, 71-2, 91-9, 107-18, 157; Alfoneh; Muir, “Khamenei”; Mir-Hosseini, 
“Sharia”, 338-9; Durham University; Freedom House; Abrahamian, “Who’s in charge”; Abdo. 
22 Constitution articles 1-8, 7-12, 20-2, 56-9; Zera‘at (1383), 301; Bazgir, 210-3; Bakhash, 78-9, 84-5; 
Arjomand, Turban, 185; Picheca, 45-6, 57; Schweizer, 295-6; Ismail, 14, 16; Martin, Creating, 123-4, 
145 note 87, 199; Cherif Bassiouni, 265; Keddie, 255, 257; Sreberny/Khiabany, 273, 279; Najvan; 
Göle, 84; Shahidi, 747-54; Fazaeli, 14-5; Tabari (Keyvan), 109-10; Zeydabadi, 381-2, 387; 
Bucar/Fazaeli; Kusha, 242-51. Re: humanistic views: Mill, On Liberty, 85-6, 118, Subjection, 133-9, 
152-61, 186-91; Locke, 8-14, 73-80, 104-5; Kant, 74. 
23 Sachedina, “The rule”, 139; Halm, 128-9. Arjomand, Turban, 179, regards the association of vali-e 
amr with Qur’anic verse 4:59 (the ‘authority verse’, mandating obedience to ulu’l-amr, “those in 
authority among you”) as a case of spurious etymology. 
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To express it simply, the prevailing doctrine before Khomeini elaborated velayat-e 
faqih in the pre-revolutionary years was that during Occultation, no government is 
valid because government is the Imam’s prerogative and he is unavailable to govern. 
Furthermore, many other Imamic functions, including the implementation of hudud, 
were in abeyance (suqut; adjectival form: saqet, ‘lapsed’). From the 16th century 
onwards, Shi‘i clerics gradually subtracted various entries from that list of lapsed 
functions, but although Shi‘i clerics – foqaha (plural of faqih), ‘ulama (plural of 
‘alim, ‘learned’) – were eventually characterised as na’eb, ‘representatives’, of the 
Hidden Imam in some areas of life, most stopped short of positing themselves as 
rulers24. Khomeini developed these earlier concepts into velayat-e faqih, whose 
departure from previous mainstream ideas, and aggressive post-revolutionary 
propagation, have been widely discussed25. Indeed, the endeavour to comply with 
Shi‘i law while running a modern state necessitated additional departures from 
earlier mainstream ideas and the elaboration of new doctrines to accommodate these. 
 
5.4. The adoption of Islamised laws. 
 
The Islamisation of laws began shortly after the revolution with the suspension of the 
1967/75 Family Protection Law (FPL), which had increased male-female equality in 
marriage and divorce, and continued with the creation of the post-revolutionary 
Constitution and the amendment of articles of the civil and procedural codes 
considered incompatible with Shi‘i jurisprudence26.  
 
As for criminal law, in 1982 parliament codified prevalent Shi‘i juristic positions 
regarding hudud and qesas (retribution for murder or injuries) into the Hudud and 
Qesas Law (precursor of the 1991/96 penal code, described below), which the 
Guardian Council approved. But when in 1983 parliament attempted to codify 
ta‘zirat, penalties that Shi‘i jurisprudence classifies as discretionary, the Guardian 
Council repeatedly objected that ta‘zirat are uncodifiable. This was not resolved until 
                                                
24 Hairi, 59; Amir-Moezzi, 10; Rose, 174-5, 178; Sachedina 1988, 21-2; Momen, 189-191. 
25 Menashri, 120-1; Arjomand, “The state”, 154-8, Turban, 98-105, 136, 148-59, 171, 177-83, 
“Ideological Revolution”, 190-8, 201-3, “Introduction”, 1-3, 6-7; Roy, 201-3; Akhavi, 230-45, 256-7, 
260-8; Abdo; and many more. 
26 Mir-Hosseini, “Sharia”, 331-5; Mohammadi (Majid), 136. 
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1988, when Khomeini (apparently in a published letter to Khamenei) declared 
velayat-e faqih-e motlaqeh (the absolute rule of the jurist), a fortified version of 
velayat-e faqih. It states that all considerations, including Islamic laws, are 
subordinate to the interests of the Islamic Republic in its capacity as defender and 
implementer of Islam. In February 1988, the Expediency Council was created and, 
through a 1989 amendment of article 112 of the Constitution, allowed to override the 
Guardian Council’s veto in the State’s interests27. 
 
The 1989 constitutional amendments also reduced the vali-e faqih’s religious 
credentials to allow Khomeini’s chosen successor, Ali Khamenei, to occupy the 
position (Khomeini having died in June 1989). Previously the Leader was required to 
be a marja‘-e taqlid (‘reference for emulation’), an eminent or even supremely 
acclaimed religious jurist. Khamenei lacked this acclaim, but all maraji‘ (plural of 
marja‘), including the previous designated successor Ayatollah Montazeri, were 
deemed unsuitable because of their political differences with Khomeini. Hence the 
earlier mainstream conception of religious authority was explicitly separated from 
political authority through velayat28. This is another example of how political 
considerations overrode previous conceptions of Shi‘i orthodoxy. 
 
A new penal code, the Qanun-e Mojazat-e Eslami (Law of Islamic Punishments), 
was ratified in November 1991 except for the Ta‘zirat section, ratified in May 1996. 
It had an ‘experimental’ validity of five years, which was renewed several times, 
most recently until mid-March 2012. Two proposed replacements for it were drafted. 
The first, referred to here as the ‘penal code bill’, was approved by parliament in 
September 2008 but rejected by the Guardian Council. The second, referred to here 
as the ‘2012 penal code’, was approved in January 2012 by the Guardian Council, 
                                                
27 Mo’meni, 73; Sachedina, “The rule”, 133-9; Picheca, 53, 170; Ansari-Pour 1997, 335, 342-351; 
Niknam, “L’Islamisation”, 48-62, “The Islamization”, 17-9; Enayat, 170; Lawyers’ Committee, 11, 
13-4, 17-9; Behrooz, 97; Arjomand 1993, 96-8, 103-5, “Shari‘a and constitution”, 160; Abrahamian 
1993, 56-8; Mayer 1993, 119-20, 1996, 269-70, 291; Tabari (Keyvan), 101-2; Akhavi 1996, 262-5; 
Roy, 206-7; Jahanbegloo, 23; Ghahremanpour, 182; Keddie 2003, 260-1; Clarke, 289; Matsunaga, 
325-6; Martin, Creating, 170; Tamadonfar, 208-9, 213-5; Mir-Hosseini, “Sharia”, 336-9; Constitution 
articles 110, 112. Maslahat and its relationship to the ‘absolute rule of the jurist’ are discussed in 
chapter 3, section 6.2. 
28 Künkler, 7-12; Kelidar, 89-90; Behrooz, 96-100; Kazemi Moussavi, 299; Arjomand 1993, 98-9, 
107-8; Abdo; Abrahamian 1993, 34-5, Tabarestani, 32 (note 2); Akhavi 1996, 265-6; Roy, 206; Mir-
Hosseini, “Sharia”, 336-9. 
 19 
who withdrew it in August to rectify errors. It had not yet been signed into law as of 
16 April 2013, and the 1991/96 code remained provisionally in force until further 
notice29. Though the cases in Part II were tried under the 1991/96 code, referred to 
here as ‘the penal code’, the two subsequent versions illustrate the interpretability 
and negotiation of various legal elements relevant to hudud. Explanations of relevant 
legal elements will refer to the 2012 code alongside the 1991/96 code, to allow 
readers to understand hadd cases tried under the new code (which, at the time of 
writing, are still in the future). The penal code bill will be referred to where it 
illustrates the interpretability of legal elements. 
 
5.5. Democracy and authoritarianism. 
 
The Islamic Republic proposes to accommodate both ‘Islam’ and ‘Republicanism’, 
that is, democracy or popular sovereignty. Iran’s post-revolutionary political history 
is complex30, but the question which directly affects the scope for legal reform is 
whether, and to what extent, the regime’s version of ‘Islam’ allows the ‘republican’ 
mechanism of popular input regarding laws. As explained earlier, the constitutional 
vision of ‘Islam’ does allow the option of overriding ‘Islamic law’ in the form of 
maslahat-e nezam, but this flexibility is monopolised by the unelected, conservative-
dominated Expediency Council and is not directly accessible to the people or their 
elected representatives. Also, maslahat-e nezam indicates ‘the benefits of the state’, 
not ‘the benefits of the people’. Under current conditions, this massive potential for 
change remains largely untapped and is mobilised only if unelected officials decide 
that the state’s interests coincide with the people’s. This occasionally occurs; for 
example, a little girl’s death at the hands of her abusive divorced father so horrified 
public opinion that child custody laws were amended, overriding dominant fiqh, to 
allow divorced mothers custody instead of unsuitable fathers31 (chapter 4, section 
3.5, explains child custody laws). More usual is the inflexibility illustrated when the 
reformist mujtahid Mohammad Khatami, elected as President in 1997 and 2001, 
                                                
29 Fararu; Tabnak, October 2012; Golduzian 26; Alborz, “Tamdid”; UN General Assembly, 
GA/SHC/3925; Paygah, “Layehe”; Hojjati, “Layehe”; ISNA; Bultan; Tasnim; ICANA. 
30 For details: Gheissari/Nasr; Mir-Hosseini/Tapper, 9-38, 174-81; Ashraf/Banuazizi; Mohammadi 
(Majid), chapters 5-6. 
31 Niknam, “The Islamization”, 20-1. 
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failed to make substantive changes because his government was hamstrung by 
unelected institutions32. 
 
However, some reformists, including mujtahids33, argue that Islam not only allows 
flexibility, but also gives the people, not merely the authorities, access to it. The 
conflict, therefore, is not simply one of Islam versus democracy, but of 
authoritarianism (rationalised through the politically dominant and constitutional 
conception of ‘Islam’) versus popular self-determination. Just as there are secular 
authoritarianisms, so some Iranian scholars offer anti-authoritarian visions of Islam 
(indeed, some ally Islam with democracy and velayat-e faqih with authoritarianism). 
 
For example, the mujtahid Mohsen Kadivar asserts that Islam does not impose 
hardship or forbid obvious benefits. He argues for the religiously permitted 
changeability of certain commandments, including those involving harsh penalties 
and inequalities (see chapter 3, section 6.5), in response to evolving morality and the 
expiry of those commandments’ past rationales and benefits. He deems Islam 
compatible with democracy, and characterises velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih as 
religiously unjustified arbitrary power for the vali-e faqih and his allies to categorise 
anything they wish as maslahat-e nezam, thereby replacing scriptural with state 
authority. Though velayat-e motlaqeh could easily bypass any ‘inconvenient’ 
scriptural commandment, being at the authorities’ discretion it can facilitate both 
democracy and repression. Kadivar’s vision instead justifies self-determination by 
opposing this ‘double-edged’ innovation and positing an accommodating Islam. He 
has been imprisoned and is now in exile34. 
 
Ahmad Qabel, another reformist mujtahid who was imprisoned and has since died 
(possibly because of insufficient medical assistance in jail), articulated similar 
positions regarding the changeability of commandments. He wrote extensively 
against stoning (see chapter 3, section 6.5) and called for a reform of the constitution 
                                                
32 Gheissari/Nasr, 98-105; Freedom House; Mir-Hosseini/Tapper, 29-36, 174-81. 
33 Despite Iran’s characterisation as a government of mullahs, not all mujtahids are part of the regime, 
which harasses many of them. Künkler; Amirpur; Abdo; CSM; Mir-Hosseini/Tapper, 118-23, 153. 
34 Nurizad/Kadivar, “Pasokhha”; Kadivar, “Qabul”; Matsunaga. 
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and governmental structures to increase popular input. He observed that by thwarting 
the efforts of Khatami’s reformist government, increasing repression, and resisting 
legal and constitutional reform, Khamenei has convinced most people that the regime 
cannot be internally reformed, thereby possibly hastening its collapse35.  
 
Likewise the mujtahid Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, who urges judges who issue 
stoning verdicts to participate in stoning and witness its cruelty, states that penal 
commandments are not eternally binding and harsh penalties cause people to loathe 
Islam. He asks why, if stoning is divine, the regime implements it secretly. He argues 
that it is not the faith’s function to control human interaction minutely, and therefore 
using human regulations for areas outside religion’s purview does not imply the 
faith’s ‘imperfection’. Every prophet, he says, arrived into a pre-existing culture, 
aiming to introduce ethical goals and improve things within existing conditions 
rather than upending that culture and being rejected. Historical developments may 
facilitate those greater goals beyond earlier societies’ limits, and the fact that those 
limits once had to be acknowledged is no indication that Islam established them and 
imposes them now36. 
 
The mujtahid Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, who was ‘defrocked’ and imprisoned by 
the regime and relocated to Germany, has also declared the changeability of 
commandments regulating human interaction, as distinct from those regulating 
humans’ relationship with God. The divine law accords with, indeed enjoins, justice 
and reason, which the healthy human conscience can detect; but human perceptions 
of these inevitably vary according to circumstances. The Prophet promoted justice 
within the possibilities of his environment, and we must promote justice within the 
possibilities of ours. The conscience of most people worldwide currently rebels 
against stoning and other harsh penalties, making it difficult to attribute inflexible 
insistence on these penalties to a God who harmonises with justice and reason. 
Therefore, he argues, we must either accept that God intended human relations to be 
governed by (variable) human justice and reason, or abandon the pretence, a 
mainstay of Shi‘ism (chapter 3, section 6.1), that the divine law is reasonable. He 
                                                
35 Qabel, “Nameh”, “Barresi”; Nurizad/Qabel; Behrang; Radio Farda, “Prominent”. 
36 Mojtahed Shabestari, “Sangsar”, “Mosahebe”; Sadri, “Attack”. 
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points out the irony of the regime routinely breaking Islamic laws in the state’s 
interests, but being peculiarly resistant to abrogating penalties which clearly harm 
those interests and contravene the faith’s essential ethos of justice and reasonability. 
He also argues that since despotism is unjust, current views of justice require 
democracy, scripture commands no particular governmental structure, and 
commandments governing human relations are changeable, Islam counters despotism 
and permits democracy, which could be Islamic by harmonising with Islam’s 
essential values37. 
 
Some senior mujtahids have taken dissident positions. Grand Ayatollah Hossein‘ali 
Montazeri, an architect of the post-revolutionary constitution and Khomeini’s former 
heir apparent, was demoted in 1988 for criticising the regime’s brutality. From 1997 
to 2003 he was under house arrest for stating that the Leader should supervise, not 
rule, and questioning Khamenei’s suitability for the post. He continued to denounce 
the regime’s repression, violence and corruption, including the Takestan stoning 
(chapter 4, section 3.7) and the 2009 election-rigging, as illegal and un-Islamic, and 
called for greater accountability and popular representation, becoming a reformist 
rallying point until his death in 200938. Grand Ayatollah Yousef Sanei has opposed 
the regime’s violence and illegalities and issued fatwas consonant with many 
freedoms and equalities found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His 
home and offices have been physically attacked and conservative institutions have 
tried to ‘defrock’ him39. 
 
Non-clerics have also explored Islamic reformism. An early example is Mehdi 
Bazargan, the first post-revolutionary prime minister, who declared from 1992 until 
his death in 1995 that God’s purpose in sending prophets had been to inform them of 
His existence and prepare them for the hereafter, not to micro-manage their 
interpersonal matters. Religion, he argued, offers guidelines for social interaction to 
promote its essential aims of justice and compassion, but whenever religion is in the 
                                                
37 Eshkevari, “Ta’mol”, “‘Aql”; Mir-Hosseini/Tapper, 38, 77, 82-100, 114, 154-74; Esfandiari, 
“Exiled”; Amnesty International, MDE13/22/00, 13/016/2001. 
38 Kurzman, 346-8; Mir-Hosseini, “Sharia”, 336-7; Mir-Hosseini/Tapper, 103-8; Keddie, 260, 274-5, 
283, 309-10; Qazi, “Pasokh”. 
39 Nurizad/Qabel; Press TV, “Ayatollah”; Abdo; CSM; Payvand, “Iranian reformist”. 
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hands of the powerful, it becomes a tool of oppression and intolerance; consequently 
people doubt and lose their faith and the religion is hated and thereby weakened40. 
Mostafa Malekian even risks suggesting that popular religiosity is best maintained if 
no political system claims to rule in religion’s name. A religious government can 
only represent one reading of religion; this hinders the development of religious 
thought and marginalises, and potentially oppresses, believers in alternative readings. 
Unlike several Islamic reformists, he questions the feasibility of ‘religious 
democracy’: if society is ruled by popular vote, where is the government’s 
‘religiousness’ manifested? However, democracy and religion can coexist, since a 
religious society can be democratically organised. Like Shabestari, Malekian argues 
that the Prophet began a trajectory of improvement, and it makes sense to keep 
following this trajectory rather than fossilising for evermore the stage of 
improvement reached in the Prophet’s lifetime. Malekian also distinguishes between 
a view of Islam which reduces it to fiqh, emphasising only the outer meaning of 
scripture, and one which seeks the spirit behind scripture41. 
 
Perhaps the best-known Iranian religious philosopher is Abdolkarim Soroush. He and 
his family have been harassed (his son-in-law was apparently tortured to make him 
defame Soroush) and he is currently abroad. For Soroush, scriptural interpretability 
allows human conceptions of God’s law to adapt to different conditions. The 
contingent minutiae of religion, resulting from variable human understandings of 
scripture, are distinct from religion’s essential aims, which are ethical. Democracy 
opposes tyranny and therefore accords with the ethics also contained in religion. The 
current regime’s brutality, however, encourages hatred of religion42. 
 
The treatment of many reformists, including mujtahids, illustrates the strength of 
conservative forces which control crucial institutions, forming a barrier to change. 
The difficulty of legal reform is one manifestation of this, and the courts’ and 
interrogators’ unaccountable discretion is another. For the time being, therefore, 
                                                
40 Mir-Hosseini/Tapper, 65, 68-70. 
41 Malekian, “Hakemiat”, “No-andishi”. 
42 Matin-asgari, 103-6, 113-5; Soroush, “Khoda nist”; BBC Persian, “Abdolkarim Soroush”; Mir-
Hosseini/Tapper, 67; Shargh. 
 24 
efforts for legal reform and accountability are more likely to succeed if they appeal 
to the authorities’ self-interest (for instance by emphasising the benefits of a better 
human-rights record in reducing internal and international discontent, thereby 
promoting stability), refrain from threatening velayat-e faqih outright, and operate 
within the prevailing framework, exploiting its opportunities for lenience and 
perhaps expanding its borders by small increments. This is not to say that radical 
restructuring should not be pursued. Reformist scholars’ interpretations may occupy 
a mainstream and practical role in future: the mainstream may enlarge until it 
includes them, or a ‘tipping point’ may bring a shift in what is widely, or even 
authoritatively, perceived as ‘Islam’. 
 
It is important to distinguish between jurists’ interpretations of any given scriptural 
commandment’s meaning or scope, remaining within the paradigm of discovering 
what Islam prescribes and permits while maintaining sometimes wide latitude within 
it, and concepts whereby Islam allows scriptural commandments to be altered with 
changing circumstances. For example, by the first paradigm, jurists might interpret 
commandments regarding hand amputation as creating such obstacles to 
implementation (stringent conditions, formidable evidence requirements etc) as to 
render the penalty highly unlikely but still technically enforceable. By the second, 
jurists might argue that Islam allows the penalty itself to be altered. For the moment, 
the framework within which Iranian hadd laws (and trials) exist, and could be 
reformed, is by default the first model (binding but interpretable scripture) with some 
flexibility to overcome residual scriptural obstacles, as in the second model. The 
main regime-approved route for such flexibility is maslahat, which the Expediency 
Council monopolises and underexploits as noted above. Consequently this project 
explores in detail the manifold scriptural interpretations which, while capable of 
significantly increasing lenience, remain within the dominant framework and are 
directly relevant to the cases in Part II, while noting more peripheral, even paradigm-
shifting ideas where appropriate. Maslahat and other forces for accommodation, 
some more established and others less ‘digestible’ by the regime, are described in 
chapter 3, section 6 and subsections. 
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5.6. A note on juristic texts. 
 
Some jurists represented in this project, such as the conservatives Mo’meni, Sadeghi, 
Farhangi and Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi and the forward-thinking mujtahids 
Nobahar and Ayatollah Mohaqqeq Damad, have known political inclinations. Most 
refrain from public political statements, and may hold both lenient and severe 
positions on different points of law depending on their scriptural interpretations. 
Importantly, political and juristic positions may not align. For example, Ayatollah 
Shahrudi, the former head of the Judiciary who tried to suspend stoning (chapter 4, 
section 3.7) and issued all the stays of execution in Part II, painstakingly used 
scripture against ‘elm-e qazi (chapter 2, section 6.4), as has the politically 
conservative Arabiyan, but also denounced reformist parliamentarians for defending 
‘westernised’ journalists and liberals and voiced other conservative opinions. 
Eshkevari has expressed some anti-gay sentiment. Kadivar has suggested that gay 
people should remedy their ‘defect’ medically; so has Ayatollah Montazeri, who has 
issued some stern fatwas about adultery, sodomy, apostasy, male-female equality, 
and marriage with non-Muslims. The mujtahid Fattah Mortazavi emphasises the 
shari‘a’s inherent lenience, declaring for instance that ignorance is a defence and 
confession demonstrates repentance, nullifying punishability (a radically lenient 
stance), but is politically conservative and pro-regime. The conservative Ayatollah 
Gilani, a member of the Assembly of Experts, has juristic positions ranging from the 
very stern to the very lenient, as does another member, the pro-regime Ayatollah 
Mar‘ashi Shushtari43. Since juristic stances cannot predict political preferences, it is 
unhelpful to speculate about jurists’ unknown political inclinations; however, it is 
useful to remain aware of the political environment in which trials and legal 
discussions occur. 
 
                                                
43 Payvand, “Reformist”; NCRI, “Brief”; Heidari; Rustazadeh; ‘Asr Iran, “Amar”; ABNA; Montazeri, 
Resaleh, topics 80, 2668, 3155-74, 3213-5, “Pasokh”; Radio Farda, “Montazeri”, “Matn”; Erdbrink; 
Gheissari/Nasr, 101; Bashi; Kadivar, “‘Adam-e javaz”; Eshkevari, “Hamjensgarai”; Mortazavi, 30, 
181; IRNA; Iranian parliament library; Baqi; Sahimi; Weblog-e ettela‘resani; Mohammadi (Majid), 
194; Mir-Hosseini/Tapper, 44, note 10; Gilani, 14-8, 40, 45-46, 63, 75, 98-100, 103-4, 183; Mar‘ashi, 
92, 101-2, 130, 235.  
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Analysis of legal elements focuses on modern Iranian juristic texts, because these 
contain interpretative spectra which are current and could therefore directly affect 
trials and legal reform. These analyse pre-modern juristic texts and scripture, 
describing relevant scripture and extant interpretations and sometimes favouring one 
position. Where possible, I verified the content of these scriptural and pre-modern 
juristic texts; otherwise I confirmed this content (often verbatim) through multiple 
modern juristic texts. Where a modern position departs from previous interpretations, 
or a dormant pre-modern stance affects the scope for lenience, this is noted. 
Otherwise, the default is that modern and pre-modern texts manifest similar 
interpretative spectra. 
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Part I: background. 
 
This project aims to identify opportunities for avoiding irreversible (death and 
amputation) hadd penalties in Iran. Part I of the project, consisting of chapters 2-4, 
provides background information for the case studies in Part II.  
 
Chapter 2 is an overview of Iranian laws affecting hudud. It explains what hudud and 
their penalties are, which law codes are used, and how they legislate various aspects 
of hadd application, such as evidence, appeals, and criminal responsibility. 
Throughout the discussion, it shows how elements of Shi‘i law, as understood by 
current Iranian legal specialists, underlie codified Iranian law, and how alternative 
interpretations of Shi‘i or codified law could maximise lenience. 
 
Chapter 3 covers principles from Shi‘i law which, whether codified or not, can affect 
the interpretation and application of the laws discussed in chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 4 goes into detail about laws governing particular hadd crimes which carry 
death or amputation penalties in the first instance. Again it explains how these crimes 
and their various facets are regulated in both Iranian law and current interpretations 
of Shi‘i law. 
 
The interplay between theory (Part I) and practical application (Part II) should reveal 
patterns traversing the system governing hudud in Iran. Part I shows that both Shi‘i 
and codified law contain not only harsh elements, notably death or amputation 
penalties, but manifold opportunities for lenience. The vagueness characterising 
many of these opportunities is observed in action in Part II, where judges are shown 
exercising immense discretion in ‘cherry-picking’ interpretations. Some juristic 
discussions observed in Part I resurface in Part II, showing that not only jurists and 
legislators but also judges and lawyers negotiate what hadd law is and how it could 
be reinterpreted. Part II also shows that judicial authorities often contravene even 
explicit laws outright, and confirms the existence of institutional obstacles to 




2. Hudud in the law. 
 
To understand the Iranian hadd trials analysed in Part II, one must first comprehend 
not only the laws and principles involved, but also the underlying elements of Shi‘i 
law and the interpretations of both which are current in the Iranian legal community.  
 
This, the first of three chapters delineating the case studies’ theoretical background, 
therefore describes codified Iranian laws covering all hudud, and the present-day 
Iranian legal community’s understanding of their origins in Shi‘i law (through their 
interpretation of scripture and earlier jurists’ writings). Where applicable, subsections 
discuss alternative interpretations which are absent from codified law but could 
influence contemporary jurists’ vision of what the law is – thereby potentially 
facilitating lenient legal reform. This is important because a major aim of this project 
is to identify opportunities for lenience. 
 
1. Shi‘i law and codified law. 
 
Constitutionally, every law in Iran must comply with Shi‘i law, and legal 
proceedings must follow codified laws ratified by parliament. However, where these 
are silent, Shi‘i law may be used directly (articles 2, 4, 167). This acknowledgement 
of Shi‘i law as the underlying source and authority behind codified law means that in 
practice Shi‘i and codified law operate in parallel in hadd trials, and uncodified 
scripture, principles of fiqh, or fatwas (most frequently from Khomeini’s Tahrir al-
Vasileh) are used in court and may decisively influence the outcome of trials.  
 
Sometimes the codified law acknowledges this parallel operation by explicitly 
referring to, or allowing the use of, Shi‘i law; sometimes it is not so explicit but its 
brevity and vagueness (especially characteristic of the penal code’s hadd section but 
also found in other codes) necessitates recourse to the underlying Shi‘i law. Modern 
jurists occasionally point out ‘errors’ in the codified law, where Shi‘i law was 
incorrectly rendered, making judges unsure which law to obey. Judges, lawyers and 
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jurists often present Shi‘i law as the ultimate legal authority, and codified law as a 
shorthand rendering thereof1. 
 
2. No crime without law.  
 
This parallel operation of two legal systems contradicts the principle, familiar in 
many legal systems, that there is no crime or punishment unless mandated by 
codified law. This constitutional principle also exists in other laws and a 
recommendation of the Judiciary. However, some codified laws refrain from 
legislating various details, either referring judges to Shi‘i law or giving them 
discretion2. The conflict has been noted and mostly lamented by scholars, who have 
observed that according to the principle of no crime without law, even where the law 
allows judges to use Shi‘i law, they should refrain; so that the law both grants and 
denies them that permission3.  
 
3. Judges and lawyers. 
 
Shi‘i fiqh indicates that only mujtahids can be judges. Article 163 of the Constitution 
says that judges must fulfil the conditions required by fiqh. However, Iranian judges 
are not necessarily mujtahids at all; this was apparently allowed4 because insufficient 
numbers of mujtahids were willing to risk their salvation by being judges. Judges 
take a unified ‘judgeship exam’, but some start their careers by studying in the 
howzeh-ye elmiyeh (seminary where mujtahids are trained), while others begin by 
                                                
1 Penal code article 110; 2012 penal code article 220; Appeals Law art. 17; Constitution articles 1-4, 
163; Bazgir, 30, 133-4, 146, 161, 303; Mo’meni, 123; Zera‘at (1385), 213, 223-6, 228-9, 232-3, 
(volume 2) 39-40; Nobahar, “Qavvadi” 150, “Be suye”, 336, “Qachaq”, 189, 195, 198-9, 207, 213-4, 
“Tanfir”, 135; Mortazavi, 32-3; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 11; Khezr Heidari; De Luce; Lawyers’ 
Committee, 21-2, 25. 
2 Penal code article 110; Procedural Code for General and Revolutionary Courts in Criminal Matters 
(PCCM) article 214; Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) article 247; 2012 penal code articles 2, 10, 12-3 
(expressing ‘no crime without law’), 220 (expressing the opposite). Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 207 note 
40, observes that polygyny is only implied by Iranian law, not explicitly allowed. 
3 Constitution articles 36, 166-7, 169; penal code articles 1, 2, 110, 575, 637; Law Establishing 
Criminal Courts 1 and 2 and Supreme Court Branches (LECC), article 29; PCCM article 214; CPC 
article 247; Mohammadi, 295-6; Golduzian, 24, 28-9, 34-5; Hojjati, 359; Nobahar, “Qachaq”, 195, 
198; Mohaqqeq Damad, “Mojazat”, 23; Bazgir, 303; Ansari-Pour (2001), 335. 
4 Permitted by LECC, note to article 38; implied by CPC, note to article 29. 
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studying law in universities5. Of the judges I met in Iran, only one was a mujtahid. 
One Iranian scholar states that only 22.5% of Iranian judges are mujtahids6. 
 
Mainstream fiqh indicates that women cannot be judges, and this is applied in 
practice. However, recently women were permitted to become assistant investigative 
magistrates, though not to issue rulings7. 
 
The Constitution (article 35) guarantees legal representation in trials, but without 
specifying when lawyers must be provided for suspects. The ‘axiom of interpreting 
laws to favour defendants’, present in Shi‘i fiqh (chapter 3, section 3), suggests that 
lawyers should therefore be provided immediately upon arrest. Instead, judges may 
demand lawyers’ exclusion from pre-trial interrogations, and the case studies show 
that frequently lawyers are introduced belatedly or entirely absent, magnifying the 
chances of conviction8. Sodomy case 1 even shows that judges can view hiring a 
lawyer as evidence of guilt. Some lawyers have told me about being prevented from 
seeing their clients, denied access to case files, introduced belatedly without access 
to information, or prevented from speaking in court. This is confirmed by additional 
sources, which even describe lawyers being denied entry to their clients’ trials9. 
 
4. Law codes, general regulations and appeals. 
 
The codified laws most relevant to hudud are the 1979 Constitution; the 1991/96 
Qanun-e Mojazat-e Eslami (Law of Islamic Punishments), the penal code under 
                                                
5 Khomeini, 244-5; Lom‘e (vol.1), 162; Shahrudi, 208; Zera‘at (1383), 265, (1385/2), 248; Niknam, 
“L’Islamisation”, 53-5, “The Islamization”, 20; Arjomand, Turban, 167, 188; Lawyers’ Committee, 
16-27; Tamadonfar, 216-7; Constitution article 163; CPC article 29; LECC article 37; communication 
with judges. 
6 Jalali-Karveh, 443-4. 
7 Khomeini, 244-5; Mostafaei, “Bazdasht”; Martin, Creating, 156, 158, 167; Esfandiari, “The 
politics”, 80-3, 89; Walbridge, 11; Sciolino, 115, 124, 208; Keddie, 292, 294; Arjomand, “Shari‘a”, 
161; Razavi, 1225, 1230; Mir-Hosseini, “When”, 120; Jeffries; Kalmbach, 43; Lawyers’ Committee, 
17, note 33. I met one female assistant judge. 
8 PCCM article 128. Amnesty International, Iran report 2010, cites instances of detainees denied 
lawyers, even during trials, following the 2009 election protests. This was often combined with 
pressure to confess, including torture. For denial of lawyers in non-hadd cases, see ICHRI, “Iran’s 
secret hangings”, “Iranian Judiciary”, “Iranian-American”. 
9 E.g. Komiteye Gozareshgaran, “Mohammad va Abdollah”; Rah-e Sabz, “Nameye Hossein”; 
Yeranian, “Iranian activists”. 
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which the cases in Part II were tried; its successor, the 2012 penal code, which 
postdates the cases in Part II and is not yet enforceable; the 1911 Ayyin-e Dadresi-e 
Keifari, the Criminal Procedural Code (CPC) containing, inter alia, regulations for 
interrogation and investigation; the 1989 Law Establishing Criminal Courts One and 
Two and Supreme Court Branches (LECC); the 1994 Law Establishing the General 
and Revolutionary Courts (LEGRC), which inter alia determines which courts try 
which crimes; the 1999 Procedural Code for General and Revolutionary Courts in 
Criminal Matters (PCCM), regulating, inter alia, trial procedures and courts’ 
jurisdiction by type of trial; the 1991 Directive on the Implementation Regulations 
for Sentences of Execution, Stoning, Crucifixion, [and] Amputation or Disabling of 
Limbs, [being] the Subject of Note 1 of Article 28 of the Law Establishing Criminal 
Courts One and Two (DIRS28/70); the 2003 Directive on the Implementation 
Regulations for Sentences of Retribution, Stoning, Judicial Killing, Crucifixion, 
Execution and Flogging, [being] the Subject of Article 293 of the Procedural Code 
for the General and Revolutionary Courts in Criminal Matters (DIRS293/82); the 
1993 Procedural Code for the Pardon and Clemency Commission; and the 1993 Law 
for Appealing Court Rulings. 
 
The 1991/96 penal code (referred to here as ‘the penal code’) contains four sections: 
hudud (fixed penalties); qesas (retaliation in kind for murder – qesas-e nafs – or 
injuries – qesas-e ozv); diyyat (‘blood money’ in lieu of qesas); and ta‘zirat and 
deterrent punishments. Ta‘zirat (adjectival form: ta‘ziri) are discretionary (literally, 
‘disciplinary’) punishments chosen by the judge within boundaries set for each crime 
not covered by the other three categories. As explained in chapter 1, section 5.4, the 
2012 penal code and, where applicable, the penal code bill, a proposed replacement 
for the 1991/96 code which never became law, will be cited to display the evolution 
of relevant legal interpretations and to keep readers informed of what will likely be 
the provisions of the future (2012) penal code. 
 
Constitutionally (article 165) all trials must be open unless the court considers this 
contrary to public order or chastity or the parties to a lawsuit request privacy. 
However, PCCM article 188 (contradicting the Constitution) enumerates categories 
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of trials which must not be public. These include trials for jarayem-e monaffi-e ‘effat 
(crimes against chastity: carnal crimes). Iranian lawyers have confirmed the near-
impossibility of bringing anyone not directly involved, even non-participant lawyers, 
into hadd trials10. 
 
Although judges are not obliged to consider judicial precedent, it sometimes appears 
in rulings, lawyers’ defences and legal treatises; there is a narration favouring 
uniformity of rulings, which article 161 of the Constitution charges the Supreme 
Court with ensuring. A one-article law was created to solve disparity in rulings. It 
authorises the Supreme Court’s General Council, comprising at least ¾ of Supreme 
Court judges, to issue legally binding ‘uniformity rulings’ (ara’-e vahdat-e ravieh). 
The PCCM instructs judges to seek and obey such rulings when detecting similarity 
among cases11.  
 
There are two types of criminal court. First-class penal courts (dadgah-e keifari-e 
yek) handle cases potentially involving more serious punishments, including any 
irreversible penalty. Second-class penal courts (dadgah-e keifari-e do) try lesser 
cases12. The case studies in chapters 5-9 show that in rural areas lacking dedicated 
criminal courts, cases may initially go to general courts (dadgah-e ‘omumi). 
 
Not every Iranian penal ruling can be appealed, but any hadd ruling or death 
sentence can, against the more classical position (advocated for instance by 
Khomeini) forbidding appeals unless judges are proven incompetent or their rulings 
contain errors of fiqh. Appeals, previously prohibited, were introduced by the 1993 
Appeals Law. Appeals go to provincial appeal courts unless a ruling contains a death 
or amputation sentence or other sentences beyond a specified level of seriousness in 
                                                
10 Constitution article 165; PCCM article 188; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 5, 10; Lawyers’ Committee, 34-
5, 54; Tabari (Keyvan), 105; communication with Iranian lawyers. 
11 Golduzian, 24, 32-4; Niknam, “L’Islamisation”, 53-5; BIA, 28-30, 33-4; Ja‘fari Langarudi, 
Maktabha, 181; Constitution article 161; one-article Judicial Uniformity Law; PCCM article 270. 
12 LECC articles 5-8. 
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terms of number of lashes, length of incarceration or amount of blood money or fine; 
in which case its appeal goes to the Supreme Court13. 
 
If a ruling is overturned (naqz) by the Supreme Court because of inadequate 
investigation, it is sent to the originating court for further investigations. If the reason 
for naqz is that the case was tried by the wrong type of court, it is sent to the correct 
court. In other instances of naqz, the case is retried by another branch of the original 
court (dadgah-e ham-‘arz, ‘equivalent court’), and the resulting ‘final’ ruling cannot 
normally be appealed. However, the law allows final rulings to undergo an 
‘extraordinary appeal’ if they demonstrably contain legal flaws. Appealed sentences 
are suspended until the appeal process is complete14. 
 
Regarding appeals returning to originating courts for ‘further investigations’, because 
the borderline between ‘further investigations’ and legal flaws can be unclear, cases 
can return to courts which have already manifested negligence or even hostility. 
Therefore involving such courts a second time can skew cases away from lenience 
towards defendants, denying them an objective ‘second opinion’. This, termed 
‘appeal bias’ here, is observed in several cases in Part II. 
 
Double jeopardy (being tried twice for the same crime15) is explicitly permitted to 
complainants appealing acquittals by LECC article 34, and implied by CPC article 
356 and the note to PCCM article 232. This is sometimes used to deduce that it is 
otherwise prohibited, though apparently no law mandates this. Also, since a quashed 
ruling requires a retrial, appeal may yield a stricter sentence than the original one16.  
 
                                                
13 Appeals Law, article 9 section 2; PCCM articles 232-3; Khomeini, 244-5; Abrahamian (1999), 134; 
Behrooz, 95; Niknam, “The Islamization”, 20; Arjomand, “Shari‘a and constitution”, 162; Rezaei, 59-
60; Lawyers’ Committee, 28-9. 
14 LEGRC, article 18; PCCM, article 265, parts 2-4; Appeals Law, articles 15, 17. 
15 “Double jeopardy… guarantees that no citizen can be tried twice for the same crime. Permitting the 
appeal of an acquittal… runs afoul of the right”. Laudan, 3; see also 17, 196-206. This refers to British 
and American legal systems. 
16 Saberi, 279-80, 292-3; Picheca, 51-2; E‘temad, “Joz’iat”; Rostami; Kermani. 
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4.1. The fragmentary nature of the penal code.  
 
Scholars vary in their use of the ‘principle of non-transferability’ or ‘non-association’ 
(asl-e ‘adam-e elhaq) regarding whether regulations assigned to one crime by 
scripture can be extended to another. For instance, revocation of confession to zena 
(adultery or fornication) carrying the stoning penalty causes it to lapse, and many 
jurists have used principles of lenience and caution17 to extend this to any death 
penalty for zena: this is crystallised in the 1991/96 penal code (article 71). Does this 
extend to any stoning or death penalty (e.g. for sodomy, as some argue), or is it 
limited to those two instances? The effects of repentance and repetition of crimes are 
presented in a similarly patchy way18. There is much scholarly discussion regarding 
these and similar points19. 
 
The fragmented nature of the penal code and of many juristic texts, which treat each 
crime separately, suggests that mostly such transfers are disallowed. However, they 
sometimes occur. The penal code bill and the 2012 penal code appear more amenable 
to transfers than the 1991/96 code, and generally contain unified articles describing 
such regulations. For instance, where the 1991/96 code regulates repetition of each 
hadd crime separately and has the death penalty for the third, not the fourth, 
repetition of alcohol consumption, the penal code bill and the 2012 penal code 
simply state that all hudud carry the death penalty on the fourth repetition, and that 
revocation of confession averts any death penalty in hudud. Likewise, they contain 
unified rules regarding proof in hudud, specifying any exceptions, rather than 
regulating proof separately for each hadd crime like the 1991/96 code. They also 
cover pardon, repentance and criminal responsibility with unified regulations20. 
 
                                                
17 These, including the ‘axiom of interpreting laws in defendants’ favour’, are discussed in chapter 3. 
18 Penal code articles 47, 89, 90, 122, 157, 201; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 28. 
19 Mortazavi, 22-3, 26-7, 44-6, 94-5, 102-3, 105, 108, 152-4; penal code bill article 213-2; Zera‘at 
(1383), 241, 250, (1385) 126-7, 228-9, 235, 243, 246-7, 252, 257, 259, (1385/2), 39-40, 48-9, 62, 89; 
Shahrudi, 68-9; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 152-3, “Qavvadi”, 150, 155, “Qachaq”, 196; Deh Abadi, 46, 60; 
Khomeini, 327-30, 341-2, 344-5, 351, 354, 357, 369-70, 376-7; Lom‘e (vol.1), 167; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 
28-9, 70; Picheca, 40; Lawyers’ Committee, 15. 
20 Penal code articles 135-8, 183-8; penal code bill articles 212-1, 212-2, 213-1, 213-2, 213-3, 215-6, 
215-7, 215-8, 216-2; 2012 penal code, articles 99, 113, 116-20, 131, 134-5, 139-99 (172 refers to 
retracted confession), 210-12, 217-8. 
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5. Hudud in codified and Shi‘i law. 
 
Jurists ancient and modern are reasonably united in their opinion – supported by 
narrations – that the characteristics of hudud are as follows: hadd punishments 
cannot be commuted, attenuated or modified (being impervious, therefore, to 
‘bargaining down’); there must be no delay in their implementation except for 
specific, scripturally supported reasons (including pregnancy, lactation, and 
sometimes illness); a certain number of repetitions of the same hadd crime carries the 
death penalty (usually four or three – see section 5.2); hadd punishments are halved 
for slaves (ta‘zirat are identical for slaves and free people); hadd punishments do not 
vary according to the intensity of crimes; intercession is forbidden in hudud; a certain 
number of confessions or witnesses can prove hadd crimes (four for carnal crimes, 
the default for others being two); and oaths cannot prove hudud21. 
 
Arguably, the word hadd was used by the Prophet and the Imams and in the Qur’an 
as simply ‘punishment’; indeed, certain axioms containing the term are used for all 
crimes. Although some modern scholars doubt that Shi‘i law mandates a hudud 
category of crimes, most assume that it exists and follows certain rules22.  
 
The penal code defines hadd crimes as those whose type and intensity are determined 
by the shari‘a, and, agreeing with most classical jurists, forbids their modification. 
However, in conformity with one juristic opinion, they can be pardoned by the 
Leader, except for theft and slander which are pardonable by injured parties under 
particular conditions (sections 8 to 9.1 below). The penal code bill and the 2012 
                                                
21 Shahrudi, 206-7; Agahei, 118 note 1; Gilani, 9-13, 94-5, 108-11; Zera‘at (1383), 228-9, (1385), 
119-20; Bazgir, 25-6; Mo’meni, 63, 65-6, 69-73, 152; Deh Abadi, 35; Khomeini, 327, 341, 356, 364-
5; Mortazavi, 13; Gorji, 7, 11, 23; Lom‘e, 245; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 85; Mohaqqeq Damad, 11, 26; 
Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 136, 159, “Qavvadi”, 155-8, “Be suye”, 337, “Qachaq”, 200; Amini, 
“Parvandeha”, 7-8; Mahmoudi, “Alternative”, 449; Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih, vol. 4, Bab Nuwadir 
al-Hudud, 74. 
22 Nobahar, “Qavvadi”, 141-2, 156-7, “Qachaq”, 195; Tabrizi, 257; Mo’meni, 152. One principle 
containing the word hudud but applied to all crimes is the ‘axiom of removal’ (qa‘edeye darr’), 
explained in chapter 3, section 5, and appearing in the case studies. 
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penal code similarly define hudud, but allow the Leader to modify hadd penalties in 
certain circumstances, compromising their immutability23.  
 
5.1. Hadd crimes and their punishments. 
 
The codified law most relevant to the cases in Part II is the Hudud section of the 
1991/96 penal code, of which each article is based on one or more Shi‘i fatwas, often 
to the exclusion of equally valid alternative interpretations. The crimes covered 
follow one version of the classical categorisation of hudud, and are zena (illicit 
carnal congress between males and females, covering adultery, fornication, incest 
and rape); lavvat (sodomy); mosaheqe (lesbianism with genital contact); qavvadi or 
qiadat (pimping, or ‘bringing people together for zena or lavvat’ with or without 
payment); qazf (slanderous accusations of zena or sodomy); mosker (alcohol 
consumption, also termed shorb-e khamr); moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard (insurrection 
and corruption on Earth); and serqat (theft).  
 
Zena has two main varieties: adultery (zena mohsan/mohsaneh) and fornication (zena 
gheyr-e mohsan/mohsaneh). Mohsan (masculine) and mohsaneh (feminine) mean 
‘possessing ehsan’, the condition of being married and having ‘access’ – whose 
definition is subject to debate – to one’s spouse. Gheyr means ‘not’. Possession of 
ehsan (see chapter 4, section 3.4) distinguishes adultery from fornication. Sodomy 
also has two varieties: dukhul (penetration) and tafkhiz (foreplay, dalliance). 
Penetrative sodomy is often called lavvat-e ‘iqabi (‘posterior sodomy’). 
 
That list is only one of several possibilities. Some crimes, such as zena, are 
established as hudud according to most jurists; others are debated (e.g. pimping) or 
their precise nature is unclear (e.g. moharebeh). The penal code bill includes hudud 
(apostasy, insulting the Prophet, sorcery and heresy) which are not in the 1991/96 
code; the 2012 code adds only insulting prophets (punishable by death) to the 
1991/96 code’s list. Some juristic works, both ancient and modern, describe 
additional actions, such as bestiality (which some classify as ta‘zir, others as hadd), 
                                                
23 Penal code articles 13, 22, 161, 200; penal code bill articles 121-2, 215-1; 2012 penal code articles 
15, 219, 279/j/2; Aghaei, 118 note 1. 
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under hudud which are not in codified Iranian laws. Necrophilia sometimes has 
independent hadd status in juristic works; the penal code bill treats it as a variant of 
zena or sodomy24.  
 
The 2012 penal code (articles 220-1) provides for hudud omitted from codified laws 
to be punished according to article 167 of the Constitution, which allows judges to 
use Shi‘i law if codified laws are insufficient. Article 221 specifies that in such cases, 
the Leader’s fatwa will be sought and obeyed, and he may delegate another 
individual to provide the fatwa. 
 
The following table shows hadd punishments in the penal code, or, for sodomy, in 
narrations, since the penal code leaves punishment at the judge’s discretion. Its 
penalties are death by fire or sword, stoning, being dropped from a height, or being 
crushed by a toppled wall (with optional posthumous incineration after each 
punishment). For pimping, males suffer additional exile. For moharebeh, the 
punishments are death, crucifixion, exile, or amputation of right hand and left foot. 
Numbers, according to column, indicate relevant articles of the 1991/96 penal code, 
or numbers of witnesses or confessions required to establish guilt25. 
 
                                                
24 Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 141-2, “Qavvadi”, 156-8, “Qachaq”, 189 195-200, 212-4; Gorji, 7; Mo’meni, 
72; Shahid, Qesas, 112-3; Bazgir, 349, 379; Shahrudi, 208; Khomeini, 379-83; Zera‘at (1385), 217, 
(1385/2), 271-326; Lom‘e, 262-6; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 181-215; Picheca, 43, 52; penal code bill articles 
211-3, 221-3, 221-18, 224-1 to 225-14; 2012 penal code articles 263-4; LEGRC, article 5; Qur’an 
5:33 (sura Ma’iddah). For a discussion of moharabeh and efsad, see Shahrudi, “Mohareb kist?” in 
Bayesteha, 208-309. 
25 Penal code articles 82-90, 110, 121-2 129, 131, 138, 140, 157, 174, 179, 190-1, 201; 2012 penal 
code articles 171, 198-9, 225-39, 243, 250, 266, 279, 283; Qur’an 5:32-3, 5:38 (Mai’ddah), 24:2-4 
(Nur); Zera‘at (1383), 230, 252, (1385) 217; Bazgir, 379. The 2012 penal code also omits the 
scriptural penalties for sodomy, mandating ‘execution’ or 100 lashes according to circumstances. 
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Some aspects of hudud in the penal code. 
Crime. Articles. Witnesses. Art. Confessions. Art. Punishment. Art. 




4. 68, 71. Stoning. 83. 
Fornication. 63-107. 
(73, 88). 
4 74-9. 4. 68. 100 lashes. 88. 
Incest, rape. 82. 4. 74, 
76-9. 





4. 114-6. Death: fire, sword, 
stone, wall or 
drop. 
110. 
Tafkhiz. 121. 4. 117-
9. 
4. 114-6. 100 lashes. 121. 
Lesbianism. 127-34. 4. 128. 4. 128. 100 lashes. 129. 
Pimping. 135-8. 2. 137. 2. 136. 75 lashes; males, 
3months-1yr exile. 
138. 
Slander. 139-64. 2. 153. 2. 153-4. 80 lashes. 140. 




80 lashes. 174. 
Moharebeh & 
efsad. 
183-96. 2. 189. 1. 189. Death, alternate 
amputation, 




Theft. 197-203. 2. 199. 2. 199. Loss of 4 fingers. 201. 
 
The vagueness about pimping in the penal code (which has only four articles about 
it), mirroring jurists’ confusion, extends to moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard. There is 
confusion regarding whether it is one crime or two (fiqh books often call it simply 
moharebeh), and what the punishment for efsad fi’l-’ard should be if the 
punishments described in Qur’an 5:33 (and in the Iranian penal code) apply only to 
moharebeh. The conditions for criminal responsibility given in the penal code for all 
other hudud are absent for pimping and moharebeh, and the protocols for repentance, 
pardon, invalidation of penalty (suqut), and proof are non-standard in moharebeh, 
further highlighting this confusion26. 
 
In hudud involving penetration of the male organ, namely zena, sodomy, and 
pimping which is their facilitation27, the extent of penetration is crucial to the crime 
according to scripture (see chapter 4, section 1). Unless evidence describes full 
penetration of the glans, the hadd is inapplicable; however, this parameter is omitted 
                                                
26 Qur’an 5:32-4 (Ma’iddah), 2:11-2 (Baqara); Nobahar, “Qavvadi”, 150, 155-8, “Qachaq”, 189, 195-
201, 212-4, “Ahdaf”, 136, 141-2, “Be suye”, 336-7; Zera‘at (1383), 269, (1385/2), 39-41, 193; 
Mar‘ashi, 236; Khomeini, 376-7; Shahrudi, 208-309; Picheca, 43, 52; penal code articles 135-8, 183-
8, 639; penal code bill article 213-2; LEGRC, article 5. Suqut, ‘lapsing’, is explained in section 9. 
27 Khomeini, 345; 2012 penal code article 242 note 1. 
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from the penal code. This is an instance where uncodified Shi‘i concepts are used in 
court as the case studies will show. Fathers and paternal ancestors do not receive the 
hadd for stealing from their descendants according to codified laws and scripture, 
though mothers do in the penal code, and stealing from parents carries the hadd. 
Paternal ancestors also receive only a ta‘ziri (discretionary) punishment for qazf 
(slander) of their children, and husbands are unpunished for qazf of dead wives 
whose only heirs are their shared children. (Similarly, paternal ancestors do not 
receive qesas – retribution in kind – for killing or injuring their descendants, but only 
pay diyeh: blood money)28. 
 
Jurists, both ancient and modern, differ concerning death caused by non-death 
penalties. Some say there is no diyeh (blood money) or punishment for killing by 
correctly administering penalties. Others believe that diyeh is payable by public 
funds29. In cases of erroneous execution, for example through invalid evidence, 
without wilful error, jurists indicate that diyeh is payable by public funds, though 
witnesses whose false testimony causes execution are liable for qesas or diyeh. 
Khomeini holds diyeh of those killed in self-defence payable by public funds30. 
 
The penal code mentions compensation for excessive or unjustified punishment or 
detention, or injuries caused while extracting confession31. Constitutionally, damage 
caused by judicial error must be compensated by the judge or, if he was not at fault, 
by the State32. However, these laws omit any protocol for death caused by correctly 
applied non-death penalties. 
 
Opinions differ concerning applicability of hudud to non-Muslims. Some forbidden 
actions, including alcohol consumption, are permitted to non-Muslims if undertaken 
privately. Some consider infidels exempt from hudud except in special cases 
                                                
28 Khomeini, 362, 420-1, 443; penal code articles 149, 150, 198 part 11, 220; 2012 penal code articles 
199, 222 note 1, 232, 260, 269 point 6, 302. 
29 Sharh-e Lom‘e, 126-7; Nobahar, “Qavvadi”, 156; Zera‘at (1385/2), 258; Bihar al-Anwar,  
vol. 77, 263. 
30 Khomeini, 360, 410, 423; Mo’meni, 134-5; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 40-1. 
31 Articles 578, 579, 587. 
32 The Constitution (article 171) also decrees that victims of unjust rulings be rehabilitated and their 
honour restored. It was invoked, unsuccessfully, in fornication case 1. 
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including zena of an infidel man with a Muslim woman. However, some hold hudud 
applicable to all denizens of Muslim lands or to anyone in non-Muslim lands tried by 
a Muslim judge. The penal code (article 3) says that the criminal law applies to 
anyone who commits crimes within Iranian lands, airspace or waters unless other 
specific provisions exist. The note to article 174, whereby non-Muslims are only 
punished for alcohol consumption undertaken in public, is such an exception. (The 
same relationship exists between articles 3 and 267 of the 2012 penal code). 
Khomeini says, within a few paragraphs, that it is prudent to apply hudud to dhimmis 
(recognised religious minorities in Muslim lands), that they must not publicly 
commit acts forbidden by Islam, and that hudud must be applied to dhimmis, leaving 
his position unclear. Constitutionally (articles 13 and 14), Jews, Christians and 
Zoroastrians, the only recognised non-Muslim communities in Iran, are subject to 
their own religious laws regarding personal affairs and religious education within the 
(unspecified) limits of the law, non-Muslims must be tolerated ‘according to the 
ethics of Islam’, and their human rights must be respected if they do nothing against 
Islam or the Islamic Republic. Article 12 accords toleration and some religious 
autonomy to Sunni Iranians33. 
 
5.2. Repetition of hadd crimes and execution. 
 
In the penal code, most hadd crimes carry the death penalty in the fourth instance if 
the hadd was implemented in all three previous instances. This refers to repetition of 
the same hadd crime34.  
 
The penal code mandates death for the third instance of alcohol consumption 
(mosker) and omits regulation of repeated pimping and moharebeh, whose disputed 
hadd status, mentioned earlier, is partly caused by juristic silence regarding their 
repetition35. Unlike the penal code bill and the 2012 penal code, which have one 
                                                
33 Penal code articles 3, 174; 2012 penal code articles 3, 267; Constitution articles 12-14; Mohaqqeq 
Damad, 40; Nurbaha, Negahi, 54; Zera‘at (1385), 126-7, 130, 136, (1385/2) 228; Mo’meni, 130; 
Khomeini, 332-3, 335, 343-4, 389-91, 418. 
34 Penal code articles 47, 89, 90, 122, 157, 179, 201. 
35 Nobahar, “Qavvadi”, 150, 155-8, “Qachaq”, 189, 195-201, 212-4, “Ahdaf”, 136, 141-2, “Be suye”, 
336-7; Zera‘at (1383), 269, vol.2, 39-41, 193; Mar‘ashi, 236; Khomeini, 376-7. 
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article determining death on the fourth instance of any hadd crime, the 1991/96 penal 
code does not uniformly regulate repetition of hudud, and article 47 says that it is 
governed by the articles covering each hadd crime36. At least one death sentence for 
repeated alcohol consumption has been reported, but it is unclear whether this 
involved the third or fourth repetition. In another case with unknown outcome, a 
person, having survived the third repetition of mosker, was tried for the fourth37. 
 
The death sentence for the third instance, not the fourth, of mosker comes from 
narrations; most jurists (including Khomeini) uphold it, though a minority favour the 
fourth repetition. The mainstream position remains that the repetitions activating the 
death penalty are three for mosker and four for sodomy and zena; many jurists apply 
the four-repetition rule to other hudud (but are generally silent regarding moharebeh 
and pimping) with mosker as the exception, while others favour a default of three, 
but, exceptionally, four for zena and sometimes sodomy38. 
 
5.3. Execution methods and protocol. 
 
Where execution method is unspecified, hanging is apparently the norm. The law 
characterises it as the default39.  
 
Many words and phrases for ‘execution’ and ‘hanging’ are used in the law and 
elsewhere. Execution can be qatl (‘killing’, also meaning ‘murder’), koshtan 
(killing), and e‘dam (execution); qesas-e nafs is, specifically, execution for murder. 
Hanging can be halq-aviz (hanging by the neck), be dar keshidan (‘to pull to the 
gallows’), or avikhtan be dar (hanging from the gallows), although the latter can also 
mean crucifixion, since the penal code gives avikhtan be dar (not salb, crucifixion) 
as one of the punishments for moharebeh and subsequently describes the procedure 
                                                
36 Penal code articles 179, 47; penal code bill article 216-2; 2012 penal code article 135. 
37 NCRI, “Sentenced”; communication with Iranian lawyer. 
38 Khomeini, 334-5, 343-5, 352, 358; Mortazavi, 63-4, 66-7, 105, 153-4; Gilani, 74-5, 122-3; Zera‘at 
(1383), 238, 259, 264, 269, 293, (1385), 166-7, 252, (1385/2), 83-4; Bazgir, 34-6; Mo’meni, 164-5; 
Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 150, “Qavvadi”, 150, 155-6, “Qachaq”, 196; Gorji, 33, 46, 49, 56, 62; Lom‘e, 234, 
244, 250, 252; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 78, 81, 103, 118; Shahid, Qesas, 112-3; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”. 
39 DIRS28/70, article 18; DIRS293/82, article 14. 
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for crucifixion (salb, maslub kardan). Other laws40 describe the cross as a dar 
(gallows) ‘similar to a cross’ (shabih-e salib), to which the condemned is ‘hung’ 
(avikhte, avizan karde). Some scholarly works mention the confusion between a 
cross and a gallows inherent in the term dar, saying that it was formerly a cross but 
now the word mostly indicates a gallows. In crucifixion, the condemned is tied, not 
nailed, to the cross, in a way that must not cause death, and left there for three days, 
though they can be taken down if they die before the three days are complete; if they 
survive they must be released41. 
 
Some narrations mandate ‘a blow with a sword’, execution by sword, or ‘a blow to 
the neck’, with no implement specified, as the punishment for incest, rape, repeated 
hudud, intentional murder, and sodomy. However, reports of executions and the 
cases reviewed in this project confirm hanging as predominant. It is apparently also 
standard in qesas-e nafs, although certain articles in the qesas-e nafs portion of the 
penal code imply the possibility of other forms of execution by forbidding ‘qesas 
with a blunt implement’ (also in Khomeini’s Tahrir) and allowing the murder 
victim’s heirs to execute the murderer personally after petitioning the Leader. Some 
jurists, including contemporary ones, believe that murderers should be executed with 
a sword or similar implement irrespective of murder method, while others allow 
execution to mimic the murder method. At least two narrations allow the family of 
someone beaten to death to execute the murderer, but with a sword, without ‘playing’ 
with them42.  
 
                                                
40 DIRS28/70 and DIRS293/82 (procedural codes regarding various types of execution). 
41 DIRS28/70 articles 18, 25; DIRS293/82 article 14 note 1, article 24; penal code articles 190, 195; 
2012 penal code article 283; Khalili, 44-5, 144-5; Khomeini, 377-8; Aghaei, 130-1. 
42 Zera‘at (1383), 230, 264, (1385) 125, 130; Mo’meni, 105, 110-3, 121-2;  Hojjati, 329; Gilani, 55-6, 
71, 119-20; Khomeini, 343, 377-8, 412, 441-2; Mortazavi, 47-8, 50-1; Gorji, Diyyat, 34-5, Hudud, 25; 
Bazgir, 156-60; Shahrudi, 348-9; penal code articles 205, 263, 267; 2012 penal code article 437; 
LECC, article 7; PCCM articles 232-3; lawyers’ letter on stoning, October 2006, section 4; Amini, 
“Seh sal”, “Atefeh”; Gorji, Mahin; Mostafaei, “Gozareshi”, “Sodur”; Hojjati, “Aya mojazat”; Iran 
Human Rights, “One man”, “An adultery”; BBC Persian, “Mard”; Meydaan, “Abdollah”; Fathi, 
“Spate”; Arjomand, Turban, 153, 177-83, “Introduction” to Authority, 1-3, 16-7, 21, “Ideological 
Revolution”, 192-7; Akhavi, “Shiite theories”, 145-7; Martin, “Religion”, 40; Qur’an 4:59 (Nisa’). 
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A usage has developed whereby e‘dam or qatl are understood as ‘hanging’, though 
both mean ‘execution’43. 
 
The five punishments for sodomy come from combined narrations. Some known 
rulings order these punishments, but are usually overturned, generally for reasons 
other than the penalties themselves. The most common punishment for sodomy 
appears to be hanging, which is absent from narrations and Shi‘i law44. 
 
The penalty of a hundred lashes for fornication comes from Qur’an 24:2. The stoning 
penalty for adultery is absent in the Qur’an but present in several narrations, 
including ones where the Prophet or the Imams applied it45. 
 
Considerable energy has gone into defending stoning because it is a ‘divine 
punishment’, given that the abandonment of divine commandments is forbidden and 
implies anything from dereliction of duty to heresy to apostasy. Comparable efforts 
for its abolition have used arguments ranging from Islamic re-interpretation to the 
invocation of modern standards of human rights. Yet despite the intense and 
prolonged struggle over stoning, other punishments (such as ‘a blow with a sword’ 
for incest, rape or sodomy) with an equivalent scriptural pedigree have long been 
ignored without apparent justification or objection46.  
                                                
43 Bazgir, 156-60, 189-90, 205-6, 208, 231; Zera‘at (1385), 89, 123-5, 203-4, 223, 225-6, (1385/2), 48, 
83-4; Khomeini, 318, 328, 343; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 152-3; Nurbaha, “Mojazat”, 116-7; Mortazavi, 26-
7, 50-1, 88, 98, 153; Lom‘e, 242; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 70; Gorji, 42-3; Saberi, 308; Mo’meni, 111; Gorji, 
Diyyat, 34-5; penal code bill, art. 213-2, note 1; Sadr, “Raftar”; communication with Iranian lawyers; 
Mostafaei, “Sangsar”; Hojjati, “Aya mojazat”; BBC Persian, “Mard”; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 5-8. 
44 Gilani, 118, 119-21, 126; Hojjati, 359, 363; Zera‘at (1383), 234-5, 240-1, 252, (1385), 223-6, 260; 
Mo’meni,163-5; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 144-5; Khomeini, 343; Mortazavi, 98, 101-2; Lom‘e, 242-3; 
Sharh-e Lom‘e, 73; Bazgir, 350-1, 379; Gorji, 44; Iran, “Partab”; Radio Farda, “Do nafar”; Quds; 
Littauer; Canning; ICAS, “The Islamic”; Council of the EU, “Declaration … concerning death 
sentences”. The Supreme Court confirmed two sentences of throwing from a height for sodomy in 
2007; two men were reportedly sentenced to be stoned for sodomy in 2011. 
45 See chapter 4, section 3.7 and note 47. 
46 Zera‘at (1383), 230, (1385), 123-5, 203; Gilani, 14-8, 65-6, 71-2, 104; Mo’meni, 110-3, 113-4, 121-
4; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 26-9, 56; Mortazavi, 47-8, 50-1, 98, 101-2; Gorji, 36; Deh Abadi, 63; penal code 
bill article 221-5 part 5 and note 4; lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi re: stoning; Amini, “Boghz”, 
“Dialogha”, “Tan-furushi”, “Kobra”, “Azadi”; Shojaei; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”; Int’l Herald 
Tribune, “Norway”; Me‘marian; Bedashti; Sadr, “Raftar”; Meydaan, “Nameye jam‘i”; Gorji, Mahin; 
E‘temad, “Joz’iat”; Mostafaei, “Sangsar”; Qazi; VOA Persian, “Safir”; Kar, “A brief history”, 
“Iranian law”, 8; WFAFI, “Stoning continues”; Amnesty International, “Iran: end”, “Report 2007”, 
139-41; Association of Iranian Women in the UK, “Memorandum”; Esfandiari, “Iran: stoning”; 
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In other countries, such as Nigeria and Somalia, stoning sentences have contravened 
Islamic law, for instance by condemning unmarried women who claimed rape. 
Stoning was insisted upon as part of ‘Islamic law’ whose other commandments were 
ignored47. Stoning may be an iconic indicator of orthodoxy in some Muslim 
countries, even while other equally ‘Islamic’ laws are contravened. 
 
At least 48 hours prior to any execution, various individuals must be notified, 
including the condemned person’s lawyer. The condemned must be placed in solitary 
confinement the night before the execution. These are both sometimes ignored, with 
lawyers and families only being informed of executions post facto. Executions have 
occasionally occurred – generally without warning – despite stays of execution from 
the head of the Judiciary, notwithstanding official statements to the effect that serious 
penalties require direct approval of the head of the Judiciary before implementation. 
To some extent disregard for stays of execution occurs because judges are 
theoretically independent and answerable to nobody but the law, so that not even an 
order by the head of the Judiciary can compel them. The independence of judges is 
also the reason why extra-legal moratoria on stoning (chapter 4, section 3.7) do not 
work: if the law prescribes stoning, it is ultimately illegal for anyone – even the head 
of the Judiciary – to force judges to avoid it. Additionally, article 170 of the 
Constitution, contradicting article 167 which forbids judges from ruling by Shi‘i law 
unless the codified law has been exhausted, prohibits judges from following 
regulations which contradict Islamic law, and gives anyone the right to demand 
annulment of such laws. Therefore even legal abrogation of stoning might be ignored 
by invoking article 170 or met with demands to reinstate stoning48. 
                                                                                                                                     
Council of the EU, “Declaration … concerning death sentences”; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, article 7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 5. 
47 Malik (Muwatta), 345, 347; Niknam, “The Islamization”, 20; Peters, 11; Munson, 283; Sanusi, 
“Amina”; Amnesty International, “Nigeria: warning”; BBC, “Nigerian woman”, “Sharia court”; 
Steiner; Onishi; New York Times, “Nigerian woman”, “Rape victim”; Aluko; Al Jazeera English, 
“Somali fighters”; BBC News, “Stoning victim”; Amnesty International USA, “Somalia: girl stoned”. 
Northern Nigeria is predominantly Maliki (one of the four schools of Sunni law). Maliki law, unlike 
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6. Proof.  
 
In Shi‘i law, according to majority opinions, the forms of proof in hudud are: 
confession (made before the judge trying the case, repeated a specific number of 
times for each crime, and, according to some, in a different trial session for each 
repetition); testimony (numbers of witnesses are pre-determined for each crime); and, 
according to some Shi‘i jurists and codified Iranian laws, ‘elm-e qazi, the ‘judge’s 
knowledge’. The phrase ‘elm-e qazi is often abbreviated to ‘elm (‘knowledge’, or 
similarly to scientia, ‘science’), as it will be here. 
 
To be punishable for a hadd crime, a person must have possessed the four 
characteristics of ‘aql (mental sanity), bulugh (the age of legal majority), ekhtiar 
(free will) and qasd (intention) while committing the crime. The same conditions are 
necessary for valid confession. These requirements, variously expressed but quite 
uniform overall, exist in juristic texts and in the hadd section of the Iranian penal 
code. They also appear in the penal code bill and the 2012 penal code, in a small 
number of unified articles with general validity rather than separately for each hadd 
as in the 1991/96 code49. The penal code agrees with narrations whereby pregnancy 
cannot prove zena50. However, the 2012 penal code apparently omits this. 
 
Proof is generally held to lapse through contradiction, a position more or less 
expressed in various codified laws51. 
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The default number of confessions to prove a crime is held to be one, but four are 
required for zena, sodomy or lesbianism, and two for other hudud except moharebeh, 
provable by one confession. As above, the conditions for confession are ‘aql (sanity), 
bulugh (majority), ekhtiar (free will) and qasd (intention). Therefore, for example, 
statements not intended as confessions cannot be counted as such. The conditions for 
confession are described in the penal and civil codes. Various laws, including these 
and the Constitution, allow the right to silence and invalidate confession or testimony 
extracted through methods ranging from trickery to torture52. This is supported by a 
narration from the Imam Ali invalidating confession extracted through fear, threats 
or violence. Among reformist mujtahids (see chapter 1, section 5.5), Ayatollah Sanei 
reiterated the prohibition of forced confession during the 2009 election protests, and 
Qabel and Ayatollah Montazeri have declared forced confessions illegal and un-
Islamic, berating Khamenei for permitting them53. Coercion removes free will and 
intention, required for criminal responsibility and valid confession54.  
 
The penal code bill accepts claims of forced or ‘tricked’ confession by default if the 
claims are plausible and not disproven – which gives judges discretion to reject such 
claims. The 2012 penal code invalidates confessions obtained through physical or 
psychological torment, but allows legally invalid proof to be used for ‘elm-e qazi, 
which can override other proof55 (see section 6.4).  
 
One of the grounds for confession as proof is the principle of jurisprudence eqrar al-
‘oqala ‘alaa anfosehem ja’ez, ‘the confessions of legally responsible individuals 
(‘aql indicating the mental faculties and maturity) are valid against themselves’, also 
                                                                                                                                     
Shahid, Qesas, 112-3; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 58; penal code articles 70, 78, 172; Civil Code article 1317; 
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termed qa‘edeye eqrar (confession axiom). It derives from a statement of the Prophet 
and allows confessions to incriminate only the confessor. Some narrations suggest 
that in some crimes (notably adultery), but potentially in all, only testimony is 
acceptable. Nonetheless, many narrations show the Prophet or the Imams ruling by 
confession; others equate confession with testimony against oneself (hence, 
according to some, the identical number of confessions and witnesses that prove 
most crimes). Confession also derives validity from these and Qur’anic verses56. 
 
The inability of one person’s confession to incriminate another is also decreed by the 
Civil Code (article 1278) and a written opinion of the Judiciary. Some believe that 
confessions naming specific partners to zena or sodomy can bring prosecution for 
qazf (slander) if their guilt is unproven. Nevertheless, a letter about stoning cases 
written in October 2006 (Mehr 1385 AP) by several prominent lawyers to Ayatollah 
Seyyed Mohammad Hashemi Shahrudi, then head of the Judiciary, identifies cases 
where confessions were used against co-defendants, as confirmed by cases reviewed 
in this project57. 
 
Confessions must be clear, explicit and coherent, removing doubts regarding 
coercion or pressure, and must not contradict other proof58. Also, confessions must 
be made nazd-e hakem or ‘end al-hakem, meaning ‘before the judge’, according to 
the penal code (and the 2012 penal code) and various narrations and juristic texts59. 
Confessions are only valid if made before the judge trying the case. This is supported 
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Hojjati, 311; Golduzian, 96-7; Deh Abadi, 71; Mortazavi, 19-23; Khomeini, 327-8. 
59 Gilani, 35-9; Zera‘at (1385), 75, (1383), 217, 254-5; Mortazavi, 19-22; Mo’meni, 92; Bazgir, 91-3;  
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by judicial precedent, a circular from the head of the Judiciary, and a legally binding 
‘uniformity ruling’ by the Supreme Court’s General Council. However, this is one of 
the most frequently ignored parts of the law, and invalid confessions are routinely 
used, including those extracted out of court by officials other than the judge60. 
 
The law is silent regarding the necessity that confessions be heard in separate court 
sessions, but defending lawyers and modern jurists frequently insist upon this, and it 
is supported by narrations, the opinions of several mujtahids including Khomeini and 
the reformist Montazeri, a recommendation of the Judiciary Office, and judicial 
precedent which holds that the shari‘a demands it. The case studies will show judges 
frequently ignoring this requirement. This is facilitated by the fact that although a 
preceding penal code, the Qanun-e Hudud va Qesas ratified in 1982/3 (1361 AP), did 
insist on separate confession diets, the 1991/96 code does not, and those who uphold 
this must invoke Shi‘i law61. The 2012 penal code eliminates this possibility by 
stating that repeated confessions can occur in one session (article 171, note 2). 
 
There is little doubt that confessions are frequently forced in Iran, by means ranging 
from trickery to intimidation to torture. Accused persons may also confess in the 
mistaken belief – sometimes created or encouraged by interrogators – that this will 
help them or co-defendants. (This, termed ‘reverse plea bargaining’, will appear in 
the case studies). Lawyers report that judges often discount claims of duress in 
confession as ‘noise’, believing them overly common. The authorities frequently 
deny that confessions are forced or detainees mistreated62. 
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6.2. Revocation of confession (enkar pas as eqrar). 
 
If confessions are revoked (enkar ba‘d az eqrar, ‘revocation’ or ‘denial after 
confession’), they invalidate the stoning penalty for zena. This is based on narrations. 
Many jurists, including Khomeini, expand this to any death penalty for zena, and 
some for sodomy or other crimes, through principles of lenience; article 71 of the 
penal code allows retracted confessions to remove any death penalty for zena. 
According to article 17 of the DIRS293/82, enkar (here, revocation of confession) 
can halt executions even in their final stages if covered by article 71 of the penal 
code. The role of enkar in suqut (lapsing) is expanded even further in the penal code 
bill, which replaces all death penalties in hudud, through enkar, with 100 lashes (for 
zena or sodomy) or 74 (for other crimes). However, it reinstates these death penalties 
despite enkar if the judge has ‘elm of guilt. ‘Elm overcomes enkar in several cases 
reviewed in chapters 5-9. However, two known Supreme Court rulings declare that 
‘elm obtained through confession lapses with enkar, citing Ayatollah Golpeygani’s 
fatwa to that effect63. 
 
The 2012 penal code (article 172) replaces all death sentences in hudud with flogging 
or incarceration through enkar. However, article 211 allows ‘elm to override other 




Each hadd crime can be proven by a specific number of witnesses according to Shi‘i 
law and the 1991/96 and 2012 penal codes. This number, applied also to confessions, 
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is called nesab, meaning ‘quorum’ or ‘eligible number or quantity’ (as the nesab in 
theft is the minimum stolen value that activates the hadd). According to a 
combination of Civil Code article 1313 and PCCM article 155, the qualifications for 
witnesses are: legal majority (bulugh); mental sanity (‘aql); righteousness (‘edalat); 
faith (iman); legitimate birth (taharat-e maulad); absence of any advantage or 
removal of disadvantage from testifying; absence of enmity between the witness and 
the parties in the trial; and not being a beggar or a vagrant. Righteousness (‘edalat) 
must be proven to the court in one of the shar‘i (adjectival form of ‘shari‘a’) ways, 
which are not described in these laws but appear in juristic works to depend mostly 
on piety, regular prayer and refraining from major crimes. If there is enmity between 
the witness and any party, testimony of that witness to the advantage of that party is 
accepted. If a potential witness is notorious for vice, even with repentance, their 
testimony is only accepted following changed behaviour which restores their 
righteousness (‘edalat) and competence (salahiyyat) to testify. If the testimony of 
any witness contradicts the others’, all testimony is invalid (through the general 
principle whereby contradiction invalidates proof). Testimony that is revoked or 
discovered to be false becomes invalid64. 
 
A witness is a shahed (plural: shuhud) and testimony is shehadat. However, the term 
bayyaneh, generally meaning ‘proof’, means ‘testimony’ in this context, as does the 
term bayyaneye shar‘i/shar‘ieh (‘shar‘iatic’ testimony). The default number of 
witnesses to prove anything is held to be two65. 
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Many jurists, ancient and modern, hold that witnesses’ ‘righteousness’ must be 
ascertained before their testimony is accepted, but some only consider investigation 
to be necessary if ‘edalat is questioned. The law seems to require prior confirmation 
of ‘edalat, and witnesses are described as ‘righteous men/women’ in the penal 
code66. However, the case studies show no instance of ‘edalat being investigated. 
 
Complicated regulations exist for testimony in general, including those about 
impugning its validity (jarh), but it is unclear whether these apply to the special case 
of bayyaneye shar‘i67. Indeed, one law explicitly differentiates between the rules for 
ordinary testimony and for bayyaneye shar‘ieh, for which ‘the conditions determined 
by the shari‘a’ (not described) must be used68. This, as well as making the rules for 
‘shar‘i’ testimony nebulous, is an instance of explicit reference to Shi‘i law, assumed 
to underlie the crystallised and relatively limited surface layer of codified law.  
 
The penal code bill, bereft of requirements for testimony in hudud beyond ‘edalat, 
does not dispel the mystery regarding requirements for bayyaneh. However, the 2012 
penal code, article 176, sets requirements similar to those of the Civil Code and 
PCCM, specifying that the judge must ascertain witnesses’ eligibility before they 
testify. Article 175 negates this by allowing judges to derive ‘elm from witnesses 
without these requirements, at their discretion. 
 
Confusingly, intention (qasd) is omitted as a condition for testimony in fiqh texts and 
Iranian laws. Arguably, if intention is necessary for confession and criminal 
responsibility, so it must be for testimony. Also, since jurists hold confession and 
testimony to be of the same nature, confession being testimony against oneself 
(Qur’an 4:135), it would seem reasonable to assign the same conditions to both69. 
One scholar, noting the absence of intention in many jurists’ descriptions of 
conditions for confession, speculates that this is because intention is so obviously 
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necessary that it need not be mentioned70; maybe the same applies to testimony. 
Nevertheless, the absence of an explicit requirement for intention in testimony could 
allow incidental statements to be used as testimony. 
 
The penal code, the penal code bill and the 2012 penal code require testimony to 
carnal crimes (zena, sodomy and lesbianism) to be based upon direct observation 
(moshahede). This is supported by various narrations requiring witnesses to have 
seen penetration of the male organ (where applicable) ‘as of the rod into the 
collyrium bottle’ or ‘the rope into the well’, and to testify to this fact. Having seen 
anything less – for instance, the suspects in bed together – is insufficient71. Codified 
law is less detailed and merely requires observation of the act without requiring 
witnesses to have observed penetration. However, the penal code gives the penalty 
for two men or two women lying naked under a blanket (articles 123, 134) as a 
maximum of 99 ta‘ziri lashes; carnal acts other than zena between males and females 
have the same penalty (article 637). This implies that even evidence of considerable 
intimacy may not justify the hadd. 
 
Female testimony in hudud is only accepted for zena. Zena carrying the flogging 
penalty can be proven through testimony of two righteous men plus four righteous 
women (assuming they all managed to see penetration!); zena punishable by stoning 
(or, in the 2012 penal code, any death penalty) can be proven by testimony of three 
righteous men plus two righteous women. (The 1991/96 penal code is unclear about 
female testimony to zena carrying death penalties other than stoning). Several jurists, 
ancient and modern, agree that if four men testify to a woman’s zena and four 
women to her virginity, she is not punished, and most agree that neither are the 
witnesses. The idea is that while the men could have seen zena, the women may also 
be truthful because virginity could have grown back; and the doubt created by the 
contradiction in testimony, insufficient to convict the men of slander (qazf), 
nevertheless exonerates the woman72.  
                                                
70 Mortazavi, 23. 
71 See chapter 4, section 1. 
72 Penal code articles 74-6; 2012 penal code article 198; Mortazavi, 102-3; Zera‘at (1383), 257, 
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6.4. ‘Elm-e qazi: the judge’s ‘knowledge’. 
 
‘Elm-e qazi (the judge’s ‘knowledge’) is allowed by the penal code as proof in 
hudud, though this is explicit only in the zena, sodomy, lesbianism and theft sections. 
The only articles describing ‘elm are 105, which is in the zena section (but, 
incongruously, not in its proof section!) and says that the judge must describe the 
sources of his ‘elm, and 120, in the sodomy section, mandating that ‘elm be obtained 
‘by established means’ (az toroq-e mota‘arref), which are never described73. It is not 
clear whether the requirement of ‘established means’ (absent in article 105) applies 
only to sodomy or to all hudud, and similarly whether the requirement for description 
of ‘elm (absent in article 120) applies to all hudud or only to zena. This and the odd 
placement of 105 are two of this law’s many points of confusion. 
 
Furthermore, both 105 and 120 give the right of ‘elm to hakem-e shar‘, a judge 
versed in the shari‘a, apparently implying a mujtahid74. Arguably, therefore, the law 
excludes non-mujtahids from using ‘elm. 
 
The penal code bill, in its articles describing proof in all hudud, permits ‘evidence 
causing clear and sensory (bayyen va hessi) ‘elm for the judge’ as proof in hudud, 
requires description of ‘elm in rulings, and explicitly allows ‘elm to counteract 
retraction of confession in hudud carrying the death penalty75. It provides no 
additional regulations for ‘elm. The 2012 penal code retains ‘elm, requires the judge 
to describe its origins, and gives examples of evidence which could create it (e.g. 
experts’ reports). It explicitly allows ‘elm to be based on invalid evidence and to 
override other legally sanctioned forms of evidence76. It is therefore less lenient 
regarding ‘elm than the 1991/96 code. 
 
                                                
73 Penal code articles 105, 120, 128, 199. 
74 Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 25, 57, 210. 
75 Penal code bill articles 213-1, 213-2 notes 1 and 4. 
76 2012 penal code articles 160-1, 168, 170, 210-1. 
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The 1991/96 code leaves the reader unsure as to whether ‘elm is an adjunct which 
plays ‘second fiddle’ to the other two forms of proof, or whether instead it is a 
loophole through which the entire complicated edifice of shari‘atic proof might fall. 
Cases reviewed here, which mostly involve ‘elm, suggest the second scenario. This 
contrasts with the exhortation of Shahrudi, head of the Judiciary at the time of most 
cases investigated here, to use ‘elm sparingly. He even wrote a detailed essay arguing 
that scripture does not support the permission of ‘elm in criminal matters for ordinary 
judges, but only for the Imams or their representative, the vali-e amr77. 
 
Several reliable narrations portray testimony, confession, and sometimes oaths 
(though not in hudud) as the only valid forms of proof in criminal matters. Other 
reliable narrations militate against ‘elm in different ways. In some, the Prophet says 
‘I judge amongst you through testimony, confession and oaths’. Others emphasise 
the impossibility of proving crimes without adequate confession or testimony; some 
say that crimes not proven by these means were intended to be ‘hidden from the eyes 
of the Muslims’. In one narration, a man says that if he saw his wife committing zena 
with another man, he would kill them both, whereupon the Prophet reminds him of 
the necessity of four witnesses even if he saw the crime himself. In two frequently 
cited narrations, a prophet – whom one of them specifies as David – requests and is 
granted infallible knowledge of crimes by God despite God’s warnings about its 
negative effects. After realising that this knowledge leads to rulings which contradict 
evidence, making him appear unjust to his horrified subjects, he asks God to take that 
knowledge away again. God obliges, declaring that he must henceforth judge by His 
book, testimony, confession, or oaths. Many other narrations suggest that ‘elm-e qazi 
is not valid proof in criminal matters, and Ayatollah Montazeri mentions only 
confession and testimony as valid proof in hudud78. 
 
Iranian law sometimes appears to mirror this conception of testimony and confession 
as the only valid proofs in hudud, as do judicial rulings occasionally. For instance, 
                                                
77 Iran Bar Association; Shahrudi, “‘Elm-e qazi” in Bayesteha; Bazgir, 159-66, 176-8, 350-1; Saberi, 
275-6, 281-3, 297-300. 
78 Zera‘at (1383), 248; Shahrudi, 46-51, 56-8, 62-70; Montazeri, topic 3163; Gilani, 106; Bazgir, 352; 
Mortazavi, 91-2; Arabiyan, 59-61, 63-4, 66-8. 
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five Supreme Court rulings clearly state that only confession and testimony are 
acceptable forms of proof in zena. Article 103 of the penal code says that a person 
being stoned who escapes from the stoning pit must be released if the crime bearing 
the penalty (it is not specified if this is only zena, but the article is in the zena 
section) was proven through confession but not if it was proven through testimony. 
‘Elm is not mentioned here, implying that proof can either be confession or 
testimony. The same applies to article 99, which determines who casts the first stone 
depending on whether adultery was proven through confession or testimony – 
without mentioning ‘elm. Several law codes omit ‘elm in legislating proof. The very 
absence of any explicit mention of ‘elm for hudud other than zena, sodomy, 
lesbianism and theft in the 1991/96 penal code also feeds the perception that the 
status of ‘elm as proof is not as established as that of testimony and confession79. 
 
Juristic opinions vary not only as to whether ‘elm is valid proof but also concerning 
its nature. Many juristic texts mention only confession and testimony as proof in 
hudud. Some jurists, including Ayatollah Shahrudi, the former head of the Judiciary, 
oppose the use of ‘elm by non-ma‘sum80 judges. Their arguments include the 
fallibility of judges; the notion that the Imams’ right to rule by ‘elm does not 
automatically apply to ordinary, fallible judges; the idea that excessive discretion in 
‘elm contradicts various principles of caution and leniency towards the accused81; 
narrations showing that the Prophet and the Imams did not actively seek proof of 
crimes ‘against chastity’ but often discouraged confession, revealing the lenient spirit 
of Islam; narrations declaring that crimes unproven through testimony or confession 
should remain hidden; the notion that although the Prophet and the Imams were 
infallible and therefore presumably knew the truth about crimes, they behaved as if 
unaware of it, still rendering judgement through confession or testimony; and the 
                                                
79 Penal code article 103; Civil Code volume 3, particularly articles 1321-4; Arabiyan, 70-1; Bazgir, 
75-6, 81, 98, 123, 204; Zera‘at (1385), 74; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”. The Civil Code (volume 3, 
dedicated to proof), the Civil Procedural Code and the PCCM do not mention ‘elm-e qazi in 
discussing proof, although articles 1258 and 1321-4 of the Civil Code mention amarat (signs, 
indications) which can constitute proof. 
80 Ma‘sum (innocent, infallible) here indicates the Prophet, his daughter Fatima, and the Twelve 
Imams, collectively termed Ma‘sumin (infallible innocents). See chapter 1, section 5.1. 
81 Shi‘i law contains many such principles (see chapter 3), including the axiom of interpreting laws in 
favour of defendants which, given the doubt regarding whether non-ma‘sum, non-mujtahid judges can 
convict through ‘elm, would favour the option whereby they cannot. 
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idea that a ruling must contain two elements, namely truth and provability. 
Opponents of ‘elm frequently cite a famous narration stating that there are four types 
of judges – those who unknowingly rule correctly, those who unknowingly rule 
incorrectly, those who knowingly rule incorrectly and those who knowingly rule 
correctly – and all but the fourth type go to hell. This implies that the way in which a 
ruling is produced is as crucial as its correctness, and that a ruling is invalid if based 
on the judge’s assumptions rather than permissible evidence. In other narrations, God 
says that things unproven by testimony or confession must not be judged by humans 
in this world but by Him in the next82. 
 
Interestingly, although Khomeini generally allows ‘the hakem’, even if not an Imam 
(it is unclear whether this means any judge or only the vali-e faqih), to use ‘elm as 
long as there is no doubt regarding the crime (which is necessary in all hudud), he 
also says that if there are insufficient confessions to sodomy, the hadd is inapplicable 
but the hakem can punish as much as he sees fit. This recalls article 115 of the penal 
code, whereby insufficient confessions to sodomy allow only a ta‘ziri (discretionary 
– ‘as much as he sees fit’) punishment83. This suggests that despite frequent contrary 
usage in Iranian courts, Khomeini did not consider ‘elm based on invalid proof to 
justify the hadd. However, in the qaza’ (judgeship) section of his Tahrir, Khomeini 
allows ‘elm to overcome contradictory testimony or confessions, or even to justify 
the hadd without them (though judges must be mujtahids)84. 
 
Ayatollah Sanei, instead, holds ‘elm inapplicable in hudud because scripture clearly 
requires sufficient numbers of confessions or witnesses in hudud, so although fewer 
confessions or witnesses could give a judge ‘elm, they cannot justify the hadd85. 
 
                                                
82 Shahrudi, 11-5, 20, 22, 24-30, 32-4, 55, 57-9, 62-8, 71-2; Shahrudi (pardon section), 199, 208; 
Khomeini, 241; Mortazavi, 87, 91-2; Zera‘at (1385/2), 206-8, 248; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 59; Arabiyan, 47-
53, 55-9, 63, 66, 72-4; Nobahar, “Be suye”, 336, “Qachaq”, 204-5, “Ahdaf”, 154-5, 157, 159, 161; 
Khezr Heidari; Hilli/Cooper, 243. 
83 Khomeini, 339, 342, 362; penal code articles 115 and 105; Lawyers’ Committee, 15, cites a Friday 
prayer sermon suggesting the same. 
84 Khomeini, 245-7. 
85 Khezr Heidari. 
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Some narrations and jurists define ‘elm as the Imam’s first-hand knowledge after 
personally seeing a crime, attributing his right to rule by this ‘elm from the fact that 
he is infallible (ma‘sum), or that he is God’s representative on Earth, or both. Some 
jurists transfer this right to the Imam’s ‘representative’, without specifying who this 
is; through velayat-e faqih this would be the Leader. Certainly the Imams’ right to 
pardon was transferred only to him. However, Iranian codified laws transfer the right 
of ‘elm to all judges, who are neither infallible nor the Imams’ vicars. The reason for 
this asymmetry is unclear. Also, some jurists argue that only ‘elm derived from first-
hand knowledge is thus transferred, according to the aforementioned narrations86. 
However, all three versions of the Iranian penal code manage to use the infallible 
Imam’s ability to use first-hand knowledge of crimes to justify the use of second-
hand knowledge obtained through unspecified means by ordinary, fallible judges 
who are not even mujtahids. 
 
Interestingly, the term ‘sensory’ (hessi) which describes ‘elm in the penal code bill87 
recalls the idea of first-hand ‘elm, though this is undermined by the description of 
‘elm as deriving from ‘evidence’. 
 
Some, mostly recent, scholars equate a judge’s first-hand knowledge of a crime with 
one person’s testimony, suggesting that he transfer the case to another judge and then 
paralyse any contradictory evidence by testifying. This also obeys the prohibition 
against judges ruling contrary to their personal knowledge. One position, whose 
incorporation into law would increase lenience, is that in hudud, ‘elm is not a third 
form of proof, but merely the knowledge deriving from valid confession or 
testimony. This has been used successfully at least once, and some classical jurists 
derive it from narrations. However, several jurists accept ordinary judges’ ‘elm based 
on evidence other than confession or testimony88. 
                                                
86 Shahrudi, 16-9, 38; Shahrudi (regarding pardon), 199, 208; Mar‘ashi, 235-7; Gilani, 63, 103-4; 
Mo’meni, 149-51, 156; Khomeini, 341-2, 373; Mortazavi, 89-92; Zera‘at (1385/2), 62, 205; Gorji, 40; 
Lom‘e (vol.1), 162, 165; Lom‘e, 240, 243; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 59, 75; Arabiyan, 51-5, 64-5; penal code 
articles 105, 120, 199; penal code bill articles 213-1, 213-2 notes 1 and 4. 
87 Articles 213-1, 213-2 notes 1 and 4. 
88 Zera‘at (1383), 248, 258, (1385/2), 209, 213, 225-6, 248-9; Shahrudi, 21-2, 53-5, 70; Hojjati, 354-6, 
363; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 149; Arabiyan, 51, 53, 58, 63-7, 69-70, 73-4; Nurbaha, “Keyfar”, 128; Saberi, 
294-306; Arjomand, Turban, 187; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 9. 
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The absence of regulations for ‘elm in the 1991/96 penal code allows it to undermine 
all strictures of proof in hudud,89 as the case studies will show. Despite the many 
arguments from Shi‘i law that can be mobilised against this indiscriminate use of 
‘elm, the 2012 penal code, instead of restricting or eliminating ‘elm, potentiates it by 
replacing its predecessor’s vagueness with explicit pro-‘elm pronouncements. 
 
6.5. Evidence other than confession, testimony or ‘elm-e qazi. 
 
Evidence other than confession and testimony is sometimes presented in hadd trials 
and received in different ways. Sometimes it is rejected outright because it does not 
fit the classical categories of confession and testimony; sometimes it is used or 
rejected in its own right based on its perceived proof-value; and sometimes it is 
incorporated into ‘elm, with varying success if the ruling is appealed. In the penal 
code bill and the 2012 penal code, evidence other than confession and testimony is 
explicitly allowed as grounds for ‘elm90. 
 
7. Criminal responsibility. 
 
Criminal responsibility in Iranian law depends on possession of bulugh (age of legal 
majority), ‘aql (mental sanity), qasd (intention) and ekhtiar (free will or self-
determination, which implies not being forced and, according to some, even lapses 
with exposure to threats); some jurists add agahi (awareness: for instance, of the 
nature of one’s actions, or, especially in criminal law and regarding serious penalties, 
their forbiddenness and punishment). Children (males under 15 lunar years, females 
under 9 lunar years) are without criminal responsibility and immune from hudud, but 
can in certain circumstances be subjected to ta’dib, ‘corrective punishments’. These 
are sometimes equated with ta‘zirat, which is why, for instance, the penal code 
allows ta‘zir of children for sodomy. Mental retardation removes criminal 
                                                
89 Zera‘at (1383), 250, (1385), 96, (1385/2), 52-3, 206; Bazgir, 337-41, 380; Saberi, 275-8, 281-3, 
297-300; Kermani. 
90 Hojjati, 310, 324, 363; Bazgir, 75-6, 337-41; Zera‘at (1383), 258, (1385/2), 62; penal code bill 
articles 213-1, 213-2 note 1.  
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responsibility, by precluding ‘aql, intention and free will; mind-altering substances 
or altered states of awareness (e.g. hypnosis) also do. All these conditions are 
represented in juristic texts, and supported by Qur’anic verses and narrations91.  
 
The famous hadith-e raf‘ (narration of removing or exonerating) lists exonerating 
circumstances, including accident, ignorance, coercion, distress, and forgetfulness. 
This narration, among others, is frequently cited in discussions of distress, coercion, 
and criminal responsibility92. 
 
The penal code omits the requirements for criminal responsibility in pimping and 
moharebeh. The penal code bill solves this by requiring bulugh, ‘aql, ekhtiar, agahi 
be mozu‘ (awareness of ‘the matter’, the nature of acts) and lack of ezterar (distress) 
for criminal responsibility in all hudud. It allows ignorance concerning forbiddenness 
of acts (jahl be hormat) to remove criminal responsibility in hudud, but not 
ignorance of precise punishments. It disqualifies children and the insane from hudud 
but renders them eligible for discretionary disciplinary punishments (ta’dib). The 
2012 penal code omits distress but requires intention (possibly implying lack of 
distress) for criminal responsibility. It accepts claims of lacking any condition for 
criminal responsibility without requiring proof, except in moharebeh and coercive 




The age of bulugh – legal maturity, which brings criminal responsibility – in Iranian 
law (on the basis of Shi‘i fiqh) is nine lunar years for females and fifteen lunar years 
                                                
91 Mortazavi, 14-6, 98-100, 109-10, 124-6, 145-7, 149, 180, 184-6; Bazgir, 87-8, 90-1, 371; Mo’meni, 
83, 90-2, 140-1, 163; Khomeini, 342-3, 361; Zera‘at (1385/2), 39-41, 230-3, (1383), 214; Gorji, 15, 
17, 27, 30, 43; Lom‘e, 233, 242-3; Shahid, Qesas, 85; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 46-7, 72-3, 90, 102, 106, 129-
30; Nurbaha, Negahi, 52-4; Nobahar, “Qachaq”, 206, 216-7; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Terminology, 113, 
entry 886 (bulugh); penal code articles 49, 63-7, 83, 111, 112, 113, 130, 146-7, 166-7, 173, 198; Civil 
Code art. 1210; 2012 penal code arts 139-58. (The Sharh-e Lom‘e, a classical juristic text, says that 
“the shari‘a sometimes treats children identically to adults regarding criminal responsibility”). 
92 Mo’meni, 90; Gorji, 17; Mohammadi, 295; Mar‘ashi, 124-5; Aghaei, 145-6; Ja‘fari Langarudi, 
Terminology, 212, entry 1690 (hadith-e raf‘). 
93 Penal code articles 136 and 189 (necessary qualities of confession to pimping and moharebeh); 
penal code bill articles 212-1 to 212-3 (parameters of criminal responsibility in hudud); 2012 penal 
code articles 217-8 (same). 
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for males. Lunar years are approximately eleven days shorter than solar years: girls 
reach bulugh 99 days before their ninth solar birthday, and boys around 14.5 solar 
years. The apparent attribution of brilliant precociousness to females is odd 
considering their preclusion from filling certain offices – such as judge, mujtahid or 
head of state – because of their perceived mental shortcomings. However, one 
scholar, Ja‘fari Langarudi, declares that the ages for bulugh are based on purely 
physical criteria (e.g. nocturnal emissions, fertility) rather than the discernment of 
right and wrong. This notion undermines the nexus between age and criminal 
responsibility (namely, mental maturity, since criminal responsibility pertains to the 
mind and not the body). At these ages, a person is fully responsible for their acts, and 
eligible for all punishments including death. Iran is a signatory to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), whose article 37 forbids, inter alia, death sentences 
for actions committed while under the age of 18 (solar) years; and article 9 of the 
Iranian Civil Code gives full legal validity to treaties which Iran signs. However, Iran 
expressed ‘reservations’ to any portions of the CRC deemed incompatible with “the 
Islamic Shariah”. This piece of cultural sensitivity allows Iran to maintain the status 
of a signatory to the Convention while continuing to sentence minors to death even 
for victimless ‘crimes’. Still, article 37 is not on the list of articles which the 
Guardian Council enumerated as ‘possibly against the shari‘a’. Also, according to 
article 51(2) of the CRC, “a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the present Convention shall not be permitted”. Hence execution of minors is 
arguably illegal internationally and in Iranian law, though this has not prevented it94. 
 
                                                
94 Penal code article 49; Civil Code articles 9, 1210; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Terminology, 113, entry 886 
(bulugh); Nurbaha, Negahi, 52-4; Baiburdi, 19-20, 22; Kar/Vahdati; Kar, “Iranian law”, 8; Picheca, 
45; Esfandiari, “The politics”, 80-3, 89; Walbridge, 11; Hashemi, 553, 563-5, 658; Bakhash, 74, 78-9; 
Abrahamian (1999), 214-5; CRC, articles 37, 51(2); Mostafaei, “Mohammadreza”, “Gozareshi”; 
Behrooz, 95; Amnesty International, “Iran, the last”, annual reports 2005 (32-3), 2006 (141-2), 2008 
(38, 160), 2009 (42, 49); Iran’s reservations to CRC: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en; 
Khomeini, 245; Lawyers’ Committee, 17, 25; BBC, “UN chides”, “Death penalty”, “Execution plea”; 
O’Toole; Eke; Amnesty International, “Iran: worrying trends”, “Iran shows”; Human Rights Watch, 
“Iran: another execution”, “Iran: revoke”, “Iran: secret”; Soares; Jeffries; Amnesty International USA, 
“Background”; Iran – Amnesty International Reports 2007, 2008, 2009; Council of the EU, 
“Declaration … concerning death sentences”. Some other Muslim countries made similar reservations 
to the CRC. Apparently the Committee on the Rights of the Child, reviewing Egypt’s compliance with 
the CRC in 1993, declared that since Egypt had not specifically made reservation to any portion of the 
Convention mandating gender equality when signing, it must uphold that principle strictly (Hashemi, 
565). This arguably applies equally to Iran regarding article 37. 
 62 
The parameters of criminal responsibility in both Shi‘i and codified law emphasise 
that it is a mental state. If external signs of maturity are used only to indicate the 
mental maturity which brings criminal responsibility, arguably they themselves do 
not determine criminal responsibility. If, instead, there is insistence that those 
physical indicators must determine bulugh, one can point out that at least currently, 
they occur significantly later than suggested by classical jurists. For instance, most 
nine-year-olds are probably incapable of pregnancy, since fertility, an indicator of 
bulugh in girls, generally occurs later than other physical signs of bulugh95. Unless 
the ages of nine and fifteen lunar years are indisputable ends in themselves, one 
could potentially employ psychological or biological data to revise them without 
contravening Shi‘i fiqh. 
 
The 2012 penal code retains the ages of 9 and 15 lunar years for bulugh (article 146). 
However, it allows youngsters under 18 to avoid hadd or qesas penalties if the court 
rules (consulting specialists if necessary) that their mental maturity was insufficient 
for full awareness of the crime (article 90). This represents a partial concession to 
demands for attenuated punishment of minors. However, instead of modifying the 
ages of bulugh outright, it gives judges discretion and shifts the issue to ‘aql, which 
was already necessary for criminal responsibility irrespective of age. 
 
7.2. Doubt and ignorance; ignorance as a defence. 
 
A necessary component of zena is that it must have been committed in the absence of 
doubt (shobhe). This is expressed in the penal code, the penal code bill, the 2012 
penal code and various jurists’ definitions of zena (some, including Khomeini, posit 
highly implausible forms of doubt as exculpatory), and sometimes appears in court. 
Doubt can take many forms, including belief in being married to one’s partner in 
zena, belief that the person with whom one copulated was in fact another to whom 
one is married, and ignorance of the forbidden nature of one’s actions. Various 
                                                
95 Anderson, Dallal and Must; Whincup et al; Padez, “Social background”, “Age”; Henneberg/Louw; 
Cameron/Nagdee; Bazgir, 87-8, 90-1, 117; Khomeini, 361; Mortazavi, 179; Zera‘at (1383), 241, 317, 
(1385/2) 203-6; Hojjati, 408-9; Lom‘e, 254-6. Kusha (111-2) explains the Prophet’s marriage to the 
very young A’isha thusly: “in the Hijaz region’s warm climate, young girls mature early”. 
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narrations support lenience in cases of doubt in all hudud. The penal code (article 66) 
and the 2012 penal code (articles 119-20, 217-8) accept claims of honest error or 
ignorance without oath or witness if there is no reasonable ground against them96.  
 
The conditions of criminal responsibility described in the 1991/96 and 2012 penal 
codes and by various jurists include awareness, free will, and intention. There exists 
the notion that ignorance is a defence in criminal matters. Opinions vary regarding 
the exculpatory value of different varieties of ignorance, which include jahl-e hokmi 
(ignorance of the law regarding an issue), jahl be hormat (ignorance that an action is 
forbidden) and jahl-e mozu‘i (ignorance of ‘the matter’, that is, the nature or 
implications of one’s actions). Each has been defended by ancient and modern 
jurists, with support from narrations (including the aforementioned hadith-e raf‘ in 
which ignorance is one of the valid exculpatory excuses for wrong actions). Jurists 
frequently argue that even in the least justifiable cases, ignorance introduces doubt 
(shobhe), which undermines punishability (this is the qa‘edeye darr’, the axiom 
whereby doubt averts punishment, which only the 2012 penal code explicitly 
codifies; see chapter 3, section 5)97. Some modern scholars explicitly allow 
ignorance as a defence in criminal matters98. This can lead to surprising rulings. One 
man’s death sentence for incest with his own daughter was overturned because the 
Supreme Court felt he might not have known it to be wrong99. Other judges discount 
highly plausible instances of doubt or ignorance, as the case studies will show. 
 
                                                
96 Penal code articles 63-6; penal code bill article 221-1; 2012 penal code articles 119-20, 217-8, 222, 
224; Hojjati, 308-10, 355; Bazgir, 39, 57-8, 213-4; Mortazavi, 14, 17; Mo’meni, 86; Shahrudi, 11; 
Zera‘at (1383), 219, 272, (1385), 62-7, 128, 229, (1385/2), 39-41; Mo’meni, 81-2, 85, 88; Nobahar, 
“Ahdaf”, 148-150; Golduzian, 99; Deh Abadi, 36, 38, 40, 44-5; Khomeini, 321-4, 326, 362; 
Montazeri, topic 3171; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 7, 8, 10, 233; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 11; Abbasqolizadeh, 
“Nezam”; Qur’an (Nisa’) 4:17. 
97 Hojjati, 308-11, 355; Khomeini, 321-6, 362; Mortazavi, 30-1, 40; Zera‘at (1385), 128, 228-9, (v.2), 
39-41, (1383), 214, 253; Lom‘e, 233-6; Deh Abadi, 36, 38, 40, 44-5, 70-1; Gorji, 13-5, 30; Bazgir, 39, 
57-8; Shahrudi, 11; Mo’meni, 81-3, 86, 88, 90; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 152, 158; Gilani, 45, 180; 2012 
penal code articles 119-20, 139, 143, 217-8. 
98 Mortazavi, 181; Zera‘at (1383), 214. 
99 Zera‘at (1385), 62. 
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7.3. Ikrah (coercion) and ezterar (distress). 
 
Coercion (ikrah) removes criminal responsibility in Shi‘i law. The penal code allows 
coercion in ta‘zirat (article 54) and escape from natural disasters without mentioning 
a crime category (article 55) to remove criminal responsibility. Article 39 of the 
abrogated General Penal Code (Qanun-e Mojazat-e ‘Omumi) removed criminal 
responsibility for crimes committed under the influence of ‘concrete or abstract 
compulsion which would normally be unbearable’, but there is no such general rule 
in the 1991/96 code, which gives conditions for criminal responsibility separately for 
each hadd crime. Most jurists consider coercion to exonerate in all crimes except 
murder, as in the penal code (article 211) and the 2012 penal code (articles 139, 376); 
some argue that loss of ekhtiar (free will) constitutes coercion. Several combined 
Iranian laws express Shi‘i fiqh’s general axiom whereby coercion removes criminal 
responsibility, though patchy legislation could undermine this interpretation100. 
 
The law does not clearly define ikrah (coercion). Regarding non-physical coercion, 
article 198, section 3 of the penal code allows threats to remove criminal 
responsibility for theft, creating a potential precedent for other crimes. One 
politically conservative scholar, Mortazavi, says that threats remove ekhtiar, hence 
criminal responsibility, in all crimes except murder. Regarding levels of coercion 
below the absolute, article 54, though it does not concern hudud, allows ‘normally 
unendurable’ hardship to remove criminal responsibility. The 2012 penal code allows 
‘unbearable coercion’ to remove criminal responsibility and requires free will for 
criminal responsibility in all crimes except murder101. 
 
Jurists have represented many interpretations of ikrah occupying widely varying 
positions on the continua of strict to broad and physical to psychological, and 
encompassing such things as threats, trickery, hypnosis and the administration of 
                                                
100 Penal code, articles 54, 64, 67, 111, 112, 113, 130, 136, 146, 166, 167, 198 section 3, 211; Aghaei, 
123-6, 145-7; Zera‘at (1383), 176-8; Mortazavi, 16, 18-9, 98-9, 180, 184; General Penal Code, article 
39; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 125; Mohammadi, 295, 303; Mar‘ashi, 121-6; Khomeini, 408-10; 
Shahid, Qesas, 40, Mo’meni, 90; Nobahar, “Tanfir”, 158, “Qachaq”, 205-6, 217; Gilani, 45, 69, 120; 
Gorji, 15-7, 26, 43; Lom‘e, 233-6, 242-3; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 75, 90, 130; Deh Abadi, 46-7. 
101 Penal code art. 198 section 3, art. 54; 2012 penal code articles 139, 150, 376; Mortazavi, 180, 184. 
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narcotics102. Some judges have declared claims of coercion to be only acceptable if 
proven; this position seems rare, though not unrepresented, among scholars103. 
 
Rape (ikrah in zena) of a man by a woman, though acknowledged in the penal 
code104, is not universally considered possible by jurists, but many, including 
Khomeini, would support a man’s claim of ikrah in zena for various reasons. These 
include the mere fact that it creates doubt, which undermines punishability; the fact 
that arousal (with accompanying rigidity) is involuntary; and the fact that zena, 
requiring only penetration of the glans, can be forced on a man with comparative 
ease105. To this could be added, although it is absent in the literature reviewed here, 
that rigidity of the male organ can be chemically (or even mechanically) induced, 
potentially without consent or knowledge. 
 
Distress (ezterar) also removes criminal responsibility according to Shi‘i law, since 
actions undertaken through necessity or fear of harm are distinct from those 
undertaken through criminal intention. The principle of fiqh which embodies this is 
al-zarurat tubihu’l-mahzurat (necessities remove restrictions), also known as 
qa‘edeye zarurat va ezterar (the axiom of necessity and distress). It is connected 
with the obligatoriety of preserving human life even by breaking lesser 
commandments106. It comes from several Qur’anic verses regarding the 
permissibility of eating forbidden foods under necessity, as well as the 
aforementioned and frequently cited hadith-e raf‘, which includes actions motivated 
by necessity or distress among the nine things for which believers are unaccountable, 
another Prophetic narration, and one where the Imam Ali acquits a thirsty woman 
                                                
102 Hojjati, 310-1, 356; Aghaei, 123-6; Mohammadi, 295, 303; Mar‘ashi, 38; Gilani, 45, 69, 120; 
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who committed zena in exchange for water. Distress, as coercion, excuses all crimes 
except murder107. 
 
Allied with the principle of distress and necessity, and often considered identical to 
it, is the principle of avoiding hardship and harm (qa‘edeye nafi-e ‘osr va haraj) 
deriving from several Qur’anic verses and the Prophet’s statement that the faith was 
intended to be easy for believers108. Another similar principle is the axiom of no 
harm (qa‘edeye la zarar) which is mainly based on a narration, also known to the 
Sunnis, saying that no harm should be inflicted nor suffered in Islam109. The penal 
code occasionally refers to distress and necessity, though, as with coercion, it does 
not explicitly give them general validity as removers of responsibility in hudud110. It 
can be argued that, in accordance with article 170 of the Constitution, scriptural 
commandments override even codified law, making the ‘distress’ axioms binding 
though uncodified. This might be supplemented by fear for the afterlife produced by 
the aforementioned narration of the Imam Sadeq, whereby judges who rule 
incorrectly are bound for the Fire whether they do so intentionally or not111. 
 
Certain portions of the Civil Code mention ‘harm’ (zarar or the phrase ‘osr va 
haraj). For example, they release wives from their usual obligation to live where 
their husbands want, if it causes them harm; and they allow annulment or dissolution 
of marriage given certain conditions harmful to the wife. This could be useful in 
cases, observed in chapter 9, where husbands force wives into prostitution. 
Problematically for abused wives, according to article 1131 the right to annul a 
marriage is immediate and vanishes if its holder does not request annulment upon 
                                                
107 Qur’an 2:173, 5:3, 6:119, 6:145; Aghaei, 145-7, 123, 125 note 1; Zera‘at (1383), 216-7, (1385/2), 
42-6, 61; Hojjati, 68, Mortazavi, 147, 149, 180, 184-6; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Terminology, 56-7 (entry 
424, ‘ezterar’), Maktabha, 24, 75,78, 125, 128-31; Mohammadi, 229, 295, 303; Mar‘ashi, 38-9, 51, 
124-5; Gilani, 123, Mo’meni, 90, 92; Deh Abadi, 68; Khomeini, 322, 356, 361; Nobahar, “Qachaq”, 
204-6, 216-7. Qur’anic verses allowing distress to remove criminal responsibility include 2:173, 5:3, 
6:119, and 6:145. 
108 Aghaei, 83-4; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 24, 84, 128, 130; Mohammadi, 230, 232; Nobahar, 
“Tanfir”, 138, 157; Mar‘ashi, 38, 51, 54-5. Qur’anic verses supporting the hardship avoidance 
principle include 2:185, 5:6, 6:152, 22:78, and 23:62. 
109 Mohammadi, 232; Hodkinson, 273; Nobahar, “Tanfir”, 158; Farhangi, 100-2; Ja‘fari Langarudi, 
Maktabha, 130-1; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 7. 
110 Penal code articles 49-52, 61, 167, 173, 198 sections 10 and 12; Zera‘at (1385/2), 206. 
111 Shahrudi, 34; Khomeini, 241; Arabiyan, 66-8; Constitution, article 170. 
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learning of the relevant condition; the definition of ‘immediacy’ depends upon 
custom (‘orf va ‘adat)112. 
 
Mir-Hosseini found, in her analysis of Iranian divorce cases, that harm is the most 
common reason for women to petition for divorce, but also the reason most likely to 
fail, and that judges have enormous discretion in deciding what does and does not 
constitute harm, which means that the theoretical right of divorce through harm does 
not necessarily translate into reality113. In hudud too, the judge, aided by the law’s 
vagueness, can decide whether a form of pressure removes criminal responsibility. 
 
Although the principles of distress and coercion are absent in a general form in the 
1991/96 penal code, the penal code bill enshrines both, covering all hudud. It also 
allows claims of confession extracted by physical or psychological pressure (e.g. 
intimidation), and claims of lacking any condition for criminal responsibility, to be 
accepted without evidence unless proven false114. 
 
If distress were enshrined explicitly in codified law, as in the penal code bill, 
discussions regarding whether forms of pressure leading to criminal behaviour (e.g. 
husbands blackmailing wives into prostitution) were absolute would be moot, 
because distress does not require absoluteness. However, this opportunity appears to 
have been missed by the 2012 penal code, which does not mention distress and 
reverts (article 151) to the more complicated regulations regarding escape from 
natural disasters etc. that one finds in the 1991/96 code. It vaguely allows illegal 
behaviour in defence of one’s own or another’s life, liberty, property or honour 
(article 155), but sets multiple conditions which are open to interpretation. 
 
8. Haqq Allah and haqq al-nas. 
 
Shi‘i fiqh posits two categories of crime: haqq al-nas (crimes against people) and 
haqq Allah (crimes against God). Jurists debate whether there exists a third category, 
                                                
112 Civil Code articles 1103, 1114-5, 1130, 1131; Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 35, 57, 210. 
113 Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 67-71, “When”, 119; Amini; “Parvandeha”, 7; Najvan. 
114 Penal code bill, articles 212-1, 213-3. 
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namely crimes against the public. Some regard this as a separate category, while 
others associate it with either of the other two (with haqq Allah because these crimes 
cannot be forgiven by identifiable individuals, or with haqq al-nas because their 
prevention is beneficial to the people – among other arguments)115. 
 
The most common definitions of haqq al-nas and haqq Allah are as follows. Haqq 
al-nas crimes have an injured party, the saheb-e haqq (holder of the right), with the 
exclusive right of prosecution and pardon. These rights are heritable and cannot be 
usurped by the government (which cannot pardon or prosecute against the injured 
party’s will; however, codified law permits incarceration of some pardoned or 
unprosecuted murderers). Haqq Allah crimes are crimes because they contravene 
divine commandments, whether or not they have victims. The term haqq Allah does 
not indicate that God is a ‘victim’ of these crimes or needs human help; rather it 
indicates God’s right over humans in His capacity as their master. The conservative 
Ayatollah Mar‘ashi Shushtari declares: “just as the slave’s obedience is the master’s 
right, so God has the right to be obeyed by us”. Prosecution of haqq Allah crimes 
normally requires no complainant or injured party (as in victimless ‘crimes’), nor can 
they be pardoned by any existing victims. This also means (though some disagree) 
that injured parties cannot prevent pardon in haqq Allah, which are pardonable only 
by the Imam or his representative116. 
 
Opinions differ as to the boundaries and overlap between haqq Allah and haqq al-
nas, with some jurists believing that all crimes are fundamentally haqq Allah but 
those which have both characteristics behave as haqq al-nas, others assigning some 
crimes to one category, some to the other and some to both and then differing in their 
opinions of correct protocol in cases of ‘incomplete dominance’, and yet others 
assigning crimes very clearly to one or the other category. Crimes which attract 
qesas – both qesas-e nafs (retribution for murder) and qesas-e ‘ozv (retribution for 
                                                
115 Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 6-7; Ma’rashi, 235-6; Hojjati, 352; Zera‘at (1383), 248-9, (1385), 
208-9; Mo’meni, 57, 63-4; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 59. 
116 Aghaei, 118, footnote 1; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 6-7; Shahrudi, 83, 181-2, 204-6; Mar‘ashi, 
235-8; Gilani, 12, 45, 104-5; Hojjati, 352; Zera‘at (1383), 247-9, (1385), 92, 205-6, 208-9; Mo’meni, 
56-7, 63, 70, 147, 149-50, 160; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 151, 160, 162; Mortazavi, 89-90; Gorji, 55; Lom‘e, 
240, 259; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 59, 105; Khomeini, 317, 341, 352-3, 373; penal code article 612. 
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injuries) – or the equivalent in diyeh (blood money) are clearly haqq al-nas; ta‘ziri 
crimes can be either, depending on their nature, since the realm of ta‘zirat is so vast 
(encompassing, essentially, any crime not covered by hudud, qesas or diyeh). The 
general consensus regarding hudud is that they are all haqq Allah except slander, 
which is exclusively haqq al-nas in its behaviour, and theft, which is a hybrid and 
exhibits features of both, being prosecutable only by the owner of the stolen goods 
but forgivable by them only before the crime’s ‘establishment’ in court. There have 
been rare modern claims that some haqq Allah crimes with victims, notably rape, 
cannot be forgiven without the injured party’s consent, or that the zena component of 
rape (zena be ‘onf: coercive zena) is haqq Allah but the ‘onf (coercion) component is 
haqq al-nas117. 
 
Current Iranian law refers to these categories generally in PCCM article 2, but leaves 
much room for interpretation regarding individual status of crimes; this is another 
case where frequent use of Shi‘i fiqh can be expected. Iranian codified laws mirror 
what seems to be the majority opinion among jurists, including the fuzzy areas. The 
haqq al-nas component of slander is clear in fiqh and codified law, but the haqq al-
nas component of theft is unclear in both. The penal code bill contains in article 121-
3 a unified explanation of haqq Allah and haqq al-nas, indicating that some crimes 
are only one (such as zena) or the other (such as murder and slander) but some (such 
as theft) are hybrid and are prosecuted only following the injured party request but 
forgivable by them only before being established in court (it is unclear what crimes 
other than theft behave in this manner)118. The 2012 penal code occasionally refers to 
haqq Allah and haqq al-nas, apparently without a unified overview thereof. 
 
9. Suqut, repentance and pardon. 
 
Suqut – ‘lapsing’ – in hudud is a punishment’s spontaneous loss of applicability, 
irrespective of guilt but frequently accompanied by lack of establishment thereof; 
                                                
117 Aghaei, 118, note 1; Shahrudi, 181-2; Mar‘ashi, 236-7; Gilani, 12; Gorji, 55; Sadeghi, 174-80; 
Zera‘at (1383), 248-9, (1385), 92, 205; Mo’meni, 56-7, 63, 70, 147; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 151, 160, 162; 
Kadivar, “Hadd”; Khomeini, 317, 352-3, 373; Mortazavi, 90; Lom‘e, 259; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 105. 
118 PCCM article 2; penal code bill articles 121-3, 215-6 to 8; penal code articles 140, 161, 200; 
Zera‘at (1385), 208-9; Bazgir, 303; Shahrudi, 181-5. 
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pardon is the decision to forgo punishment despite guilt. Both can occur, inter alia, 
through repentance. Suqut in a different context also means ‘lapsing’ of certain 
functions of the Imam, including the application of hudud, during his Occultation119. 
 
Pardon, suqut and repentance behave differently in haqq al-nas and haqq Allah, as 
noted earlier120. 
 
Several Qur’anic verses mention repentance, and many declare that repentant sinners 
are safe, without describing a protocol for repentance121. As in many instances, 
jurists differ in their interpretations of relevant scripture. Elements of Shi‘i law which 
have been crystallised into codified law – and some which have not, but might 
nevertheless help to avoid irreversible penalties – are as follows. 
 
In hudud, repentance before testimony has been heard generally causes suqut; jurists 
specify that this can occur before all testimony is finished. Some say that judges 
should delay testimony to maximise opportunities for repentance. Repentance after 
complete confession, but not testimony, allows the Imam or his representative the 
discretion of pardon. The penal code allows the judge in that situation to petition the 
vali-e amr for pardon, though the previous ‘Hudud and Qesas Law’ allowed judges 
to pardon directly. (The 2012 penal code essentially mirrors the 1991/96 code in 
these respects). Repentance before confession causes suqut: therefore some hold, 
through principles of lenience, that claims following testimony or confession that 
repentance preceded them still cause suqut122. 
 
                                                
119 Gorji, 39-40; Khezr Heidari; Modarressi (1984), 55-7; Cole in Keddie, 37, 39-40; Sachedina, 20-1; 
Momen, 127, 186; Hairi, 67; Halm, 57-8; Rippin (vol.1), 113-4; Akhavi, 230-2; Amnesty 
International, “Iran: end”, 4. 
120 For mediation in haqq al-nas, see Shams Nateri; Mahmoudi, “The informal”; and Gholami. 
121 Qur’an 2:35-9, 54, 159-60 (Baqara), 3:85-91 (Al-i Imran), 4:15-8, 64, 145-6 (Nisa’), 5:39 
(Ma’iddah), 6:54 (An‘am), 7:153 (A‘raf), 9:112 (Tauba), 16:119 (Nahl), 19:59-60 (Maryam), 20:82 
(Ta-Ha), 24:4-5 (Nur), 25:68-71 (Furqan), 28:67 (Qasas), 32:20-1 (Sajda), 40:2-3 (Mu’min or Ghafir), 
66:8 (Tahrim) among others. 
122 Penal code articles 72, 81, 125-6, 132-3, 181-2; 2012 penal code article 113; Zera‘at (1383), 222, 
228, 261, 265, (1385), 121, 125, 257-60, (1385/2), 89; Hojjati, 131, 318, 365-6; Bazgir, 28-31, 105-6, 
142-7, 154-5; Aghaei, 120-1; Shahrudi, 186-99; Mar‘ashi, 84; Gilani, 44-5, 118, 123, 125, 187; 
Mo’meni, 108-9, 156, 166; Khomeini, 329, 332, 344; Mortazavi, 27-30, 44-6, 108, 152-3; Gorji, 19, 
23, 45, 49, 63, 81; Lom‘e, 235, 242-4; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 25-6, 70, 78, 82, 120; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 151-
2, 162, “Qachaq”, 206-7; Montazeri, topics 3163-4. 
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The above protocol applies in the penal code to all hudud except slander because it is 
haqq al-nas, theft where repentance or the injured party’s pardon causes suqut only 
before ‘establishment’ in court, pimping for which the law mentions no protocol, and 
moharebeh va efsad, in which repentance is not clearly described but appears to have 
efficacy only before arrest (perhaps reflecting Qur’an 5:33-4: “The punishment for 
those who wage war against God…. Except for those who repent before they fall into 
your power”)123. The confusion regarding moharebeh and pimping was discussed 
earlier. The 2012 penal code (article 113) is clearer, allowing suqut through 
repentance in all hudud except slander, but, in moharebeh, only before arrest. 
 
Suqut can be independent of repentance, affecting, for instance, death penalties in 
zena through enkar (section 6.2). In adultery (it is unclear whether this applies to 
sodomy) proven by confession, escape from the stoning pit causes suqut by implying 
enkar. Similarly, escape of any witness to adultery during stoning implies retraction 
of testimony, which invalidates it, causing suqut. At least one narration posits the 
same effect in theft, but it is not represented in codified law, and jurists disagree 
regarding its transferability to other hudud. This is ironic because several jurists 
indicate that this very narration, now disregarded for theft, justifies suqut of stoning 
(as in the 1991/96 penal code), its import having been transferred through principles 
of lenience124. 
 
There exists the argument, amicable to lenience and featured in adultery case 12, that 
confession implies repentance, because the desire to be punished for an action 
indicates recognition of its reprehensibility. However, in some narrations the Prophet 
or the Imams had repentant confessors punished (including by execution). At least 
                                                
123 Penal code articles 140 note 1, 161 note 3, 163-4, 192, 194, 200; Qur’an 5:33-4 (Ma’iddah); 
Khomeini, 352-3, 373, 377-8; Zera‘at (1385/2), 89, 249-54; Gorji, 55; Nobahar, “Qavvadi”, 150, 
“Qachaq”, 196, 206-7; Mar‘ashi, 227. 
124 Penal code articles 64-7, 71, 103, 107, 111, 130, 136, 146, 166-7, 173, 198; Hojjati, 349-50, 357; 
Bazgir, 300-1, 313-4; Mo’meni, 86, 133-5, 156; Gorji, 18, 36-7, 43; Lom‘e, 237, 242; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 
40-1, 44, 70; Zera‘at (1383), 241, 250, (1385), 89, 209, 212-4, (1385/2), 48; Mortazavi, 24-7, 86-8, 
94-5; Gilani, 92-3, 100-1; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 152-3; Khomeini, 328, 340, 370. 
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one says that repentance after establishment of a crime does not affect punishment 
but causes forgiveness by God125. 
 
Some narrations and jurists both ancient and modern, including Montazeri, declare 
that private repentance is better than confession and punishment. This idea is 
frequently connected with the concept that believers should be shielded from 
knowing about shameful acts. In some narrations, the Imams lament that the criminal 
confessed – thereby drawing attention to the shameful act – rather than repenting at 
home and maintaining the secrecy of the misdeed, since most shameful acts were 
intended to remain hidden. Other narrations have statements similar to ‘God has 
drawn a veil over crimes without four witnesses’ or ‘crimes without four witnesses 
will be judged not in this world but by Me in the afterlife’. This last statement 
ominously implies punishment in the hereafter for crimes unpunished in life, but 
other narrations conveying the same concept indicate that authentic repentance 
brings God’s pardon irrespective of punishment126. 
 
Some narrations and pre-modern juristic texts posit a ‘statute of limitations’ for some 
crimes, notably zena, possibly all ‘crimes against chastity’ or all haqq Allah crimes. 
They say that crimes which have gone undiscovered for a certain amount of time – 
which varies but is often given as five or six months – cannot be prosecuted. 
Sometimes they add that the perpetrator must have repented or ceased any illicit 
activity during that time. Jurists vary in their opinions of this idea’s applicability. 
Some say that suqut depends on the perpetrator’s improved behaviour, repentance or 
both; some attribute suqut only to the passage of time, others only to repentance. 
Some limit this effect to zena, seemingly the only crime featured in such narrations; 
others expand it to other crimes. This idea seems dormant, being absent from 
codified law and recent fatwas, and a written opinion of the Guardian Council 
excludes any statute of limitations in hudud; the 2012 penal code (articles 104-12) 
                                                
125 Bazgir, 154-5; Shahrudi, 186-8, 191-4; Gilani, 51, 79-83, 118; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 149, 151; 
Mortazavi, 30, 52-3; Mo’meni, 84, 94-7, 156; Gorji, 17, 63; Zera‘at (1385), 121, (1385/2), 257; Deh 
Abadi, 49. 
126 Bazgir, 30; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 151-4, 159; Gilani, 50-1; Mo’meni, 96-7; Mortazavi, 45-6; Sharh-e 
Lom‘e, 26; Montazeri, topic 3166; Shams Nateri, 405. 
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allows a statute of limitations only in ta‘zirat127. Nevertheless the concept has a 
scriptural pedigree and its codification would promote lenience. 
 
The role of repentance in crimes judged by ‘elm-e qazi (the majority in our sample) 
is unclear in codified law. Several jurists posit not the presence of confession but the 
absence of testimony – combined, according to some, with repentance – as the 
decisive factor in the Imam’s (or his representative’s) right to pardon. Others identify 
repentance, irrespective of proof, as the crucial factor. Yet others declare that since 
‘elm is ‘knowledge’, it is superior to zann, ‘conjecture’, which comes from 
testimony, so that rulings obtained by this inherently stronger mode of proof are 
more reliable and should be more difficult to overturn. (Of course, calling something 
‘knowledge’ does not make it so). The prestige of ‘elm is associated with narrations 
and classical juristic texts (see section 6.4) defining it as the Imam’s first-hand 
knowledge. However, Khomeini, as discussed earlier, prioritises ‘elm of an ordinary 
mujtahid (which most judges are not) over other, conflicting evidence. Nevertheless, 
many jurists who characterise the ‘elm of ordinary (mujtahid) judges as stronger than 
the zann deriving from testimony describe this ‘elm as hessi – sensory, based on first-
hand knowledge – rather than hadsi – based on guesswork. In the penal code bill 
(article 215-7) the absence of testimony allows judges to petition for pardon – if they 
consider repentance genuine (in other words, ironically, they can petition for pardon 
against their own ‘elm if they have ‘elm of authentic repentance). Still, convicts can 
apply for pardon directly, and all death sentences except those for murder (which are 
haqq al-nas) can be pardoned by the Leader128. 
 
The law, except the new 2012 penal code, is unclear about whether repentance must 
be judged authentic. Just as judges in many cases in Part II use invalid confessions, 
forced confessions, revoked confessions or confessions of a co-accused as 
ingredients of ‘elm, so they sometimes claim discretion to reject repentance which 
                                                
127 Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 153-4; Zera‘at (1383), 228, (1385), 119, 259-60; Mortazavi, 45-6; Sharh-e 
Lom‘e, 25-6; Mo’meni, 107. 
128 Mortazavi, 86-92; Zera‘at (1385/2), 205, 207; Lom‘e, 240; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 59, 75; Arabiyan, 50-8, 
64-5, 69-74; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 31-4, 39-44, 302; Shahrudi, 55; Mo’meni, 149-51, 161; 
Mar‘ashi, 235-6; Procedural Code for the Pardon and Clemency Commission, article 10; penal code 
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would otherwise cause automatic suqut. The penal code’s beneficial vagueness is 
removed by the 2012 penal code, which specifies that repentance must be accepted 
by the judge129. Here, too, the new code is stricter than its predecessor. 
 
The codified law says that religious authorities ministering to convicts prior to 
execution must encourage them to repent. It is not clear if repentance would prevent 
execution at this stage, especially in view of Qur’an 4:18 which rejects repentance of 
lifelong sinners who only repent when death is near130. This could, however, be a 
last-ditch attempt to avert execution, though the 2012 penal code (article 117) again 
precludes leniency by allowing repentance to be considered only until the ruling is 
declared final. 
 
Though constitutionally it is the Supreme Leader who pardons, pardon petitions – 
which can be made by judges, convicts, or their families or lawyers – are sent to the 
‘Pardon and Clemency Office’ (Edareye ‘Afv va Bakhshudegi) which handles the 
affairs of the ‘Pardon and Clemency Commission’ (Komision-e ‘Afv va Bakhshudegi) 
consisting of five experts in Shi‘i and codified laws chosen by the head of the 
Judiciary and convening on certain pre-arranged occasions (or, if necessary, 
additional occasions as requested by the head of the Judiciary). It is governed by the 
Procedural Code for the Pardon and Clemency Commission. Legally, pardon 
petitions cause suspension of sentences until their result is revealed. Rejected pardon 
requests can be resubmitted if the reason for rejection ceases to exist. Apparently the 
Commission only accepts written defences from lawyers, who cannot speak to its 
members directly131. 
 
Various laws, including the Constitution, forbid unjustified incarceration, including 
that of pardoned convicts, and mandate punishments for officials who perpetrate it132. 
                                                
129 Hojjati, 328-9; Deh Abadi, 74-6; Aghaei,121; Zera‘at (1385), 260; Bazgir, 145-7; Amini, 
“Parvandeha”, 4-6; 2012 penal code articles 113, 116. 
130 DIRS293/82 articles 7, 10; DIRS28/70 article 5; Qur’an 4:18 (Nisa’). 
131 Constitution article 110 (11); penal code article 24; Procedural Code for the Pardon and Clemency 
Commission, articles 1, 4-6, 8, 10-12; DIRS28/70 article 1 note 3, DIRS293/82 article 4; Hojjati, 130-
1, 134, 139,  328; Shahrudi, 199; communication with Iranian lawyer. 
132 Penal code articles 572, 575-6, 583; PCCM article 287; PCP article 356; Constitution article 32; 
Hojjati, 287; Golduzian, 28-9, 206-11; Mas‘ud, 5-7. 
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Maslahat (here meaning the State’s interests) is one of the parameters to be 
considered by the Leader in granting a pardon, and ultimately he can override all 
other considerations in the State’s best interests133. 
 
9.1. Tabdil (commutation) and takhfif (attenuation). 
 
The definition of hudud includes resistance to commutation or attenuation134, as 
explained in section 5. However, some scholars suggest that from the Imam’s right to 
pardon comes his right to pardon partially or choose alternative penalties; others, 
including the conservative Ayatollah Gilani, declare that hudud might sometimes 
necessitate modification for political reasons135. Under current law, commutation or 
attenuation could be achieved through pardon followed by a lighter sentence, but 
sentencing pardoned convicts is forbidden because pardons cancel convictions.  
 
The penal code bill allows commutation of stoning to ‘death’ (if adultery was proven 
by testimony) or 100 lashes (otherwise) if certain officials deem it beneficial to the 
state (maslahat), and suggests that pardon may cause modification of hadd penalties. 
The 2012 penal code implies the latter, and allows, in its theft section, for non-ta‘ziri 
prison sentences (e.g. for repeated theft) to be waived because of maslahat136. 
 
Despite the penal code’s prohibition of attenuation or commutation in hudud, a man 
sentenced to stoning for adultery (though almost certainly married to his partner in 
zena) was hanged in prison in 2009, without official justification of the illegal 
commutation of a penalty so staunchly defended as immutable due to its scriptural 
                                                
133 Procedural Code for the Pardon and Clemency Commission, article 9; Hojjati, 123, 133; Zera‘at 
(1383), 265, (1385), 92; Aghaei, 118 note 1; Mar‘ashi, 235-6; Nobahar, “Qachaq”, 207, 216-7; 
Shahrudi, 198, 203-5. Maslahat and its equation with Islamic interests are described in chapter 3, 
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134 Penal code article 22; 2012 penal code articles 15, 219; Mo’meni, 66; Aghaei, 118 footnote 1; 
Hojjati, 119; Gilani, 94-5; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 7-8. 
135 Shahrudi, 195, 198-200, 203-6; Zera‘at (1385), 260; Gilani, 94. See chapter 3, sections 6.2-3. 
136 Penal code bill article 221-5 section 5 note 4, article 227-5; 2012 penal code articles 219, 279/j/2; 
Nurbaha, “Keyfar”, 128. 
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pedigree137. This also possibly happened in adultery case 4 of this project. Such 
behaviour demonstrates that even laws enthusiastically defended as ‘divine’ are 




This chapter should have familiarised readers with several basic elements affecting 
Iranian hadd trials. Some laws, either by commission or omission, create obstacles to 
lenience, of which several will be seen operating in the case studies (Part II). These 
obstacles include vagueness regarding the timing of lawyers, the absence of a general 
prohibition of double jeopardy, and the permission of ‘elm-e qazi, which can be used 
as a ‘wild card’ to bypass ordinary legal strictures.  
 
The laws governing the cases in Part II contain harshness including these obstacles, 
but can also be harvested for leniency, sometimes because they explicitly protect 
defendants (e.g. the rules for confession or criminal responsibility) and sometimes 
because their vagueness allows interpretability through Shi‘i law. This 
interpretability is manifested in the extensive discussions among present-day Iranian 
jurists, many of whom favour lenient legal reform. Theoretically, even in the codified 
law multiple opportunities for avoiding irreversible hudud exist between arrest and 
conviction. The case studies, however, suggest that judges often ignore these. 
Furthermore, the new 2012 penal code often resolves this interpretability to the 
defendant’s detriment, showing that forces for lenient reform are still opposed. 
 
The next chapter describes principles of Shi‘i law (whether codified or not) which 
could affect the deployment, interpretation and possibly reform of the regulations 
discussed so far. They too, like the laws described above, contain harshness, but their 
multiplicity and vagueness allow for leniency. 
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Shi‘i law contains various principles, some explicitly enshrined in Iranian law and 
others not, which judges and legal scholars acknowledge, and which can therefore 
appear in court. Many govern the interpretation and interaction of legal elements 
discussed in the previous chapter, and their role is visible in the construction of 
codified Iranian law. Some can militate against leniency, but others favour it and 
could promote lenient legal reform. 
 
This chapter explains those principles insofar as they are relevant to hadd law and 
the case studies in chapters 5-9. Sections 1 and 2 discuss basic principles whose 
interaction yields a strong basis for the presumption of innocence and a ‘default 
setting’ of lenience towards defendants. Section 3 discusses more forms of lenience, 
with a caveat, in subsection 3.1, that Shi‘i law also contains severity. Sections 4 and 
5 explain two important principles which could further protect defendants. Finally, 
section 6 and subsections discuss principles and concepts which allow Shi‘i law to 
accommodate evolving morality. 
 
What emerges is that Shi‘i sources can be used to construct a potent basis for 
lenience in criminal law. In fact, many jurists argue that the Prophet and the Imams 
had a default attitude of lenience (sections 3-4). Judges’ harshness observed in 
chapters 5-9 contrasts with this precedent from their own law. The multiplicity of 
opinions being currently discussed by Iranian legal specialists shows that many legal 
concepts are not ‘set in stone’ and are being subjected to scrutiny and negotiation. 
This ‘dynamism’ could be harnessed to maximise leniency in new legal codification. 
 
1. Basic principles. 
 
The following basic principles govern the fundamental conception and organisation 
of ideas in Shi‘i law. Several Iranian legal scholars layer them, as explained 
hereunder, to create a strong tissue of default lenience in criminal law. 
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The asl-e ‘adam – principle of absence – states that since all created things and states 
of being are preceded by their absence, their presence, not their absence, requires 
proof. One form of this principle is the default inapplicability of punishments1. 
 
The asl-e ebahe, ‘principle of permissibility’, is the default permission of anything 
not explicitly forbidden. With these two principles combined, permission can be 
viewed as an ‘absence’, retaining the default state of permissibility, while a 
restriction, by modifying these defaults, is a ‘presence’ requiring justification2.  
 
The concept of bara’at – ‘exculpation’ or ‘exemption’ – is that until a legal 
obligation is established, no action is enjoined nor any responsibility determined. 
Absence and permissibility being the default, restrictions and criminal convictions 
require justification. This means, in criminal matters, that all persons are presumed 
innocent until proven guilty. In this form, the concept becomes the asl-e bara’at – 
innocence principle, or principle of innocence by default. It is enshrined in article 37 
of the Iranian Constitution3. Related to it, and to ebahe, is the principle of sehhat, 
whereby acts or transactions are presumed correct until proven otherwise4.  
 
The principle of ehtiat, meaning ‘caution’ or ‘prudence’, demands that when in 
doubt, one must act in the manner most likely to be correct. Since it is “better to risk 
failing to perform a recommended action than … to risk performing a forbidden 
action” (Gleave, see note), it is better to free the guilty than execute the innocent, 
murder being more reprehensible than failure to punish. 
 
In criminal matters, considering innocence by default, ehtiat often favours lenience, 
and several jurists use it to choose the most lenient of equally authoritative options. 
                                                
1 Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 53-4, Terminology, 51, entry 384; Mohammadi, 287-9, 299; Zera‘at 
(1385/2), 52; Nobahar, “Qavvadi”, 155, 158, “Qachaq”, 195, 198-9, 201. 
2 Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 65-8, 133, Terminology, 108 entry 832; Mohammadi, 287, 290, 294-6; 
Sharh-e Lom‘e, 43; Gleave, 35; Qur’an 65:7 (sura Talaq), 17:15 (Isra or Bani Isra’il). 
3 Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 47, 122, Terminology, 37, entry 271, 49, entry 363, 107-8, entries 831-
2; Mohammadi, 287-9, 293-7, 299; Shahrudi, 11; Gilani, 46, 63, 78; Zera‘at (1383), 219, (1385), 86; 
Bazgir, 39; Mas‘ud, 5-7; Deh Abadi, 52; Mortazavi, 30-2; Gorji, 79; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 46-7, 61; 
Nobahar, “Qachaq”, 195, 198-9; Gleave, 35; Constitution article 37; Qur’an 65:7 (Talaq), 17:15 (Isra 
or Bani Isra’il); Amini, “Parvandeha”, 9. 
4 Civil Code article 223; Mohammadi, 329; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Terminology, 51, entry 381. 
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A usage exists whereby ‘choosing the side of ehtiat’ is equated with ‘favouring 
lenience’ in juristic texts. For instance, ehtiat is the reason most cited for preferring 
four instead of three repetitions of a hadd crime before the death penalty is activated, 
though the case for three is arguably stronger, and ehtiat meaning ‘the greatest 
possibility of correctness’ would probably favour three. However, ehtiat means 
‘prudent pursuit of correctness’, not ‘favouring the defendant’, so it can also 
undermine lenience. For instance, there is doubt regarding applicability of the hadd 
for zena between non-Muslims, but some argue that ehtiat favours applicability5. 
 
When the death penalty is possible, ehtiat assumes the heightened status of qa‘edeye 
ehtiat dar khunha (or dar dama’), ‘the axiom of caution in matters of blood’, 
forbidding death penalties until all doubt is removed. This axiom is supported by 
narrations, including one which says “hudud are grounded in lenience and there must 
be caution (ehtiat) especially in the bloods (dama’)”. This narration also supports the 
axiom ‘hudud are grounded in lenience’ (discussed below). Several jurists use 
‘caution in shedding blood’ to allow enkar (retraction of confessions) to halt all death 
penalties for zena, not only stoning – a position represented in the penal code and its 
successor, the 2012 penal code, which extends this to any death penalty in hudud and 
acknowledges the qa‘edeye darr’6 (section 5). 
 
Esteshab is the presumption that the last known circumstances remain current. Since, 
by the principles of ‘adam, ebahe and bara’at, one’s default and initial state is 
innocence, by esteshab it is presumed current unless proven to have changed. 
However, similarly to ehtiat, esteshab can be inimical to the defendant. For instance, 
                                                
5 Mohammadi, 287, 296, 302, 305, 307-8, 325; Gleave, 36-40; Shahrudi, 11, 67; Bazgir, 337-41, 352; 
Gilani, 66, 90, 93-4, 122-3, 126, 187, 233; Mo’meni, 97, 105, 114-5, 129, 149, 155-6, 165; Zera‘at 
(1383), 214, (1385), 62-3, 92, 251; Mortazavi, 47, 63-4, 66-7; Gorji, 79; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 70; Nobahar, 
“Ahdaf”, 148-50, 158, “Qavvadi”, 155-6, “Qachaq”, 195, 197-201; Khomeini, 300, 322, 325, 328-9, 
330, 332, 335-6, 339-40, 343-5, 350, 352, 354, 359, 365, 367, 370, 376, 378-9. 
6 Bazgir, 31, 337-41, 352; Gilani, 66-7, 74-5, 122; Mar‘ashi, 130; Mo’meni, 114-5, 122, 152, 165; 
Zera‘at (1383), 214, 230, 259, 264, 269, 293, (1385), 62-3, 89, 126, 128, 166-7, 229, 252, (1385/2), 
83-4; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 150, 152-3, 158; Mortazavi, 26-7; penal code article 71; 2012 penal code 
articles 119-20, 172. 
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if guilt is deemed ‘established’, it becomes the default and anything which seeks to 
dislodge it, such as claims of coercion, must provide overwhelming proof7. 
 
2. The general (‘amm) and the particular (khass). 
 
Broadly speaking, in Shi‘i fiqh the general cannot abrogate the particular while the 
particular can modify the general. This means that a general rule can be modified in 
special circumstances. For example, confessions retain their proof-value (hojjiat) 
even if revoked, but for zena carrying the death penalty, revoked confessions 
exceptionally lose it. Or, according to some jurists, the default for repetition of 
crimes is embodied in a narration whereby any kabireh (major sin or crime) carries 
the death penalty on the third repetition, but other narrations describing the fourth 
repetition of zena modify the general rule in this instance. The concept also allows 
‘refinement’ of unclear or general commandments. For example, 100 lashes, the 
general punishment for zena in verse 24:2 of the Qur’an, is refined by narrations 
ordaining stoning for adultery, a subset of zena (zena while married). 
 
This relationship between the general and the particular can be advantageous or 
disadvantageous to suspects in hudud: it sometimes creates advantageous exceptions 
to disadvantageous rules, and sometimes the opposite. Sometimes it goes against 
ehtiat and ‘caution in shedding blood’. Many jurists favour ehtiat by allowing enkar 
to prevent execution in hudud other than zena, or by saying that, given the 
uncertainty regarding the death penalty for three or four repetitions of hudud, the 
most lenient option – four – is preferable. Others use ‘the general and the particular’ 
which suggests a default of three repetitions unless authoritative texts indicate four, 
and a default of enkar not preventing execution. The two principles similarly clash 
regarding punishments for incest, rape and sodomy, especially since the death 
penalty is absent from some relevant narrations and ‘the general and the particular’ 
favours the death penalty over no death penalty8. 
                                                
7 Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 25, 46, 48-9, 222, Terminology, 36 (entry 269), 51 (384), 37 (271); 
Mohammadi, 309-14, 325; Deh Abadi, 41; Mortazavi, 86-7; Gorji 63; Shahrudi, 320; Gleave 35. 
8 Gilani, 74; Zera‘at (1383), 275, (1385), 125; Mo’meni, 123-4, 164-5; Mortazavi, 66-7, 94-5; Qur’an 
24:2 (Nur); lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi, October 2006, part 1-b; penal code article 71. 
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This interpretability is visible in the differences between the 1991/96 penal code, 
which mandates death for the third instance of alcohol consumption and allows enkar 
to halt execution only in zena (articles 71, 179), and the 2012 penal code. It has death 
on the fourth repetition of alcohol consumption and allows enkar to halt any death 




There exists the notion, repeated by many scholars both ancient and modern, that the 
shari‘a, or hudud, are grounded in lenience, and the default is to favour the accused. 
The idea of favouring the accused is the qa‘edeye tafsir-e maziq-e qanun be naf‘e 
mottaham, ‘the axiom of interpreting the law’s ambiguities in favour of the accused’. 
The concept of lenience by default is variously expressed in phrases such as qa‘edeye 
takhfif dar keifar (the axiom of lenience in punishment), qa‘edeye takhfif dar hudud 
(the axiom of lenience in hudud), and qa‘edeye banaye hudud bar takhfif (the axiom 
whereby hudud are grounded in lenience) among others. These interrelated concepts 
are supported by narrations. In one, for instance, the Prophet declares that it is better 
to err on the side of lenience than on the side of severity. The Imam Ali’s famous 
letter to Malik Ashtar, when sending him to govern Egypt in 658, says the same 
thing, as does the aforementioned ‘caution in shedding blood’ narration9. The idea of 
lenience by default is allied with several principles including the qa‘edeye darr’ 
(axiom of removal), the asl-e bara’at (for the present purposes, innocence by 
default), ehtiat (caution), and ehtiat dar khunha (caution in shedding blood). 
 
                                                
9 Shahrudi, 67; Gilani, 40, 75, 183; Nahj al-Fasaha, hadith 119; Zera‘at (1383), 248, 251-3, 269, 
(1385), 62-4, 127-8, 229, (1385/2), 40; Mo’meni,70, 155; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 150, 152-3, “Be suye”, 
336; Golduzian, 99, 104; Deh Abadi, 49, 63, 66; Mortazavi, 30, 40, 66; Gorji, 79; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 40, 
70; Bazgir, 31; Constitution, article 37. See Cherif Bassiouni, 256-7.  
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3.1. Against lenience. 
 
Attitudes against lenience also exist in fiqh, though not all are in codified law. 
According to several Shi‘i jurists, ancient and modern, various narrations emphasise 
the intrinsic heinousness of hadd-bearing crimes, including victimless ones. Others 
forbid any delay in implementing hudud (unless for a specific reason, such as the 
necessity to wait before flogging an ill person lest the punishment inflict more than 
its allotted injury). Some describe the laudability of implementing hudud, or decry 
failure to do so, characterising those who ‘trample’ hudud as, among other things, 
enemies of God, or saying that the community should be purified by shedding the 
blood of those guilty of ‘corruption’ (fasad)10.  
 
Jurists cite many narrations describing the Prophet’s and the Imams’ implementation 
of stoning and other heavy penalties, though elsewhere their extreme lenience is 
invoked by jurists and lawyers urging scrupulousness. Some juristic texts exhibit 
attitudes contrary to lenience. One, for instance, insists that self-incriminated 
adultery convicts who escape the stoning pit are free (the majority attitude, seen in 
article 103 of the penal code) but only if some stones have hit them first, because 
they must have some torment. Narrations and juristic texts describe many other stern 
attitudes, whether regarding points of law (e.g. death must not be swift in stoning; 
confession need not be before a judge; claims of coercion must be proven) or 
expressed in general terms (e.g. ‘lenience and delay are betrayals of the Imam’s duty 
in hudud’, ‘all are slaves to God and all actions are by His permission, including 
humans’ use of themselves’, ‘sometimes the wisdom behind commandments is 
hidden so we must obey them whether they seem reasonable or not’, ‘breaking any 
established law is equivalent to apostasy’). Even the reformist Ayatollah Montazeri 
has declared that denying some essentials of religion, such as prayer or fasting, 
implies apostasy11. 
                                                
10 Shahrudi, 184-5; Gilani, 14-8; Mo’meni, 77, 84, 94-7, 114, 126-8, 134-5, 150; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 
149, 154-5, 157-8, 161, “Qachaq”, 190-1, 201; Mortazavi, 42-3, 96; Dastjerdi, 47; Zera‘at (1385), 
132, 218-9, 229, 251; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 37; Gorji, 23, 43. 
11 Penal code article 103; Mar‘ashi, 101-2; Gilani, 59, 79-84, 90-5, 104; Hojjati, 364; Momeni, 27, 63, 
88, 97, 107-9, 115-6, 121-3, 126, 137-41, 147, 158, 160; Zera‘at (1385), 92, 99, 213, 230-1, 249, 251, 
(1385/2), 52-3, 62; Deh Abadi, 41, 53, 57-8, 63, 66, 69-70, 72, 75, 77; Khomeini, 322-4, 335, 341-3, 
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Particularly ironic is the idea that it is merciful to apply punishments (including 
execution) because it prevents wrongdoers’ worse punishment in the afterlife (except 
possibly in moharebeh, where earthly punishment is followed by torment in the 
hereafter but repentance prevents both). This appears in various narrations where 
people confess to crimes with heavy punishments (such as theft, sodomy or adultery) 
to be punished in this life rather than the next12. This attitude, applied in practice, 
would mean that while stern judges might order harsh punishments through a spirit 
of retribution, sympathetic judges might do it through compassion. 
 
4. No investigation of crimes ‘against chastity’.  
 
Iranian law (PCCM article 43) forbids prosecution and investigation of crimes 
‘against chastity’ without complainants. This is supported by juristic texts including 
those forbidding interrogation of a woman about the reason for her pregnancy 
because the shari‘a intended such crimes to remain mostly hidden, and narrations 
wherein the Prophet or the Imams make such statements, discourage confession, or 
do not seek evidence. The idea is connected to the dismissal of pregnancy as proof13. 
The case studies, however, suggest that crimes ‘against chastity’ are frequently 
(illegally) prosecuted by the authorities without complainants. 
 
5. The qa‘edeye darr’ or ‘axiom of removal’. 
 
The qa‘edeye darr’ (‘axiom of removal’) is expressed in a Prophetic narration which 
says “idra’u’l-hudud be’l-shubuhat”, meaning, ‘avoid (remove, avert) punishments 
through doubts’; the axiom is therefore also known as qa‘edeye idra’u’l-hudud be’l-
                                                                                                                                     
358-9, 362, 370, 377; Mortazavi, 43-4, 55-7, 78, 86-8, 94-5, 153-4; Gorji, 23, 43; Lom‘e (vol.1), 167; 
Lom‘e, 245; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 85, 126-7; Nobahar, “Tanfir”, 158, 171, “Qachaq”, 201, 206; Nurbaha, 
“Keyfar”, 126; Montazeri, topic 80; Ja‘fari Langarudi, Terminology, 113 (entry 886, ‘bulugh’); 
Shahrudi, 343-7. 
12 Nobahar, “Be suye”, 337, “Qachaq”, 197, “Ahdaf”, 148-52; Mo’meni, 77, 84, 94-7, 126-8, 134-5, 
156; Zera‘at (1383), 252, 234-5, (1385), 218-9, 225, 234-5; Qur’an 5:33-4 (Ma’iddah), 24:2 (Nur); 
Gilani, 45, 79-83, 118; Mortazavi, 22, 52-3, 101-2; Gorji, 17; Lom‘e (vol.1), 167; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 16-
7; Shahrudi, 186-9. 
13 PCCM article 43; Zera‘at (1383), 228; Gilani, 46; Mortazavi, 31-2; Lom‘e (vol.1), 166-7; Nobahar, 
“Ahdaf”, 148-51, 153, 159-61, 169, “Qachaq”, 204-5, “Be suye”, 337; 2102 penal code article 241. 
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shubuhat (or the alternative form, todra’u’l-hudud be’l-shubuhat). It states that even 
the most tenuous doubt renders punishments inapplicable.  
 
It can be a powerful weapon against ‘elm-e qazi (judges’ ‘knowledge’, allowed as 
grounds for conviction), so that scholars have occasionally bewailed the excessive 
leniency it facilitates in Iranian courts. Its use has been advocated by various jurists 
and scholars, including Khomeini, to resolve even the most unlikely cases of doubt in 
favour of the defendant. According to the qa‘edeye darr’, any claim of non-
consummation of marriage invalidates the stoning penalty (which necessitates 
consummated marriage) even if the marriage has produced offspring, any claim of 
coercion, distress, ignorance or error impugns criminal responsibility, invalidating 
the hadd, and doubt regarding proof prevents the hadd. The word hudud in the axiom 
is interpreted as ‘punishment’, and ehtiat and ‘caution in shedding blood’ extend the 
axiom to any punishment. The narration embodying the qa‘edeye darr’ is known to 
both Sunni and Shi‘i jurists. 
 
Although the qa‘edeye darr’ is ubiquitous in judgements, lawyers’ defences and 
scholarly works, its validity has occasionally been doubted because it is based on a 
morsaleh narration (a narration whose chain of transmission is absent or flawed) in 
Shaykh Saduq’s Man la yahduruhu al-faqih and because the ijma‘ (consensus of 
jurists) regarding it is not as uniform as is widely believed. Against this one can 
argue that, similarly to the qa‘edeye hormat-e tanfir az din (axiom against causing 
hatred of religion, described presently), it is the subject of ijma‘-e ‘amali, ‘consensus 
through action’, and shohrat, ‘fame’ or ‘wide acceptance’, since it is used and cited 
so frequently in judgements and by jurists including Khomeini and Shahid II (d. 
1558). According to some, these two forms of popularity can lend legitimacy to 
narrations and juristic positions. Also, the axiom is in Ali’s aforementioned letter to 
Malik Ashtar. (There are issues with its chain of transmission, and the crucial 
sentence, while appearing in the Bihar al-Anwar, does not appear in the version of 
the letter present in the Nahj al-Balagha, which however can be characterised as a 
summary of Ali’s pronouncements rather than a full account thereof). It is also 
embodied in a narration of Ali which says “whenever there is a ‘maybe’ in hudud, 
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the hadd is inapplicable”. Although much can be said about the possible arguments 
for and against the authority of the qa‘edeye darr’, the fact remains that it is a 
formidable promoter of lenience, whose validity has been accepted seemingly 
without question by judges, lawyers, jurists and scholars alike. Ijma‘ has been 
claimed for it, and it is frequently described as an established rule of Shi‘i law14.  
 
Chapters 5-9 show that ‘elm-e qazi may thwart all opposition, imposing irreversible 
penalties in cases containing clear illegalities. In other cases, the qa‘edeye darr’ has 
turned the tide against the death penalty, and Supreme Court judges have sometimes 
used it spontaneously to overturn rulings. Though the qa‘edeye darr’ is absent from 
the 1991/96 penal code, it is paraphrased in the penal code bill (article 213-4) and 
mentioned explicitly in the 2012 penal code (articles 119-20), though its action is not 
deemed automatic in moharebeh, efsad, theft and slander. 
 
6. Maslahat and other forces for accommodation. 
 
According to several, mostly modern, jurists, the following principles promote 
lenient legal interpretation and facilitate accommodation of Shi‘i laws to evolving 
morality. They could even inspire lenient legal reform without sacrificing Islamicity. 
 
6.1. Qa‘edeye molazeme: the reasonability of commandments. 
 
The qa‘edeye molazeme – ‘axiom of connexion’ or ‘axiom of inherence’ – is the idea 
that divine ahkam (commandments) are inherently reasonable, and that, therefore, 
one can construe the correct commandments through reason even where the law is 
silent, unclear or contradictory. In its extreme form, this concept characterises reason 
                                                
14 Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih, vol.4, Bab Nuwadir al-Hudud, hadith 74; Bihar al-Anwar, volume 77, 
243; Nahj al-Fasaha, hadiths 119-20; Khomeini, 331, 362; Gorji, 15-6, 65, 79; Tabrizi, 257; Saberi, 
285, 305; Bazgir, 176-8, 204, 239-40, 337-41, 352; Mortazavi, 30, 40, 44-6, 66-7, 94, 149, 187; 
Golduzian, 99, 104; Mar‘ashi, 92, 130; Gilani, 13, 63, 98-100, 122, 183; Zera‘at (1383), 214, 219, 
222, 224, 232, 234, 251-3, 317, (1385), 62-3, 65, 67, 129, 131-2, 144-5, 161, 217, 229, 251, 258, 260, 
(1385/2), 39-41, 213; Mo’meni, 81-3, 85, 88, 113, 125-6, 148-9; Nobahar, “Qavvadi”, 155-7, 
“Ahdaf”, 149, 152-4, 158, “Tanfir”, 153-4; Deh Abadi, 33-4, 39-55, 61, 64-78; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 25, 28, 
58, 75, 120, 123, 133; Shahid, Qesas, 74, 113; Dutton, 136; Peters, 21-2; Ja‘fari Langarudi, 
Terminology, 399-400, entries 3201-3 (shohrat); Khosroshahi, 251; ‘Asr Iran, “Joz’iat”; Cherif 
Bassiouni, 256-7; penal code bill articles 213-4; lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi, October 2006, section 1: 
“‘elm-e qazi cannot overcome todra’u’l-hudud be’l shubuhat”. 
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as a litmus test of authenticity for narrations: if they appear unreasonable, that is a 
sign of their inauthenticity. The axiom is also known as qa‘edeye molazeme beyn-e 
hokm-e ‘aql o shar‘, meaning, ‘the axiom of connexion between the commandments 
of reason and of the shari‘a’. It is related to the permissibility to avoid ‘osr and haraj 
(hardship and harm) and the qa‘edeye la zarar (no-harm principle), to the notion that 
injunctions of the divine law are always indicative of intrinsic goodness or badness 
(hosn va qobh, hosn va qobh-e zati) or ‘benefits or detriments’ (masaleh va 
mofassad) to individuals or to society, and to the idea that since it is obligatory to 
‘enjoin the good and forbid the bad’ (amr bi’l-ma‘ruf wa nahy an al-munkar or amr 
be ma‘ruf va nahi az monker, as in Qur’anic verses 3:104 and 3:110 among others), 
what is perceived as ‘good’ by the human mind becomes obligatory, as what the 
mind perceives as ‘bad’ becomes forbidden. The reformist mujtahid Ahmad Qabel 
cites narrations deeming reason to be ‘God’s inner proof’. Against this, there is the 
idea that sometimes the wisdom behind commandments is not apparent to humans 
and therefore it is risky to rely excessively on reason for discerning those 
commandments or the underlying principles. It is generally accepted that some areas, 
such as ‘ibadat (acts of devotion), are impenetrable to reason, but some extend this to 
any divine commandment, even in criminal matters, which seems unreasonable but is 
supported by explicit reliable narrations or clear Qur’anic verses. Some hold that 
even commandments suggested by reason or considerations of ‘benefits and 
detriments’ must be confirmed by scripture15.  
 
6.2. Maslahat.  
 
Maslaha (plural: masalih), or its Persianised version maslahat, roughly translates as 
‘benefit’. Some Sunni (particularly Maliki) jurists developed the concept that the 
benefit of the community – as a principle variously expressed as maslaha, istislah 
                                                
15 Qur’an 3:104, 3:110 (Al-e Imran), 7:157 (A‘raf) and 9:71 (Tauba); Mo’meni, 73, 122-3; Ja‘fari 
Langarudi, Maktabha, pp. 84, 114-5, 117-9, 121-2, 130-1, 133, 158-62; Mohammadi, 227-30, 232-4, 
337; Mar‘ashi, 35, 37-40, 45-6, 51, 53-5, 57-8, 239; Khosroshahi, 247-50; Gleave, 36-7, 41; Sharh-e 
Lom‘e, 47, 79; Nobahar, “Tanfir”, 137-9, 144, 155-8, 166-71; Baiburdi, 23-4; Farhangi, 79, 90-2, 100-
2; Hodkinson, 273; Momen, 187; Jafri, 311; Sachedina, 7, 9; Dahlén, 66-7, 73 footnote 37; Halm, 54; 
Akhtar, 226; Modarressi (1984), 4; Opwis, 64, 78; Keddie, 18, 308; Marcinkowski, 98, 101; 
Matsunaga, 323, 326-7; Nurizad/Qabel, “Porseshha”. Mainstream Shi‘i thought is Mu‘tazilite in its 
contention that God and his laws follow reason, justice and natural law. 
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(discerning benefit), or salah al-Muslimin (the benefit of the Muslims), one variant 
being masalih al-mursala (‘unattested benefits’, in matters for which there is no 
authoritative text) – is a tool for identifying laws. Though some scholars argue that 
the Twelver Shi‘a classically reject it, modern Iranian jurists acknowledge it16.  
 
Some scholars emphasise the mursal (‘unattested’) component of the phrase masalih 
al-mursala: these benefits do not contravene sacred laws because the shari‘a is silent 
about them. This idea is further justified by the notion, established among the 
Twelvers, that the essence of law is the observance of masaleh and mofassad, and the 
entire purpose of the sacred law is to protect five things, namely life (jan), property 
(mal), faith (din), reason (‘aql) and offspring or lineage (nasl, nasab). Further 
support comes from related principles including the asl-e ebahe (default 
permissibility), the qa‘edeye la zarar (Islam inflicts no harm) and the permissibility 
of avoiding ‘osr and haraj (hardship and harm). If a principal aim of the divine law is 
to protect humanity’s welfare, the argument continues, it is at least permissible to use 
their welfare as a basis of legislation wherever scripture is silent; for instance, the 
infrastructure of the modern Iranian state is based on maslahat because no scripture 
prescribes it. Indeed, one is only bound by explicit scriptural prohibitions, so if 
anything contains a mafsadeh (detriment) unbeknownst to us but nevertheless 
appears advantageous, we are not culpable for allowing it in good faith. Some, 
including the conservative Ayatollah Mar‘ashi Shushtari, continue that instead of 
providing individual detailed commandments for all possible contingencies, which 
would have been cumbersome and inefficient, God provides general principles by 
which to discern the correct course of action in response to any contingency. As well 
as being streamlined and efficient, this allows for laws to be tailored to the varying 
conditions of time and place (moqtaziyyat-e zaman va makkan, ‘the exigencies of 
time and place’) in matters which are neutral in the eyes of the divine law17. 
 
                                                
16 Mohammadi, 227-34; Tabari (Keyvan), 106; Dutton, “Sources”, 16-20; Waines, 84; Krawietz, 186-
7, 190; Jokisch, 121-2, 128; Mar‘ashi, 35-6, 38-9, 44, 51; Farhangi, 92; Niknam, “The Islamization”, 
18; Peters, 19; Akhavi, “Shiite theories”, 141; Arjomand, “Shari‘a”, 160; Shah, 470-1; Ford,  35 and 
note 159; Khatami, 7. Consult Opwis for details on maslaha. 
17 Ja‘fari Langarudi, Maktabha, 84, 115-9, 121-2, 158-62; Mohammadi, 227-34; Mar‘ashi, 35, 37-45, 
47, 50-5, 57-60, 239; Khosroshahi, 247-50; Mo’meni, 73; Baiburdi, 23-4; Nobahar, “Be suye”, 341, 
“Qachaq” 199, “Tanfir”, 134, 137-8, 156-8; Farhangi, 90-2; Mokhtari, 616, 618; Matsunaga, 325-6. 
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There exists also the concept of ‘assessing benefits’ (maslahat-sanji, sanjesh-e 
maslahatha), related to the idea of primary and secondary commandments. Primary 
commandments (ahkam-e avvalieh; sing. hokm-e avvali) are the general, default 
ones, such as the prohibition on consuming alcohol or carrion or the obligations of 
prayer or fasting. Secondary commandments (ahkam-e thanaviyyeh; sing. hokm-e 
thanavi), a subset of which are ‘distress commandments’ (ahkam-e ezterari), are 
those that apply to special circumstances. An example of a ‘secondary 
commandment’ is that which prescribes that one’s prayers be shortened and one’s 
fast be abandoned when one is travelling. The obligation (wujub) to consume 
alcohol, carrion or other forbidden comestibles in order to save one’s life or the life 
of another is also a hokm-e thanavi: since the obligation to preserve (human) life 
overrides most other considerations, it can transform the forbidden actions which it 
necessitates into obligatory actions (coercion in murder being an exception to this 
rule). Again, this is crucial to the concept of ezterar (distress) and it is the reason 
why, for instance, in a famous narration, a woman who committed zena in exchange 
for water was acquitted by the Imam Ali: the necessity to avoid hardship by 
obtaining water overrode the general prohibition of zena. The general idea is that a 
greater necessity or benefit overrides a lesser one; and this allows less important laws 
to be broken when they conflict with more important laws18. 
 
This can ultimately evolve into the doctrine whereby the interests of the Islamic 
state, as the protector of Islam itself, override all other considerations, so that 
maslahat can even contravene explicit scripture if necessary.  
 
The rationale behind this concept is roughly as follows. Muslims’ paramount 
obligation is to ensure that God be obeyed and worshipped; in other words, to ensure 
the survival of Islam. True Islam is of course Ithna‘ashari (Twelver) Shi‘i Islam, and 
the only country that implements it is the Islamic Republic of Iran. If the Iranian 
regime were to fall, or if the Iranian state were weakened or attacked, Islam itself 
                                                
18 Mar‘ashi, 38-9, 51; Nobahar, “Tanfir”, 133-5, 138-40, 153-9, 160-1, 163-71, “Be suye”, 341, 
“Qachaq”, 199, 207, 216; Gilani, 86-7, 94; Deh Abadi, 68; Khomeini, 336-7, 367; Mortazavi, 74, 77, 
88; Zera‘at (1385), 184-7; Gorji, 33; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 84; Nurbaha, “Keyfar”, 127-8; Baiburdi, 23-4; 
Farhangi, 79, 98-102, 104; Mohammadi, 227; Shahrudi, 318; Kalmbach, 46; Clarke, 301. 
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would be endangered by its paladin’s affliction. Therefore whatever protects the 
regime is Islamically obligatory, because it safeguards Islam itself, even if it 
contravenes individual divine commandments. This is a major element of 
Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih – absolute rule of the jurist – and 
it is the raison d’être of the Majma‘-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam, the ‘Council for 
Discerning the Benefit of the State’, also known as the Expediency Council. It can 
force laws through in the State’s best interests even though the Guardian Council 
(who can veto laws for being un-Islamic) deem them incompatible with Islam. For 
example, in 2003 it amended the Civil Code (article 1169) to give mothers custody of 
children if fathers were proven unsuitable. Such pragmatism has led to various 
changes of heart by the government, in matters ranging from contraception and the 
preservation of pre-Islamic monuments to banking laws and female enfranchisement, 
as it gradually realised that maslahat and practical necessity had to be taken into 
account. According to several scholars, Khomeini’s ideas increased in pragmatism as 
the Shah’s overthrow became ever more desirable, and especially after Khomeini 
became head of state and encountered the necessity to render that state viable. 
Nevertheless, conservative voices prevent maslahat from causing many radical 
changes, decrying its indiscriminate use as a wild card to transform the divine law 
into an entirely human law. The prolonged battle over stoning is a testament to this19. 
 
6.3. The axiom against causing hatred of the faith. 
 
The qa‘edeye hormat-e tanfir az din – axiom against causing hatred of the faith – is 
implicit in a number of Qur’anic verses (including 6:108, which forbids insults to 
heathen gods lest the infidels retaliate by insulting God, and 3:159, which says that 
                                                
19 Mar‘ashi, 35-6; Farhangi, 98-104; Gilani, 87, 94; Nobahar, “Tanfir”, 140-5, 149-54, 159, 163-71; 
Kar/Vahdati; Tabarestani, 21-34; Roy, 212-3; Keddie/Monian, 528-32; Abrahamian (1993), 34-5, 54-
5, 138-141, (1999), 167, 171-2; Mayer, “The fundamentalist”, 119-21, 142; Zubaida, 108-118; Amini, 
“Parvandeha”, 4, 10-11; Niknam, “The Islamization”, 17-21, “L’Islamisation”, 47-59; Behrooz, 96-
100; Roy, 202-14; Clarke, 289; Khomeini/Curzu, 183, point 1; Rajaee, 222-31; Moroni, 233; Mir-
Hosseini, “Stretching”, 291-2, 298, 313; Ansari-Pour (1997), 335, 342-51; Martin, “Religion”, 36-45, 
Creating, 110-1, 173, 199-200; Wright, 268; Lawyers’ Committee, 11-4; Menashri, 120, 123-4, 127; 
Esposito, 3-5, 8-11; Boroujerdi, 14; Esfandiari, “The politics”, 83-6, 89; Tabari (Keyvan), 101-2, 106; 
Schweizer, 293; Khosrovani, 48; Keddie, 287-8, 292, 315; Arjomand, “The state”, 156-7, “Shi‘ite 
jurisprudence”, 96-105, “Shi‘ite Islam”, 305, 308-9, 311, 313, 315-6, Turban, 100-2, 149, 163-4, 182-
3, “Ideological”, 201-3, ‘Shari‘a’, 160; Sachedina, “The rule”, 133; Krawietz, 186; Mokhtari, 620-1; 
Ridgeon, 264; Tamadonfar, 208-9, 213-5, 218; Matsunaga, 325-6; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”. 
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the Prophet was lenient and calm since people would have fled from him if he had 
been stern), narrations (including those forbidding the implementation of hudud in 
enemy lands, or those forbidding excessively long communal prayers lest they 
discourage attendance) and juristic texts, but it was generally not expressed explicitly 
until recently. However, the concepts of maslahat, the paramount necessity of 
protecting the faith or the Muslim community, and the divine law’s adaptability to 
the exigencies of time and place (moqtaziyyat-e zaman va makkan) in certain 
respects, as explained above, facilitate the development of new axioms and principles 
of fiqh.  
 
This particular axiom states that, considering the necessity to ensure the survival of 
Islam, it is desirable to attract people to it and undesirable to endanger it or deter 
people from embracing it. This ‘secondary commandment’ overrides all 
commandments except those whose contravention Islam expressly forbids 
irrespective of risk or circumstance (including the prohibition of murder, which most 
jurists do not excuse even under coercion or danger of death, as confirmed by the 
penal code, article 211, and the 2012 penal code, articles 139 and 376). ‘Hatred of 
the faith’ can take various forms ranging from discontent among Muslims, which 
causes them to doubt their faith, to the implementation of punishments which cause 
non-Muslims to associate Islam with barbarism. This axiom, expressed or implied 
not infrequently by Iranians (including Ayatollah Montazeri) calling for change, has 
apparently caused jurists who regarded stoning as scripturally obligatory, including 
Khomeini, to recommend its suspension if it damaged the faith and the Muslims 
(vahn-e din va Mosalmanan). Incidentally, the phrase vahn-e nezam, ‘weakening the 
State’, is used in article 221-5, section 5, note 4 of the penal code bill as the 
condition allowing commutation of stoning to hanging or 100 lashes20. 
 
                                                
20 Nobahar, “Tanfir”; Shahrudi, 195, 203-5; Gilani, 86-7, 94; Zera‘at (1383), 242, (1385), 184-7; 
Khomeini, 336-7; Khezr Heidari; Radio Farda, “Matn”; Mortazavi, 74, 77-8, 88; Gorji, p. 33; Sharh-e 
Lom‘e, 84; Nurbaha, “Keyfar”, 128; Farhangi, 98-102, 104; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 4, 10-11; 
Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”; Eshkevari, “Ta’mol”; Keddie, 321; Qur’an 3:159 (Al-e Imran), 6:108 
(An‘am); penal code bill, art. 221-5, part 5, note 4. 
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6.4. Hudud were intended to be applied sparingly if ever.  
 
Some modern jurists, both reformist and deeply conservative and pro-regime, have 
argued that the requirement for four witnesses in ‘carnal’ crimes indicates that they 
were meant to be prosecuted rarely – for example if carried out so shamelessly that 
four people could witness them. (This idea is sometimes accompanied by the notion 
that some hadd penalties, including stoning, existed in pre-Islamic society or in 
previous Abrahamic religions and were simply confirmed, rather than decreed, by 
Islam). I have heard this concept cited by several judges arguing that Islamic penal 
laws are not as brutal and incompatible with modern society as is commonly thought, 
and that the mere presence of harsh penalties in scripture does not determine under 
what circumstances and how frequently they should be implemented. One judge, 
plainly calling the qat‘-e yadd (‘hand cutting’) punishment for theft ‘barbaric’, 
opined that amputation was only for professional thieves repeating the crime an 
inordinate number of times. Another, giving me the documents for theft case 2, 
emphasised the large number of complainants and repetitions of theft as 
exceptionally justifying amputation in that case (though legally these are irrelevant). 
Yet another judge explained that since witnesses to carnal crimes must legally have 
seen penetration itself, proof by testimony is impossible and they can only be proven 
by confession: the punishment is for the idiocy or shamelessness of confessing. This 
is an example of reliance on uncodified Shi‘i law: narrations require witnesses to 
have observed penetration (chapter 2, section 6.3), but the penal code (articles 77 and 
117) only requires them to have observed the act without further specifications. 
 
This judge, like many who emphasise the strictness of proof in hudud, did not 
mention ‘elm-e qazi, which, as the case studies show, can easily bypass these 
vaunted strictures; nor did he acknowledge the possibility that forced, unintentional 
or otherwise invalid confessions could be used as evidence. The reformist Grand 
Ayatollahs Montazeri and Sanei, emphasising the impossible stringency of proof, 
have speculated that the punishment is only a deterrent or for the shamelessness of 
confessing; Montazeri has doubted the applicability of ‘elm. The stringency of proof 
in hudud has been used by reformists to promote leniency, but also by government 
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officials, judges and pro-regime scholars to emphasise the consequent supposed 
rarity (or non-existence) of hadd sentences such as amputation and stoning, perhaps 
to counter the image of barbarity created by Iran’s use of harsh punishments21.  
 
6.5. Islam is compatible with human rights. 
 
Both Iranian and international scholars and authorities have sought to counter the 
stern image of Islamic law by arguing that Islam is adaptable to the exigencies of the 
times, that it is inherently lenient, that its commandments which are now considered 
objectionable were merely the result of social necessity during the early Islamic era 
and can evolve, or that its criminal laws have been misconstrued. For example, 
Ayatollah Sanei holds that, considering the principle whereby Islam should be 
acceptable to believers, laws which are difficult to accept should be reformulated, 
and of all equally valid scriptural interpretations, those most consonant with current 
ethics should be chosen. Several scholars have expressed similar views and 
suggested that some scriptural commandments were intended to apply to all times 
and places and others were intended as adaptable to different circumstances. Some 
declare that heavy scriptural punishments (including hudud) for crimes represent 
their maximum penalties, not the penalties they always carry22.  
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Eickelman, 19-20, 23-5; Tibi, 94-5; Kutty, 2-3, 5; Ahmad, 9-14; Fish, 325-6; Takeyh, 288, 291-6; 
Wright, 260, 263; Filali-Ansary, 61-3, 66; Schweizer, 298-9; Keddie, 17, 269, 281, 293-7, 304-11, 
319-21; Hefner, 184-5, 188-9, 195, 197, 200-1; Khadduri, 16; Morgan-Foster, 376, 393-5; 
Barlow/Akbarzadeh, 418-9; Sardar Ali; Shah; Razavi, 1227-31; Fazaeli, 3-6, 8; Kusha, 94-6, 113, 
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291-2, 298, 313, “The construction”, 1-4, 8-14, 20-6, “The politics”, 10-15, “Sharia”, 362, 365-6. 
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Occasionally mentioned is the idea that hudud are applicable only in a society free of 
want (and therefore the impetus for crime). This notion, attributed inter alia to 
Khomeini23, would entirely remove the necessity for debate regarding the application 
of irreversible hadd penalties. 
 
Another claim is that the harsh scriptural penalties were only intended as deterrents, 
while their impossibly stringent proof requirements would prevent their actual 
application. (Again, this overlooks the ease of sentencing allowed by ‘elm-e qazi). 
Qesas-e nafs – retaliation for murder – has been described as an indication of Islam’s 
respect for human life. The emphasis on its deterrent function and the exhortation of 
the awliya-ye damm (‘keepers of the blood’, the victim’s heirs who can demand the 
murderer’s execution, accept blood money instead or pardon completely) to forgive 
murderers have been presented as signs of the divine law’s merciful spirit24.  
 
Sometimes the movement to reconcile Islam with humanistic values manifests itself 
through novel scriptural interpretations. For example, Qabel and Bazargan have 
argued, through etymology and scriptural usage, that the word rajm indicates 
banishment, not stoning (though the reformist mujtahid Eshkevari counters that some 
narrations describe ‘stones’, undermining this interpretation). Some modern scholars 
(including Bazargan and Qabel) have used similar arguments to interpret ‘the thief, 
male or female, cut off their hands’ (Qur’an 5:38) as meaning that the hand is 
‘marked’, or that thieves must be ‘cut off’ from opportunities to steal. Others declare 
that the punishments for zena were only intended for professional adulterers, 
meaning prostitutes, or that the punishment for ‘women guilty of lewdness’ of being 
‘confined to houses until death takes them or God opens a way for them’ (Qur’an 
4:15) indicates a quarantine to avoid contagion, the ‘way’ opened by God being 
simply repentance or marriage. Some argue that the prohibition against adulterers 
and idolaters marrying anyone but each other (Qur’an 24:3) indicates that adultery 
was not intended to be punishable by stoning, whereby they would not survive to 
                                                
23 Mottahedeh, 180; Peters, 18, 22; Bielefeldt, 245-6. 
24 Tabrizi, 256-60; Amini, “Boghz”, “Parvandeha”, 10-11; Nobahar, “Qachaq”, 204-5, “Ahdaf”, 138-
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marry. (In a similar spirit but regarding women’s rights, Muhammad Abduh, a 
reformist 19th-century Egyptian Grand Mufti and Islamic modernist, famously argued 
that since the Qur’an allows polygyny contingently on the husband’s ability to treat 
his wives equally (4:3) and elsewhere declares that men cannot treat their wives 
equally (4:129), it implicitly forbids polygyny)25.  
 
Several scholars have claimed that Islam is lenient, egalitarian and completely 
compatible with democracy, human rights and personal freedoms, which it 
anticipated centuries before the Enlightenment, and that its patriarchal 
misinterpretation by self-serving authorities or adulteration by culture-bound custom 
have caused its misconception as a force for inequality and minute control of 
personal matters. Compatibility of Islam with democracy often associates 
‘consultation’ (shura) as in Qur’an 3:159 (“consult them in affairs”) and 42:38 
(“those who … conduct their affairs by mutual consultation”) with democracy, an 
idea enshrined in article 7 of the Iranian Constitution and supported by Ayatollah 
Montazeri. However, there also exists the argument that Islam offers another version 
of human rights or an alternative form of freedom: not the secular liberty limited 
only by that of others, but freedom to pursue ‘rectitude’ and attain a spiritual 
development that secular models lack. Indeed some scholars characterise absolute 
freedom as slavery to animalistic desires, and obedience to God as liberation from 
them by the divine truth. Some add that Islam allows freedom of opinion – as long as 
those opinions are not contrary to Islam26. 
                                                
25 Mashini; Bielefeldt, 244-5; Krämer, 31-3; Keddie, 30; Morgan-Foster, footnote 144; Sardar Ali, 
450-1; Shah, 483-5; Kusha, 109-10; Eshkevari, “‘Aql”; Qabel, “Barresi”, “Porseshha”; 
“Misconception”: http://www.misconceptions-about-islam.com/cut-off-hands-theft.htm; Universal 
Unity: http://www.universalunity.net/Punishment_For_Theft.htm; Quran Inspector: 
http://submission.org/d/x/Quran_Inspector_EN_AR.html#4; Qur’an 4:3, 4:15, 4:129 (Nisa’), 5:38 
(Ma’iddah), 24:3 (Nur). 
26 Khosroshahi, 177-8, 184; Nobahar, “Qachaq”, 187, 192-3, 199, 204-5, “Be suye”, 335-7, 340-1; 
Kar, “Iranian law”, 8-13; Khezr Heidari; Abdo; Baderin, “Islam and the realization”, 11-2, 15-18, 21-
5, “Introduction”, xv-xxiii, xxix-xxxi; Khatami, 7-8, 10, 16, 24-5, 42, 44-8, 65-6, 72-3, 75-9, 88, 93-6, 
103-23, 128, 131; Menashri, 123-5, 134; Arjomand (1981), 313-4; Newman, “Khomeini”, 579-81; 
Kant, 72-8, 124; UN Economic and Social Council, “Report”, paragraph 16; Aman; Jeffries; De Luce; 
Campbell; Kadivar, “Political rights”, 115; Salimi, iv-ix; Javadi Amuli, 16-7; Khamini’i, 45-50, 54-8; 
Martin, Creating, 101-3, 140-1, 172; Esfandiari, “The politics”, 81-2; Mokhtari, 616-9; Boroujerdi, 
15; Bielefeldt, 241-7; Rezaei, “Islamic sharia”, 107, 113-4, 116, 118-24; Akhavi, “Shiite theories”, 
141-3, 150; Akbarzadeh, “General Introduction”, 8-13; Mayer, “The universality”, 316, “The 
respective”, 78-80, 84, 96, “The Islam”, 0-1, 6-8, 13, 27; Kamrava (2006), 133; Mazrui, 250-1; 
Eickelman, 19-20, 23-5; Kutty, 2-3, 5; Ahmad, 9-14; Takeyh, 288, 291-6; Hamdi, 134, 136, 138; 
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Several scholars, including the reformists Kadivar and Qabel, argue that Islamic law 
is flexible because its essence is binding, while its details are adaptable to 
circumstances, especially if, like stoning, they were absorbed from pre-Islamic praxis 
(ahkam-e emza’i, ‘endorsed commandments’) rather than being introduced by Islam 
(ahkam-e ta’sisi, ‘decreed commandments’). (Ayatollah Mar‘ashi dismisses this, 
arguing that Islam’s endorsement renders even pre-Islamic laws authoritative; 
however, they can be overridden through maslahat). Some, including the reformists 
Malekian and Mojtahed Shabestari, argue that Islam introduced ethical goals and 
improved upon existing conditions within the limits of its environment, and this 




Several principles of Shi‘i law promote lenience. Some could easily shape legal 
usage or reform without departing significantly from extant law. Others, incorporated 
into a judicious bid to minimise ‘harm’ or ‘harm to the regime’, could bring radical 
change while maintaining an Islamic pedigree, thereby solving the problem of 
permitting lenience while maintaining an Islamic state. It is clear from the extensive 
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discussion among modern Iranian jurists that avenues for maximising lenience are 
being explored and could, if the authorities collaborated, facilitate lenient reforms. 
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4. Crime-specific regulations. 
 
While chapters 2 and 3 explained, respectively, laws and principles affecting all 
hudud, this chapter describes regulations specific to hadd crimes which can carry 
irreversible penalties in the first instance. It begins by discussing conditions affecting 
multiple crimes (sections 1-2), and then gives definitions and regulations for each 
crime in turn.  
 
Unless footnotes refer to codified laws, these definitions and regulations come from 
Shi‘i law as explained by modern Iranian jurists, and, where applicable, earlier jurists 
to whom they refer. Where footnotes to basic definitions give both codified laws and 
scholarly sources, this indicates that those juristic sources agree with those codified 
laws, and any exceptions (e.g. parameters in juristic texts absent in codified law) are 
pointed out.  
 
Reliance on Shi‘i law (as presented by Iranian jurists) is necessary in discussing 
these crimes and punishments because, as explained earlier, the codified law is often 
vague and implies reference to Shi‘i law, which legal specialists acknowledge as 
ultimately authoritative. The case studies (chapters 5-9) also show that judges and 
lawyers routinely use Shi‘i law. Often, especially for basic definitions, the codified 
law mirrors the consensus of Shi‘i jurists. With more complex issues, the codified 
law represents one of several positions derivable from Shi‘i law, and not always the 
most lenient one. 
 
As well as rendering the case studies in chapters 5-9 comprehensible by providing a 
compendium of relevant rules, this chapter also discusses important obstacles to 
lenience. For example, gender inequalities in divorce and child custody laws hinder 
lenience in the case studies, and the definition of rape as ‘coercive zena’ can 
facilitate prosecution of those who report rapes but cannot prove coercion. 
 
The discussion also reveals the sheer complexity of many parameters governing 
these hudud, and the consequent proliferation of juristic opinions about them. This 
 98 
multiplicity, which can favour lenience, contrasts with the simplistic harshness 
observed in several forthcoming case studies. It also contains the possibility of an 
equally Islamic, but more lenient, code of laws. 
 
1. Extent of penetration and testimony to it.  
 
Crimes involving penetration of the male organ (sodomy, zena and pimping) depend 
on the glans being entirely hidden. Various narrations require evidence to zena or 
sodomy to describe penetration ‘as of the rod (mile) into the collyrium bottle 
(sormedan)’ or ‘the rope into the well’ and to remove any doubt regarding coercion1.  
 
A consummated marriage, which creates ehsan (access to a spouse2), also requires 
full penetration of the glans. Not even children prove consummation, because 
pregnancy could have occurred through non-penetrative insemination. Though 
implausible, parthenogenesis is accepted by several pre-modern and modern jurists 
including Khomeini, and two court rulings acquit pregnant women (one found to be a 
virgin) of zena because non-penetrative insemination was not disproven3. 
 
These parameters are given in far greater detail in Shi‘i juristic works than in the 
penal code, which merely requires observation of the carnal act, not specifically of 
genital contact or its extent, in witnesses to carnal crimes (articles 77, 117, 128; 
similarly, penal code bill, article 213-2). Likewise it makes ehsan dependent on 
copulation (article 83) without specifying full penetration of the glans. The 2012 
penal code explicitly requires direct observation (articles 182, 199) and penetration 
of the glans (articles 222, 232, 234). 
 
                                                
1 Zera‘at (1383), 251-2, (1385), 96, 104, 217, 223, 243; Mo’meni, 81-4, 90, 103-5, 128-9, 148-9, 151, 
154, 161, 163; Khomeini, 306-7, 322, 324, 327, 329-30, 342, 345; Lom‘e (vol.1), 175, (vol.2), 233-6, 
242-4; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 7, 10, 20, 31-4, 59, 72, 82; Deh Abadi, 39; Mortazavi, 31-2, 40-4; Gorji, 13, 
15-6, 19-20, 42; Bazgir, 337-41; Hojjati, 358, 362; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 148-9; Clarke, 298. 
2 See section 3.4 below. 
3 Mo’meni, 103-4, 128-9, 148-9, 151, 154, 161; Khomeini, 306-7, 324, 329, 345; Lom‘e, 236, 244; 
Sharh-e Lom‘e, 31-5, 58, 82; Zera‘at (1385), 96; Deh Abadi, 39; Gilani, 45-6; Mortazavi, 31-2; Gorji, 
19; Hojjati, 321-2; Bazgir, 201-3; Clarke, 295. 
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2. Mahduroldamm status. 
 
Mahduroldamm means ‘whose blood is forfeit’; damm is blood and hadar is 
‘expendable’. The concept is relevant to hudud whenever hadd crimes also involve 
murder. Since a few such instances occur in the case studies, mahduroldamm status 
should be explained. 
 
The idea of mahduroldamm is that some people deserve to die, for instance by 
committing crimes carrying the death penalty or being enemies of God, and their 
murder is therefore unpunishable. According to article 295, section j, note 2, of the 
penal code, a murderer who proves belief in the victim’s mahduroldamm status in 
court cannot be executed for the murder, but must pay diyeh (blood money) if the 
belief was incorrect, and nothing if it was correct. In April 2007, six militiamen were 
reportedly acquitted by the Supreme Court on the basis of this article, after 
murdering five people whom they believed ‘morally corrupt’. Two, killed for having 
an illicit love affair, were in fact married to each other, but the killers were acquitted 
because they did not know this4. 
 
There is a narration in which a man says that if he found his wife committing 
adultery with another man, he would kill both, and the Prophet retorts that four 
witnesses would still be necessary to prove the pair’s guilt. This narration is used to 
argue that a husband can kill his wife caught in adultery, but must prove guilt or be 
executed. Furthermore, he must have seen the required amount of penetration, and 
can only kill the woman if he knows she consented. Another narration says that 
whoever breaks into a house with the intent of theft or debauchery is 
mahduroldamm. Only wives (and their lovers), not other relatives, can be killed if 
caught in adultery; and a wife who witnesses her husband’s adultery not only cannot 
punish him but receives eighty lashes for slander if she divulges what she saw. (A 
man can perform li‘an – divorce through his oaths that his wife committed adultery 
and her oaths to the contrary – if he suspects his wife’s infidelity but cannot prove it; 
wives have no such option). The concept of mahduroldamm has other applications: 
                                                
4 Penal code articles 184, 226 and 295 note 2; Sepehri. 
 100 
for instance, there is no qesas (execution for murder) for killing apostates, who are 
mahduroldamm, and injuries suffered while unjustifiably attacking another person 
are ineligible for retribution because the aggressor’s limbs are hadar. Koffar-e harbi 
– infidels who are enemies of Islam – are also mahduroldamm. In the codified law, 
article 630 of the penal code allows a man who catches his wife in adultery to kill 
both parties if he knows the woman consented, and if not, only the man5. 
 
The concept of mahduroldamm is in the penal code bill and the 2012 penal code. 
Both also specifically allow the murder of wives and their lovers caught in adultery6. 
 
Regarding case studies, the defendant in adultery case 10 was apparently forced to 
confess to adultery with a man to exonerate her husband of his murder. Adultery case 




Zena is illicit penetration between a man and a woman. It has multiple ‘variants’, 
including adultery (zena while married), incest (zena with blood relatives), and rape 
(coercive zena). These, and other parameters, are discussed in subsections 3.1-8. The 
analysis of zena and its implications reveals the interpretability of relevant scripture, 
and unearths contradictions and institutionalised inequalities within the law. 
 
Definitions of zena frequently recurring in contemporary Iranian juristic texts, 
themselves paraphrasing older juristic texts, are as follows. Zena is the anterior or 
posterior penetration of a woman by the generative organ of a man who is forbidden 
to her, so that its glans is entirely hidden, in the absence of doubt, coercion or 
distress, and in the presence of bulugh (the age of majority), ‘aql (mental sanity), 
ekhtiar (free will), qasd (intention) and awareness that the act is forbidden (these are 
the conditions of responsibility). Zena is either adultery, where the conditions of 
                                                
5 Gilani, 105-6; Shahrudi, 64-6; Mo’meni, 151-2; Khomeini, 410, 418-9, 424; Zera‘at (1383), 301; 
Lom‘e, 241, 267, 291-2; Shahid, Qesas, 89; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 61, 215; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 7; Civil 
Code article 1052; penal code article 630. 
6 Penal code bill article 313-1; 2012 penal code article 303. 
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ehsan apply and the punishment is stoning (rajm, sangsar), or fornication, where 
they are absent and the punishment is a hundred lashes. Special variants are rape 
(coercive zena), incest with blood relatives, zena with one’s father’s wife, zena with 
a Muslim woman (for non-Muslim males), or zena repeated the fourth time (some 
say the third) after the hadd has been applied for the previous three (some say two) 
instances. These carry the death penalty. (The codified law, apart from the new 2012 
penal code, does not mention the glans or distress, and prescribes death on the fourth 
repetition. It otherwise reproduces these parameters. The 2012 penal code, article 
222, does mention the glans). 
 
Zena is proven by: four confessions made before the judge trying the case, while 
under the conditions of responsibility enumerated above, and, according to some 
jurists, made in four separate court sessions; or the testimony, describing full 
penetration of the glans, of witnesses, four male, or three male plus two female or, 
according to some, two male plus four female in zena punishable by flogging, if the 
witnesses possess ‘edalat (righteousness), which according to some must be 
established before testimony can be heard; or, according to some, ‘elm-e qazi. This 
means either the judge’s personal knowledge through seeing the crime, or his 
conjecture of the crime, deriving either from the two other forms of proof 
(confession or testimony), or, in another interpretation, from any form of evidence. 
Pregnancy cannot prove zena. In zena proven by confession, any death penalty, but 
no other penalty, lapses with retraction (enkar) of confession; furthermore repentance 
after confession gives the Imam or his representative the discretion of pardon. In 
zena proven by testimony, repentance before the testimony has been completely 
heard causes the hadd to lapse. (The codified law, apart from the 2012 penal code, 
reproduces these parameters except that it does not mention four confession hearings, 
specify that ‘edalat must be previously established, or define ‘elm. The 2012 penal 
code denies the need for four confession hearings, fails to mention pregnancy, 
requires establishment of ‘edalat, and gives ‘elm sweeping powers: see chapter 2, 
section 6.4)7. 
                                                
7 Penal code articles 63-97, 578; PCCM article 155; Civil Code articles 1262, 1317, 1319; CPC 
articles 125, 151-4; Constitution article 38; 2012 penal code articles 160-1, 168, 170, 171 note 2, 176, 
210-1; Qur’an 24:2 (sura Nur); Khomeini, 300, 317-22, 327-9, 341-2, 345, 373; Zera‘at (1383), 216, 
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Article 637 of the penal code mandates a ta‘ziri (discretionary) penalty with a 
maximum of 99 lashes for ‘actions against chastity’ not amounting to zena. Some 
jurists combine narrations to yield a minimum of 30, and a maximum of 99 lashes 
(‘one stroke below the hadd’), for lesser variants of zena or sodomy8. 
 
3.1. The punishment of children born through zena. 
 
In Iran, by default, children born of zena do not belong to their parents’ lineage, and 
therefore cannot bear their surnames, be financially maintained or educated by them, 
or inherit from them. (The exceptions are children conceived through error or 
coercion, assigned to the lineage of the coerced or misled parent). ‘Illegitimate’ 
offspring are denied a shenasnameh, the main identity document used in Iran, and 
therefore many basic rights. Because they do not ‘belong’ to their parents, they can 
be forcibly removed from their parents’ homes to Behzisti, welfare and social service 
agencies. Furthermore, parents can publicly deny their ‘illegitimate’ children with 
impunity, while they are punished with eighty lashes for denying their ‘legitimate’ 
children. Taharat-e maulad – ‘purity of birth’, meaning ‘legitimacy’ – is a necessary 
qualification for judges and the head of state, positions permanently off-limits to 
‘illegitimate’ individuals irrespective of ability. ‘Legitimacy’ is also necessary for 
witnesses. Rejection of testimony is part of the punishment for slander as in Qur’an 
24:4 (“flog them with eighty stripes, and reject their testimony ever after”), whereas 
‘illegitimate’ individuals, even if ‘righteous’ and otherwise qualified, are excluded as 
if they were criminals. Parents of ‘illegitimate’ offspring, if the death penalty does 
not apply to them, will only suffer the temporary sting of the whip for creating them, 
while those children are punished for the rest of their lives for others’ misdeeds 
before their birth. This is, in its way, an irreversible punishment, which also 
                                                                                                                                     
226-8, 248, 252-3, 256, 258, (1385), 242-3, (1385/2), 52-3, 62, 205, 209, 213, 225-6, 248-9; 
Golduzian, 35, 94-8-100-1; Mo’meni, 81-8, 90, 104-7, 147-51, 156, 161, 163; Mortazavi, 14-6, 19-23, 
34-5, 41-2, 89-92; Lom‘e (vol.1), 162, 165-6, 174, 178-9; Lom‘e, 233-6, 240, 243; Shahrudi, 16-9, 21-
2, 34, 38, 53-5, 70; Shahrudi (same book, pardon section), 199, 208; Mohammadi, 302, 335-6; 
Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 147, 149; Gorji, 13-5, 20-1, 40; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 16, 20-1, 59, 72, 75, 81, 102; 
Gilani, 35-6, 63, 103-4; Hojjati, 316, 354-6, 363; Mar‘ashi, 235-7; Arabiyan, 51-5, 58, 63-7, 69-70, 
73-4; Mohaqqeq Damad, 12-3, 23-33, 36-40; Montazeri, topics 3156-71. 
8 Penal code article 637; Khomeini, 343-5; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 79, 106. 
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contravenes the established principle of individual responsibility, expressed in 
various Qur’anic verses and narrations9. 
 
3.2. Incest and rape. 
 
Incest and rape are defined as varieties of zena, incest being ‘zena with blood 
relatives’ (zena ba maharem-e nasabi) and rape being ‘coercive zena’ (zena be 
‘onf/ikrah). The penal code simply prescribes execution (qatl) for both. Narrations 
mostly mandate execution with a sword, ‘a blow to the neck’ without specifying an 
instrument, or ‘a blow with a sword’, sometimes with the qualifications ‘to the neck’ 
or ‘whether it kills or not’, sometimes followed by lifelong incarceration for 
survivors, sometimes not. At least one narration prescribes stoning for incest, for 
which some jurists believe that the Imam can choose between stoning and the sword-
related punishments. Nevertheless, executions for incest or rape generally occur by 
hanging, which narrations do not mention10. 
 
Apart from blood relatives (maharem-e nasabi) there are two other types of relatives: 
relatives by marriage (maharem-e sababi) and by milk (maharem-e rezai). The Civil 
Code (article 1032) defines blood relatives as siblings, parents and their antecedents 
or siblings, and offspring and their descendants. Sababi relatives (article 1033) are 
one’s spouse’s blood relatives or one’s blood relatives’ spouses. Rezai relatives 
(article 1046) are those who have drunk the same person’s milk, as well as the 
producer of said milk. Marriage is forbidden with all nasabi and rezai relatives and 
most sababi relatives11.  
 
                                                
9 Penal code article 142; Civil Code articles 884, 1164-7 and 1313; 2012 penal code articles 140, 247; 
Khomeini, 245; Behrooz, 95; Zera‘at (1383), 216, (1385/2), 206; Nobahar, Qawa’id, on personal 
responsibility; Vahidmanesh; Pourzand; Syed; Hashemi, 549; Sardar Ali, 431 and note 37; Shah, 477, 
496; Dalacoura, 236; Zuhili, 80; Berween, 603; Afrasiabi, 66; Hujjati Kirmani, 105-6; Qur’an 24:4 
(Nur), 53:38 (Najm), 35:18 (Fatir), 5:105 (Ma’iddah), 41:46 (Ha Mim Sajda or Fussilat), 49:13 
(Hujurat); 4:79 (Nisa’). (Some Western nations perpetrate similar injustices, e.g. British Nationality 
Act 1981, sections 2, 3(6)c; 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum act, contravening ICCPR 26 
and UDHR 2, 25.2). 
10 Penal code article 82; 2012 penal code article 225/a; Gilani, 65-6; Zera‘at (1383), 230, 232, (1385), 
123-5, 130; Mo’meni, 114; Mortazavi, 47-8, 50-1; Gorji, 25; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 26, 28-9; Bazgir, 153-6, 
159-68, 176-8; Mar‘ashi, 237; Mo’meni, 121-2; Montazeri, topic 3159; Khomeini, 332-3. 
11 Civil Code articles 1031-3, 1045-9; Zera‘at (1383), 231, (1385) 127.  
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A common juristic opinion, represented in codified law, is that only incest with 
nasabi relatives (plus one’s father’s wife) carries the death penalty. Jurists frequently 
insist on certainty of the blood tie and the parties’ awareness thereof, exercising 
‘caution in shedding blood’12 (chapter 3, section 1). 
 
Rape contains two elements: zena and coercion (‘onf, ikrah, ejbar). Some jurists 
point out that ikrah need not be physical. Most consider any claim of ikrah in zena to 
be acceptable by default, without proof, as does article 67 of the penal code. A 
minority insist that coercion be proven, since the default is lack of coercion13.  
 
In several known cases, women who reported rapes could not prove coercion and 
were punished for zena; sometimes they named attackers, who denied everything and 
were released, undermining the women’s rape claims. (The 2012 penal code, article 
218, note 1, may limit this by requiring further investigation of accused rapists who 
deny responsibility). Women who report rapes or consistently claim ikrah are 
frequently called zanieh (fornicatress) in court documents even if ultimately 
acquitted as coerced. In one case, a girl who reported a rape supported by video 
evidence was convicted because her prior loss of virginity meant that she was a 
‘loose woman’ who must therefore have consented to zena. Some minors have been 
condemned to death for incest despite consistently claiming rape. Risks in reporting 
rape exist not only in Iran but in other countries where rape is defined as zena plus 
coercion, for example Pakistan, Mauritania and Nigeria. In October 2008, a 13-year-
old Somali girl (probably unmarried) reported her rape to the authorities and was 
publicly stoned to death for zena. The risk of reporting rapes is magnified by the 
severe penalty (death) for rape: acknowledging coercion potentially means having to 
execute accused rapists. This can be solved by declaring the woman’s rape claim 
sufficient to exonerate her but not to convict her alleged attacker without additional 
proof. Khomeini advocates this14. 
                                                
12 Zera‘at (1383), 229-31, (1385), 126-8; Hojjati, 330-1; Gilani, 64; Mo’meni, 113-6; Khomeini, 332; 
Mortazavi, 47-8; Bazgir, 153-6, 159-68, 258-60; Gorji, 25; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 26. 
13 Penal code article 67; 2012 penal code article 225/d; Zera‘at (1385), 130-2, (1383), 232; Saberi, 
304-6; Lom‘e, 236; Khomeini, 329; Mo’meni, 105; Bazgir, 176-8; Hojjati, 310, 356; Gorji, 15-6.  
14 Hojjati, 310, 356; Zera‘at (1383), 232, (1385), 131-2; Bazgir, 159-61, 176-8, 290-1, 293-4; 
Mo’meni, 105; Khomeini, 329; Gorji, 15-6; Lom‘e, 236; Saberi, 304-6; Quraishi, 303-4; Amini, 
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Article 67 accepts rape claims by males or females, implying that females can rape 
males. However, article 82 only prescribes death for male rapists. Jurists debate 
whether female rapists can be executed. Some say they can, others not, since the 
death penalty is inapplicable by default. Some argue that the masculine zani in article 
82, though perhaps resulting from the legislator’s unconscious assumption of 
masculinity, only indicates a male, and principles of lenience, including ‘caution in 
shedding blood’, therefore exclude females. The 2012 penal code has no provision 
for females raping males and implies that rapists are male15. 
 
3.3. Rape and murder of underage girls. 
 
The problem of the rape and murder of underage girls reveals gender and age 
inequalities that many jurists dislike but consider scripturally established, which 
hinders their removal. The analysis of relevant laws highlights the obstacles to 
reform created by the dominant ‘scriptural immutability paradigm’. 
 
Article 82 of the penal code, prescribing death for ‘coercive zena’, does not mention 
age. Article 63 defines zena as an action between a man and a woman, potentially 
implying that the act is only zena if both partners are adults. Article 83 decrees the 
stoning penalty for ‘a) zena of a [married] man and b) zena of a [married] woman 
with a balegh [adult] man’, specifying that a married woman is flogged, not stoned, 
for zena with an underage boy. This implies that zena can have one underage 
partner, and the specification ‘balegh’ for a woman’s partner in zena but not a man’s 
implies that a man’s punishment does not depend on his partner’s age. The penal 
                                                                                                                                     
“Parvandeha”, 9; Abdel Wedoud; New York Times, “Nigerian woman”, “Rape victim”; Al Jazeera 
English, “Somali fighters”; BBC News, “Stoning victim”; Amnesty International USA, “Somalia”; 
Bloch; Mydans; communication with Iranian lawyers. 
15 Penal code arts 67, 82; 2012 penal code articles 225/d, 229; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 29; Zera‘at (1385), 
126-7, 131-2, (1383), 230; Gorji, 15-6. This unconscious assumption of masculinity, also seen in the 
next section where blood money for ‘humans’ is assumed to apply to males only, is common in 
Iranian laws and juristic texts. For example, in Civil Code articles 1049-50 and 1056-8, ‘somebody’ or 
‘people’ refer to males, while women have to be specified as such, implying two categories: ‘people’ 
and ‘women’. Khamini’i (“Individual rights” p. 47) likewise writes of ‘people’ and ‘their wives’. 
Ironically, this characterisation of females as ‘the other’ contradicts what is known of mammalian 
biology, whereby the male is a modified female: Jolly, 235; Carr and Norris, 138; Müller, 305; 
Squires, 138. 
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code explicitly requires bulugh in both partners, with specific exceptions, for sodomy 
but not zena. Still, because article 63 arguably requires that both partners be adults, 
some say that the law decrees no specific punishment for zena (including rape) with 
an underage girl (though the 2012 penal code, article 222 note 2, considers zena to 
have occurred even if one partner was underage, without specifying gender). 
 
Most jurists hold that a man does not suffer the full hadd for zena with an underage 
girl; because rape is defined as a type of zena, there is confusion between consensual 
zena and rape in this respect. Jurists offer several reasons why zena – or potentially 
rape – involving a small girl does not attract the full hadd, sometimes accompanied 
by the argument that since the default is lenience towards the accused and ‘caution in 
shedding blood’ forbids death penalties unless clearly applicable, there is no death 
penalty for rape of underage girls unless explicitly mandated by law16.  
 
One reason offered is that ‘aql and bulugh of both parties is necessary to the 
definition of zena; this is partially supported by narrations using the word marah, 
‘woman’, or describing men not receiving the full hadd for zena with the insane or 
underage. In other, equally reliable narrations, men receive the full hadd for zena 
with underage girls. However, they were overridden by those indicating a lesser 
penalty, because of ‘caution in shedding blood’17. This creates a precedent for 
choosing the most lenient option in the absence of other determining factors. 
 
Another reason offered is that the ehteram – respect – due to a saghireh (‘small’, 
meaning underage girl) or a madwoman is less than that due a fully grown, sane 
woman, so that crimes against them are less heinous; this is why slander of the 
underage or insane carries no hadd (as in article 146 of the penal code) and 
presumably why Khomeini favours diyeh over qesas for their murder. Yet another 
argument, supported by narrations, is that the pleasure deriving from the act, whether 
for the man or for the girl, is inferior to that afforded by zena between adults. Some 
draw a parallel with zena of a married woman and a small boy, which only carries 
                                                
16 Gilani, 78; Bazgir, 38-9; Mo’meni, 122-3, 137-9; Mortazavi, 52; Zera‘at (1385), 142; Gorji, 27-8; 
Lom‘e, 238; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 28, 46, 56; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”. 
17 Bazgir, 153-9; Mo’meni, 122-3, 137-9; Mortazavi, 52; Zera‘at (1385), 142; Gorji, 27-8; Sharh, 28. 
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the flogging penalty for her because a small boy cannot experience as much pleasure 
from zena as a grown man, and by failing to give a large amount of pleasure, the 
woman has committed a less reprehensible crime. This intriguingly implies a 
‘pleasure principle’ – whereby the heinousness of crimes derives from the amount of 
pleasure they give – almost diametrically opposed to the more familiar ‘harm 
principle’, whereby only harmful acts are crimes. Finally, there exists the minority 
argument that ‘onf (coercion) of minors is impossible because coercion implies 
overcoming resistance, and children are defenceless18.  
 
Though sodomy with underage boys carries the death penalty, implying punishability 
irrespective of the other party’s age, the consensus is that this is specific to sodomy. 
Some jurists consider rape of a minor worse than rape of an adult, but even they 
mostly concede that since scripture does not conclusively indicate the death penalty 
for rape of underage girls, and scriptural commandments cannot be overturned 
merely because they seem unreasonable, this act cannot carry the death penalty19.  
 
A minority nevertheless advocate the full penalty. One scholar simply declares that 
child rape is worse than adult rape, and cannot carry a lighter punishment. Another 
bewails the absence of an explicit punishment for child rape as “one of the penal 
code’s greatest flaws”, pronouncing both fiqh and the codified law defective in this 
regard. Even Khomeini holds that zena of a man with an underage girl carries the full 
hadd20. In a published ruling, a man pursues the death penalty for his 6-year-old 
daughter’s rapist, arguing that child rape is especially heinous; but the Supreme 
Court insists that the law decrees otherwise21. In another ruling, however, a man is 
sentenced to death for raping an eight-year-old girl, but it is unclear whether she had 
reached the age of nine lunar years22. Lunar years being approximately eleven days 
                                                
18 Gilani, 78; Bazgir, 38-9; Mo’meni, 122-3, 137-9; Zera‘at (1385), 142, (1385/2), 193; Khomeini, 
423; Mill, On Liberty, 10-21, 85-108, Utilitarianism, 257; Bentham, 170-2, 178-82; Beccaria, 34-5, 
43, 45, 49, 85-8, 98; Russell, 237-8; penal code articles 146, 621. 
19 Mo’meni, 122-3, 158; Bazgir, 153-9, 350-1; Khomeini, 342-3; Mortazavi, 99; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 28; 
penal code articles 111-2. 
20 Bazgir, 153-9; Zera‘at (1385), 142; Khomeini, 333-4; Gorji, 27. 
21 Bazgir, 268-9. 
22 Saberi, 277-8. 
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shorter than solar years, she would have reached bulugh 99 days before her ninth 
solar birthday. 
 
If underage girls are raped and also murdered, the possibility that their rape does not 
carry the death penalty creates additional problems. In both Shi‘i and codified law, 
the blood money (diyeh) for a murdered female is half that of a male. If a male rapes 
and murders an underage female, to have him executed her family must pay his 
family half the blood money of a ‘free human’ (meaning, of course, free male), a 
prohibitive amount, to compensate them for his loss, because his life is worth twice 
that of the girl he raped and murdered23. (Here, ‘free’ means ‘not a slave’). 
 
Blood money for murdered men, expressed in Shi‘i and codified law as 100 camels 
or equivalent values, is approximately 50,000 pounds or 77,000 US dollars for 1391 
(2012-3). Diyeh for intentional (not accidental) murder must be paid within a year 
unless agreed otherwise. It is unclear if such limits apply to compensation for a 
murderer’s execution, and whether a murdered woman’s family owes diyeh if they 
accept the victim’s diyeh but the murderer does not pay it and is executed24. 
 
Most jurists favour halved female diyeh, though at least two pre-modern jurists 
opposed it. In modern times, the reformist Grand Ayatollah Sanei supports equal 
diyeh irrespective of gender. The Qur’anic verses (2:178, 4:92, 5:45) concerning 
qesas and diyeh do not mandate inequality, though 2:178 decrees equivalence in 
qesas (retaliation for murder) – free for free, slave for slave, female for female. This 
has not prevented men from being executed for murdering women and vice versa, 
and the consensus is that no additional money is due if a woman is executed for a 
man’s murder. It is frequent for Qur’anic commandments to be refined by narrations, 
and this has happened for diyeh. Some narrations prescribe unequal diyeh; others 
                                                
23 Penal code articles 209, 258, 300-1; Khomeini, 416-7, 473-4; Gorji, Diyyat, 37, 40, 75-6; Shahid, 
Qesas, 59; Baiburdi, 12-14, 18-9; Mostafaei, “Dard”. Monetary rewards for murdering females may 
encourage suicidal male relatives to enrich their families by murdering wealthy women. 
24 Penal code articles 257, 297-8, 302; Khomeini, 473-4; Gorji, Diyyat, 37, 40, 45; Baiburdi, 12; 
Lom‘e,  295-6; Mortazavi (vol.3), 13-8, 21-3, 26-7; Brajer/Rahmatian, 2; Mo‘avvenat; BBC News, 
‘Iran lawyer’. The value of 100 camels apparently derives from a narration where God waived the 
Prophet’s grandfather’s promise to sacrifice one of his sons in exchange for 100 camels 
(Brajer/Rahmatian, 3, note 2). The victim’s family can demand more or accept less. 
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merely fix diyeh for ‘free humans’ as 100 camels, but were assumed to intend ‘male’ 
by ‘human’. Arguments for unequal diyeh have included women’s inherent 
inferiority, men’s role as breadwinners, necessitating greater compensation, and 
analogy with women’s halved status in testimony and inheritance. But some have 
suggested that diyeh is one of those commandments whose details vary with the 
exigencies of time and place, and that since women’s role in society has now 
changed, their diyeh should be equal. Sanei declares the ‘breadwinner’ rationale 
flawed because retired, unemployed or disabled men receive full diyeh. For Sanei, all 
humans have identical intrinsic value and Islam’s ‘default setting’ of equality can 
only be modified by specific scriptural texts, none of which support unequal diyeh25. 
 
Despite appeals to logic or changed circumstances, jurists have had difficulty arguing 
away these asymmetries (indeed halved female diyeh persists in the 2012 penal 
code). This illustrates the tension between the ‘scriptural immutability paradigm’ and 
the quest for adaptability discussed in chapter 1, sections 5.2 and 5.5. Some of the 
rationales offered for these inequalities invoke a morality which no longer resonates 




Eligibility for stoning depends on possessing ehsan during zena, therefore being 
mohsan or mohsaneh. Mohsan and mohsaneh (masculine and feminine respectively) 
in general usage mean ‘devout’, ‘abstemious’, ‘chaste’, or ‘free’ (not a slave), with 
etymological roots meaning ‘fortified’ or ‘entrenched’. Regarding adultery, however, 
ehsan means being free and in a consummated permanent marriage, or, for males, 
having a slave girl with whom one may copulate and has done so, and having 
‘access’ to that spouse or slave girl. The nature of ‘access’ is the subject of debate26. 
 
                                                
25 Baiburdi, 12-24; Shahid, Qesas, 59; Gorji, Diyyat, 75-6; Khomeini, 416-7, 473-4; Lom‘e, 271, 296; 
Mortazavi (vol.2), 30-3; Najvan; Khezr Heidari; De Luce; Jeffries. 
26 Mo’meni, 128; Mortazavi, 52; Dutton, 98-100; Wortabet and Porter, 61; Steingass, 21; Malik, 216-
7; Muslim, book 7, hadiths 2819 and 2874; Halm, 138; Mir-Hosseini, “The construction”, note 10. 
Shi‘i, but not Sunni, law allows ‘temporary marriage’ (nika mut‘a) with a pre-determined ‘expiry 
date’; it can last anywhere from a few hours to 99 years. A man may only have four simultaneous 
permanent marriages, but any number of temporary wives. 
 110 
Temporary marriage does not create ehsan, and slavery is probably irrelevant in 
contemporary Iran27; so for practical purposes, only permanent marriage creates 
ehsan. It must have been consummated by frontal penetration entirely concealing the 
glans while possessing ‘aql (sanity) and bulugh (majority), and according to some, 
also ekhtiar (free will) and qasd (intention). Jurists’ lists of these conditions vary, but 
generally include ‘aql and bulugh. Some jurists believe that all or some of these 
conditions need only apply to one partner; others require all in both. Ehsan lapses if 
any condition that initiates it subsequently disappears. Ehsan can exist for one 
partner only: for example, slaves, the underage and the insane lack ehsan, but, 
according to some, can create it in their spouses28.  
 
Article 83 of the penal code describes ehsan as the condition of men or women who, 
while mentally sane, have copulated with their permanent spouses and remain able to 
do so. Age is not mentioned, though ‘man’ and ‘woman’ could imply bulugh. Article 
85 says that a roj’i (revocable) divorce does not remove ehsan from either spouse, 
while a ba’en (irrevocable) divorce does. Article 86 says that lack of ‘access’ to 
one’s permanent spouse through “travel, incarceration or similar exculpatory 
conditions” precludes stoning29.  
 
Since ehsan requires consummation, jurists consider claims of no consummation, 
and therefore no ehsan, valid unless proven false through testimony or confession 
describing penetration of the glans (they do not mention ‘elm), and insist that 
children do not prove consummation. This is not in the codified law, which some 
jurists lament, arguing that the law should accept any unfalsified claim of no ehsan30. 
 
The most controversial and interpretable element of ehsan is ‘access’. Impossibility 
of copulation clearly removes ‘access’, as in article 83 of the penal code. However, 
article 85 says that a revocable divorce does not liberate either spouse from ehsan. In 
                                                
27 Scripture allows slavery, but contemporary Islamists and Muslim governments mostly ignore this. 
Griffel, “Introduction”, 14-5; Morgan-Foster, 369, note 17; Sardar Ali, 429, 457; Mortazavi, 52; 
Matsunaga, 323; Kusha, 109, 155, 294. 
28 Khomeini, 324-5; Mo’meni, 128-30; Mortazavi, 52; Zera‘at (1385), 138-9; Gorji, 29-30; Hojjati, 
316; Lom‘e, 236; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 31-2, 34-5, 37; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”. 
29 Penal code articles 83, 85-6. 
30 Zera‘at (1383), 237; Mo’meni, 129; Lom‘e, 236; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 31-2, 34-5. 
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a revocable divorce, the husband, but not the wife, may resume the marriage at any 
time during the wife’s waiting period (the three ‘monthly cycles’, or, after 
menopause, three months, during which a divorced wife cannot remarry)31. If only 
the husband has ‘access’ to the wife during this time, not vice versa, why does she 
have ehsan? 
 
Some jurists explain this through husbands’ unilateral conjugal rights, whereby 
husbands have the right of copulation with their wives but not vice versa. Men’s 
ehsan therefore hinges on their own ability to copulate with their wives; women’s 
ehsan depends on their husbands’ ability to copulate with them even if they do not. 
Therefore a wife remains under ehsan following a roj’i divorce because her husband 
could resume their marriage if he wanted to, even if the wife cannot. A small 
minority of scholars object to this, saying that since a wife’s access to her husband is 
necessary for ehsan, a roj’i divorce liberates her, though not him, from ehsan; and 
the idea of mutual ‘access’, favoured by some jurists, is expressed in article 83 of the 
penal code, though partially negated by article 85. In any case, some narrations 
declare that a roj’i divorce does not remove ehsan from either spouse, and most 
jurists agree, and also assign the right of copulation only to husbands32. 
 
The Civil Code implies husbands’ conjugal rights, declaring that while wives 
generally lose the right to financial maintenance by husbands through failure to 
perform their ‘marital duties’ (which, though listed, do not explicitly include 
copulation), they can refrain from copulating with husbands afflicted by venereal 
diseases. This supplements the implication of unilateral conjugal rights of penal code 
article 8533. 
 
Husbands’ unilateral conjugal rights undermine the concept of marital rape: by 
raping his wife, a man would only be taking what is rightfully his. Furthermore, 
some jurists, lawyers and even judges (see adultery cases 1-3) have suggested that 
                                                
31 Penal code articles 83, 85-6; Civil Code articles 1143, 1148-51. 
32 Zera‘at (1383), 234, (1385), 139, 141-2, 154-5, 149-50, 155; Mo’meni, 71, 129-30; Bazgir, 206-10, 
244-6; Khomeini, 325-6; Mortazavi, 52, 55-8; Gorji, 29-30; Lom‘e, 236-7; Sharh’e Lom‘e, 31, 34-5, 
37; Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 32-4. 
33 Civil Code articles 1106, 1108, 1127; penal code article 85. 
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ehsan depends on continued copulation rather than its mere possibility, so extended 
chastity within a marriage removes ehsan34. By this interpretation, a man could force 
ehsan on his wife by raping her. 
 
Since the impossibility of copulation between spouses removes ehsan, various 
obstacles to copulation are held to remove it also, though opinions vary as to whether 
they remove it in their own right or only because they prevent copulation. This issue 
can become rather complicated. 
 
It is generally agreed that absolute, intranscendible physical separation of spouses – 
through incarceration of one partner, for instance – precludes copulation and 
removes ehsan. There are narrations which support this; others declare spouses in 
different cities bereft of ehsan. Beyond this, the matter becomes vague and to some 
extent it bifurcates between the possibility that distance itself removes ehsan, and 
that difficulty of reunion, not mere distance, removes it. The second possibility also 
involves potential parameters of time and intention35. 
 
Some jurists and judges hold that a specific distance between spouses removes ehsan 
irrespective of its causes or ease of reunion. That distance is sometimes given as the 
hadd-e tarakhos (‘limit of permission’, from rukhsa, ‘licence’), which removes 
ehsan according to some narrations. It is the same distance which removes the 
normal duties of prayer and fasting, inaugurating the permission for the shortened 
‘travellers’ prayer’ and exempting travellers from fasting.  
 
Some jurists express the hadd-e tarakhos as the point beyond which one cannot hear 
the call to prayer in one’s town of residence (vatan) or see its inhabitants. At that 
point, one officially becomes ‘a traveller’, subject to the regulations for travellers. 
Others define a traveller as a person whose minimum ‘round trip’ is eight farsakhs or 
farsangs; this means that as soon as a person is four farsakhs or farsangs from their 
                                                
34 Zera‘at (1385), 155; Lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi, October 2006. Some northern Nigerian penal 
codes exclude marital rape “because of implied consent” (Peters, 15), as did India’s penal code until 
2006 (Ahmed, note 68). 
35 Hojjati, 317, 336-8; Bazgir, 243-4; Mo’meni, 129; Khomeini, 325; Mortazavi, 57-8; Zera‘at (1385), 
139-42, 153-5; Gorji, 29-30; Lom‘e, 236; Sharh’e Lom‘e, 31, 34. 
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home, they automatically become ‘a traveller’ because four further farsangs separate 
them from their home. In terms of ehsan, this means that spouses four farsangs apart 
lose ehsan. The definition of the farsang, an ancient unit often characterised as the 
distance covered by an hour’s walk, has varied considerably according to time and 
place, but contemporary jurists equate four farsangs with roughly 21.5 or 22 
kilometres. This is confirmed in some Supreme Court rulings and a written 
recommendation of the Judiciary office, though no such thing is present in the 
codified law. Some scholars point out that in very large cities with a diameter greater 
than the masafat-e shar‘i (‘legal distance’, a synonym for the distance of tarakhos), a 
couple more than four farsangs apart might still be within their vatan – place of 
habitation – which could conflict with conceptions of tarakhos which hinge upon 
leaving the vatan. Some nevertheless declare that the ‘doubt’ (shobhe) involved in 
such cases activates the qa‘edeye darr’ (‘axiom of removal’), whereby doubt favours 
the accused36. 
 
Some narrations declare that ehsan depends on a man’s access to his wife day and 
night, or at the beginning and end of each day. This could broaden the territory of 
ehsan to intercontinental proportions for those with access to swift modes of 
transport. Opinions based on these narrations mostly posit ease of reunion as the 
determining factor, allowing ehsan to survive distances greater than four farsangs if 
spouses can reunite ‘morning and night’. Some interpret such narrations as meaning 
that even access at times other than ‘morning’ and ‘night’ cannot create ehsan37. 
 
It is also possible that one does not lose ehsan by voluntarily making reunion or 
copulation impossible in order to commit zena whilst bereft of ehsan. This has 
support from a narration whereby the prayer obligation is not removed by travel 
                                                
36 Hojjati, 317, 336-42; Bazgir, 230-2, 243-55; Mortazavi, 58; Zera‘at (1383), 235, (1385), 139-40, 
153-4; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 34; Saberi 292-3; Opwis, 68-9; Houtum-Schindler, 584-6; “Travel Fiqh”: 
http://www.islamic-laws.com/travelfiqh.htm; Makarem Shirazi, estefta’at (solicited legal opinions): 
http://www.makaremshirazi.org/english/estefta/?mit=391, 
http://www.makarem.ir/english/estefta/?mit=480.The farsang, parsang or farsakh is a unit deriving 
from the ancient parasang which is variously defined as a number of cubits, royal cubits or stadia or 
as an hour’s walk (similarly to the league, another anthropic unit originating from the distance covered 
by an hour’s walk). Interestingly, in former times the definition of the farsang as an hour’s walk 
meant that in some regions, hilly areas had shorter farsangs than flat areas (Houtum-Schindler). 
37 Mo’meni, 129; Khomeini, 325; Mortazavi, 57-8; Zera‘at (1385), 139, 141, 154-5; Gorji, 29; Lom‘e, 
236; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 31, 34; Bazgir, 243-55. 
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undertaken with the purpose of removing it. However, a written opinion of the 
Judiciary office declares intention irrelevant, specifying that a woman who 
intentionally commits zena four farsangs from her husband is ineligible for the 
stoning penalty; some court rulings display the same attitude. Another potential 
parallel with the prayer obligation (not discussed in the texts available) is that it is 
not removed by habitual travel, necessitated for instance by work or recurrent 
nomadism. This, applied to zena, would exclude loss of ehsan by commuters or 
travellers on ‘business trips’, who could therefore still be stoned for adultery 
committed on those travels. The prayer obligation is also not removed by travel with 
a forbidden purpose (e.g. gambling), so if the norms for prayer were transferred to 
ehsan, such travel would not remove ehsan38. 
 
Jurists agree that whatever makes copulation physically impossible, such as 
incarceration or impotence, removes ehsan. Some doubt that illness alone can 
preclude copulation and hence ehsan, but most consider illness an obstacle, and some 
court rulings accept illness, advanced age or weakness as removers of ehsan. One 
ruling even accepted that a man’s wife’s refusal to copulate with him, for fear of 
endangering her pregnancy, removed his ehsan. The conservative Grand Ayatollah 
Nuri Hamedani (b. 1926) specifies that spouses lose ehsan if they have no carnal 
congress because of bad marital relations39. 
 
Can obstacles to ehsan be purely psychological, however? Scholarly works, and most 
often the writings of lawyers, occasionally mention psychological obstacles. One 
Supreme Court ruling (echoing Ayatollah Nuri Hamedani’s opinion) declares ehsan 
absent because disharmony between spouses prevented carnal relations, though it is 
unclear whether the disharmony or the chastity removed ehsan. The possibility of an 
emotional dimension to ehsan may depend on the terms used to define ‘access’ 
between spouses. Sometimes jama‘, copulation, is used; sometimes dastresi or other 
words meaning ‘access’ are employed; but sometimes one finds tamatto‘, estemta‘, 
                                                
38 Zera‘at (1385), 153-5; Hojjati, 317, 336-8; Bazgir, 244; Makarem Shirazi, estefta’: 
http://www.makaremshirazi.org/english/estefta/?mit=391;  
“Travel Fiqh”: http://www.islamic-laws.com/travelfiqh.htm. 
39 Bazgir, 206-10, 244-6; Mo’meni, 129; Khomeini, 325-6; Mortazavi, 57-8; Zera‘at (1385), 139, 154-
5; Gorji, 29-30; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 34; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”. 
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or similar words indicating ‘pleasure’, ‘enjoyment’ or ‘fruition’. If ehsan depends on 
‘enjoyment’, some lawyers argue, it lapses through bad marital relations. 
Nonetheless, ‘enjoyment’ may only mean ‘carnal enjoyment’, indicating none other 
than copulation40.  
 
Lawyers are likely to support the notion of abstract impediments to ehsan, which 
provides additional ammunition in favour of their clients. For example, in a letter to 
Shahrudi, then head of the Judiciary, in October 2006, a group of prominent lawyers 
defending adultery convicts declared that ehsan depends not only on carnal access, 
but also on healthy marital relations. Some of their clients were in forced or abusive 
marriages but could not obtain divorces, thereby, they argued, losing ehsan. Others 
were in loveless marriages which they could not escape, and some no longer had 
carnal relations with their husbands; again ehsan was deemed lost there. In cases 
where husbands forced wives to commit crimes, including the prostitution which 
later caused their stoning sentences, this coercion by husbands proved that the 
marriage was abusive and therefore ehsan was absent. Finally, some of their clients 
organised or participated in their abusive husbands’ murders: marriages so abusive as 
to drive wives to murder cannot have maintained ehsan41. This introduces the 
interesting scenario whereby one can be stoned to death for adultery, but by 
subsequently having one’s husband murdered by a third party, one avoids stoning by 
impugning ehsan. In other words, in such a case adultery plus murder potentially 
carries a lighter penalty than adultery alone. 
 
While the notion of abstract impediments to ehsan promotes leniency, the consensus 
favours the possibility of copulation, not emotional enjoyment, as the key to ehsan. 
The penal code bill (article 221-6) and the 2012 penal code (article 233 note 2) 
confirm this by defining the possibility of jama‘ az tariq-e qobol – anterior 
copulation – as the maintainer of ehsan. For psychological impediments to affect 
trials, they would have to be enshrined in law. 
 
                                                
40 Mortazavi, 57-8; Zera‘at (1383), 235, (1385), 153-5; Bazgir, 244. 
41 Lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi, October 2006; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 6-7. 
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Interestingly, the 2012 penal code only describes ehsan (article 233 note 2) with 
reference to sodomy, only tangentially mentioning it regarding zena (article 228: 
punishment for zena without ehsan). This may be associated with the decision to 
omit references to stoning in the new code, while still allowing stoning sentences 
indirectly (see section 3.7 below). 
 
3.5. Marriage, coercion, and criminal responsibility. 
 
Marriage is an ‘aqd – a contract between consenting parties – while divorce is an 
iqa‘ – a unilateral prerogative (in this case, of dissolution by the man). Men hold the 
reins of marriage according to the Qur’an (2:237, 4:34) and at least one narration. 
Iranian wives must petition for divorce in court, proving specific justifications. 
Divorce is not automatic for men: divorces must be approved in court and can be 
challenged by wives, and Mir-Hosseini found in her study of Iranian divorce cases 
that judges often pressurise male divorce applicants. Nevertheless, men have the final 
say regarding divorce, even if it means negotiating or making sacrifices, e.g. 
promising maintenance payments to wives. (Khomeini writes that wives need not be 
aware of divorce, much less consent, for it to be valid). Women (unless their 
marriage contracts include a divorce clause) always need the approval of someone 
else – their husband or a judge – to secure a divorce. Furthermore, although the 
father’s suitability can now be challenged in court following 1998 and 2003 
amendments to Civil Code article 1169 by the Expediency Council (chapter 3, 
section 6.2) and both divorced parents have theoretical visitation rights, by default 
fathers have custody of children older than seven. (Book 8, Section 3, of the Civil 
Code is devoted to ‘the father’s and paternal line’s natural custody’ [velayat-e qahri] 
over children). If their mother cannot prove their father’s unsuitability, she loses 
them at that age after divorce, and immediately upon remarrying irrespective of age. 
But wives cannot force divorce on husbands even by relinquishing their children.  
 
Aside from holding the reins of divorce, men have additional rights including the 
right to chastise disobedient wives, the right to cease financial maintenance if wives 
unjustifiably ignore their marital duties, and the right to have escaped wives forcibly 
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returned to the marital home. The Civil Code (article 1105) explicitly characterises 
the husband as the head of the household42.  
 
All this introduces a potential element of distress (ezterar) or even coercion (ikrah) 
into any marriage where the husband forces the wife into illegal acts (including 
adultery). It is not only the immediate pressure to commit individual illegalities that 
is relevant, but the fact that the wife cannot escape the enforcer of illegal activity. If 
she leaves without a divorce, she can be forcibly returned; even if she obtains a 
divorce, she loses her children unless the court accepts her husband’s unsuitability, 
which may be difficult (see adultery case 1). In adultery cases 2-3, men lived off 
their wives’ enforced prostitution, frequently beat their wives and children, and 
might have prostituted the children had the wives escaped. The wives remained only 
to protect their children, but were condemned to death for adultery. 
 
For women in forced marriages, the law’s invalidation of marriages undertaken 
without consent could be advantageous. However, the right to have invalid marriages 
annulled lapses if not claimed ‘immediately’ (a parameter determined by ‘custom’)43. 
Removing this condition could protect such women from stoning by liberating them 
from ehsan – and even potentially from their abusive marriages. 
 
Mir-Hosseini discusses a radical and useful, but hitherto dormant, alleged opinion of 
Ayatollah Khomeini regarding divorce: if a woman’s request for divorce is denied by 
her husband, this denial demonstrates ‘hardship’, which is grounds for divorce, and 
the marriage can be dissolved through the la zarar (no harm) principle44. 
 
                                                
42 Civil Code articles 1103, 1105-12, 1114-22, 1125-49, 1169-70, 1173-4, 1180-1; Constitution article 
21; Qur’an 2:237 (Baqara), 4:34 (Nisa’); Niknam, “The Islamization”, 20-1; Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 
ix-x, 35-40, 55-60, 63, 65-71, 129-30, “The construction”, 7-8, “When”, 121; Modarressi Tabataba’i, 
14, 19-21; Aghaei, 88-9; Picheca, 45-6; Khomeini, 131; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 7-8, 11; 
Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”; Najvan; Sardar Ali, 439-41; Hashemi, 553-5. Regarding wives’ enforced 
return home: Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 41, 43-4, 46-7, 49-50, 52-3, 58-60. Ibid 57-8: marriage contract 
stipulations allowing wives’ divorce (Civil Code article 1119) may be ignored in practice. 
43 Civil Code articles 1064 and 1070; Amini, “Parvandeha”, 6-7, 11; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam’”; 
lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi, October 2006; Samgiss, 70-1 (discussing forced marriage in Iran). 
44 Mir-Hosseini, “When”, 117-8, 125-6. Khomeini’s intervention apparently ensured inclusion of 
‘hardship’ as grounds for divorce in the Civil Code. 
 118 
3.6. Pregnancy cannot prove zena. 
 
Most Shi‘i jurists agree that pregnancy cannot prove zena, and the penal code 
excludes unmarried women’s pregnancy as proof. Jurists generally exclude it 
irrespective of marital status, and some criticise the penal code’s mention of 
‘unmarried’ status. Some, including Khomeini, add that pregnant individuals cannot 
be questioned about their pregnancy, because by default nobody must be 
interrogated. This is not explicit in codified law but implied by the prohibition 
against investigating ‘crimes against chastity’ (chapter 3, section 4). Jurists further 
explain that pregnancy cannot prove penetration of the glans or disprove coercion45. 
 
Nevertheless, the case studies show that pregnancy is often used to prove zena, 
frequently as an ingredient of ‘elm. This contradicts Khomeini’s opinion whereby 
only correct confession or testimony (he does not mention ‘elm) can prove zena46. 
 
Instead of fortifying the penal code’s prohibition of pregnancy as proof, the 2012 
penal code omits any mention of it. 
 
3.7. Stoning for adultery. 
 
Stoning for adultery, and its protocol, come from narrations, although some posit a 
lost Qur’anic ‘stoning verse’47. The condemned are directed to wash themselves as 
corpses are washed (as if they were already dead), and are then wrapped in the 
shroud in which they will be buried without additional washing (the removal of 
bloodstains is not obligatory). They are buried in a pit, men up to the waist and 
women up to the bosom (deeper burial makes escape more difficult). Then they are 
stoned by those present, who include the judge, any witnesses, and a varying 
                                                
45 Hojjati, 321; Gilani, 45-6; Mo’meni, 129, 154; Zera‘at (1385), 96; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 149; Deh 
Abadi, 39; Khomeini, 329, 345; Mortazavi, 31-2; Gorji, 19; Lom‘e, 236, 242, 244; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 31, 
34, 58, 82, 84; Penal code article 73. 
46 Khomeini, 329. 
47 Gilani, 90-5; Mo’meni, 84, 94-7, 99, 114, 125-8, 134-5, 156; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 16-7, 20, 37; Nobahar, 
“Be suye”, 336, “Ahdaf”, 149, 157-8; Deh Abadi, 57-8; Mortazavi, 52-3, 86-7; Khomeini, 340; 
Zera‘at (1385), 104; Shahrudi, 66-9; Arabiyan, 59-60; Mohaqqeq Damad, 11-3, 36-40; Malik, 345-6; 
Dutton, 57, 123-4, 163, 216-7; Stewart, 130-3; Mashini. 
 119 
minimum number of other ‘believers’ (three according to some jurists, as few as one 
according to others). After they die, the prayer of the dead is performed over them 
and they are buried. If adultery was proven through testimony, the witnesses must 
cast the first stones; if through confession, the judge who condemned them casts the 
first stone. No protocol is given for adultery proven through ‘elm. The absence of the 
judge or the witnesses does not prevent stoning, although escape of witnesses during 
stoning invalidates the conviction. Escapees from the pit are returned and stoned if 
adultery was proven by testimony, but released if it was proven by confession 
(escape implying retraction of confession). Again, no protocol is given for ‘elm, and 
jurists differ on this point. Stones used in lapidation must not be so small as to be 
ineffective (or, according to some, to delay death excessively), nor large enough to 
kill immediately. Some say this is intended to inflict sufficient suffering; others 
attribute it to the precise wording of narrations48. 
 
As a ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment, stoning has attracted much controversy, and 
considerable efforts have been made to abolish it, while the authorities have 
frequently dismissed reports of stoning or denied that stoning occurs at all in Iran. 
Khomeini is claimed to have supported the suspension of stoning. In December 2002 
the head of the Judiciary issued a moratorium on stoning, whereby stoning sentences 
were not to be implemented. However, the law was not changed, and a man and a 
woman were stoned in Mashhad in May 2006. Efforts were made to conceal that 
stoning: local newspapers published the news of their ‘execution’ (e‘dam) without 
mentioning how it occurred, and the woman’s death certificate gave ‘execution’ as 
her cause of death, although her autopsy report described it as ‘cerebral haemorrhage 
caused by impact of a hard object’. Investigations revealed that cemetery records 
gave ‘stoning’ as the woman’s cause of death. When activists broadcast this news, 
the spokesman of the Judiciary denied the stoning. A man was stoned (and 
apparently finished off with a concrete block when he failed to die) in July 2007 in 
Aqche Kand, a village outside Takestan in Qazvin province, following a ruling based 
on ‘elm-e qazi. The authorities initially denied that stoning. Three men were 
                                                
48 Penal code articles 98-107; DIRS28/70 articles 23-5; DIRS293/82 articles 7, 10, 21-3; Gilani, 90-4, 
92-3, 104; Mortazavi, 13, 46, 86-8, 94-5; Zera‘at (1385), 204; Mo’meni, 65-6, 133-5; Lom‘e, 237-8; 
Sharh-e Lom‘e, 40-1, 43; Hojjati, 349-50, 357; Gorji, 36-7. 
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reportedly stoned in Mashhad in December 2008, though one apparently escaped the 
pit and was released. In February 2009 a man sentenced to be stoned for adultery was 
instead hanged, prompting debate about the permissibility of this commutation. 
There were reports that a man was stoned in a prison yard in Rasht in March 2009. 
The controversy regarding stoning has not prevented stoning sentences from being 
issued even recently: for instance, a 2006 stoning sentence has been denied by the 
authorities; two sisters were reportedly sentenced to be stoned in August 2007; a 
woman’s stoning sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court on 4 August 2008, one 
day before a press conference (see below) which prompted rumours that stoning had 
been suspended; and a husband and wife were apparently sentenced to be stoned for 
zena in January and June 2009. Reportedly four women were secretly stoned in 
October/November 201249. 
 
There has been some discussion in Iran about possibly omitting stoning from the new 
penal code. The conservative Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi reportedly said in 
December 2002 that in certain circumstances, stoning could be replaced by other 
punishments, and in June 2009 the head of the parliamentary judicial commission 
told journalists that the commission had concluded that the law could omit stoning 
since this would be in the nation’s best interests and Islam severely restricts it, 
making it extremely rare. However, stoning was not removed from the penal code 
bill but only rendered conditionally commutable to flogging or hanging. On the 5th of 
August 2008, Alireza Jamshidi, the spokesman of the Iranian Judiciary, announced in 
a press conference that of the nine known stoning convicts at the time (eight women 
                                                
49 Eskhevari, “Ta’mol”; Amini, “Parvandeha”, “Tan furushi”; E‘temad, “Joz’iat”; Tabnak; Mostafaei, 
“Sangsar”; Abbasqolizadeh, “Nezam”; Melli-Mazhabi; communication with discoverer of Mashhad 
stonings; Alasti, 20-3, 30; Iran Human Rights: “Revised”; WLUML, “Iran: we are”; Iran: Amnesty 
International Report 2009; Int’l Herald Tribune, “Norway”; Esfandiari, “Iran: activists”; BBC, “Iran 
‘adulterer’”; Bastani; Amini, “Dialogha”, “Boghz”; Shojaei; Gorji, Mahin; Hojjati, “Aya mojazat”; 
Iran Human Rights, “An adultery”; Meydaan, “Abdollah”; BBC Persian, “Mard”; PressTV, “Iran”; 
BBC News, “Iran denies”; Reuters, “Iran”; Amnesty International, “Iran: announcement”, “Iran: 
demand”, “Iran: end”, “Report 2007”, 139-41, “Report 2008”, 160, “Iran: Amnesty”; Association of 
Iranian Women, “Memorandum”; Esfandiari, “Iran: stoning”; Kar/Vahdati; Coomaraswamy, 186 
(item 1004); Council of the EU, “Declaration…death sentences”, “Rasht”; Solomon/Fassihi; BBC, 
“Iran executes”; Iran Focus; Iran Times International; Kar, “A brief history”, “Iranian law”, 8; AWID; 
Meydaan, “Nameye jam’i”; Me‘marian; Lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi, October 2006 (section 4); ‘Asr 
Iran, “Joz’iat”; Iran Bar; Rostami; Kermani; Mokhtari, 613-4, 618-9; Peters, 20; Arjomand, “Shari‘a 
and constitution”, 163-4; Osanloo, “Whence”, 43; UDHR, article 5; ICCPR, article 7 (Iran signed it 
before the revolution); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment: frequently cited as incompatible with stoning, though Iran did not sign it. 
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and one man), two had been pardoned and two had had their sentences commuted to 
incarceration or flogging, while the other five sentences were being reviewed by the 
Pardon and Clemency Commission. This led to announcements in the foreign press 
that Iran had suspended stoning. However, the suspension of some individual 
sentences did not mean the suspension of stoning itself, and Jamshidi explicitly 
denied that stoning would be, or could be, abolished. Indeed, stoning sentences were 
issued and implemented thereafter50. 
 
Article 221-5, section 5, of the penal code bill identifies stoning as the penalty for 
adultery. Note 4 allows its commutation to hanging if testimony exists, otherwise to 
100 lashes, if the case prosecutor deems stoning dangerous to the State’s interests. 
(‘Elm is associated with confession and greater lenience). The 2012 penal code, in 
article 229, specifies 100 lashes as the penalty for zena without ehsan, but mentions 
no penalty for zena with ehsan (adultery). While this appears to be an abrogation of 
stoning, and judges could use it to avoid stoning, it is merely an omission, since it 
specifies ‘without ehsan’ rather than mandating 100 lashes for zena in general. 
Omissions are covered in articles 220-1, which state that hudud not covered in the 
penal code are subject to article 167 of the Constitution, whereby judges can rule by 
Islamic or fiqhi sources wherever the law is silent. Article 221 specifies that in such 
instances, the Supreme Leader’s guidance will be sought. In other words, the 2012 
code ostensibly bows to human-rights demands by not mentioning stoning, but 




According to several scholars, the word lavvat (sodomy) comes from the name of the 
prophet Lut (the Biblical Lot), whose people were famed for it (though he refrained). 
Sodomy is the penetration of a man by another’s generative organ, concealing the 
glans entirely, in the absence of coercion or distress and while possessing sanity, 
majority, free will, intention and awareness that the act is forbidden. Without such 
                                                
50 Sadr, “Raftar”; Shojaei; Bedashti; Me‘marian; Amini, “Boghz”; AFP, “Iran”, “Stoning”; AWID; 
BBC, “Iranians”; Telegraph, “Iran suspends”; Reuters, “Iran suspends”; Amnesty International, “Iran: 
announcement”; Times of India; Iran: Amnesty International Report 2009. 
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penetration, the act is not sodomy but tafkhiz, whose penalty is a hundred lashes and, 
in the fourth instance (or third according to some), death. (The 1991/96 penal code 
does not mention the glans, merely differentiating between penetration and non-
penetration; the 2012 penal code mentions the glans). Most jurists, using various 
scriptural texts, allow the judge to choose between the following penalties for 
sodomy: stoning, burning, death by sword, throwing from a height, and crushing by a 
toppled wall – all with optional subsequent burning of the corpse. (The penal code 
only gives the judge discretion without specifying penalties, implying recourse to 
Shi‘i law; the 2012 penal code merely prescribes ‘execution’). These penalties apply 
irrespective of consent: coerced parties are exonerated, but sodomistic rape carries 
the same penalties for the rapist as does consensual sodomy. Minors receive a ta‘ziri 
(lesser ‘discretionary’) punishment for sodomy. Sodomy or tafkhiz are proven by 
four valid confessions, or the testimony of four ‘adel (righteous) men who have 
personally seen (moshahede) them, or, according to some, ‘elm. The hadd lapses 
with repentance before confession or completed testimony; after confession, 
repentance allows the Imam or his representative the discretion of pardon51. 
 
Some narrations describe the intrinsic heinousness of sodomy; some jurists have 
concurred, saying for instance that sodomy is worse than zena because copulation 
between men and women is allowed under the correct circumstances, while 
copulation between men is not, and because a town (the Biblical Sodom, only 
mentioned as ‘the city of Lut’ in the Qur’an) was destroyed because of sodomy but 
not for zena. A narration of Ali even equates sodomy with apostasy (ertedad). 
(Incidentally, other narrations and juristic opinions equate other kabireh [major] 
crimes, or even doubt regarding the certainties [mosallamat] of the faith and its 
commandments including the validity of the stoning penalty, with apostasy). In 
another narration, the Imam Sadeq explains the extreme reprehensibility and 
prohibition of sodomy by saying that if it were allowed, men would copulate with 
each other, women would become redundant, and the population would be 
                                                
51 Penal code articles 108-26; 2012 penal code articles 232-4; Qur’an 6:86 (An‘am), 7:80-4 (A‘raf), 
11:69-83 (Hud), 15:51-77 (Hijr), 21:71, 74-5 (Anbiya) 22:41-4 (Hajj), 26:160-74 (Shu‘araa), 27:54-8 
(Naml), 29:23-35 (‘Ankabut), 37:133-8 (Saffat) 38:12-4 (Sad) 50:12-4 (Qaf), 54:33-40 (Qamar); 
Mo’meni, 160-1; Mortazavi, 96-102; Zera‘at (1383), 251-2, (1385), 217-35; Gorji, 42-4; Lom‘e, 242-
3; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 72-3; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 144-5; Bazgir, 337-41; Hojjati, 358. 
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dangerously reduced52. This oddly implies that most (all?) men desire sodomy. The 
depopulation argument also creates a strange precedent for promoting sodomy and 
lesbianism when overpopulation is problematic and reduced procreation is desirable. 
 
4.1. Alternative punishments for sodomy. 
 
As mentioned earlier, several narrations give ‘a blow with a sword’ as the 
punishment for sodomy, incest and rape, some without specifying an implement for 
this ‘blow’53. Narrations allowing retracted confession to invalidate stoning for 
adultery have been used to justify not only invalidation of any death penalty for 
adultery, but also, through principles of lenience, for sodomy. Could the same 
principles not promote ‘a blow with a sword’ instead of the more definitely fatal 
punishments for sodomy, given that the ‘blow’ need not be struck with the blade of 
the sword? 
 
The penal code bill and the 2012 penal code, which also do not incorporate ‘a blow 
with a sword’, differ considerably from the 1991/96 penal code regarding sodomy. 
Both decree death (qatl, e‘dam) for coercive or married (mohsan) active parties to 
sodomy, and otherwise, 100 lashes; but always death for consenting passive parties. 
The greater penalty for passive parties, supported by the reformist Ayatollah 
Montazeri, exists in narrations, as does the penalty of 100 lashes for unmarried 
sodomists54. The phrase ‘one stroke below the hadd’ to describe 99 lashes for lesser 
variants of sodomy (see section 3) implies 100 lashes, not death, as the punishment 
for sodomy55. The use of dormant minority opinions to change sodomy penalties 
radically, as here, creates a precedent for further change – for instance by instituting 
100 lashes for unmarried sodomists, removing the greater penalty for passive parties, 
and generally choosing the most lenient option for every crime. 
 
                                                
52 Mo’meni, 126, 158-61; Mortazavi, 96; Zera‘at (1385), 218-9, 229; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 154, 
“Qachaq”, 190-1; Khomeini, 358-9. 
53 Zera‘at (1385), 125, 223-5, 230; Mortazavi, 98, 101-2. 
54 Zera‘at (1385), 223-5; Gorji, 43-4; Mo’meni, 163; Montazeri, topic 3172; penal code article 110, 
penal code bill article 221-19; 2012 penal code article 233. 




Verse 5:38 of the Qur’an says ‘the thief, male or female, cut off their hands’. In Shi‘i 
fiqh this becomes amputation – in the first instance – of four fingers, excluding the 
thumb, of the right hand, provided that many conditions – as many as twenty 
according to some jurists – are met. The reason given for the removal of four fingers 
rather than the entire hand is that the palms are two of the body parts which touch the 
ground in sajda (prostration during prayer), and some narrations interpret the 
Qur’anic verse 72:18, ‘the places of prostration are for God alone’, as meaning that 
those body parts – ‘the places of prostration’ – are God’s and must not be removed. 
Some narrations also show the Imam Ali using this argument in judging thieves. 
 
The conditions for criminal responsibility for theft include the standard ones – ‘aql, 
bulugh, ekhtiar and qasd – and in the penal code and juristic works, lack of ezterar 
(distress) and freedom from threats are also specified. Additional conditions, which 
must all be present for the hadd to be applicable, include the following: the thief 
must know that the property belongs to another and that stealing it is forbidden; the 
thief must not be the father of the owner of the property (some also exonerate slave-
owners stealing from their own slaves, and some specify that offspring receive the 
hadd for stealing from their parents as do mothers for stealing from their offspring, 
but some exonerate mothers as well as fathers for theft from their offspring); the 
value of the property must reach the nesab (quorum) of a quarter of a dinar or 4.5 
‘grains’ of gold; the theft must not be motivated by need or occur during a famine; 
the intent must have been theft, not borrowing; the goods must not be governmental 
or public property, which has no individual owner; the goods must have been placed 
in a herz, a protective enclosure or container which could be reasonably expected to 
protect them; and the thief must have personally broken into this herz – even if aided 
by another – and removed the property, so that if one person breaks it open and 
another removes the goods, neither can receive the hadd. Furthermore, the hadd is 
not established if the thief is arrested after breaking into the ‘enclosure’ but before 
leaving it. Theft can only be prosecuted following a request by the saheb-e mal 
(owner of the [stolen] goods), and if the owner has not forgiven the thief, gifted the 
 125 
property to them, sold it to them, or had it returned after the theft but, according to 
some, before prosecution (though the penal code mentions no ‘expiry date’ for return 
of the goods preventing the hadd). Also, the hadd lapses if the thief repents before 
theft is established (it is not clear if ‘established’ means proven in court or merely 
prosecuted; if the first, repentance during the trial could potentially cause suqut, 
‘lapsing’). Theft is proven by two ‘righteous’ witnesses; or two intentional, unforced 
confessions made in a state of mental sanity before the judge trying the case; or, 
according to the penal code, ‘elm-e qazi (many do not mention this; Khomeini only 
mentions it incidentally while discussing the necessity of the owner’s complaint for 
prosecution, not in the section about proof of theft). Furthermore, a person who 
confesses to theft once must return the goods allegedly stolen, but does not receive 
the hadd. Repentance or the injured party’s pardon does not prevent amputation after 
theft is ‘established’. Assistance in theft, or theft which does not fulfil all the haddi 
criteria, has only a ta‘ziri penalty. According to narrations, the Imam can pardon 
theft established by confession if there is no complainant, and if it is proven through 
testimony, the escape of witnesses during implementation of the hadd causes it to 
lapse, being equivalent to retraction of testimony56. 
 
The 2012 penal code omits some of these conditions. It mentions famine but not 
intent to borrow, need, or distress as exonerators. Its ‘deadline’ for prevention of the 
hadd through repentance (which the judge must accept), return of stolen goods to 
their owner, or owner’s pardon is ‘establishment’ of the crime. It retains the 1991/96 
code’s penalties for theft57. 
 
Some jurists and government authorities have declared anaesthesia permissible prior 
to amputation, arguing that the punishment is loss of fingers, not attendant pain, and 
the asl-e ebahe (permissibility by default) allows anything not explicitly forbidden. 
Some have proposed reattachment of the severed limbs, though others have 
countered that it would reduce the punishment to a meaningless formality58. 
                                                
56 Penal code articles 197-203; Khomeini, 360-75; Aghaei, 127-9, 128 footnote 2; Mortazavi, 176-
202; Gorji, 64-89; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 129-66; Zera‘at (1383), 250, 313-39, (1385/2), 187-270; Hojjati, 
405-29; Lom‘e, 254-60. 
57 2012 penal code articles 113, 116, 268-79. 
58 Hojjati, 426; Zera‘at (1383), 335-6, (1385/2), 258. 
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The former head of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Shahrudi, has written an essay on the 
reattachment of limbs after qesas-e ‘ozv (retribution in kind for injuries) and another 
on anaesthesia during corporal punishments; some of the arguments investigated 
there are also relevant to the issue of reattachment following hadd amputation. Since 
in the final analysis the scriptural punishment for theft is the removal of fingers, and 
their subsequent reattachment is not explicitly forbidden and the default is the 
permissibility of actions (asl-e ebahe) and the inapplicability of punishments (in this 
case the continued absence of fingers), one can make a rather tenuous claim in favour 
of reattaching fingers lost through amputation for theft59. 
 
Amputation, once infrequently reported and claimed to be exceedingly rare, may be 
on the rise. A judge told me that he witnessed it once; there were reported instances 
in February 2007, October 2010, October 2011, and January 2013, another 
(involving foot amputation for the second instance) in December 2011, and a few 
others described in the media60. In theft case 1, amputation was implemented, 
apparently without being reported. 
 
6. Moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard. 
 
Although court documents for moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard (‘insurrection and 
corruption on Earth’) cases were not available for this study, one of its aims is to 
provide background information for all hudud carrying irreversible penalties. 
Furthermore, laws governing moharebeh, like some of those described earlier, shed 
light on an important greater issue. In this case, it is the vagueness of the law, 
permitting great latitude in accusing dissidents of moharebeh whether or not they 
bore arms. Therefore the regulations for moharebeh are given below. Future projects 
could focus on moharebeh cases if any became available. 
 
                                                
59 Shahrudi, 311-47; Khomeini, 457. 
60 Aghaei, 128-9; Picheca, 44; Niknam, “The Islamization”, 20; Qazi; VOA Persian, “Safir”; Saffari; 
RAHANA, “Qat‘-e pa”; Guardian, “Iran cuts”; Radio Zamaneh, “Yek e‘dam”; Mehr; Ferran; Daily 
Mail, “The Sharia saw”; personal communication with judges. 
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In the penal code, moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard – treated as one crime – encompasses 
armed robbery, highway robbery, the use of weapons to terrify the public, and armed 
insurrection against the state. It also covers membership or support – even if one has 
not personally undertaken violent action or borne arms – of any group involved in 
armed insurrection against the state or formulating plans to overthrow it. 
Furthermore, membership or support of any group allied with another group having 
the above description is moharebeh va efsad, even if the first group has not used 
weapons or plotted against the government. Supplying such groups with resources 
including weapons, explosives, funds and equipment is also moharebeh va efsad. An 
armed component is therefore unnecessary in moharebeh va efsad: membership or 
perceived support of a group having any perceived allegiance with armed anti-
governmental organisations also counts as such. The punishments for this crime, at 
the judge’s discretion, are execution, crucifixion, amputation of right hand and left 
foot (‘cross-amputation’), or exile. 
 
A crucial point is whether moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard is one crime or whether efsad 
fi’l-’ard – ‘corruption on Earth’ – stands independently of moharebeh – 
‘insurrection’ – and if so, whether ‘corruption on Earth’ can firstly include actions 
unrelated to the overthrow of government, and secondly attract the same 
punishments as moharebeh. Although moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard appears as one 
crime in the penal code, it is unclear whether it is ‘insurrection and corruption on 
Earth’ or ‘insurrection and/or corruption on Earth’. Also, one of the procedural codes 
(determining which crimes are to be tried in which courts) refers to ‘insurrection or 
corruption on Earth’, implying that they could be separate. The vague boundaries of 
this crime give judges considerable discretion regarding whether an act counts as 
moharebeh and/or efsad fi’l-’ard61. 
 
In Shi‘i fiqh there is also confusion regarding the dual nature of the crime. Jurists 
often identify the use of weapons as a necessary part thereof, and apply the 
punishments of Qur’an 5:33 – the origin of the concept of moharebeh va efsad fi’l-
’ard – to moharebeh, making it unclear whether that is shorthand for the entire 
                                                
61 Penal code articles 183-8; LEGRC, article 5. 
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phrase of which the ‘corruption’ element is merely an adjunct. A few contemporary 
jurists have noted the older jurists’ silence regarding efsad fi’l-’ard and called for any 
lewdness not covered by other hudud – for instance, the maintenance of co-
educational swimming pools or ‘houses of feasting’, or the promotion of drugs or 
shamelessness – to be punished as efsad fi’l-’ard with the same penalties as 
moharebeh, including death. Some have declared that exile can occur in prison, 
which separates the criminal from their place of residence. Some consider 
moharebeh as a subset of efsad fi’l-’ard, so that every mohareb is also a mofsed fi’l-
’ard (corruptor on Earth). At least one narration punishes kidnappers who sell free 
individuals as mofsed fi’l-’ard, but it is not clear if they are also mohareb. In the 
early post-revolutionary period there were apparently several executions for 
‘corruption on Earth’ – defined as ‘crimes of sufficient proportions to encourage and 
propagate corruption on Earth, causing misery to the masses’ – for such diverse 
actions as assassinating revolutionaries, appropriating public funds, belonging to 
dissident groups, hostility or insults against Islam or the Revolution, and 
collaboration with Israel. More recently, moharebeh and/or efsad sentences, 
including death and amputation sentences, have been issued and occasionally 
implemented for mugging, insurrection, armed robbery, drug smuggling, 
membership of opposition groups, street protest, blogging, and sending emails about 
human-rights violations. It is not always clear if these punishments, especially for 
non-violent actions, were administered for moharebeh, efsad, or both62. 
 
The penal code bill has a section about moharebeh va efsad fi’l-’ard, similarly to the 
penal code, but differentiates between the two. Moharebeh must have a public 
element and an armed element, and its punishment depends on damage inflicted. 
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Efsad is any action which compromises public order or the national economy, and 
has the same penalties as moharebeh (execution, cross-amputation or exile). The 
2012 penal code has a section for moharebeh and one for baghi (tyranny/rebellion) 
va efsad fi’l-’ard. Moharebeh again must have a public and an armed element, and is 
punished by ‘execution’, crucifixion, cross-amputation or exile. Baghi va efsad need 
not involve weapons but must aim for large-scale destabilisation. It encompasses 
such varied acts as microbial warfare, creating ‘centres of corruption and 




Chapters 2-4 provided background information regarding Iranian hadd laws and their 
interpretations by jurists. Chapters 2-3 addressed laws and principles governing all 
hudud, and this chapter described more detailed regulations regarding individual 
hadd crimes carrying irreversible penalties (death or amputation) in the first instance. 
The codified law’s vagueness, and the multiplicity of sometimes conflicting 
scriptural interpretations, facilitate the discretion seen in the case studies of Part II. 
This can cause harshness if judges employ severe interpretations, but it could also 
promote lenient legal reform (e.g. sections 3.5, 3.7) if alternative interpretations 
became mainstream. 
 
This chapter also displayed various institutionalised obstacles to lenience. These 
include the characterisation of rape as ‘zena plus coercion’, potentially endangering 
those who report rapes (chapter 6, published rulings, section 5; chapter 7, section 7), 
and gender, age and ‘legitimacy’ discrimination. The inequalities in marriage, 
divorce and child custody laws are particularly relevant to adultery trials (e.g. 
adultery cases 1-3). Though not all these obstacles appear in the case studies, they 
combine to illustrate the difficulties in requiring laws to comply with scripture 
presented as inalterable irrespective of evolving morality. This is visible through 
laws governing child rape, stoning, and amputation, which some modern jurists, 
though themselves Shi‘i Muslims, find incompatible with their own morality. 
                                                
63 Penal code bill articles 228-1 to 228-13; 2012 penal code articles 280-9; Gilani, 240-5. 
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Part II expands on the theoretical material in Part I by showing it ‘in action’, but also 
displays additional dimensions of hadd prosecution, such as the authorities’ legal 
contraventions, which are better observed through real cases, providing a fuller 
picture of how hudud operate in Iran today. 
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Part II: case studies. 
 
Part I of this project (chapters 2-4) described the laws and principles affecting hudud 
in Iran, and contemporary conceptions of their Shi‘i roots. Part II (chapters 5-9) 
analyses Iranian trials for hadd crimes carrying irreversible penalties, supplemented 
by published rulings regarding the same crimes, namely theft, sodomy, fornication 
and adultery. Chapters are arranged by crime. Part II shows how the concepts from 
Part I, including opportunities for, and obstacles to, lenience, are interpreted and 
applied in court. 
 
Part II covers unpublished cases and published rulings. Unpublished cases are those 
for which I obtained multiple unpublished court documents, often supplemented by 
information from individuals involved. (The exception is theft case 5, based entirely 
on court attendance and discussion with the judge). The amount of detail in these 
cases reveals many facets of how legal concepts are applied in court. 
 
Published rulings come from two collections of court judgements. Despite supplying 
less detail than unpublished cases, they corroborate or expand patterns observed in 
the unpublished cases. They also give some indication of the incidence of 
punishments, e.g. stoning. These numbers apply only to the limited sample, and 
cannot therefore be extrapolated to represent the whole country, for which overall 
data are unavailable. However, they suggest possible tendencies which could be 
investigated in future. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 (theft and sodomy) begin with unpublished cases and continue with 
published rulings. Chapter 7 differs from the others by containing only published 
zena rulings. This is because the number of published zena rulings was large enough 
to merit their own discussion. Furthermore, many published rulings did not 
exclusively concern adultery or fornication, because they involved multiple 
defendants, some married and others not. Because published zena rulings are all in 
chapter 7, chapters 8 and 9 (fornication and adultery) only cover unpublished cases. 
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For each unpublished case, known facts are described, and then salient points are 
analysed. The presentation of cases is cumulative: a mechanism discussed at length 
in one case may be noted briefly as also occurring in a subsequent one, or instead 
greater discussion may occur after several cases have displayed multiple 
manifestations of the same mechanism. Published rulings, whether following 
unpublished cases (chapters 5-6) or constituting the entire chapter (7), are instead 
arranged by theme. 
 
Every chapter concludes by showing how the mechanisms identified contribute to the 
four major patterns characterising Iranian hadd trials. As explained in chapter 1, 
these are: the interpretability of laws and consequent judicial discretion; legal 
infractions; socioeconomic circumstances; and institutional obstacles to lenience. 
The first two patterns are associated with the fact that both Shi‘i and codified law 
contain opportunities for lenience, whose application however is at the authorities’ 
discretion. Socioeconomic factors do not appear in all cases, but where they do they 
constitute an important theme. Chapters 6-7 (and to some extent chapter 5) include 
the additional theme of incidence of penalties. Successive chapters build upon each 
other, displaying the manifold ways in which specific mechanisms contribute to 
overall patterns. 
 
As explained in chapter 1, section 3, limited access to sources precludes a nationwide 
statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the repeated recurrence of themes suggests that 
they may traverse the system of Iranian hadd prosecution. 
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5. Theft cases. 
 
This chapter analyses five unpublished Iranian theft cases and nine published theft-
related rulings, displaying practical applications of several elements from Part I. The 
manifold ‘micro-patterns’ characterising these cases contribute to the broader 
patterns discussed throughout the project: the interpretability of laws, judicial 
authorities’ legal infractions, socioeconomic dimensions of prosecution, and 
fundamental obstacles to lenience in the legal system, as well as the additional 
tentative theme of incidence of penalties. This coalescence into greater patterns will 




Case 1: amputation sentence carried out. 
Esfahan, 2003. 
 
This case is important because it involved the implementation of the supposedly rare 
penalty of hand amputation for theft. Most legal conditions for the penalty were 
apparently present, showing that if such penalties are in the law, their 
implementation will occasionally be legally unavoidable. However, the man who lost 
his fingers never had lawyers, which is a legal flaw since lawyers are constitutionally 
guaranteed (chapter 2, section 3). The events of the case unfolded as follows. 
 
A man reported a mobile, tape recorder and fax machine stolen. Two men, ‘A’ and 
‘B’, were found with the phone and arrested. The mobile and the fax machine, also 
found in A’s possession, were returned to their owner, but the tape recorder had 
apparently been sold. When interrogated, both men said that B was innocent of theft 
and had only been given the mobile, unawares, by A. Though both were tried 
together, B was acquitted through the asl-e bara’at (in Shi‘i penal law, the 
presumption of innocence) unaccompanied by codified laws. 
 
 134 
Suspect A confessed twice (sufficient in theft), in court, to taking the objects, alone, 
from their owner’s unlocked house, and selling the tape recorder to another man. 
This meant that the two conditions of the property being in a herz – enclosure – and 
of the same person breaking into the herz and removing the property were fulfilled. 
Furthermore, the value of stolen goods was deemed to reach the nesab (threshold for 
applicability) and the injured party had requested the hadd if applicable. Since the 
crime had been proven by correctly formatted confession and the conditions for the 
hadd were present, A was sentenced to qat‘-e yadd: amputation of four fingers. He 
was also sentenced to return the tape recorder or provide compensation. Its alleged 
buyer, never captured, was sentenced in absentia to six months in jail and 74 lashes 
for knowingly purchasing stolen goods, on the sole basis of A’s confession. 
 
The Supreme Court confirmed A’s sentence as compatible with mavazin-e shar‘i va 
qanuni – the standards of the shari‘a and codified law. Following various 
bureaucratic procedures, the amputation sentence was carried out in a park, with a 
forensic specialist and an ambulance team standing by, and with orders for A to be 
released once his injuries healed. The entire process, from the first court hearing to 
the amputation, took approximately six months.  
 
Several issues transpire from this case. 
 
1) Although the conditions for amputation are advertised as impossibly stringent, if 
they are considered fulfilled, amputation will naturally follow. As long as these 
penalties are in the law they may sometimes be applicable. 
 
2) Failure to provide even a court-appointed lawyer for the defendant is incompatible 
with article 35 of the Constitution, which guarantees legal representation. This was 
apparently a strict judge (he confirmed an amputation sentence in case 3, rejecting a 
declaration of repentance that legally prevented the hadd) but still there were 
opportunities for A to avoid confession or use repentance to prevent the loss of his 
fingers, and the absence of a lawyer meant that he was denied these possibilities. 
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3) The judge’s interpretation of ‘herz’ is questionable. Article 198, note 1, of the 
penal code describes a herz as an enclosure protecting goods from theft. Jurists 
elaborate on this (see chapter 4, section 5) by saying that the enclosure must be 
reasonably expected to protect the goods; likewise, article 198, section 15, specifies a 
‘commensurate enclosure’. Khomeini even declares that pickpockets are only liable 
for amputation (assuming the stolen amount meets the nesab) if the pockets whence 
they steal are hidden or have a closing such as a zipper which would require efforts 
to open; the contents of an ordinary pocket are not sufficiently mahfuz (protected) for 
it to be considered a ‘commensurate enclosure’1. In this case, goods were stolen from 
an unlocked house, which arguably was not a ‘commensurate enclosure’. 
 
4) Amputation is presented as contingent upon the complainant’s request thereof, but 
the law does not require it. Article 200, part 1, of the penal code requires the injured 
party’s initiative in prosecution for theft; through part 2, amputation is inapplicable if 
the injured party forgives the thief before prosecution. The most lenient 
interpretation of this is that injured parties can first forgive, then prosecute, thereby 
retrieving their goods without inflicting amputation. It does not, however, require 
complainants’ demand for amputation: by default, amputation is applicable unless 
complainants have pardoned before prosecution. This judge makes non-applicability 
the default, requiring an additional condition – complainants’ request – before 
amputation is applicable. It adds another opportunity, absent from codified law, to 
avoid amputation. However, it still gives complainants the discretion to override this 
added lenience, as happened in this and the next case. 
 
5) The conviction in absentia of the tape recorder’s alleged buyer, based exclusively 
on A’s confessions, contravenes the prohibition against using one person’s 
confessions to incriminate another2. 
 
6) The use of the asl-e bara’at, without accompanying codified laws, and the phrase 
‘the standards of the shari‘a and codified law’ display Shi‘i law’s perceived 
independent relevance to trials. 
                                                
1 Khomeini, 367. 
2 See chapter 2, section 6.1. 
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7) Article 198, note 4, of the penal code says that “if the thief returns the stolen 
goods to their owner, the hadd is inapplicable”, without specifying a time limit for 
this mechanism. The defendant returned two of the three stolen objects, but was 
unable to return the tape recorder, which had been sold. A lawyer might have 
prevented amputation by having the tape recorder traced, confiscated and returned 
(or obtaining and ‘returning’ an identical one). 
 
8) While the total value of stolen goods apparently exceeded the nesab of a quarter of 
a dinar, two items – the mobile and the fax machine – were returned to their owner 
before the trial, thereby removing themselves from the total amount. Only the tape 
recorder remained. Again, a lawyer could have investigated whether it, alone, 
fulfilled the nesab. 
 
Case 2: the dangers of collaborating with the authorities. 
Esfahan, 2002-4. 
 
This case has characteristics in common with the previous one, including the absence 
of lawyers and the importance attributed to complainants’ request of the hadd. 
Similarly to the previous case, it shows that collaboration with the authorities in 
hudud institutionally incriminates the collaborator. It adds the possibility that 
defendants might believe that collaboration will be rewarded with lenience. It also 
shows the importance of judges’ attitudes towards defendants. 
 
A man was arrested following investigations regarding stolen cars and multiple shop 
robberies. With a companion charged only as an accomplice, he confessed to the 
police and collaborated on a grand scale, revealing many locations of the thefts and 
even taking police officers there and demonstrating their methods.  
 
Some incriminating items (e.g. stolen goods described by the complainants and lock-
picking or cutting equipment) were found among the accused men’s possessions or 
with buyers of stolen goods, who confessed to buying them from the defendants. 
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Several complainants recognised the suspects in identity parades. The property stolen 
in each theft was apparently many times greater than the nesab that activates the 
hadd. The evidence suggested that a gang of four men, of whom two remained at 
large, had committed the thefts. 
 
The defendants were prosecuted on the request of 89 complainants, of whom 60 also 
testified and 25 requested the hadd. As in the previous case, there were no lawyers.  
 
In court, retracting their pre-trial confessions, both men denied most of the thefts, 
and also denied having taken police to the scenes of their thefts, although several 
complainants testified to seeing them there on those occasions, and the associated 
police reports bore the signatures of the defendants and the accompanying officers. 
In court they only admitted to thefts for which the complainants had waived the 
hadd, and one for which the goods were found in their possession, undermining 
denial. The primary defendant, having confessed to approximately 70 thefts before 
the trial, only admitted to 12 in court. 
 
On the basis of the evidence, the judge declared ‘elm (‘knowledge’, which permits 
conviction) of the men’s guilt of some of these crimes. Where there was insufficient 
evidence, the men were acquitted through the asl-e bara’at as expressed in article 37 
of the Constitution. Where the complainants had pardoned the thieves or only 
requested return of their goods, the judge complied with those requests. But 
regarding the thefts for which there was sufficient evidence and the complainants 
had requested the hadd, the judge, finding that the conditions for the hadd were all 
present, sentenced the primary defendant to amputation plus return of the stolen 
goods or compensation, through articles 198 to 201 of the penal code. The 
accomplice received a lesser ‘discretionary’ (ta‘ziri) sentence. 
 
The Supreme Court overturned the amputation sentence. It questioned the use of ‘elm 
when testimony and confession proved theft directly. Also, since two members of the 
gang of four were unavailable, it was uncertain that the man sentenced to amputation 
had personally broken into any herz and removed its contents. Finally, since many of 
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the complainants had not requested the hadd, it had to be clarified on whose request 
it was ordered. The case went back to the original court for revision. 
 
In response, the first judge explained that the thefts occasioning amputation had been 
those for which the required conditions existed and the injured parties had requested 
amputation. The conditions had been proven through ‘elm deriving from testimony 
plus other evidence. He did not address the issue of the herz. 
 
The Supreme Court, insisting that naqz (quashing) required a new ruling, requested 
this of the original judge, also ignoring the problem of the herz.  
 
When I was in this court, this was the most recent stage of the trial, and I do not 
know how it later developed. The judge told me that because of the large number of 
thefts and complainants, the man deserved amputation, a rare punishment reserved 
for the worst criminals. His justification of the penalty through the unusually 
multifarious nature of the crime contradicts the mechanism of the hadd, which is 
activated through fulfilment of its conditions irrespective of additional seriousness of 
the crime (chapter 2, section 5). This explanation is also undermined by the fact that 
he had issued the ruling in case 3 (confirmed by the judge from case 1) less than a 
month before sentencing this man, and case 3 involved only one theft, prosecuted by 
three, not 89, complainants. Furthermore, his colleague from case 1 had issued an 
amputation sentence for a single petty theft with one complainant. Interestingly, this 
judge told me that there was a ‘trend’ whereby the Supreme Court generally 
overturned amputation rulings, and he was, on this occasion, going to combat this. 
 
The trial up to this point had occupied well over a year, though the suspect was tried 
almost a year after arrest. 
 
Issues revealed by this case: 
 
1) As in case 1, the suspects were unconstitutionally denied lawyers. 
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2) There were sixty witnesses to the thefts cumulatively; but given the large number 
of thefts, were there at least two witnesses3 to at least one theft which certifiably 
carried the hadd? This was never made clear. The need for such crucial clarity was 
submerged by the impressive number of witnesses, and there was no mention of their 
‘edalat (‘righteousness’, required for valid testimony) or other legally required 
qualifications. All these were legal infractions. 
 
3) It was not proven that the defendant had breached the herz and removed the goods 
in any specific instance of theft. This had the most realistic chance of preventing 
amputation, but the absence of a lawyer precluded insistence on this point. 
 
4) The hadd was only ordered for thefts where haddi (adjectival form of hadd) 
conditions (chapter 4, section 5) were deemed established and complainants 
requested amputation, displaying the same lenient interpretation seen in case 1, and 
shared by the Supreme Court, whereby amputation depends on complainants’ 
request. Again, this added condition is not in the law. 
 
5) There is confusion surrounding the applicability of pardon in theft. As discussed 
in case 1, point 4, the penal code (article 200, section 2) says that amputation is 
applicable if “the injured party has not forgiven the thief before lodging a 
complaint”. This implies, without stating it explicitly, that injured parties can forgive, 
thereby preventing amputation, but subsequently prosecute. Here, some complainants 
pardoned the defendant or only requested the return of their stolen property, and the 
judge ruled that for thefts from those complainants, amputation was inapplicable. 
However, they were still classified as complainants, implying that a person can 
pardon a thief but still prosecute them to retrieve stolen goods without inflicting 
amputation. In fact, the note to article 200 says that after sobut (establishment) of 
haddi theft, neither pardon nor repentance can prevent amputation. This implies that 
until ‘establishment’, pardon and repentance can prevent amputation. However, 
‘establishment’ is not defined in codified law. Therefore in the next case we shall see 
                                                
3 Theft is proven by two witnesses, two confessions or ‘elm. 
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different interpretations of it, ranging from the moment of arrest to the issue of a 
ruling which the judge deems ‘correct’. 
 
6) Once the first ruling was overturned, the case went back to its original judge. For 
him to reconsider his ruling would have required an admission of error before the 
exalted Supreme Court judges and his colleagues in his own court. This bias is 
compounded by the judge’s unsympathetic stance: he emphasised his moral duty to 
pursue the man’s punishment with any means at his disposal. Given these conditions, 
the appeal did not constitute a ‘second opinion’. 
 
The law (see chapter 2, section 4) allows an appealed case to be returned to its 
original court if its ruling was overturned because of insufficient investigation. 
However, as observed in this case, a judge’s vested interest in proving himself right 
can hinder investigations which could suggest that his original ruling was wrong and 
the initial investigations careless. Also, issues other than mere ‘investigation’ can be 
involved but subordinated to the perceived main issue of ‘insufficient investigation’ 
which leads to revision by the same court. Therefore the legal permission of revision 
by the originating court can vitiate the objectivity of appeals and constitute a bias. 
 
7) The judge had considerable personal investment in the case. His stated reason for 
exceptional applicability of amputation, the large number of thefts and complainants, 
is not in the law and was undermined by the fact that he ordered amputation in case 3 
which lacked these features. His decision had less to do with the law than with his 
contempt for the defendant, which was clear from his manner, his adversarial attitude 
towards the Supreme Court for overturning his rulings, and his insistence that he 
would pursue amputation with every tool available. This partiality indicates a 
blurring of the roles of judge and prosecutor also seen in case 5 below. His mention 
of the Supreme Court’s tendency towards lenience in theft foreshadows the high 
proportion of overturned execution sentences among the published rulings in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
 
 141 
8) As case 1 also shows, suspects of hadd crimes do not obtain lenience by co-
operating with the authorities. Here the suspects’ extensive collaboration only 
incriminated them. It is possible that in pre-trial custody they learned of the perils of 
co-operation from fellow inmates, which might explain their sudden about-face when 
the trial began. This is similar to what apparently happened in fornication case 2 and 
adultery case 5.  
 
Case 3: who removed the loot? 
Esfahan, 2002-3. 
 
In the previous two cases, goods were assumed to have been removed from an 
‘enclosure’ without much investigation of the parameters involved. This case shows 
that when these parameters are investigated, they are highly interpretable. 
 
The events of the case are as follows. Three men were suspected of stealing from a 
shop; only two, Suspects A and B, were arrested. Their pre-trial confessions matched 
those made in court, where they had a court-appointed lawyer. 
 
The men confessed more than twice in court. Their confessions described the 
following details. All three suspects had made a hole in the wall of the shop. Suspect 
A and Suspect C, who had escaped arrest, had placed some merchandise into a sack 
and tied it to a rope. Suspect B had stood on the roof and pulled everything up; then 
all three had taken the goods away on a motorcycle. 
 
Suspect A stated in court that he had repented immediately after his crime, saying “I 
was a fool” and “I made a mistake” but also explicitly declaring “I repented”. 
Nevertheless, the judge – who also tried case 2 – declared ‘elm and yaqin (certainty) 
of his guilt. Finding that his act of placing the goods in the sack and tying them to a 
rope constituted their removal from the herz, he sentenced A to hand amputation. 
 
His lawyer appealed, citing various flaws in the judgement. 1) While Suspect A had 
confessed to perforating the wall, he had not confessed to removing the goods, but 
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only to tying them to a rope. The lawyer cited from Khomeini’s Tahrir al-Vasileh 
(his treatise on Shi‘i law) to confirm that the hadd only applies to those who have 
breached the herz and removed its contents. 2) All property stolen by A and B was 
returned, and the complainants had officially withdrawn their complaint and 
pardoned all suspects. 3) Suspect A not only claimed to have repented immediately 
after the crime – before arrest and prosecution, therefore – but announced this in 
court, before the ruling was issued, and therefore before the crime had been 
‘established’. This, by article 200, part 5, of the penal code, automatically prevented 
amputation. 4) Suspect A was severely addicted to narcotics, and, motivated by 
impellent need for them, committed theft under ezterar (distress), which prevents 
amputation by article 198, part 10, of the penal code.  
 
Accepting these arguments, the Supreme Court overturned the ruling, declaring that 
under these conditions amputation would contradict ‘the standards of the shari‘a and 
codified law’. The case was sent for retrial to an equivalent court, presided over by 
the judge from case 1. (Incidentally, the Supreme Court branch which overturned this 
ruling also confirmed that of case 1). 
 
During these new hearings, both men declared that Suspect B had not perforated the 
wall or pulled up any goods, but had merely waited for the others by the ‘getaway’ 
motorbike. This contradicted their confessions in the initial trial, whereby he had 
pulled up the goods, and all three suspects had perforated the wall. 
 
Furthermore, A, whose theft was deemed haddi because he had previously confessed 
to tying the sack to a rope for B to pull up, changed his confessions, claiming to have 
stood on the roof and pulled the goods up. This worked against him, because the 
second judge, in contradiction with the first, declared that it was not placing the 
goods in a sack and tying them to a rope which constituted their removal from the 
herz, but, indeed, the act of pulling them out of the shop. The judge, again invoking 
the Tahrir al-Vasileh, said that since the same man had attacked the herz and 
removed its contents, that condition for amputation was fulfilled.  
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The judge also used the Tahrir to claim that addiction to drugs did not constitute 
ezterar. (The Tahrir seems not to specifically exclude addiction from the definition 
of ezterar, merely giving famine as an example thereof4). The shop owners’ pardon 
came too late, occurring after prosecution. (Here, prosecution, not ‘establishment’, is 
identified as the moment when pardon loses effectiveness). 
 
The judge declared that such statements as ‘I was a fool’ and ‘I made a mistake’ 
were not identical to repentance, and that since the supposed repentance had occurred 
after ‘establishment’ of the crime, that is, after A’s arrest, it could not prevent the 
hadd. (Note this judge’s conception of when ‘establishment’ occurs, contrasting with 
the interpretation by the lawyer, accepted by the Supreme Court, whereby 
‘establishment’ means issue of the ruling). Since the judge had ‘elm of the crime and 
all haddi conditions, the man was again sentenced to amputation, with the possibility 
of appeal, through penal code articles 105 and 197-201. (Incidentally, this judgement 
was issued the day after the amputation sentence from case 1 was implemented 
following a ruling by the same judge). 
 
The lawyer appealed again, and the case went to the same Supreme Court branch 
which had overturned the first ruling. The Supreme Court judges agreed with the 
second judge’s idea of what constituted removal of goods from a herz. However, this 
cast A’s repentance in a new light. Because the first ruling was flawed, it had never 
‘established’ haddi theft, which had only been ‘established’ when the second ruling 
was issued. Any repentance made or announced before that would normally avert the 
hadd automatically. For these judges, contrary to the opinion of the retrial judge, 
‘establishment’ of the crime occurs when a valid ruling correctly assesses its haddi 
nature: yet another, even more lenient, interpretation of ‘establishment’. 
 
Since this claim of repentance would normally prevent amputation, only the judge’s 
‘elm that the repentance was false could still allow it. Quoting directly from the 
ruling: “Since the esteemed court has ‘elm of the theft, does it also have ‘elm that 
                                                
4 Khomeini, 361, 367. 
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[A’s] repentance is false? Through al-hudud todra’ be’l-shubuhat5, if the court 
convicts [A] without ‘elm of the falsity of his repentance, there will be dire 
consequences in the afterlife. Therefore the judgement is overturned and the case is 
returned to its originating court; and if that court has ‘elm of the falsity of [A’s] 
repentance, it can issue another amputation sentence, which this court is prepared to 
confirm. If not, it should issue a suitable ruling”. This document is dated a year and 
three months after the first ruling. 
 
This is the last document available regarding this case, and we do not know A’s 
ultimate fate. However, the extant documents, and the dialogue between the judges 
involved, shed light on several interesting issues. 
 
1) The use of extra-legal texts and ideas (e.g. the qa‘edeye darr’ and Khomeini’s 
Tahrir) again confirms Shi‘i fiqh’s influence on rulings alongside codified law.  
 
2) The technicalities of the herz were crucial here, and the documents are full of 
repeated and minutely detailed explanations of exactly who performed which act in 
the course of the theft. By haddi standards, identical crimes with identical amounts of 
harm and responsibility can carry radically different penalties on the basis of these 
technicalities. The emphasis on the herz also demonstrates that amputation is for 
physical theft limited by what humans can carry out of an ‘enclosure’ before being 
caught, whereas potentially enormous thefts perpetrated through computers or other 
non-physical means (e.g. fraud) cannot attract this penalty. (Even theft with animal 
assistance is only counted as ‘supervision’ of theft by article 198, note 2, of the penal 
code, so it is unclear whether removal of goods with machinery would be haddi 
theft). Because the shar‘i (adjectival form of ‘shari‘a’) parameters for ‘theft’ 
originate in an era remote from ours, they exclude thefts which can transcend the 
limits of that era through technology particular to this one. While including petty 
theft most probably carried out by relatively impoverished individuals, they do not 
cover potentially gigantic ‘white-collar theft’. 
 
                                                
5 The ‘axiom of removal’ (literally, ‘doubt averts punishment’); see chapter 3, section 5. 
 145 
3) This case illustrates the lack of consensus regarding the mechanics of the herz, and 
the crucial role played by different, though perhaps equally feasible, interpretations 
of its parameters. The first and second local judges had almost opposite conceptions 
thereof. Luckily for B, his changed confession during the new trial kept him outside 
the shifting definitions of ‘removing the contents of the herz’, while A’s altered 
confessions did precisely the opposite by keeping him within the moving boundaries 
of the hadd. 
 
4) Both men’s confessions during the second trial contradicted those in the first, but 
there was no mention of consequent invalidation (generally, contradiction invalidates 
proof). Each set of confessions was accepted as evidence in its own right in each 
trial, even though confession was the only form of evidence in both trials. 
 
5) Despite valid confessions in each trial, made in court more than twice per trial, 
both judges incorporated these confessions into ‘elm instead of using them as direct 
proof. This is even more noteworthy since in both cases confession was the only 
form of proof, so the judges’ ‘elm cannot have been superior to the zann (conjecture) 
created by confession. Yet ‘elm apparently gave them the right, even according to the 
Supreme Court, to reject repentance which ordinarily would have automatically 
averted the hadd. Judges’ ability to upgrade knowledge based exclusively on one of 
the ‘classical’ forms of proof (confession or testimony) to ‘elm, without additional 
evidence, obviously endangers defendants, potentially sweeping away all the 
strictures and advantages applicable to ‘lower’ forms of ‘knowledge’. 
 
6) Since article 200, part 5, of the penal code simply says that repentance before 
‘establishment’ of the crime causes suqut (invalidation) of the hadd, it is not clear 
whether ‘elm can overturn that suqut. The Supreme Court invoked the qa‘edeye darr’ 
(the axiom ‘doubt prevents punishment’) in overturning the last ruling. In the 
presence of two equally likely possibilities, one causing an irreversible punishment 
and the other not, the qa‘edeye darr’ would favour the second possibility, and so 
would the ‘axiom of interpreting laws to favour defendants’ and similar principles 
explained in chapter 3. The second judge’s, and the Supreme Court’s, permission of 
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the harsher choice clearly contradicted these principles. Incidentally, while rejecting 
‘indirect’ repentance (“I was a fool”) the second judge disregarded the suspect’s 
explicit statement “I repented”, displaying both severity and carelessness. 
 
7) As this and the previous case show, it is unclear when repentance, pardon and 
return of stolen goods lose their ability to avert the hadd. The penal code gives no 
‘expiry date’ for suqut following return of stolen property, so technically its return 
should have prevented an amputation sentence, but did not. Also, as discussed in 
cases 1 and 2, the codified law can be interpreted as allowing repentance and pardon 
to prevent amputation until ‘establishment’ of the crime, which the law does not 
define. Here, the Supreme Court’s definition of ‘establishment’ as ‘the issue of a 
correct ruling’ is more lenient than the second judge’s view that it occurs upon arrest. 
The second judge’s opinion that pardon and return of stolen property only prevent 
amputation before prosecution mirrors Khomeini’s Tahrir which says the same 
thing6. This means that the stern stance of the Tahrir overrode the more lenient 
possibilities permitted by the codified law. The ability of uncodified sources to 
override codified law demonstrates the tenuous authority of the codified law 
compared to Shi‘i law, of which it is deemed an imperfect shorthand version. 
 
Case 4: collaboration in theft prevents the hadd. 
Esfahan, 1995. 
 
This case only requires brief discussion, being notable only for containing no 
amputation sentences. Various men were accused of several crimes including rape, 
sodomy, assault and theft (of, inter alia, another tape recorder). Some thefts clearly 
involved breaking into locked homes. The two men accused of theft confessed before 
trial and subsequently in court, where all defendants had lawyers. There was other 
evidence, including medical reports, complaints by locals, and the discovery of 
stolen goods; ‘elm was therefore cited as the basis of the ruling. The two men were 
sentenced to public hanging for rape (not stoning, despite being married: see adultery 
                                                
6 Khomeini’s Tahrir (p. 373) allows the return of stolen goods to prevent amputation before 
prosecution but not after, and pardon to prevent it before prosecution. 
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case 5); they had other sentences including discretionary penalties for some thefts 
and restitution of stolen goods. The Supreme Court confirmed this ruling. 
 
Although some of the thefts involved breaking into an ‘enclosure’ and stealing its 
contents, amputation was never mentioned. The death penalty does not override 
amputation: penalties (with some ta‘ziri exceptions) must be arranged so as not to 
undermine each other if possible, as expressed in the penal code and Khomeini’s 
Tahrir7. Because thefts were collaborative, it was assumed to be unproven that either 
suspect had breached the enclosure and removed its contents. The same mechanism 
appears in the case below and some published rulings. However, the same 
uncertainty was ignored in case 2, further highlighting judges’ discretion. 
 
Case 5: patterns in written files also emerge in court. 
Esfahan, 2004. 
 
The only complete hadd-related trial I saw in Iran unfolded as follows. A weeping 
young man was brought into the courtroom with his equally distraught aged parents. 
The judge perused some papers and stated that the boy, bereft of previous 
convictions, had confessed before interrogators to having stolen two carpets 
accompanied by an accomplice. He then addressed the terrified boy, asking him 
whether he knew the punishment for theft. A long pause followed; I expected the 
judge to cite the amputation penalty. However, when the boy failed to speak, the 
judge flipped through his copy of the penal code and began enumerating various 
permutations of ta‘ziri fines and flogging and incarceration penalties. The rest of the 
trial consisted of negotiations regarding the optimal proportion of each of the three 
types of punishment in view of the boy’s personal situation and the extent of 
attenuation allowed through article 22 given his obvious repentance and lack of a 
criminal record. The boy and his parents protested that his kidney problem precluded 
flogging to the back, that his wife would leave him if he were imprisoned, and that 
they would have to sell their modest abode to cover any heavy fines. A mutually 
agreeable compromise was reached whereby incarceration would be waived in 
                                                
7 Penal code, articles 47, 98; see also 48. Khomeini, 447-8. 
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exchange for a fine of 100,000 tomans and twenty lashes to be administered to the 
back of the legs, avoiding the kidney area. The boy and his parents departed much 
relieved, loudly and enthusiastically thanking the judge and praising one of the 
Imams, whose birthday was approaching, for his intercession. 
 
After everyone had left, upon questioning the judge I discovered why he had 
immediately cited ta‘ziri penalties as ‘the punishment for theft’. Because the boy had 
had an accomplice, the assumption was that one person had not broken into the herz 
and removed the goods; therefore the theft was automatically reclassified as ta‘ziri. 
This was not stated explicitly in court, and the judge told me that the default was for 
thefts to be presumed ta‘ziri because of the stringent haddi conditions. The presence 
of multiple and particularly stringent conditions for amputation may be one of the 
reasons for the apparent rarity of amputation rulings in Iran.  
 
This judge’s relatively understanding disposition towards the defendant, which even 
permitted negotiations with him and his parents, led to a light penalty and failure to 
press the point of whether or not one person had indeed profaned the herz and 
removed the goods – a point which was pressed in case 3 and ignored in case 2 even 
though multiple participants were involved. The judge’s discretion means that his 
personal inclinations could lead him in either direction, as illustrated by case 2 and 
both fornication cases, and as Mir-Hosseini observed in divorce cases8. 
 
Importantly, the boy never confessed in court. His confessions were technically 
invalid because they occurred out of court. However, they were used as direct 
evidence of guilt, and the question of their validity never arose. Furthermore, the boy 
had no lawyers despite the guarantee of legal representation (chapter 2, section 3). In 
fact, in all the court sessions I was allowed to attend, most of which were irrelevant 
to the project, lawyers were absent and pre-trial confessions were used. In other 
words, the patterns of confession and frequent absence of lawyers observed through 
written court files also emerged in every court session I attended. Another example 
of this is a trial hearing where the accused man (again without a lawyer) denied his 
                                                
8 E.g. Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 63, 65, 67-71, 75-7, 218 (note 36). 
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pre-trial confessions, protesting his innocence, and the judge disregarded this by 
declaring him “a liar – a liar and an addict” although no drug-related charge was 
being heard. 
 
Overall, the hearings I witnessed suggested not only that pre-trial confession was 
standard and its denial frequently disregarded, but as in the above example, judges 
often presumed guilt, their emotional assessments of the defendants appeared 
important in their attribution thereof, and their role resembled that of prosecutors 




Nine published theft rulings are available. None contain amputation sentences. Some 
give only limited information regarding the case, leaving some details unknown9. 
The rulings reveal the following issues. 
 
1) In four cases, the charge was sherkat dar serqat, meaning ‘collaboration in theft’. 
As in cases 4 and 5, the ‘collaboration’ element appeared sufficient to avert the hadd, 
in contrast with cases 2 and 3 where the charge was also ‘collaborative theft’ but the 
herz was investigated. Only one ruling even mentions haddi conditions, which were 
deemed absent with no explanation. This case involved a lone thief, so the 
‘collaboration’ obstacle was intrinsically absent. Two rulings explicitly mention 
breaking and entering, but the issue of the herz does not arise. All this shows the 
discretion with which conditions for amputation can either be assiduously 
investigated or presumed absent at the earliest opportunity. 
 
2) One ruling relies only on testimony, but makes no mention of ‘edalat 
(righteousness) of witnesses. Two rulings rely exclusively on confession; in one, 
confessions clearly occurred out of court, and in the other (again involving theft of a 
tape recorder!) the location of confessions is unspecified. The one using confessions 
out of court cites the prohibition of using one person’s confessions to incriminate 
                                                
9 Saberi, 225-39, 384-6; Bazgir, 161-3. 
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another, using these otherwise invalid confessions only against their originators; 
however, another ruling uses one person’s confession against another. Six rulings 
imply ‘elm by including evidence other than confession or testimony, but only one 
explicitly mentions ‘elm. It relies exclusively on proof other than confession or 
testimony, and since it is an appeal ruling, we can see that the Supreme Court 
approved the ‘elm as mota‘arref, meaning ‘obtained by acceptable means’ (as 
required by article 120 of the penal code). 
 
3) In two cases, Shi‘i law was used without codified law cited alongside it. 
 
4) One case involved theft of an irreplaceable, potentially priceless artefact from an 
ancient mosque – an act automatically disqualified from the hadd because the 
property stolen was public10 and because the mosque, being open and accessible, did 
not constitute a herz. Instead, in case 1, an unlocked house was considered a herz and 
a man consequently lost four fingers over a tape recorder. As discussed in case 3, the 
fulfilment of the haddi conditions, not the seriousness or moral dimensions of theft, 




As reiterated in the beginning of this chapter, four major themes characterise Iranian 
hadd trials. The issue of incidence of penalties also occasionally arises and is 
foreshadowed here. The ‘micro-patterns’ observed in these theft cases contribute to 
these larger patterns in the following ways. 
 
Interpretability and judicial discretion. 
 
The interpretability of laws, and consequent judicial discretion, were manifested in 
several areas. In cases 1 and 2 amputation was declared contingent on the 
complainants’ request thereof; this lenient interpretation is not specified in the 
codified law. The interpretability of when repentance, pardon or return of stolen 
                                                
10 Article 198, point 16, of the penal code excludes the hadd for theft of governmental, public or 
religious endowment property. 
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goods could prevent the hadd before ‘establishment’ of the crime was displayed in 
cases 2 and 3. Interpretations ranged from ‘establishment’ occurring upon arrest to its 
delay until a ‘correct’ ruling is issued; similar variations in timing applied to pardon 
and return of stolen property, affecting the chances of avoiding amputation. 
 
The parameters of the herz are also highly interpretable, as observed particularly in 
case 3, where judges held opposite conceptions of what constituted removal of goods 
from the ‘enclosure’. The herz in case 1, an unlocked house, would arguably not 
have justified amputation according to Shi‘i jurists. The herz parameters prevented 
amputation in cases 4 and 5 and most of the published rulings: because there were 
multiple suspects, it was assumed that it could not be determined whether any 
particular suspect had breached the herz and removed the goods. On the other hand, 
in case 2, failure to determine this parameter did not prevent an amputation sentence.  
 
‘Elm is both an eminently interpretable concept and a tool giving judges discretion. 
In case 3, even the Supreme Court conceded that ‘elm, at the judge’s sole discretion, 
could override the normal action of repentance in preventing amputation.  
 
All this displays the interpretability of many parameters and judges’ discretion in 
applying them. Other instances of discretionary interpretation are the judge’s 
rejection, in case 3, of repentance as incorrectly phrased, and of addiction as a form 
of ‘distress’ just because Khomeini’s Tahrir does not explicitly mention it. This 
decisive use of a fiqh treatise exemplifies a major source of interpretability: the 
parallel operation of codified and Shi‘i law in court. Uncodified Shi‘i legal elements 
or fatwas were used independently of codified law in cases 1 and 3 and some 
published rulings. In case 3, the Tahrir even overrode codified law, precluding 
legally permissible opportunities to avoid amputation through pardon and return of 
stolen goods. 
 
Judicial discretion is also manifested in the importance of judges’ personal attitudes. 
In case 5, the judge’s sympathetic stance benefited the defendant. Cases 1-3 involved 
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the same severe judges pursuing amputation. The judge’s personal insistence on 




In cases 1, 2 and 5, defendants were illegally denied lawyers; in cases 1 and 2, this 
meant that important legal arguments were not made. Laws governing confession 
were broken in cases 1 and 5 and some published rulings; testimony regulations were 
contravened in case 2 and one published ruling. In case 2, the presence of breached 
‘enclosures’ was used as proof that one particular suspect had breached them and 
removed the goods, though this was not proven. The discretion allowed through ‘elm 
in case 3 allowed repentance norms to be disregarded: this is an example of ‘elm, 




Because legally amputation applies only to physical theft limited by how much a 
person can carry from an ‘enclosure’, it includes petty theft mostly linked to low 
socioeconomic status. It excludes more sophisticated fraud or computerised theft 
involving much greater values and more privileged individuals, including politicians 
and powerful corporate figures11. By specifying physical theft, amputation laws 
target poorer individuals while sparing wealthier ones. 
 
Institutional obstacles to lenience. 
 
These theft cases display some ways in which the system is weighted against 
lenience. One is appeal bias, observed in case 2 when the case went twice to the 
same court. An appeal assessed by the authority that one is appealing against is 
meaningless. Other institutional obstacles are the confusion of the roles of judge and 
prosecutor, seen in cases 2 and 5, and the swiftness of some trials, seen in case 1 and 
                                                
11 Regarding huge, unpunished fraud by government officials: Kusha, 272-3, 290-1. On widespread 
corruption: Maleki, 20. 
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observed again in chapter 812. Yet another is the mechanism of ‘reverse plea 
bargaining’ seen in case 2. Because in hudud, confession invariably incriminates 
confessors, suspects who confess in the belief – sometimes encouraged by 
interrogators, as seen in chapters 6 and 9 – that this will be rewarded with lenience 
thereby doom themselves. The coexistence of confession as proof and the belief in 
lenience as a reward for confession increases the possibility of conviction in hudud. 
 
A crucial obstacle to lenience observed through cases 1-3 is that the amputation 
penalty exists in the law, and therefore, no matter how stringent its conditions, judges 
can occasionally demand it. Its scriptural origin (Qur’an 5:38) hinders abrogation. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, it is contingent upon physical characteristics which not 
only limit it to forms of petty theft linked to low socioeconomic status, but are 
unconnected to some moral dimensions of the crime. In one published ruling, the 
theft of an irreplaceable historic artefact did not attract amputation because of 
technicalities; in case 1, instead, a man lost four fingers over a mass-produced tape 
recorder. Even injured parties’ prerogatives are overridden by technicalities of 
timing, which can overrule pardon.  
 
This dissociation between harmfulness of the crime and severity of punishment, 
combined with that punishment’s apparent irremovability, illustrates the difficulties 
created when rules originating in one environment are considered obligatory in 
another (see chapter 1, section 5.5). 
 
Incidence of penalties. 
 
The absence of amputation sentences in the published rulings and cases 4 and 5, plus 
the judge’s assertion in case 2 about the Supreme Court’s tendency to overturn them, 
foreshadow the tentative indications regarding incidence of penalties observed in the 
published rulings of the next two chapters. They suggest that irreversible hadd 
                                                
12 Reportedly, 49 days elapsed between crime and execution in a murder case from November 2011: 
see Iran Human Rights, “One man”. ICHRI, “Iran’s secret hangings”, has examples of brief trials in 
non-hadd cases. Ayatollah Montazeri has declared that the blurring of the roles of judge and 
prosecutor invalidates trials (Qazi, “Pasokh”). 
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penalties may be relatively rare and overturned on appeal significantly more often 
than lesser penalties. 
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6. Sodomy cases. 
 
This is the second of five chapters presenting case studies of Iranian hadd trials 
arranged by crime. It discusses four sodomy (lavvat) court cases and 36 published 
sodomy rulings, displaying practical application, and often misapplication, of laws 
and principles discussed in chapters 2-4. These cases continue some themes observed 
in the previous chapter, such as the use of confession and ‘elm and the arbitrary 
deployment of laws. They also introduce themes particular to carnal crimes, such as 
the degree of penetration which classifies a carnal act as sodomy.  
 
These cases, building on those in the previous chapter, indicate certain tendencies 
characterising the implementation of hudud in Iran. As in theft cases, they crystallise 
into four main patterns: arbitrariness deriving from vague laws, legal contraventions, 
socioeconomic implications, and the system’s obstacles to lenience. The additional 
issue of the incidence of penalties, foreshadowed in the previous chapter, also arises 
here. The way in which the individual, smaller patterns coalesce into the larger ones 




Case 1: acquittal is replaced by a death sentence. 
Esfahan, 1999-2000. 
 
This case highlights the mechanism whereby an overturned ruling leads to a retrial 
which may cause a heavier penalty than the original one (in this case, death). It 
displays the discretion surrounding judges’ assessment of evidence, and broaches the 
issue of children’s testimony, which is used contrastingly in the next case. 
 
A boy, aged nine, told his parents that his employer, a wealthy local dairy farmer, 
had raped (tajavoz) him. The employer was tried for coercive sodomy (lavvat be 
‘onf), which he always denied. He admitted to bathing the boy and accidentally 
scalding him with hot water, accounting for burn marks on his back. Medical 
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evidence could not prove rape, to which the only direct references were the boy’s 
claims which did not specifically mention penetration. The man was acquitted of 
rape, but sentenced to lesser ta‘ziri (discretionary) penalties for ‘acts against chastity’ 
plus compensation for burns. 
 
The boy’s parents appealed the acquittal, which was overturned because of 
insufficient attention to “the shari‘a (shar‘) and the law”. The retrial court, seeking 
additional medical opinions, concluded that while the medical evidence, consisting 
of muscular laxity in the crucial area without the abrasions normally indicating 
forcible penetration, could not prove rape, neither could it disprove rape. As 
additional evidence the court cited the man’s attempts to bribe the boy’s family to 
prevent prosecution, his flustered attempts to deny various things (e.g. bathing the 
boy) and invent conspiracy theories during his second trial, making himself appear 
guilty, and the fact that he hired a lawyer to defend him. Claiming ‘elm 
(‘knowledge’ – chapter 2, section 6.4), it sentenced him to death by public hanging, 
citing articles 120 (permission of ‘elm) and 112 (death for sodomy with underage 
boys) of the penal code and sodomy topic 3 of Khomeini’s Tahrir al-Vasileh1. The 
man appealed; the case went back to the same Supreme Court branch that had 
already overturned his acquittal, which confirmed the sentence. We do not know if it 
was implemented. The entire process, from complaint to final confirmation, took 
approximately a year and seven months. 
 
Here are the salient issues involved in this case. 
 
1) A crucial difference between lavvat (sodomy), carrying the death penalty, and 
similar crimes carrying only 100 lashes or ta‘ziri penalties is that lavvat requires 
establishment of full penetration of the glans (chapter 4, sections 1 and 4). The only 
evidence indicating lavvat was the nine-year-old boy’s account, using the words 
lavvat and tajavoz, whose technical meanings were not necessarily clear to him, 
without describing penetration itself. Given the punishment for sodomy (death), the 
choice is therefore between executing men based only on children’s testimony and 
                                                
1 Topic 3 (p. 342) allows judges (who, on p. 245, must be mujtahids!) to use ‘elm in sodomy. 
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releasing potential child rapists to avoid executing them, thereby failing to protect 
children against molesters. The middle ground represented by the ta‘ziri penalties in 
the first ruling is available, but is fragile and can be undermined by ‘elm on appeal. If 
the middle ground were specifically regulated, such cases would be firmly in the 
realm of ta‘zir, eliminating the risk of ignoring children’s complaints to avoid 
executions, but averting death sentences based on insufficient evidence. 
 
2) The use of the defendant’s employment of a lawyer as evidence against him is 
particularly intriguing. Absence of a lawyer can be disastrous (cf. theft case 1), but 
hiring one can give the impression of having ‘something to hide’.  
 
Farkhondeh describes negative stereotypes of deceitful lawyers and their corrupt, 
wealthy and guilty clients in the Iranian media, and the accompanying apparently 
widespread notion that judges resent the presence of lawyers. This is corroborated by 
Mir-Hosseini’s analysis of Iranian divorce cases. She found only two cases involving 
lawyers, and “in both instances it had an adverse effect and was looked upon 
unfavourably by the judge”2. This exemplifies how theoretical rights may not be 
upheld in practice: here the defendant was harmed by his insistence on his 
constitutional right. 
 
3) Since the Supreme Court’s role in appeals is merely to confirm or overturn rulings 
and order retrials, appeals can result in harsher sentences than the original ones. This 
happened here, exemplifying both the possibility and the dangers of double jeopardy 
(chapter 2, end of section 4). 
 
4) After appeal of the death sentence, the case went to the same Supreme Court 
branch which had initially overturned the man’s acquittal, thereby expressing its 
belief that he should be executed. This displays the bias against the accused, also 
seen in theft case 2, existing in the appeal system. Here it was not even the result of 
the legal permission for the same court to revise appealed cases because of 
‘insufficient investigation’ (chapter 2, section 4). 
                                                
2 Farkhondeh, “Rule of law”, 9; Mir-Hosseini, Marriage, 31; Mohammadi (Majid), 186. 
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5) The use of the phrase ‘the shari‘a and the law’ and the Tahrir to support a death 
sentence exemplifies Shi‘i law’s role in criminal trials. 
 
6) This ruling was based on ‘elm, relying on very little, ambiguous medical evidence 
plus accumulated statements which did not prove the crucial parameter of 
penetration. The Supreme Court accepted the judge’s discretion to decide that this 
tenuous evidence gave him sufficient ‘elm to justify a death sentence. 
 
7) This is an example of hanging, absent in Shi‘i law, being chosen as the execution 
method for sodomy. If stoning were similarly uncodified, would judges prescribe 
hanging for adultery? If the five scriptural penalties for sodomy were codified, would 
they be defended as ardently as stoning? 
 
Case 2: blurred boundaries between haqq Allah and haqq al-nas3. 
Tehran, 2004-6. 
 
The evidence in this case was similar to that in the previous one, yet the previous 
defendant was condemned to death and this one was acquitted. This contrast, while 
adding to the discussion of children’s testimony and extent of penetration, also 
continues the theme of arbitrariness deriving from the law’s vagueness and 
interpretability, observed in the previous chapter. Another theme continued from the 
previous chapter is judges’ treatment of complainants’ wishes as relevant though 
they are technically irrelevant in ‘crimes against God’. 
 
A man went to the police with his twelve-year-old son, who said he had been 
kidnapped and raped in a park by three men. There was clear medical evidence of 
rape. Police tracked down a suspect, who admitted to being with two other men when 
they kidnapped and raped a boy, but denied participation. 
 
                                                
3 Haqq Allah are ‘crimes against God’, impervious to complainants’ pardon; haqq al-nas, ‘crimes 
against humans’, allow complainants’ pardon. 
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In court, the child identified the suspect as the man who had ‘done a bad thing to 
me’, but the suspect said that only his companions had committed rape. Only 
afterwards were lawyers introduced. Soon the boy’s father declared that since his son 
could have incorrectly identified the suspect as his rapist, he pardoned him 
unconditionally, withdrawing his complaint. The court declared that irrespective of 
the legally irrelevant pardon and withdrawal, the suspect was acquitted for lack of 
dalil-e shar‘i va qanuni, ‘shar‘i (adjectival form of shar‘) and legal grounds’. 
 
Mysteriously, despite the father’s pardon, his lawyer appealed the acquittal. The 
Supreme Court confirmed it, citing the suspect’s uniform denial of sodomy, the 
pardon, and the possibility of mistaken identity. The case, from the police complaint 
to the confirmation of acquittal, lasted a year and six weeks. 
 
These are the salient issues transpiring from this case. 
 
1) Again, acquittal was appealed seeking increased severity.  
 
2) As in the previous case, the child never described penetration of the glans (‘he did 
a bad thing’), and the suspect uniformly denied sodomy. The medical evidence was 
stronger than in the previous case, but yielded no death sentence. Doubt about the 
assailant’s identity was perhaps more credible than doubt surrounding the mechanics 
of penetration, present in the previous case, and the father’s legally irrelevant pardon 
also subjectively favoured acquittal. However, the contrast between this and the 
previous case highlights judges’ discretion to assess similar evidence.  
 
3) Sodomistic rape is haqq Allah: ‘God’s rights’, prosecutable independently of 
injured parties and unpardonable by them (chapter 2, sections 8-9). Therefore the 
father’s pardon was irrelevant, as declared by the first court. However, immediately 
after it the suspect was acquitted, and the Supreme Court listed it among the reasons 
for confirming the acquittal. The Supreme Court explicitly, and the first court 
perhaps implicitly, treated rape as partially haqq al-nas (‘rights of humans’, 
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pardonable by injured parties). This apparent influence of the harm principle (crimes 
are such because they cause harm) overrode Shi‘i and codified law. 
 
4) Again we find the phrase shar‘i va qanuni, implying the shar‘ as a source of law 
alongside or underlying the codified law. 
 
5) Finally and very importantly, this case shows the belated introduction of lawyers. 
The suspect had no lawyers during pre-trial interrogation and even during the first 
stages of his trial where evidence was heard; they were only introduced at the end, to 
defend him after all statements were taken. The fact that in this particular case he 
was released is irrelevant. Given the frequency with which pre-trial confessions are 
used as crucial evidence, and the explicit legal validity of confessions made in court, 
failure to introduce a lawyer immediately upon arrest can cause defendants to 
incriminate themselves irrevocably without legal counsel, despite their constitutional 
right to it. Explicit legislation mandating provision of lawyers upon arrest would 
prevent this de facto negation of their constitutional right. 
 
Case 3: murder victim is claimed mahduroldamm through lavvat. 
Esfahan, 2001-3. 
 
The concept of mahduroldamm – a person whose blood is forfeit because they 
committed a capital crime – appears in action here for the first time. It highlights the 
tension between the letter of the law, which allows belief in a murder victim’s 
mahduroldamm status to exonerate the murderer, and the judge’s contention that the 
capital crime (in this case, sodomy) be proven. This either-or situation, whereby 
either the murderer or the victim is guilty, resurfaces in chapter 9 (adultery cases). 
 
A murder suspect confessed to the murder in self-defence. He claimed the victim, 
with three companions, had attempted to rape his cousin, then raped him (the 
suspect), and finally attacked him with a knife and chain to stop him from alerting 
the police, dying in the altercation. In all the suspect’s trials and appeals, the self-
defence claim was dismissed and judges focused on whether rape had actually 
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occurred, rendering the victim mahduroldamm through commission of a capital 
crime (coercive sodomy), thereby downgrading his murder to unauthorised execution 
carrying no death penalty (chapter 4, section 2). However, the law (article 295/j/2) 
excludes the death penalty, though still prescribing punishment, even if the murderer 
erroneously believes the victim to be mahduroldamm and proves that belief, not the 
reason thereof. 
 
The cousin’s attempted rape had been witnessed and halted by passers-by. It could 
not be prosecuted since the boy was underage, his father and ‘natural guardian’ was 
abroad, and his mother, not being his ‘natural guardian’, could not prosecute on his 
behalf. However, judges used this attack to support one participant’s conviction for 
disturbing the peace. Independent corroboration and acceptance of the suspect’s 
claim of his cousin’s attempted rape by the victim (and companions) could have 
supported his claim of rape by the same individuals, thereby saving his life though he 
could still receive heavy penalties; but he was sentenced to death because he could 
not prove his rape. 
 
Here are some salient issues of this case. 
 
1) Judges’ discretion allows dramatically differing rulings regarding mahduroldamm 
status. Judges may emphasise suspects’ belief in it4 or may instead insist on 
establishing its reality, against article 295/j/2. In a published zena ruling (which cites 
the Tahrir), a man found his wife in bed with another man and killed him. He was 
only sentenced to pay diyeh (blood money) because of his possibly erroneous belief 
that the victim was mahduroldamm; his wife was acquitted of adultery, which she 
denied, receiving only a ta‘ziri punishment for illicit relations5. 
 
2) Legally, claims of coercion are acceptable by default except in murder, and rape 
claims alone cannot justify accused rapists’ execution6. The same mechanism, 
                                                
4 One published zena ruling sentences a murderer only to diyeh because he claimed the victim had 
raped his mother: Saberi, 67-8. 
5 Saberi, 94-5. 
6 Chapter 2, section 7.3; chapter 4, section 3.2. 
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whereby doubt exonerates defendants without incriminating named attackers, here 
could have prevented the death penalty for all parties. A published ruling embodies 
this mechanism by clearing a boy of passive tafkhiz (sodomy minus penetration) 
because he claimed coercion, without thereby convicting his putative aggressors7. 
 
Here, instead, the emphasis shifted from failure to disprove belief in rape to failure to 
prove rape. This recalls case 1, where failure to disprove lavvat through medical 
evidence facilitated a death sentence. Both imply presumed guilt. 
 
3) The judge’s discretion is also shown in his acceptance of the cousin’s attempted 
rape but not the suspect’s belief that the same attackers were mahduroldamm. 
 
4) The suspect’s cousin’s and his mother’s inability to prosecute his attackers 
exemplifies not only the male bias of the law, whose dismissal of mothers is termed 
‘natural’, but also the system’s inadequacy to protect children without male relatives 
to defend them. Prosecution was additionally prevented by the prohibition, cited by 
the judge, against prosecuting ‘crimes against chastity’ without complainants 
(chapter 3, section 4), used here to deny rights, but elsewhere ignored (as in several 
forthcoming cases) when it could have prevented prosecution by the authorities! 
 
Case 4: execution of a minor despite invalidation of ‘elm and stay of execution. 
Kermanshah, 2006-7. 
 
In this case, a boy was executed, notwithstanding a stay of execution, for acts 
allegedly committed while under the age of bulugh (legal maturity). The judge’s ‘elm 
of his guilt was based on testimony which was invalidated because the witnesses 
retracted it. Therefore this case displays authorities contravening multiple laws with 
impunity, and showcases the remarkable powers attributed to ‘elm. 
 
Several teenage boys allegedly complained to the police that an age-mate, with 
accomplices, had repeatedly raped them years before, when they were all around 13 
                                                
7 Bazgir, 345-8. 
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years old, threatening various repercussions if they reported him. Under interrogation 
he agreed to tell the truth only if the prosecutor promised lenience in return. He then 
confessed to several instances of rape followed by intimidation. In court, he denied 
these confessions as coerced, as did his co-defendants. No complainants appeared in 
the first two trial hearings. Three of the six individuals listed as complainants – the 
others being various government offices – appeared in the third session, withdrew 
their testimony as coerced, and requested that all charges be dropped. 
 
The judge, pontificating lengthily about Islamic morality and the heinousness of the 
alleged crimes, claimed ‘elm and sentenced the boy to public execution by one of the 
methods (chapter 4, section 4) prescribed by fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). He cited 
articles 108, 110, 111 and 120 of the penal code and sodomy entries 1, 3 and 4 of 
Khomeini’s Tahrir al-Vasileh8. Evidence given was testimony, confession, the 
suspect’s penal precedents for assault and brawling, his bad reputation, and his 
possession of prohibited items including “a satellite dish, video tapes and CDs, a 
sword, and albums containing photographs and negatives” (some items were 
described as ‘obscene’). 
 
In court, the suspect had a lawyer, whose arguments the judge dismissed. The 
argument that the suspect was underage was overridden by the judge’s contention 
that the boy had been 16, therefore over the age of criminal responsibility (bulugh) 
for boys (15 lunar years: chapter 2, section 7.1), during the crimes, though all reports 
indicated a much earlier time. Objections to the use of invalid confession and 
testimony, retracted and never occurring in court, were countered by the judge’s 
insistence that these had given him ‘elm (‘knowledge’), superior to other forms of 
evidence which only allow zann (‘conjecture’). 
 
In acquitting the other defendants for insufficient age or evidence, the judge cited the 
qa‘edeye darr’ (‘doubt prevents punishment’), ‘the shari‘a’s insistence on caution 
and lenience in hudud’, ‘caution in shedding blood’, and article 37 of the 
                                                
8 Definition of sodomy; proofs of sodomy including ‘elm-e qazi; death for the adult partner in sodomy 
with children (Khomeini, 342-3). The judge considered the boy an adult. 
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Constitution embodying the asl-e bara’at (presumption of innocence)9. The 
complainants were acquitted of passive sodomy because they claimed coercion, and 
were likely bereft of ekhtiar (free will). 
 
The Supreme Court confirmed the sentence, briefly declaring that the evidence 
justified ‘elm. Another lawyer took the case and requested an extraordinary review; 
the head of the Judiciary granted a stay of execution to allow further investigations. 
However, without any warning to his lawyer or family, the boy was hanged at dawn 
in prison slightly over a year after the initial complaint. His family were only 
informed when they were instructed to collect his body. 
 
Here are some important issues emerging from this case. 
 
1) The suspect only confessed after seeking the prosecutor’s help. The possibility of 
confession in the belief that collaboration will be rewarded is discussed in chapter 2, 
end of section 6.1, theft case 2, and adultery case 3. This authorities’ use of trickery 
to extract confessions to crimes carrying the death penalty displays a mechanism 
opposite to ‘plea bargaining’, whereby swift confession incriminates the confessor 
instead of securing lenience. 
 
2) Court documents claim that complainants initiated prosecution spontaneously; 
however, some of them claimed in court that their testimony was coerced and false. 
Maybe their testimony was correct, and withdrawn through fear of reprisals. 
However, as suggested also by the fact that two complainants were prosecutors’ 
offices and by the disregard for law and protocol10 permitting the secret execution, 
the case, similarly to fornication case 1, was possibly initiated illegally by the 
authorities11 who interrogated suspected sodomists, of whom some evaded the 
charges by claiming rape, and then pretended there were complainants. When a 
confession of sodomy is extracted, the confessor’s only chance to escape execution 
may be a rape claim.  
                                                
9 All explained in chapter 3. 
10 For instance, lawyers must be notified 48 hours before executions (chapter 2, section 5.3). 
11 ‘Crimes against chastity’ are unprosecutable without complainants (case 3, point 4; chap. 3, part 4). 
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The condemned boy’s lawyer suggested he was possibly prosecuted as revenge over 
a private conflict, which spiralled out of control once the authorities were involved. 
Although the truth is unknown, the acceptability of testimony as sole proof in hudud 
facilitates conviction through false accusation if the required number of witnesses 
make sufficiently detailed statements; and through ‘elm, any requirements for 
testimony, including that it not be withdrawn, can be overridden, as happened here. 
 
3) This ruling, like many others, was based on ‘elm, its grounds being invalid 
versions of the other two types of proof (confession and testimony) combined with 
vague indicators of the defendant’s generally criminal nature.  
 
All confessions were invalid because they occurred out of court, and further 
invalidated by claims of coercion. All testimony occurred out of court; the testimony 
of three witnesses was invalidated by being withdrawn in court, and further 
compromised by claims of coercion. That of the remaining three was neither 
confirmed nor withdrawn in court because they did not appear. It was also invalid 
because they did not constitute the nesab (required number) of four witnesses. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether testimony, similarly to confession, is valid only if 
heard in court. On this point one can either favour the defendant – a principle 
discussed in chapter 3, sections 1 and 3 – by dismissing testimony heard out of court, 
or not. Additionally, testimony can only prove sodomy by referring to the same 
instance thereof; but the complainants testified to different rapes with different 
victims. Witnesses’ ‘edalat (righteousness: chapter 2, section 6.3) was never 
investigated. Hence all testimony and confession was invalid for multiple reasons. 
There was no medical evidence, given the passage of years between the alleged 
crimes and the trial, and no investigation into claims of torture.  
 
Therefore the judge’s claim of ‘elm apparently relied on no valid evidence, but he 
declared ‘elm intrinsically superior to other forms of proof. He used a philosophical 
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classification of gradations of knowledge12 to attribute authority to his ‘elm because 
the term happened to coincide on that scale with the name of a superior form of 
knowledge. Importantly, the association of the penal with the philosophical ‘elm 
originally refers to the ‘elm of the infallible Imams. Furthermore, many jurists stress 
that ‘elm must be sensory (hessi), not based on guesswork, and even jurists allowing 
‘elm to ordinary judges insist that they be mujtahids: jurists authorised to interpret 
the sacred law. This judge, like most Iranian judges, was not (chapter 2, sections 3 
and 6.4, middle of section 9). Despite all this, the Supreme Court accepted the 
judge’s claim of ‘elm as a matter of definition. 
 
The judge (possibly feeling obliged to acknowledge the technical definition of 
sodomy) even specified that his ‘elm was of complete penetration of the glans, which 
none of the evidence demonstrated or even mentioned. Instead, in some published 
rulings below, judges ruled against the death penalty despite medical evidence of 
penetration and confessions to sodomy, rape or penetration (dukhul), finding that 
such evidence could not prove that the glans had been entirely hidden. This contrast 
illustrates judges’ immense discretion in assessing proof. 
 
The success of ‘elm in this case exemplifies its ability to avoid the strictures of proof 
and even survive the invalidation of its own grounds – a feat also accomplished in 
fornication case 2.  
 
4) This is an example of a claim that statements made out of court were extracted 
forcibly by the authorities.  
 
5) Although it is unlikely that this would carry the day, a claim related to the ‘statute 
of limitations’ might have bolstered the defendant’s case. His crimes allegedly 
                                                
12 For example see Akhtar, where the term ‘ilm al-yaqin (‘certain knowledge’) means ‘certainty’. 
Momen, 187, discusses the gradations of knowledge applied to the extrapolation of rulings from the  
Qur’an and narrations, but uses qat‘ (certainty) as the form of knowledge superior to zann. In the court 
documents available, judges often combine these terms in phrases such as ‘elm, qat‘  va yaqin 
(knowledge and certainty), suggesting association of their ‘elm with the superior epistemological 
qualities of ‘certainty’ as conceived in philosophical gradations of knowledge. 
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occurred a minimum of six years before his trial, and there are narrations forbidding 
prosecution for acts more than five or six months old (chapter 2, section 9).  
 
6) At the latest time referred to in any descriptions of rape, the suspect would have 
been 14 years old. Therefore his execution violated Shi‘i and codified law. Even if he 
was 16, as the judge claimed, his execution, as in fornication case 1, contravened 
article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Iran is a signatory 
(chapter 2, section 7.1). 
 
7) As in other cases, the judge’s use of the Tahrir, the qa‘edeye darr’, caution in 
shedding blood, and the concept of lenience in hudud shows Shi‘i fiqh’s independent 
role as a source of judgements. Here, however, lenient portions of Shi‘i fiqh were 
used selectively and did not benefit the boy who was ultimately hanged, although 
there is a strong case for arguing that they should also have applied to him. 
 
8) Some of the evidence against the prime defendant, vaguely indicating loose 
morals, was entirely unrelated to the charges. Evidence appears to have been used 
quantitatively rather than qualitatively: a large collection of irrelevancies and 
emotional appeals was deployed in lieu of conclusive evidence, compensating for 
imprecision with sheer bulk. 
 
9) Here is an example of the perceived necessity to clear rape claimants of passive 
sodomy. Though in this case their claim of coercion exonerated them, the very 
possibility of trying those who report a rape means that complaining of rape could 
result in punishment, as shown by some published sodomy and zena rulings. 
 
10) Again a person was hanged for sodomy and not executed by one of the five 
scriptural methods (chapter 2, section 5.3) prescribed by his sentence. 
 
11) A theme which permeates the debate over Iran’s human-rights record is the 
authorities’ powerlessness to disregard ‘Islamic laws’13. However, here the 
                                                
13 See e.g. chapter 2, section 5.3; chapter 4, section 3.7; Mayer (1996), esp. 269-72. 
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authorities broke several of their own laws. Using inadmissible evidence, they 
sentenced a person to death for crimes allegedly committed when he was under 18 
and had almost certainly not reached bulugh. Although the ruling sentenced him to 
be publicly executed in one of the ways described in scripture and fiqh, he was 
secretly hanged in prison, despite a stay of execution, and without regard for 
protocol, since his lawyer was not advised 48 hours prior to his execution as required 
by law (chapter 2, section 5.3). The hurried, secret execution suggests that the 
authorities were determined to eliminate him even if it meant presenting objecting 
parties with an irreversible fait accompli. In this respect, and also as regards the 
flawed evidence, this case recalls that of Delara Darabi, who was suddenly executed 
for a murder allegedly committed at age 17 despite a stay of execution granted to 
allow the examination of crucial evidence which the authorities had previously 
disregarded. In her case too it was speculated that protocol was ignored to 
circumvent the possibility of protests and preventive measures that a 48-hour 
warning might have allowed14. 
 
The authorities’ abdication of responsibility through claims that humans are 
powerless to ignore ‘divine laws’ and that judges are duty-bound to apply codified 
laws is undermined by the pragmatism suggested by their disregard of their own 
supposedly intranscendible rules. This pragmatism could equally well promote 
lenience, thereby avoiding domestic and international diplomatic problems related to 
Iran’s human-rights record. This would obey the axiom against causing hatred of the 
faith and the concept that the regime is authorised to break individual 




The 36 published sodomy rulings available15 contain themes which expand upon 
those observed in the unpublished cases. These include the use of evidence and Shi‘i 
law, the presence of double jeopardy, and the authorities’ initiative in prosecution. 
                                                
14 Amini, “Seh sal”; Soares, “Delara”; Human Rights Watch, “Iran: secret execution”; 
communications with two individuals with first-hand knowledge of the case. 
15 Saberi, 44-6, 309-13, 317-9; Bazgir, 330-48, 350-5, 357-91, 394-404, 409-10, 413-4. 
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They also introduce mechanisms not seen in the unpublished cases, such as the use of 
repentance and the prosecution of rape claimants. These combine with the themes 
from the unpublished cases to fortify the image of the larger themes, permeating the 
case studies, of legal interpretability, legal infractions, socioeconomic factors and 
institutional obstacles to lenience. 
 
The number of published rulings also gives a tentative impression of the incidence of 
death penalties and of rape versus consensual sodomy cases. These will be examined 
first, followed by the themes mentioned above. 
 
1) Incidence of death sentences. 
 
Almost half (17) of the 36 cases involve death sentences, but only four are known to 
have been confirmed. In this sample, first-instance courts are as likely to decree 
death penalties as non-death penalties, while the Supreme Court is twice as likely to 
overturn death sentences as non-death sentences. However, the Supreme Court’s 
leniency could be cancelled out by local judges conducting retrials. Both of these 
patterns are corroborated in the next chapter and recall the judge’s statement in theft 
case 2 about the Supreme Court frequently overturning amputation sentences. There 
could indeed be such a ‘trend’ for both death and amputation sentences. 
 
Only four death sentences explicitly prescribe one of the five scriptural execution 
methods (chapter 2, sections 5.1 and 5.3; chapter 4, section 4). Of these, only one, 
prescribing throwing from a height, was definitely confirmed. Other death sentences 
prescribe either hanging or simply execution by unspecified method. 
 
2) Rape versus consensual sodomy. 
 
Of the 36 published sodomy rulings, 30 involve coercive sodomy (lavvat be ‘onf), as 
do all the unpublished cases available. Of these, 26 explicitly involve underage boys, 
aged between 4 and 15, with their fathers as complainants; where bulugh was 
doubtful, boys aged 15 were considered underage. In two cases the charge was 
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clearly consensual sodomy and in the others it is unclear. Though rape, having a 
victim, is clearly a crime, consensual sodomy also carries the death penalty and is at 




No rulings involved bayyaneye shar‘i (four men’s eyewitness testimony).  
 
23 rulings mention medical evidence, usually combined with invalid confession or 
children’s statements. In ten cases where medical evidence indicated sodomy, the 
defendants were only found guilty of tafkhiz (punishable by 100 lashes) or ‘illicit 
relations’, because the evidence could prove penetration, but not full entry of the 
glans. This doubt averted fourteen death sentences, either because medical evidence 
was held insufficient to prove that extent of penetration, or because confessions to 
penetration omitted this detail. 
 
22 of the 36 rulings involved confession, explicitly valid in only two cases. 20 
clearly involved invalid confessions; 12 had no confessions; and in the remaining 
two, it is unclear whether confessions existed. The most common cause of invalidity 
was that confessions occurred out of court; they were often retracted in court, 
sometimes with claims of coercion. 
 
All death sentences relying only on invalid confession were overturned, again 
suggesting greater lenience of the Supreme Court than first-instance courts. 
However, the results of the subsequent retrials are unknown. The fact that naqz 
(quashing) is not a reprieve, since it only causes a retrial, is illustrated by a case 
where a non-death sentence, based mostly on invalid confession, was overturned but 
replaced by the death penalty following retrial. Nor does acquittal guarantee safety: 
an acquittal and a ta‘ziri sentence were appealed by the authorities pursuing the death 
penalty. Both rulings were confirmed, yet again suggesting the Supreme Court’s 
greater lenience. However, they illustrate two dangers: the danger caused by 
allowing double jeopardy, and the danger of allowing the authorities to act as 
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complainants even regarding crimes ‘against chastity’, a status giving them 
permission to appeal acquittals, extended here to non-acquittals. 
 
13 of the 36 rulings are explicitly, and seven others implicitly, based on ‘elm. Five 
others mention ‘elm, for instance by bewailing the judge’s failure to use ‘elm for 
greater severity: overall, 25 rulings involve ‘elm in some way. Sometimes ‘elm 
explicitly overrode invalidatory conditions including invalidity of confession, or 
sentences were confirmed because they were based on ‘elm, defined as a superior 
form of knowledge according to the ranking of knowledge gradations, unconnected 
to the term ‘elm in criminal law, discussed in case 4. In one case this occurred where 
complainants retracted their testimony, as in case 4. This respect for ‘elm is almost 
theological in its convolution: once ‘elm is established in the judge’s mind, it 
survives invalidation of its initial causes.  
 
About half the rulings involving ‘elm contain death sentences, which are as likely to 
result from ‘elm based only on invalid confession as ‘elm encompassing additional 
evidence. However, they are mostly overturned, while non-death penalties are more 
frequently confirmed. This mechanism, observed also in the next chapter, suggests 
greater lenience by the Supreme Court than the unpublished cases do.  
 
In 18 cases, children’s testimony was used as evidence. In seven of these, medical 
evidence was absent or inconclusive, and confessions were either absent or invalid. 
No death sentences resulted only from children’s statements. However, one death 
sentence, confirmed, was based on a child’s testimony supplemented only by 
confession out of court, denied in court. 
 
4) Use of uncodified Shi‘i law. 
 
Twenty rulings mention uncodified elements of Shi‘i law. Five cite the Tahrir; nine 
use the qa‘edeye darr’, often invoked by the Supreme Court. Other concepts used 
include the asl-e bara’at without supporting laws, caution in shedding blood, eqrar 
al-‘oqala (confessions incriminate only confessors: chapter 2, section 6.1), and 
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phrases with the element shar‘, indicating standards of Islamic law. Emphasis on full 
penetration of the glans, unspecified in codified law, also exemplifies reliance on 
Shi‘i law. 
 
5) Rape claimants prosecuted. 
 
In eight cases, rape claimants were tried for passive sodomy or the Supreme Court 
recommended that they be tried, and in two cases, teenage boys’ descriptions of rape 
were interpreted as ‘confessions’ to lavvat and they were condemned to flagellation. 
 
6) Haqq Allah. 
 
In five cases, complainants unsuccessfully attempted to drop all charges. Three had 
death sentences, two overturned, one confirmed; the others prescribed flogging. The 
impossibility of retracting charges illustrates a crucial element of haqq Allah: they 
are crimes because they contravene scripture, not because they harm people.  
 
7) Double jeopardy and authorities’ involvement. 
 
Several fathers of underage alleged rape victims appealed the defendants’ acquittals 
or non-death sentences, pursuing the death penalty. This was rarely successful. 
Sometimes complainants’ right to appeal non-death penalties was denied because 
these were not acquittals. This implies that double jeopardy is forbidden except 
through complainants’ appeal of acquittals (though no law is cited in this regard), 
and that acts unproven as lavvat can be renamed and punished as ‘illicit relations’, 
tafkhiz, or ‘acts against chastity’, preventing retrial and execution for the same acts. 
However, in adultery case 8, a woman was tried twice for the same acts with 
different names. 
 
In four instances, the authorities appealed, against the principle that crimes ‘against 






Repentance is mentioned in seven cases, occurring during confession except in one 
case. Only two show investigation into repentance: in both it contributed to naqz. 
One ruling explicitly mentions that since the timing of repentance is unclear and 
repentance before confession prevents the hadd, the qa‘edeye darr’ gives the 
defendant the benefit of the doubt by assuming repentance preceded confession. 
Another shows indirect expressions of repentance (e.g. “I made a mistake”) 




Some themes found in these sodomy cases, such as disregard for the laws of 
evidence and uncertainty regarding legal representation, also appeared in the 
previous chapter. New themes are introduced, including technicalities particular to 
carnal crimes (e.g. penetration, rape). Whether new or continued from the previous 
chapter, these themes combine to fortify the impression of the four larger patterns 
permeating the system, as explained at the beginning of the chapter.  
 
Interpretability and judicial discretion. 
 
As in theft cases, uncodified elements of Shi‘i law and fatwas – particularly from 
Khomeini’s Tahrir – were used in sodomy cases. Sometimes this promoted lenience; 
for instance, the qa‘edeye darr’ and ‘caution in shedding blood’ favoured lenience in 
published and unpublished cases. However, in case 3 the Tahrir contributed to a 
death sentence, and in case 4 lenient Shi‘i principles were used to benefit some 
defendants but not the one who was hanged, though they applied equally to him. 
 
An example of the arbitrariness allowed by having two highly interpretable systems 
– Shi‘i and Iranian codified law – coexisting is the treatment of penetration. In Shi‘i 
law, punishability for sodomy requires proof that penetration covered the glans 
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completely (chapter 4, section 1), though codified law omits this detail. In several 
published rulings, medical evidence of penetration was overridden because this 
required extent of penetration was not proven – even where suspects confessed to 
penetration without mentioning this detail. By contrast, in case 1, medical evidence 
did not prove any penetration, let alone of the required extent, and no evidence 
described penetration, yet the judge claimed ‘elm of full penetration of the glans. 
This degree of discretion is facilitated not only by ‘elm, but by the codified law’s 
omission of the parameters of penetration. Clearer legislation might limit this 
particular form of discretion. 
 
The same applies to execution methods. The penal code leaves the judge discretion, 
but Shi‘i narrations are interpreted as specifying a choice between death by sword, 
stoning, throwing from a height, burning, and crushing by a toppled wall. Most 
sodomy cases in this chapter instead involved hanging, which is absent from 
narrations. As discussed in case 4, the authorities often emphasise their inability to 
contravene scripture; yet these narrations are routinely contravened. 
 
Discretion is also exemplified by the fact that in most published rulings, repentance 
was ignored altogether, yet where it was investigated, it proved a most versatile tool 
of lenience. Repentance, if used judiciously, can almost guarantee avoidance of 
irreversible hadd penalties (chapter 2, section 9). However, judicial discretion means 
that it is often ignored outright. 
 
‘Elm allowed immense discretion in published and unpublished cases. In case 4 and 
some published rulings, ‘elm overcame invalidation of its own grounds, and was 
assigned inherently superior authority to other forms of knowledge through spurious 
association with a philosophical ranking of types of knowledge. In case 1, the 
ambiguous medical evidence was used in opposite ways by the first and second 
judges: one emphasised that it could not prove rape, while the other insisted that it 
could not disprove rape. As in theft case 3, the Supreme Court accepted the second 
judge’s discretion regarding ‘elm. Case 2 had virtually identical evidence to case 1, 
but yielded an acquittal, further emphasising the discretion of ‘elm in case 1. In case 
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3, the judge’s discretion allowed him to accept that the suspect’s cousin had been 
attacked by the murder victim, while claiming ‘elm that the same man had not also 
attacked the suspect.  
 
‘Elm for ordinary mujtahid judges is only tenuously justifiable through Shi‘i sources 
(chapter 2, sections 3 and 6.4). Nevertheless, non-mujtahid judges in these cases used 
‘elm, defined it spuriously as a superior form of knowledge, and allowed it to 




Laws contravened include those governing testimony, confession, age, execution 
protocol, and stays of execution. ‘Elm was frequently used as licence to contravene 
laws, as in theft cases.  
 
Despite the prohibition, present in Shi‘i and codified law, of prosecuting crimes 
‘against chastity’ without complainants (chapter 3, section 4), in several published 
rulings authorities initiated prosecution and appeal. This is especially inimical to 
lenience when judges ‘crusade’ against perceived iniquities, as observed in theft case 
2 and the forthcoming three chapters. This ‘crusading’ attitude appeared here in case 
4, where authorities acted as complainants and possibly coerced confession and 
testimony to facilitate prosecution.  
 
The explicit law of mahduroldamm status was contravened in case 3, where the 
judge insisted that the suspect prove his rape. This mechanism will reappear in 
adultery case 10, while adultery case 11 displays literal application of the 
mahduroldamm law.  
 
Interestingly, in case 2 the Supreme Court considered the injured party’s pardon as 





There is little overt sign of socioeconomic factors in these cases. However, it is 
notable that most of the published rulings involved fathers reporting their underage 
sons’ rape. In several instances, defendants claimed that the fathers had fabricated 
these charges because of personal feuds. If a statistical study were possible, it would 
be informative to calculate the proportion of child rape to other crimes tried by 
courts. A significantly high incidence of child rape trials might suggest widespread 
use of children as pawns in adult conflicts. 
 
Institutional obstacles to lenience. 
 
Institutional obstacles to lenience observed in sodomy cases (some also seen in theft 
cases) include appeal bias (appeals returning to the same court), double jeopardy, and 
the possibility that a lenient penalty or acquittal will be replaced by a harsher penalty, 
even death, following appeal and retrial. This last occurs because when rulings are 
overturned, cases are ‘reset’ by a new trial even without new evidence. Also, while 
the law specifically permits complainants to appeal acquittals, it does not explicitly 
forbid appeals of non-acquittals or by non-complainants. This uncertainty gives the 
authorities discretion to tolerate both. Vague laws also create uncertainty about 
whether acts tried as sodomy, then reclassified and punished as ‘illicit relations’, can 
be retried as sodomy, allowing double punishment for the same acts. This issue 
resurfaces in chapters 7 and 9. 
 
Another theme of theft and sodomy cases concerns lawyers. In theft cases, some 
defendants were denied lawyers. Here, in case 2, lawyers appeared belatedly, after 
interrogation and after evidence had been heard in court. This is because the 
constitutional guarantee of lawyers does not specify when they should be introduced. 
This reappears in subsequent chapters. 
 
As discussed in case 1, and section 3 of the published rulings, the unavailability of 
penalties other than death for sodomy is problematic when children’s testimony is 
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the only evidence of rape. Judges must choose between issuing death sentences based 
only on children’s testimony, and releasing potential rapists. Laws explicitly 
connecting children’s testimony to ta‘ziri penalties would remove this difficulty, 
reducing death sentences without releasing possible rapists. 
 
The phenomenon of ‘reverse plea bargaining’, whereby defendants might confess 
believing that they will be rewarded with lenience but instead are invariably 
incriminated, emerged in the previous chapter. It surfaced here in case 4, where the 
suspect only confessed after asking the interrogator to promise lenience in return. It 
will reappear in adultery case 3. 
 
Two themes encountered in this and the next chapter are anti-female bias and the 
prosecution of rape claimants. The first appears in case 3 where the mother was 
forbidden to prosecute her son’s attacker, and will resurface in the next three 
chapters, manifesting itself in many ways including unequal female rights to divorce 
and child custody (chapter 9) which facilitate prosecution. The second, appearing in 
published rulings in this and the next chapter, is the result of defining rape as 
‘sodomy plus coercion’ or ‘zena plus coercion’. Consequently the burden of proof 
may be placed upon the rape claimant, who can be punished for sodomy or zena if 
they cannot prove coercion. 
 
As in theft cases, the most fundamental obstacle to lenience in sodomy cases is that 
they can involve irreversible penalties. Though most cases here concerned rape, it is 
important that some published rulings involved consensual sodomy, which carries 
the death penalty irrespective of coercion. In fact, since coercion only exonerates the 
coerced, it is possible, as discussed in case 4, for individuals accused of sodomy to 
claim rape, thereby exonerating themselves (perhaps) but facilitating interrogation of 
another person. The death penalty for consensual acts exemplifies the difference 
between conceptualising ‘crimes’ as harmful acts (chapter 4, section 3.3) and as 
infractions of scriptural commandments irrespective of harm. 
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Incidence of death penalties. 
 
An additional theme from the published rulings is that while approximately half the 
sodomy trials in the sample resulted in death sentences, the Supreme Court 
overturned most of these and was twice as likely to overturn death penalties as other 
penalties. This pattern, foreshadowed in chapter 5, is corroborated in the next 
chapter, concerning published zena rulings.  
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7. Published zena rulings. 
 
The previous two chapters discussed both published and unpublished theft and 
sodomy cases. Because published zena (fornication or adultery) rulings were so 
numerous, this chapter discusses the 121 published zena rulings available1 separately 
from unpublished zena cases, treated in chapters 8 and 9. Adultery and fornication 
rulings are combined because multiple defendants were often tried together for 
different variants of zena. 
 
Some themes characterising these rulings occurred in previous chapters. These 
include the use of evidence, uncertainty surrounding legal representation, the 
treatment of rape and extent of penetration, and the possible incidence of irreversible 
penalties. Other themes are particular to zena, for example ehsan, the condition of 
having ‘access’ to a spouse, which determines eligibility for stoning. 
 
1. Type of penalty: incidence and appeal result. 
 
Almost half the rulings (56 of 121) contain death sentences; of these, over half (30) 
prescribe stoning. However, the Supreme Court is known to have confirmed only 14 
death sentences on appeal, and overturned 36, over half (the rest having unknown 
appeal status). Stoning sentences were most likely to be overturned (20 out of 30); 
only 7 were definitely confirmed on appeal, the other appeal results being unknown.  
 
This, despite the limited nature of the sample, suggests two things. 1) Despite the 
rarity of recent known stoning executions, death sentences for zena, including 
stoning sentences, may not be uncommon. 2) However, the Supreme Court seems 
most likely to overturn death, especially stoning, sentences on appeal, indicating that 
it could be more lenient than first-instance courts. This is corroborated by the fact 
that non-death sentences in the sample were approximately twice as likely to be 
confirmed as overturned on appeal. The Supreme Court may be more averse to 
confirming death sentences, particularly stoning sentences, than non-death sentences. 
                                                
1 Bazgir, 44-327, Saberi, 67-8, 81-5, 94-5, 275-308, 331-4. 
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The Supreme Court’s possible greater lenience was also mentioned in theft case 2 
and observed in the previous chapter’s published sodomy rulings. However, like 
those, some of these published zena rulings show overturned death sentences 
reinstated following retrial, or lesser penalties appealed, overturned, and replaced by 
death sentences (including stoning). This recalls sodomy case 1, where the dairy 
farmer’s acquittal was replaced by a death sentence following retrial. The Supreme 
Court’s greater lenience may be cancelled out if local courts have the final say, 
especially if they are as bent on harsh penalties as the judge in theft case 2. 
 
Married rapists were generally sentenced to qatl (death; method unspecified) for 
rape, not stoning for adultery, even if ehsan2 was deemed proven. This resurfaces in 
adultery case 5. 
 
2. Appeals and authorities’ involvement. 
 
The law allows complainants to appeal acquittals, without explicitly allowing or 
forbidding any other form of double jeopardy (chapter 2, section 4). However, 
complainants appealed both acquittals and non-acquittals, though mostly 
unsuccessfully. Also, authorities, e.g. prosecutors, initiated appeal in 10 cases, again 
mostly unsuccessfully. Only rarely was the law cited to disallow double jeopardy 
where not explicitly permitted by law, implying a general permission of double 
jeopardy from the law’s failure to prohibit it overall. 
 
However, in two cases, complainants’ right to appeal acquittals was denied outright 
because the charge was haqq Allah, not haqq al-nas3, though in one case the charge 
was rape, which at least two modern jurists consider partially haqq al-nas because it 
involves an injured party4. In other words, uncodified interpretations overrode 
codified law (complainants’ right to appeal acquittals). 
 
                                                
2 ‘Access’ to a spouse, determining eligibility for stoning for adultery (chapter 4, section 3.4). 
3 ‘Crimes against God’ vs ‘crimes against humans’, which only injured parties can prosecute or 
pardon (chapter 2, section 8).  
4 Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 151, 160, 162; Kadivar, “Hadd”. 
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Some rulings were expressed as acquittals of zena followed by sentences for lesser 
crimes (illicit relations, acts against chastity), allowing appeal of the acquittal 
portions. This, noted in published sodomy rulings, introduces the issue of whether 
one can be tried twice for the same acts with different names, or whether acts 
reclassified under lesser charges cannot be retried as zena. Both alternatives appear 
in these rulings. The issue affects adultery case 8, whose defendant was flogged for 
‘illicit relations’, then condemned to be stoned for the same acts renamed ‘zena’. 
 
Defendants apparently have no clear norms to invoke against the authorities’ appeal, 
as the law does not unequivocally prohibit this. If the law were interpreted as 
forbidding double jeopardy with one exception (complainants appealing acquittals), 
such appeals would be eliminated. However, this would ironically make it riskier for 
defendants to be acquitted than to receive reversible penalties (e.g. flogging, 
incarceration), because only acquittals would allow complainants’ appeal and 
possibly harsher sentences following retrial. 
 
In five cases the authorities clearly initiated prosecution. In three cases, hospitals 
reported unmarried girls whose pregnancy they discovered. A further ten cases 
clearly show the authorities intervening, whether by appealing sentences or by 
issuing recommendations. For example, in one case the Supreme Court, in its ruling 
following appeal of a death sentence for incest passed on a girl aged 12 and her 
brother aged 15, bewailed the fact that their remaining young brother was not also 
tried for incest on the strength of the first brother’s confessions5. Such intervention, 
especially initial prosecution, contravenes the prohibition of prosecuting crimes 
‘against chastity’ without complainants6. 
 
3. Subjectivity and appeal bias. 
 
Eight cases show subjective assessments clearly influencing sentences. In two cases, 
girls’ reputations for insufficient piety were used to dismiss their rape claims; in 
another, a man was acquitted of rape because of his reputation as a pious ‘pillar of 
                                                
5 Chapter 2, section 6.1: one person’s confession cannot incriminate another. 
6 Chapter 3, section 4. 
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society’. At least two judges expressed resentment over their rulings’ appeal and 
sought to have them reinstated. This shows emotional investment in rulings and 
increases the riskiness of the ‘appeal bias’ whereby overturned rulings are sent to 
their originating judges for retrial: judges resenting appeal are unlikely to ‘back 
down’ even if their rulings’ flaws are pointed out. 
 
Emotional assessments may also influence prosecution. In two cases the initial 
complainants were ‘the God-fearing people of the area’ who reported locals to the 
authorities. One of these complaints resulted in two stoning sentences, confirmed on 
appeal, and the other yielded a ta‘ziri (discretionary) penalty, overturned on appeal 
because the Supreme Court recommended stoning. One brother reported his pregnant 
unmarried sister, who consistently claimed violent rape but received the hadd of 100 
lashes. Two sisters reported a third sister and their father for incest, leading to death 
sentences for both, confirmed on appeal despite accounts of the girl’s rape. 
 
4. When are lawyers introduced?  
 
In most rulings there is either no mention of lawyers or no mention of when they 
were introduced; however, five rulings make it clear that lawyers only appeared 
during the trial, after all preliminary investigations had occurred and ‘confessions’ 
(taken out of court, therefore invalid) had been made (as in sodomy case 2 and 
adultery cases 9 and 10). Even if defendants have court-appointed lawyers during 
their trials – which, as in theft cases 1 and 5, does not necessarily happen, and is 
unknown for most rulings – they will not be informed before the trial of the danger 
of making statements interpretable as ‘confessions’ which, though invalid, will 
probably incriminate them. This problem is known to Iranian human-rights activists7. 
 
                                                
7 For example: Radio Zamaneh, “Nameye Shirin”; Fair Family Law. 
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5. Evidence used. 
 
Of the 121 rulings, 97 (80%) involve confession; but only 15 of these have clearly 
valid confession8, made four times in court, even if not in four separate sessions (as 
some jurists prefer). Of those, four involved reports of rape, repeated in court as 
accusations but used as ‘confessions’. Since a ‘confession’ to ‘zena plus coercion’ 
(as rape is defined) does not legally incriminate the ‘confessor’, these four are 
subtracted from the number of valid confessions and added to the invalid 
confessions, leaving only eleven clearly valid confessions. 
 
In one case confession occurred in court, but fewer than four times; in another it 
occurred in court but was retracted, leading to an illegal stoning sentence9, later 
overturned. 17 cases feature confession clearly made out of court, but not explicitly 
denied in court; several of these ‘confessions’ were descriptions of rape. 15 cases 
have confessions out of court, retracted in court; 16 feature confessions out of court, 
retracted in court with claims that they were coerced10, usually by beatings or 
intimidation (one man described being held by interrogators for four days) but 
sometimes trickery, including promises of lenience or even acquittal in exchange for 
confession. One lawyer argued unsuccessfully that the defendant’s immediate 
confession justified takhfif (attenuation). The notion of rewarding swift confession or 
collaboration with lenience, familiar in some legal systems, occasionally appears in 
hadd cases where the opposite mechanism operates. (See chapter 2, end of section 
6.1; theft case 2; sodomy case 4; adultery case 3).  
 
Invalid confessions were either used – in 30 cases – as the direct basis of rulings, 
without explicit claims of ‘elm-e qazi (‘judge’s knowledge’), or as ingredients of 
‘elm. Sometimes they were used though their invalidity was pointed out; for instance, 
one defence lawyer showed that confessions had never reached the nesab (minimum 
required number) of four, but the Supreme Court ignored this, confirming the death 
sentence because confessions existed. 
                                                
8 Chapter 2, sections 6.1-2 (confession regulations). 
9 Penal code article 71: retraction of confession prevents death penalties for zena. 
10 Confessions extracted through coercion or trickery are invalid: chapter 2, section 6.1. 
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38 rulings explicitly used ‘elm. In 24 it relied either on invalid confession exclusively 
(19 cases), or invalid confession plus pregnancy (5 cases), which legally cannot 
prove zena; in one case ‘elm was based on ‘no valid testimony or confession’ but it is 
unclear what proof existed. ‘Elm was never based entirely on valid confession, but in 
one case it included valid confession plus ‘other evidence’. In seven cases ‘elm was 
implied by the absence of other legally valid proof; in two, ‘elm was declared 
impossible. 37% of these rulings rely on ‘elm, 31% explicitly; 39% mention it. 
 
In nine cases, ‘elm was dismissed as a form of proof, through statements that only 
valid confession or testimony can prove zena. This indicates the unclear position of 
‘elm in hudud (chapter 2, section 6.4).  
 
However, five rulings explicitly declare that ‘elm potentiates rulings, being an 
intrinsically superior form of knowledge to the zann (conjecture) allowed by other 
evidence. This refers to a categorisation of types of knowledge, unrelated to the 
coincidental use of the term ‘elm in criminal law, wherein ‘elm outranks zann in 
closeness to certainty (qat‘, yaqin; see sodomy case 4, point 3). Sometimes fatwas 
are cited to support this. In many other cases, judges accord ‘elm special status in 
dismissing doubts which would otherwise save lives. 
 
One arena illustrating the lack of consensus regarding ‘elm is that of retracted 
confessions. Some rulings explicitly state that retraction of confession, which 
normally prevents death penalties for zena, cannot do this if the judge has ‘elm. 
Others declare that, as in a fatwa of Grand Ayatollah Golpeygani (b. 1917) cited in 
two rulings, ‘elm based on confession lapses with its retraction. In one case, lawyers’ 
invocation of the Prophet and the Imams’ emphasis on lenience and concealment of 
crimes against chastity convinced the Supreme Court to overturn a ruling; the 
Supreme Court added that the khass (specific) action of enkar (retraction of 
confession) overcame the ‘amm (general) permission of ‘elm11. The fact that neither 
                                                
11 See chapter 3, section 2 (general and particular), adultery case 3. 
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scenario – enkar overcoming ‘elm or ‘elm overcoming enkar – appears in the 
codified law allows these opposite opinions to be accorded the force of law.  
 
A third possibility is that invalid confessions justify ta‘ziri penalties, not the hadd. It 
appears in three cases with invalid confessions, where judges ordered ta‘ziri 
penalties, declaring the hadd inapplicable although the court was aware of zena. 
Significantly, in one of these cases the defendant rashly appealed her ta‘zir sentence, 




Mere numbers show equally likely disregard for males’ as females’ ehsan. However, 
the sample shows a marked preference for thorough questioning of males regarding 
ehsan, acceptance of males’ denials thereof, or emphasis on its unproven status for 
males. Instead, ehsan was mostly presumed in females without investigation. Only 
one female was questioned about ehsan in her first-instance trial, though with only 
one question. Only for males did courts declare ehsan absent without mentioning 
why, or accept unsubstantiated denials thereof, while ehsan was only declared absent 
in females’s first-instance trials with specific proof. Often, later investigation 
disproved women’s ehsan, presumed by first-instance judges. Sometimes clear 
obstacles to ehsan were ignored: one woman’s stoning sentence was confirmed 
though her husband was incarcerated, hence inaccessible. 
 
Ehsan was almost exclusively connected to the physical possibility of copulation. 
Mostly it was deemed absent through physical separation, with frequent citation 
(sometimes from Khomeini’s Tahrir) of the distance of four farsangs (~22km), 
absent in the codified law, as the vital parameter. Motive of separation was 
irrelevant. Other obstacles to copulation despite proximity – e.g. illness, impotence – 
were sometimes considered, especially (for females) on appeal. Non-consummation 
of marriage and awareness of being married, though legally important, were mostly 
                                                
12 See chapter 4, sections 1, 3.4. 
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ignored, as was marital chastity. Emotional obstacles to ehsan were never accepted 
with one possible partial exception where they coexisted with physical obstacles. 
 
The interpretation of ehsan as depending on male, not mutual, ‘access’ is illustrated 
by a case where a woman remarried because, having been abandoned by, and had no 
contact from, her husband for years, she presumed herself divorced. She was found 
bereft of ehsan only because her husband (who appealed her flogging sentence 
unsuccessfully, pursuing stoning) was fortuitously in prison when she remarried. 
What mattered was not her lack of access to her husband, or belief in being divorced, 
which both legally remove ehsan, but his lack of access to her. Her predicament 
recalls that of Jewish agunot13. Exclusive emphasis on male ‘access’, male rights to 
polygyny, and wives’ inferior divorce rights (chapter 4, section 3.5) are doubly unfair 
when considered alongside the famous narration whereby females have nine times 
more carnal desire than males14. If this is so, the qa‘edeye molazeme (axiom of 
divine laws’ reasonability) should presuppose greater female access to carnal 
pleasure, not subjection to polygyny or enforced chastity by husbands they cannot 
divorce. The male bias in this case is emphasised by the fact that the husband was 
never prosecuted for abandoning his wife15. 
 
7. Rape, age and male bias. 
 
Those who report rape risk being tried for zena. This occurred in twenty cases, 
against only five where rape claims prevented prosecution. Some sentences, 
including death sentences, for zena were overturned on appeal because the Supreme 
Court noticed that ‘confessions’ to zena were descriptions of rape; some women 
were tried for zena but acquitted because their rape claims were not disproven. 
However, in eleven cases, punishments resulting from rape claims were confirmed 
                                                
13 An aguna (‘chained’ – plural, agunot) is a woman whose unavailable husband cannot grant her a 
get (divorce), for example because he has disappeared without being confirmed dead. (Similarly, a 
mesorevet get – plural mesoravot get – is a person whose husband refuses to divorce her, since 
halachically divorce requires the husband’s free will). Agunot are in limbo: they can neither enjoy 
marriage nor leave it and remarry. Abel, 2; Levy; Cwik; Silberberg; VidYid; Yefet, “Unchaining”, 
442-51. 
14 Wasa’il al-Shi‘a (vol.20), 63, text 25042; al-Kafi (vol.5), 338, text 1. 
15 Forbidden by Qur’an 4:129, Civil Code articles 1106-7; see also Civil Code articles 1129-30, penal 
code articles 64, 66, 83b. 
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on appeal. These were mostly sentences of 100 lashes for young unmarried girls, 
with some ta‘ziri sentences when rape claims or retracted confessions were allowed 
to avert the hadd; but in one case the confirmed sentence was death for incest. 
 
Very common is the scenario where a female as young as 9 claims rape, and both she 
and her accused rapist are given hadd sentences; however, he appeals and is 
acquitted, while her sentence, generally 100 lashes, is confirmed, sometimes because 
defloration or pregnancy incriminate her, though legally they cannot prove zena. 
Disregard for female rape claims often exonerates accused rapists while justifying 
the claimants’ punishment, although article 67 of the penal code exonerates rape 
claimants by default. This can be avoided by the mechanism, observed in three cases, 
whereby a woman’s rape claim exonerates her but cannot, by itself, justify execution 
of the accused man (chapter 4, section 3.2). 
 
One man was condemned to death for raping a girl who had almost certainly not 
reached legal maturity (9 lunar years, but 15 for boys). However, in several other 
cases the disparity in male and female bulugh (legal majority) ages meant that girls 
barely over 9 were sentenced for zena, sometimes to death, while boys under 15 were 
exonerated through age and men escaped death16 for raping girls under age 9. Men 
also escaped death by claiming that girls barely over 9 had consented to zena. If 
nine-year-olds are held capable of consenting to zena, there is clearly no such notion 
as ‘statutory rape’ activated by youth irrespective of consent; instead, the opposite 
mechanism operates whereby the victim’s youth benefits the rapist. For instance, one 
man argued that his six-year-old daughter’s rapist deserved the death penalty, since 
her young age aggravated his crime. This was rejected through the opposite 
argument: her young age made her rape undeserving of the death penalty. 
 
Another prominent age-related theme is that of zena between men and much younger 
teenage girls, typically relatives half their age or less. In all ten cases following this 
pattern, the female defendants, all unmarried, were 18 or younger, except one aged 
19. In only one instance, a rape case, the girl aged 11 was exonerated; in the others, 
                                                
16 Chapter 4, section 3.3: rape of underage girls arguably does not carry the death penalty. 
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including three rape cases, the girls’ hadd of 100 lashes was confirmed on appeal. 
Meanwhile six of the men, all married, were acquitted or had their sentences 
overturned recommending exoneration; one was given ta‘zir, one received the hadd 
of 100 lashes in a rape case, and two received stoning sentences (not in rape cases). 
Two accused rapists were acquitted, one received a ta‘ziri penalty and one received 
the hadd of 100 lashes. Though rape carries the death penalty, no accused rapists 
received it and two were exonerated, while only one rape claimant went unpunished.  
 
A few examples are informative. One girl aged 14 reported a rape and was sentenced 
to 100 lashes, confirmed on appeal, possibly because pregnancy incriminated her. 
Her accused rapist, her brother-in-law who confirmed her detailed rape account in 
and out of court, had his sentence overturned because, not asked that particular 
question, he did not specifically mention complete insertion of the glans (required for 
zena by narrations but not codified law) and pregnancy could have occurred without 
penetration. These doubts favoured him but not her. In two cases, girls aged 13 were 
punished for zena with older men. In one, the man was a brother-in-law clearly able 
to take advantage of his young relative, and both defendants’ sentences were 
confirmed. In the other, the girl was prosecuted by the authorities for unmarried 
pregnancy, and the married man, aged 32, who admitted to impregnating her was 
exonerated on appeal by his failure to mention penetration of the glans, while the 
girl’s hadd of 100 lashes remained. The Supreme Court argued that she was only 
medically examined after parturition (the hospital having reported her for giving 
birth there) and therefore might have remained a virgin until childbirth, having 
absorbed the man’s seed without sufficient penetration. This doubt, applicable to 
both parties, benefited only the man. 
 
In another case, which has the added element of using the authorities to impose 
virtue on relatives ultimately to their detriment, a brother reported his unmarried 19-
year-old sister for bearing the child of their other sister’s husband. She claimed rape 
effected through choking, violence and death threats, and received the hadd. The 
man, aged 35, confessed to zena with a number of excuses including being forced 
into it by the girl and being the victim of a conspiracy, and was exonerated of 
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adultery and given a ta‘ziri penalty. Again pregnancy, which cannot prove 
penetration, incriminated the girl but not the man, whose claim of ‘rape’ by his 
young relative was accorded greater credibility than her claim of rape by him. Only 
one woman was acquitted on the basis that pregnancy cannot prove zena – a 
principle enshrined in the penal code (article 73). 
 
Other systems might consider an abusive power dynamic in such cases, especially 
those involving particularly young girls and older relatives. These girls generally 
cited false promises of marriage, trickery, intimidation or rape as the reasons for 
zena, but were mostly deemed, simply, guilty. Instead lenience favoured significantly 
older males who, given their presumably greater familiarity with the public sphere, 
could probably ‘work the system’, while the girls often displayed considerable 
naïveté through statements like ‘he said he would marry me and I believed him, but I 
repent and accept my punishment’. Frequently the girls themselves or their families 
initiated prosecution, apparently believing that this would force the men to keep their 
promises of marriage, but instead unintentionally endangering the girls. 
 
Although quantification of such a subjective parameter is problematic, 51 rulings 
exhibit various degrees of male bias. This can be a male advantage in the law, such 
as women’s difficulties in divorcing and thereby shedding ehsan even when 
abandoned, girls’ lower bulugh, and men’s exclusive right of polygamy17. It also 
appears through illegal use of evidence incriminating only females (defloration and 
pregnancy). Finally, it can result from judges’ discretion whereby prejudice can seep 
into rulings. Instances of male bias are described throughout this chapter. 
 
The existence of male bias does not mean that men are never treated harshly or 
women never treated leniently. Four women were not prosecuted after reporting men 
for tricking them into consensual zena. Some rulings display severity against men or 
lenience benefiting women. Importantly, while most known recent stoning sentences 
                                                
17 One man illegally remarried without his existing wife’s consent (Family Protection Law 1975, 
article 16, especially item 1; Marriage Law 1931, articles 5-7; Mir-Hosseini 1999, 192-6: parts of 
these codes remain valid) but prosecuted her for adultery (i.e. for taking another partner, which he 
himself had done). 
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involve women, mostly men are known to have suffered stoning since the 2002 
moratorium18. Despite frequent male bias, stoning for zena pertains to ‘human 
rights’, not exclusively ‘women’s rights’. 
 
8. Use of uncodified Shi‘i law. 
 
52 cases feature uncodified elements of Shi‘i law or Shi‘i jurists’ writings. The most 
common are Khomeini’s Tahrir; Khomeini’s or Golpeygani’s fatwas; the qa‘edeye 
darr’; the qa‘edeye eqrar; the asl-e bara’at; caution in shedding blood; and the 
masafat-e shar‘i (legal distance) of four farsangs removing ehsan. Narrations and 
other principles were sometimes employed. Only once was the argument raised that 
rulings should rely exclusively on codified law19. Shi‘i law frequently supplemented, 
and sometimes overrode, codified law. 
 
The use of Haqq Allah, a concept of Shi‘i fiqh only briefly mentioned in codified 
law, in several cases illustrates the difference between humanistic and scripturally 
circumscribed laws. Rape victims’ pardons of accused rapists always failed because 
rape is a form of zena, which is haqq Allah. In one instance the conflict is 
particularly clear: an alleged rapist subsequently married his victim, who pardoned 
him, announcing her desire to live with him. The Supreme Court insisted that he 
must die because zena, being haqq Allah, is unpardonable even by its victims. Rape 
as an infraction of ‘God’s rights’ overrode the victim’s wishes. 
 
9. Lenience in use. 
 
Twenty-six rulings show strong evidence overridden by lenient legal elements, 
including repentance, the strictures of confession including insistence on four court 
sessions, ‘elm lapsing with enkar, doubt regarding penetration despite pregnancy, 
acceptance of unproven claims of coercion or no ehsan, and erroneous belief in being 
married. The qa‘edeye darr’ (‘doubt prevents punishment’) sometimes averted death 
penalties through tenuous doubts. 
                                                
18 See chapter 4, section 3.7.  
19 See chapter 2, sections 2, 6.1, and chapter 3. 
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Some rulings exemplify how a battery of lenient options can avert the death penalty. 
One woman made valid confessions to adultery, confirming that she had a permanent 
husband with whom she could copulate. She appealed her stoning sentence, declared 
repentance and retracted her confessions. The Supreme Court overturned her 
sentence for three reasons: retraction of even valid confession automatically 
invalidated the hadd; she claimed to have left the marital home and since Khomeini’s 
Tahrir specifies that four farsangs’ distance removes ehsan, stoning was 
inapplicable; and her declaration of repentance introduced the possibility that she had 
repented before confession was complete20, creating doubt, which activated the 
qa‘edeye darr’. In another case, by merely seeing a photograph of the accused 
woman’s elderly husband the Supreme Court accepted that he could be impotent, 
casting doubt on the wife’s ehsan, again through the qa‘edeye darr’. 
 
One defence lawyer successfully appealed a death sentence by arguing that severity, 
especially in the death penalty, contradicts Islam’s emphasis on lenience and 
concealment of crimes against chastity. Uncodified Shi‘i concepts triumphed over 
the first-instance judge’s whimsical use of evidence. 
 
Another ruling shows painstaking investigation of the accused man’s ehsan and 
criminal responsibility, recalling narrations where the Prophet or the Imams practised 
similar caution. Still the Supreme Court overturned the stoning sentence because the 
four sessions of confession consisted merely of exiting and re-entering the court on 
the same day, which was deemed insufficient. Meanwhile the female defendant’s 
clear, consistent rape claim was ignored and she received 100 lashes. This 
exemplifies judges’ enormous discretion to apply or ignore even uncodified legal 
strictures – such as the requirement for four sessions, observed in three rulings – and 
asymmetrical treatment of defendants, often displaying male bias.  
 
Such lenience, often favouring accused rapists, contrasts starkly with the more 
frequent disregard for lenient laws. 
                                                





The themes characterising these 121 zena rulings combine with those in previous 
chapters to suggest that vague laws underlain by highly interpretable Shi‘i concepts 
permit considerable judicial discretion, and that authorities often contravene laws. 
Furthermore, some elements of the system, such as double jeopardy and the 
uncertainty regarding legal representation, hinder lenience.  
 
It is difficult to discern socioeconomic elements in these rulings because they reveal 
little about their defendants. However, some social mechanisms do emerge. One is 
male bias, whereby subjective cultural influences facilitate harsher sentencing of 
females than males in identical circumstances, often in contravention of laws (e.g. 
the invalidity of pregnancy as proof). This is sometimes combined with a large age 
difference between significantly older men, often relatives, and frequently very 
young, apparently naïve girls, the former usually being treated more leniently than 
the latter. The girls or their families may demonstrate naïveté by initiating 
prosecution (sometimes against errant ‘suitors’) only to have it backfire. These 
tendencies suggest underlying social patterns. Another is the enforcement of ‘virtue’ 
by relatives, neighbours or even hospitals by reporting ‘vice’ to the authorities. 
 
A mechanism shared with theft and sodomy cases is the authorities’ role in initiating 
prosecution (even, illegally, in crimes ‘against chastity’) and interfering with trials, 
and their ‘crusading’ attitude, use of subjective assessments, and emotional 
investment in rulings. This increases the riskiness of appeal bias when cases go twice 
to the same court. 
 
Other shared characteristics are the routine use of invalid confession, often retracted 
with claims of coercion or fatuous promises of lenience, and the frequency of ‘elm 
based on invalid evidence (including pregnancy, particular to zena). ‘Elm sometimes 
‘potentiates’ the proof-value of evidence while remaining immune to outside 
assessment. The classical image of hudud proven by n male witnesses or confessions, 
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and therefore devilishly difficult to establish, is replaced by one of proof dominated 
by invalid confession and ‘elm. 
 
As in the previous chapters, uncodified Shi‘i concepts or fatwas were used in court. 
Here this usually promoted lenience. In some cases, the lenient options offered by 
both codified and Shi‘i law were exploited almost shamelessly, in contrast with 
others where obvious avenues of lenience were disregarded, again highlighting the 
interpretability and consequent discretion characterising the system. The presence of 
multiple interpretations of legal concepts shows that not only jurists but also judges 
and lawyers are party to the debates about what hadd law really is: a fluidity that 
could potentially make lenient interpretations mainstream in future. 
 
Particular to zena are the minutiae of ehsan, which resurface in chapter 9. Ehsan 
hinges on many interpretable parameters which are only briefly mentioned in the 
codified law. Therefore conflicting interpretations thereof draw from different 
uncodified sources, often determining whether defendants live or die. The same 
applies (also in sodomy cases) to the extent of penetration, whose uncodified 
parameters can determine the outcome of trials. 
 
Regarding incidence of penalties, these rulings mirror almost exactly the pattern seen 
in published sodomy rulings (foreshadowed in chapter 5). First-instance death 
sentences were common, but overturned far more frequently than non-death 
sentences, suggesting that the Supreme Court may be more lenient than first-instance 
courts. Here, stoning sentences, though common in first-instance rulings, were 
particularly likely to be overturned on appeal. 
 
Because of the sheer number of published zena rulings available, not all individual 
sub-themes discussed here will surface in the unpublished zena cases presented in the 
next two chapters. However, the three zena chapters complement each other, and 
often overlap, to show many facets of the broader patterns which operate in zena 




8. Fornication cases. 
 
Fornication (copulation between unmarried males and females) is usually punishable 
by flogging under Iranian law. The two cases described hereunder involve special 
cases of fornication carrying the death penalty, namely, the fourth repetition in case 
1, and incest in case 2 (chapter 2, section 5.2; chapter 4, section 3.2). The first 
defendant was hanged, while the second was ultimately exonerated. 
 
This, the fourth of five case-study chapters, corroborates some themes from previous 
chapters. They include the use of invalid confession and judges’ arbitrary claims of 
‘elm (unregulated ‘knowledge’ which allows conviction) based on inadmissible 
evidence. A notable element in both cases is how low socioeconomic status 
facilitated neglect and abuse, causing behaviour which was prosecuted in 
contravention of laws governing criminal responsibility. The four overarching 
themes noted in previous chapters, namely judicial discretion caused by legal 
interpretability, contravention of laws, institutional obstacles to lenience, and 
socioeconomic dimensions of prosecution, are all manifested in these two cases. 
 
Case 1: execution despite evidence of psychological disorders. 
Mazanderan, 2004. 
 
This case culminated in a public hanging. Its information comes from court papers 
and other documents from a lawyer representing the executed girl’s family, 
supplemented by the family’s statements to that lawyer and to another individual. 
 
The defendant was a girl aged approximately 16 years and 11 months when 
executed. When she was five years old, her parents divorced. Subsequently her 
mother died in a car accident, one of her brothers drowned, and her father and 
surviving brother became homeless addicts; thereafter she mostly lived with her aged 
grandparents. These traumas caused a sudden decline in academic performance, as 
shown in her school records, accompanied by psychological problems. Locals 
considered her insane, and without competent care she drifted into illicit activities. 
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During the last three years of her life, she was arrested eight times. Aged thirteen, 
she was sent by the police to a social welfare office, where a psychiatrist diagnosed 
her with various disorders including cyclothymia, hypersexuality, borderline 
personality disorder, and pseudo-hallucinations, and prescribed medicines that she 
soon abandoned. She was interned on at least four other occasions in similar 
institutions. She once received 99 ta‘ziri (discretionary) lashes for lesser carnal 
misdemeanours and was thrice flogged 100 lashes as the hadd for fornication: once 
at age 13 before her psychiatric diagnosis, once at age 14, and once ten days before 
her fifteenth birthday. 
 
Less than two weeks before the girl’s final arrest, local police produced an unsigned 
letter purportedly from local inhabitants. Describing her as a recidivist fornicatress 
and a bad influence on local schoolgirls, it urged firm action against her. This letter, 
presented as the impetus for prosecution, is mentioned in both rulings of the case. 
However, another letter, signed by 43 local residents including respected individuals, 
was submitted to the court before sentencing but is not mentioned in either ruling. It 
urged the authorities to abandon prosecution because the girl was mentally unstable 
and intermittently insane, and therefore bereft of criminal responsibility. Similarly 
ignored was a letter from the girl herself, submitted from prison as grounds for 
appeal on the day of her initial death sentence, referring the court to the residents’ 
affidavit of her insanity and medical reports of her psychiatric disorders available in 
various welfare offices. 
 
The girl was tried alongside another young unmarried woman also accused of 
fornication, and three much older men accused of illicit relations with them. The men 
denied all charges and were released; the girls confessed and were detained. 
 
The trial opened the day after the girls’ arrest. The primary defendant (who was 
eventually hanged) confessed to zena with two of the men, sometimes in exchange 
for money, during the first four sessions of the trial1. Only during the fifth session, 
where she also confessed, was her court-appointed lawyer introduced. The 
                                                
1 Confession to zena (fornication or adultery) must occur in court (chapter 2, section 6.1). 
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judgement was announced in the sixth session, twenty days after the arrests. The first 
girl was sentenced to death for the fourth instance of fornication, the second, who 
had also confessed in court four times, to 100 lashes for fornication, and the men to 
95 lashes for the lesser crime of ‘illicit relations’. On the same day, the first girl 
appealed as described above. 
 
The girl’s relatives claim that the judge who issued her death sentence personally 
travelled to the Supreme Court to ensure confirmation of his ruling. In any case, the 
Supreme Court confirmed the sentence just over a month after it was issued. The girl 
appealed the Supreme Court’s ruling, as allowed by law, and also lodged a pardon 
request. Both legally should have halted her execution until their results were 
announced2. Nevertheless, before either request was considered, she was publicly 
hanged a month and 12 days after the confirmation of her sentence and precisely 105 
days after her arrest. Witnesses report that during her execution, the first-instance 
judge declared that she had lodged no further appeal. 
 
Immediately after her execution, townsfolk submitted another affidavit, bearing 44 
signatures, reiterating their belief in her mental problems and consequent loss of 
criminal responsibility. The presence of two such ignored affidavits lends credibility 
to the girl’s family’s contention that the only letter which the court considered, the 
unsigned complaint, emanated not from local residents but from the authorities (as 
possibly happened in sodomy case 4).  
 
Within two months of the execution, a lawyer began representing the girl’s father 
and brother pro bono in their complaint to the ‘Prosecution Office for Violations by 
Government Workers’ against the judge. This lawyer’s arguments recall common 
themes encountered in other cases, particularly the hazy boundaries of ‘elm-e qazi 
(‘the judge’s knowledge’, allowed as proof) and judges’ disregard of laws. 
 
                                                
2 Appeals Law, article 15; Law Establishing the General and Revolutionary Courts, article 18; 
Procedural Code for the Pardon and Clemency Commission, article 10, note 1; DIRS293/82, article 4; 
DIRS28/70, article 1, note 3. 
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The grounds for sentencing presented by the first-instance judge, and accepted by the 
Supreme Court, were confession and ‘elm-e qazi. The judge pointed out that the 
defendant confessed in five court sessions, including the penultimate hearing where 
‘a court-appointed lawyer was present’, and cited articles 63, 64, 68-70, and 90 of the 
penal code, the first five defining zena and the requirements for valid confession to it 
– including, of course, mental competence – and the last prescribing death for the 
fourth instance of zena. He continued that these confessions also gave him ‘elm in 
accordance with articles 105 and 120 of the penal code. Finally he condemned her to 
death by public hanging. The Supreme Court confirmed that because she had 
confessed, the sentence was legally correct. 
 
The new lawyer emphasised that article 105 is not in the proof subsection of zena 
laws3, but, incongruously in the subsection entitled ‘method of implementation of the 
hadd’. This, the lawyer argued, shows that ‘elm is not valid proof in zena.  
 
The contrast between this and the judge’s attitude is evident considering that he cited 
article 120, which is in the sodomy section of the penal code, as well as article 105 to 
justify his use of ‘elm. By citing an article which is not in the zena section, he 
implied general applicability for both articles irrespective of their position, thereby 
choosing the interpretation which maximally extends the territory of ‘elm-e qazi 
rather than benefiting the defendant4.  
 
Having tenuously undermined ‘elm, the lawyer attacked the remaining evidence, 
namely confession. The girl’s documented insanity, argued the lawyer, not only 
invalidated her confessions5 but deprived her of criminal responsibility6. Her very 
persistence in carnal activity despite repeated flogging, amounting to 399 lashes in 
two years, indicated lack of the self-control whereby a sane person would abandon 
such dangerous activities. 
                                                
3 See chapter 2, section 6.4. 
4 This contravenes the axiom of interpreting laws in favour of defendants (see chapter 3, section 3). 
5 ‘Aql (sanity) and ekhtiar (free will) are enumerated in article 69 of the penal code as necessary for 
making a valid confession to zena. 
6 Article 64 of the penal code includes ‘aql (sanity) and ekhtiar (free will) as conditions for eligibility 
for the hadd for zena. 
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The lawyer pointed out that though the defendant was aged 16 when tried, as attested 
by her identity documents and school records, her first-instance ruling did not 
mention her age while the Supreme Court ruling described it as 22. Though 16 is 
well above the age of bulugh7 for girls in Iran, the common practice of delaying 
execution of minors until they are 18 would have meant, argued the lawyer, that if 
her correct age had been acknowledged, she might have survived, albeit in prison, 
long enough to allow additional investigation during her lifetime rather than 
posthumously. The lawyer also cited the ban on execution of minors in article 37 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Iran signed and which article 9 of 
the Civil Code therefore inglobates into Iranian law. The lawyer cast this as a method 
of ‘buying time’ rather than a bar to execution, but did not mention that Iran did not 
make reservation to article 37, which is therefore arguably binding8. 
 
The lawyer concluded that failure to report the defendant’s age correctly and to 
investigate mental insanity, and execution despite pardon and appeal requests, could 
be readily connected to the extraordinary speed and sloppiness with which the case 
was handled, and constituted, even refraining from speculation regarding the judge’s 
motives in expediting the proceedings, at least grave negligence requiring diyeh 
(blood money), the judge’s prosecution through article 171 of the Constitution, and 
(posthumous) rehabilitation of the girl9. 
 
The complaint went to the Dadgah-e ‘Ali-e Qozzat, the ‘High Court for Judges’. 
Before being addressed, it was archived and labelled “in parvandeh makhtumeh 
e‘lam mishavad” (this case is declared closed) without further explanation. The 
judge’s career was unimpaired. 
 
To summarise, the following salient issues arise in this case: 
 
                                                
7 Bulugh (chapter 2, section 7.1) is the age of legal majority and criminal responsibility: 9 lunar years 
for girls, 15 for boys. Lunar years are approximately 11 days shorter than solar years. 
8 Legal details in chapter 2, section 7.1. 
9 Constitution, article 171: moral or material losses caused by judicial error must be compensated by 
the judge if he is at fault, otherwise by the state; in all cases the defendant’s honour must be restored. 
 200 
1) Similarly to many others, this case demonstrates the fuzzy boundaries and lack of 
legal regulation of ‘elm-e qazi (though the potentially advantageous fuzziness caused 
by the bizarre placement of article 105 is unfortunately absent in both proposed new 
penal codes). It is intriguing that despite the presence of sufficient confessions in 
court, the judge declared that they gave him ‘elm – a strategy that in previous cases 
was used to lend greater force to rulings with shaky evidence, though in this case the 
challenge to the validity of confession was never addressed by either court. Notably, 
the lawyer, by first invalidating the use of ‘elm itself and only thereafter casting 
doubt on the validity of the confessions, implied that ‘elm can be based on faulty 
proofs, or at least that the authorities assessing the grounds for the judge’s 
prosecution might maintain so. If not, the lawyer could simply have pointed out the 
confessions’ invalidity and consequent ineligibility as proof, whether independently 
or through ‘elm. 
 
2) Failure to record the girl’s age correctly not only indicates the sloppy and possibly 
dishonest (according to the girl’s family) handling of the case, but also meant that 
she was denied the likely delay of execution that might otherwise have given the new 
lawyer time to intervene within her lifetime. The age problem also highlights the fact 
that arguably, CRC article 37 is legally binding in Iran. 
 
3) The girl apparently had no lawyers until the fifth trial diet – in other words, the 
proceedings ensured that even according to the most stringent norm for confession 
requiring four separate court sessions10, the girl would incriminate herself before 
meeting a lawyer. Furthermore, the speed of the trial, which began the day after the 
girl’s arrest, would have precluded preparation of a defence. She was denied her 
constitutional guarantee11 of representation. Laws were also broken through failure to 
consider documentary evidence of insanity, which invalidates confession and 
removes criminal responsibility, and the girl’s (pre-emptive?) execution before all 
avenues of appeal and pardon had been exhausted.  
 
                                                
10 Chapter 2, section 6.1, explains various positions regarding rules for confession, including the 
preference for a separate court session for each confession required (for zena, four). 
11 Article 35 of the Iranian Constitution guarantees the right to a lawyer. 
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4) The male defendants were convicted of ‘illicit relations’ only through the females’ 
confessions, implying that the judge considered the prohibition of using one person’s 
confession against another12 applicable only in hudud, not in ta‘zirat. This 
contradicts the interpretation of this rule as covering all crimes.  
 
5) Under a different system, the defendant might have been characterised as a victim 
– a socially and mentally disadvantaged child bereft of guidance during her 
formative years and easily abused by older men – rather than a criminal, while her 
co-defendants might have received far greater opprobrium and harsher sentences 
than they did. Though the men were illegally punished for ‘illicit relations’, their 
lesser initial charge, contrasting with the girls’ greater haddi charge, may indicate 
male bias and the role of prejudice in determining prosecution – especially as the 
males and females were accused of relations with each other. 
 
6) The unjustified closure of the prosecution initiative against the judge starkly 
exemplifies the authorities’ awesome arbitrary power, further substantiating theories 
of personal intervention by officials while illustrating the authorities’ 
unaccountability and the practice of disregarding laws when expedient. 
 
The speed and selective use of proof characterising this trial, combined with 
disregard for laws and probable vitiation by local authorities’ personal prejudices 
against the girl, suggest this as another possible instance of authorities ‘crusading’ 
against ‘corruption’ and initiating prosecution for ‘crimes against chastity’, forbidden 
by both Shi‘i and codified law13.  
 
                                                
12 Article 1278 of the Civil Code limits the influence of confession to the confessor, as does the fiqh 
principle eqrar al-‘oqala ‘alaa anfosehem ja’ez (chapter 2, section 6.1). 
13 Iranian codified law and Shi‘i law forbid prosecution and investigation of crimes ‘against chastity’ 
without complainants (chapter 3, section 4). 
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Case 2: death sentence for incest with rape claim14 and enkar15. 
Markazi, 2004-5. 
 
In this case, a girl aged 18 was sentenced to death for incest but ultimately 
exonerated after appeal and retrial. The facts of her case come from court documents 
plus information from the lawyer who handled her appeal, a social worker in the 
centre where she eventually went for rehabilitation, and an individual who spoke to 
the judge and court-appointed lawyer involved in her initial trial. 
 
Almost every member of the girl’s family had penal precedents. Her father was 
serving a life sentence for drug smuggling and her mother had frequently been in 
prison, where the girl had consequently lived with her on several occasions from the 
age of three. She was entirely illiterate, never having been to school. Prostituted by 
her mother from early childhood, she had eight penal precedents beginning from the 
age of eleven, all related to carnal misdeeds, and had been flogged at least five times, 
once as hadd and four times as ta‘zir, by the time of this trial.  
 
At the age of 16 she was given in ‘temporary marriage’ to a man who prostituted her 
as a source of income for himself and his permanent wife16. She was arrested when 
his house was raided as a ‘centre of corruption’, and charged with participation in 
organising this establishment. The complainant was the ‘office for combating social 
depravities’ (edareye mobareze ba mafased-e ejtema‘i). 
 
During a pre-trial interrogation session (where her confessions, being out of court, 
were invalid), the girl, presenting her lifelong abuse as ‘extenuating circumstances’, 
described her prostitution before her temporary marriage, causing the birth of three 
children of unknown paternity, and subsequently by her temporary husband (who 
kept the proceeds; she had avoided pregnancy through contraceptive pills). In a 
                                                
14 Rape claims exonerate ‘confessors’ to zena (penal code, article 67). 
15 Retraction of confession, which averts death penalties in zena. 
16 Temporary marriage, with an ‘expiry date’ fixed in advance in the marriage contract and a 
maximum term of 99 years, is allowed by Shi‘i law and the Iranian civil code (articles 1075-7, 1113). 
It cannot create ehsan, the condition of having ‘access’ to one’s permanent spouse, which determines 
adultery and therefore eligibility for stoning (see chapter 4, section 3.4). Therefore the girl was 
ineligible for stoning. 
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session two days later, also out of court, she described being prostituted by her 
mother from the age of nine and raped by two of her brothers from the age of ten. 
She specifically used the word ‘tajavoz’, ‘rape’, describing how her brothers hit her 
if she resisted. Both brothers were arrested and confessed to raping her, again out of 
court. All three were charged with incest. In court they denied incest, saying they had 
confessed in fear of being beaten, while admitting to non-penetrative carnal activities 
together. The girl again described her prostitution by her temporary husband. She 
was represented by a court-appointed lawyer who only saw her once before the trial. 
 
Approximately four months after the initial investigation, the judge issued his ruling. 
The evidence used against the girl was as follows. 1) She confessed to incest with her 
brothers. 2) She confessed at least four times to zena (though the hadd for zena is 
applicable through four confessions to the same instance thereof, while her 
confessions were to various instances of zena, most of them not constituting incest). 
3) She had penal precedents, all for illicit carnal activity. 4) She had produced three 
children (although she clearly described these pregnancies as unrelated to the much 
earlier coerced incest). 5) Her brothers confessed to incest with her. 6) In court, she 
and her brothers confessed to illicit relations.  
 
None of the evidence legally justified the death penalty for incest. Pregnancy and co-
defendants’ confessions are invalid as proof17; most instances of zena mentioned in 
her ‘confessions’ were not incest, and the same applies to her penal precedents and 
‘illicit relations’. Her invalid confession to incest was further invalidated through 
retraction. In court, she only confessed to ‘illicit relations’ and forcible prostitution 
by her husband. 
 
Nevertheless, the judge claimed ‘elm and sentenced her to death by hanging for 
incest, 100 lashes for ordinary fornication, and five years’ ta‘ziri incarceration for 
organising a house of vice. Although she had only confessed once to incest (with 
rape), her confessions to different episodes of zena which did not constitute incest 
were counted towards the total of four, and then the death penalty for incest was 
                                                
17 Chapter 4, section 3.6; chapter 2, section 6.1. 
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applied as if all these confessions had been to incest through the misleading 
association of the two phrases ‘she confessed four times to zena’ and ‘she confessed 
to zena with her brothers’. Her penal precedents were similarly used as evidence of 
incest though none of them involved incest. Her retraction of confession to incest 
was rejected because the judge claimed that his ‘elm overcame enkar; and the rape 
claim accompanying her lone ‘confession’ to incest, which exonerated her through 
article 67 of the penal code, was never mentioned.  
 
As for her brothers, the judge simply declared that since they had retracted their 
confessions to raping their sister, and since according to article 71 of the penal code 
any death penalty for zena lapses with retraction of confession, through that article as 
well as article 37 of the Constitution (innocence by default), the asl-e bara’at (same) 
and the qa‘edeye darr’ (doubt removes punishability), they were acquitted of incest. 
 
This is an extraordinary example of the sweeping powers of ‘elm and the unequal 
deployment of legal elements. The only reason why zena carried the death penalty 
for the girl was because it allegedly occurred with her brothers; none of her other 
alleged acts carried the death penalty. She was sentenced to death for incest with her 
brothers, who, according to the court, had not committed incest with her. ‘Elm 
created two incompatible yet coexisting realities, one of which necessitated an 
execution. The court applied suqut (lapsing of punishment) through enkar to her 
brothers, whose criminal record was no better than hers and who had confessed to 
rape, while ignoring this principle with regard to the girl whose circumstances were 
identical except that her confession was to being raped. Confession only incriminates 
the confessor; but the brothers’ confessions which, when retracted, were deemed 
incapable of incriminating them were nevertheless used against another person. 
 
A reliable source who spoke to the girl’s court-appointed lawyer reveals that he only 
saw her once before the trial. He declared that given the choice, he would have 
refused such an obviously guilty client, since a lawyer’s job is to assess whether a 
person is guilty, and then defend them if they appear innocent. Clearly this is 
incompatible with the guarantee of a fair defence irrespective of apparent guilt, and 
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with the notion that a lawyer’s task is not to assess guilt (that function belongs to the 
judge) but to use every opportunity to defend their client.  
 
The lawyer further argued that he could not, with a clean conscience, instruct his 
client to lie in court by retracting confessions that clearly showed her guilt; and that 
since she had borne three ‘illegitimate’ children and confessed more than four times 
in court to prostitution enforced by her temporary husband, the lawyer was powerless 
to argue her innocence. Again, the lawyer confused her prostitution and pregnancies 
with the issue of incest, ascribed to a time prior to these, and failed to cite the flaws 
in confession. He said that the girl’s possibly low IQ would not remove criminal 
responsibility, which does not lapse through ignorance of the law. Here he was 
simply mistaken, as ignorance of the law does remove criminal responsibility18. 
Furthermore he confused ignorance with insanity and coercion, which remove 
criminal responsibility and invalidate confession. The lawyer’s incompetence and 
subjective assessment of guilt facilitated conviction. 
 
A new lawyer took the case to appeal, acting alongside the first, using the following 
arguments. 1) Confession to incest occurred only once. 2) It was accompanied by 
claims of rape, which exonerated the girl by article 67 of the penal code and the 
qa‘edeye darr’. 3) The judge, by combining the propositions ‘she confessed four 
times to zena’ and ‘she confessed to incest’, misleadingly conflated confessions to 
different instances of zena with strangers, which cumulatively occurred more than 
four times but could not prove any single instance of zena, with the girl’s sole 
confession to incest (with rape), thereby falsely indicating four confessions to incest. 
4) Even regarding prostitution, criminal responsibility was doubtful because there 
had always been ikrah (coercion) or at least ezterar (distress) involved. A young girl, 
placed under the overwhelming power of irresponsible and unscrupulous adults all 
her life, was ordered to commit zena by persons on whom she depended for food and 
shelter. Here the lawyer cited a narration regarding ezterar, where the Imam Ali 
acquitted a thirsty woman of zena committed in exchange for water19. 5) The girl 
retracted her confession, which prevented punishability through article 71, and 
                                                
18 See chapter 2, section 7.2. 
19 See chapter 2, section 7.3. 
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introduced an important requirement for ‘elm, namely, that it be based on truth (see 
chapter 2, section 6.4). Incest is a special case of zena, requiring the correct 
identification of the other party. Exoneration of the girl’s brothers implied 
acknowledgement of a reality whereby incest between them and their sister never 
occurred; this is incompatible with the reality in which incest occurred, and yet 
according to this reality, which the judge presented as impossible by acquitting her 
brothers of incest, the girl must die. Either incest occurred and all participants must 
die – except, of course, any possibly coerced party – or it never happened and 
nobody was punishable for it. 6) Even ignoring the controversy among jurists 
regarding whether non-ma‘sum, non-mujtahid judges may rule by ‘elm, its grounds 
must be comprehensible to others, because provability, as expressed by Ayatollah 
Shahrudi20 in his book, is necessary for ‘elm to be valid. Furthermore, some jurists 
maintain that ‘elm only comes to a judge from personally witnessing a crime. The 
lawyer cited the opinions of three jurists including Ayatollah Shahrudi, as well as 
judicial precedent showing ‘elm being found unjustified by higher courts, therefore 
demonstrating that it must be justifiable to others. 7) The charge of incest was 
introduced without complainants, during investigations for pimping, despite the 
prohibition against prosecuting crimes ‘against chastity’ without complainants. 8) 
Prison officials had suggested the girl’s potentially very low IQ and mental age of 
eight as obstacles to criminal responsibility. 9) Considering the girl’s deficient 
upbringing and lifelong abuse, she should be considered a victim, not a criminal. 
 
The new lawyer told me that the girl’s brothers possibly retracted their confessions 
after learning in prison that enkar precludes execution for zena. If they did rape their 
sister, her retraction implies her realisation that her rape claim would be used against 
her, and her only chance of escape was to exonerate her tormentors.  
 
The Supreme Court accepted some, not all, of the new lawyer’s arguments. It 
accepted that ‘elm must be based on reality, declaring that since the appellant’s 
brothers were acquitted of incest, there was no named partner to the girl’s incest and 
her death sentence was incorrect. It questioned whether ‘elm could survive enkar, 
                                                
20 The head of the Judiciary when this case was tried. The Ma‘sumin are the Prophet and the Imams; 
Islamically, only mujtahids (Islamic jurists) can be judges. See chapter 2, sections 3 and 6.4. 
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without providing a definitive answer (perhaps because the law offers none). It 
accepted that the girl had probably not organised the ‘house of corruption’, and 
confirmed only the sentence of 100 lashes for fornication (with strangers brought by 
her temporary husband), ignoring her possibly low IQ and the ‘distress’ argument. 
Regarding incest and brothel organisation, the case was sent for retrial. 
 
The retrial judge also ignored any suggestion of low IQ and consequent lack of 
criminal responsibility. Rejecting any intimation that her social disadvantages and 
the fact that she always acted under orders affected her responsibility for illicit 
behaviour, he indulged in a lengthy and flowery disquisition regarding proper 
Islamic morality to be followed irrespective of adversity. However, he accepted that 
the retraction of her confession to incest nullified the hadd, and that article 37 of the 
Constitution (innocence by default) required acquittal if guilt remained uncertain. 
Therefore she was only punishable for the ‘illicit relations’ to which she had 
confessed in court. She was sentenced to three years’ incarceration for participation 
in a ‘house of vice’ followed by eight months’ rehabilitation in a welfare centre. 
 
Tests administered soon after this ruling revealed her IQ as 75. If, as repeatedly 
requested, such examinations had been conducted before sentencing, she might have 
immediately been found bereft of criminal responsibility. 
 
In brief, the issues raised by this case are as follows. 
 
1) This case continues the theme of overlooked obstacles to criminal responsibility. 
The girl’s low IQ was never investigated before sentencing, and her rape claim was 
consistently dismissed. Extenuating circumstances and ezterar (developed 
extensively in Shi‘i law, but mostly absent from codified law) were also ignored. 
Even the judges who eventually blocked her death sentence dismissed any 
diminished responsibility deriving from lifelong abuse and the fact that she had 
always acted under orders from adults with power over her. Like the girl in the 
previous case, she might have been considered a victim under a different system. 
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2) This case displays the extraordinary powers attributable to legally unregulated 
‘elm, which here posited two conflicting realities. Furthermore it illustrates various 
competing opinions regarding ‘elm, including the position whereby it cannot be 
assessed by others even if unprovable, and the opposing opinion whereby unprovable 
‘elm is invalid. It is interesting to observe participants’ divers assessments of ‘elm. 
For example, the argument that ‘elm cannot overcome retraction of confessions, 
initially rejected, ultimately prevented the girl’s execution, but the larger issue of 
whether ‘elm can be based entirely on invalid proof was not properly addressed. 
 
3) Like the previous case, this one displays the crucial role of subjective assessments 
(by both judge and lawyer). 
 
4) Neither age nor the possibility of a ‘statute of limitations’ was offered as a reason 
to exonerate the girl, the first because her age, which in some systems pertains firmly 
to childhood, is above the very low age of bulugh for girls, and the second perhaps 
because it is an obscure juristic possibility. Some narrations, however, do posit a 
statute of limitations21, and there is no reason to ignore them if other scriptural 
commandments are used.  
 
Another defence that was ignored was the idea, present in both Shi‘i and codified law 
but only partially developed by the lawyer, that crimes against chastity cannot be 
prosecuted without complainants. The Supreme Court ignored this point, which 
could have been emphasised more through citation of laws and narrations. If 
authorities could be ‘complainants’ for this purpose, the prohibition would be 
redundant; its existence implies that the girl’s prosecution was illegal. 
 
5) Male bias, possibly present in the previous case, almost certainly operated in this 
one. Identical conditions were used to exonerate males and condemn a female to 
death – in fact, an additional condition affecting the girl, namely the rape claim, 
should have protected her but was completely ignored. 
 
                                                
21 Chapter 2, section 9. 
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6) Parts of Shi‘i law were employed with varying results. The Supreme Court 
ignored distress as a remover of criminal responsibility, and the idea of a ‘statute of 
limitations’ was never mentioned, but the qa‘edeye darr’ was used by the first judge 
– together with the asl-e bara’at – in acquitting the girl’s brothers of incest and 
successfully by the second lawyer in exonerating her. Also, some interpretations of 
‘elm propounded by the new lawyer were accepted by the Supreme Court – which 
questioned its ability to overcome enkar, and agreed that it must reflect reality and be 
provable to others – in preference to those used by the first judge. This debate 
necessarily occurred entirely within the arena of Shi‘i law, since the codified law is 
silent regarding the details of ‘elm. 
 
Concluding remarks.  
 
Both of the cases presented here involve mentally compromised girls from 
underprivileged, abusive or neglectful families, condemned to death by hanging 
(rather than the methods described in narrations22) for acts committed while under 
the age of 18, by courts that overlooked evidence of their mental problems.  
 
Both cases display disregard for laws: in the first, laws regarding criminal 
responsibility, appeals and pardon requests, and possibly valid prosecution of crimes 
‘against chastity’ were ignored with fatal results, and in the second, laws governing 
valid prosecution, rape claims, confession and its retraction, and again criminal 
responsibility were bypassed but then partially reinstated in time to save the 
defendant. Both cases raise the issue of improper legal representation and confusion 
between the roles of judge, lawyer and prosecutor (cf. theft cases 2 and 5). Both 
exemplify the extent to which ‘elm, undefined and unregulated, can become a ‘wild 
card’ capable of deflecting any objection, leap-frogging any legal obstacles, and 
prevailing over the limitations of physical reality (did incest occur or not?) while 
remaining impervious to external assessment. In both cases, contending 
interpretations of ‘elm confronted each other.  
 
                                                
22 Chapter 2, section 5.3; chapter 4, section 3.2. 
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Both cases show that no matter how clearly obvious legal flaws are pointed out, the 
authorities’ unaccountability allows them to overlook even the clearest 
inconsistencies and illegalities. Nothing compels them to obey their own laws. Case 
1 dramatically displays the system’s unaccountability, given that appeals against it 
are assessed by other tentacles thereof23. This is why the ‘high court for judges’ 
could block the judge’s prosecution without justification. Appeals are only 
successful, even partially as in case 2, as a concession by the authorities. 
 
All these mechanisms are facets of the frequently interlocking major themes 
delineated in previous chapters: that judges may interpret vague laws with immense 
discretion; that judicial authorities also frequently break laws; that socioeconomic 
circumstances may be intimately associated with prosecution; and that the system 
contains inherent obstacles to lenience.  
 
One such obstacle is that ‘extenuating circumstances’ do not exist in hudud, because 
they are ‘fixed penalties’ whose applicability depends on fulfilment of technical 
parameters (chapter 2, section 5). Though criminal responsibility was arguably 
absent in both cases, even by hadd standards, because of (ignored) mental problems 
(chapter 2, section 7), the fact of having always lived with neglect and abuse is more 
difficult to fit into the stringent hadd parameters. If the concept of ezterar (distress), 
derivable from Shi‘i law, were more clearly incorporated into codified law, this 
could allow such socioeconomic disadvantages to be considered. Ezterar allows 
punishability to lapse if circumstances which do not constitute absolute removal of 
free will nevertheless make it very difficult to abstain from illicit acts (chapter 2, 
section 7.1). 
 
Another obvious obstacle is the very existence of the death penalty, present in 
scripture, for acts which may be victimless (repeated fornication) or may result from 
coercion. This once again indicates the discrepancies which can arise when laws 
rooted in the morality of one era are deemed obligatory in another. 
 
                                                
23 Mayer, “Universality”, 314: “Iran’s courts [are] an arm of the regime’s apparatus of repression”. 
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Many patterns emerging from these cases – for example, the authorities’ arbitrariness 
and unaccountability, their initiative in prosecution, their disregard for laws 
including those governing evidence and criminal responsibility, ‘elm’s ‘wild-card’ 
quality, improper legal representation, and execution of minors – also appear in 
earlier chapters. The next chapter, analysing adultery trials, displays other facets of 
their application. It also continues the theme of socioeconomic disadvantage 
intersecting with criminal trials, and of uncertainty regarding what can be considered 




9. Adultery cases. 
 
This, the last of five case-study chapters, analyses the court documents (and 
sometimes additional information from lawyers) for thirteen Iranian adultery trials. 
They involve some issues specific to adultery, including the stoning penalty and 
ehsan1, which determines eligibility for stoning. They also share themes observed in 
chapters 5-8, notably the pervasiveness of conviction through ‘elm-e qazi (the 
judge’s ‘knowledge’) often based on invalid evidence. Some cases reveal the 
inequalities inherent in divorce and child custody laws and how they facilitate 
women’s prosecution for adultery: these are obstacles to lenience inherent in the law. 
Also revealed are the intersections of socioeconomic conditions, such as poverty, 
illiteracy, addiction and ethno-linguistic background, with prosecution. 
 
The manifold themes present in adultery cases build on the previous case-study 
chapters to complete the picture of how the theoretical elements presented in Part I 
(chapters 2-4) are deployed in practice. The fundamental characteristics of this 
system, as noted throughout the project, are the interpretability of laws due in great 
part to the simultaneous operation of Shi‘i and codified law; the frequency of legal 
infractions; the intersection of socioeconomic circumstances with prosecution, where 
applicable; and the presence of inherent obstacles to lenience in the law. The overall 
impression is that the system surveyed in Part I, while containing some formidable 
obstacles to lenience, also provides opportunities to avoid most irreversible hadd 
penalties, though judges may disregard these in choosing less lenient interpretations 
or contravening laws outright. The extensive debates among jurists observed in Part I 
are seen among judges, lawyers and even (in case 1 below) Ayatollahs in this and 
other case-study chapters. 
 
Because of the multiple, intersecting themes linking these cases with each other, no 
linear sequence of them is entirely satisfactory. This is one possible order which, it is 
hoped, allows themes to lead into each other and cumulatively fortify each other. The 
sheer volume of information available for each case precludes description of all 
                                                
1 The condition of being married and having ‘access’ to one’s spouse (chapter 4, section 3.4).  
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details of the cases, but every case is given a description presenting its salient 
elements, followed by a discussion of its important themes. 
 
Case 1: stoning sentence despite belief in valid marriage. 
Qazvin, 1999-2008. 
 
This case shows how interpretations pertaining entirely to Shi‘i law can crucially 
affect sentencing. It also shows how inequitable divorce and child custody laws, 
described in chapter 4, section 3.5, can remove women’s control over events that 
culminate in their prosecution. This represents one of the system’s institutional 
obstacles to lenience. 
 
The case involved two individuals, A, female, and B, male, convicted of adultery 
with each other. We are mainly concerned with A because B’s case file is 
unavailable. A, an illiterate member of a linguistic minority with no knowledge of 
Persian, had an arranged marriage to a man whose narcotic addiction and consequent 
financial irresponsibility endangered the family’s survival. She returned to her 
parents’ house, remaining there for eight months, and sued for divorce. Though a 
husband’s addiction and failure to provide financial maintenance are legal grounds 
for divorce, the court rejected her petition because her children needed a mother, 
whereas fathers have custody of children after divorce.  
 
B, a family friend with a wife in another village, convinced A that by deserting her 
husband’s home she could obtain a divorce ‘in absentia’. She therefore consented to 
be taken to B’s village 300 km away, but had no carnal relations with him. After 
some time, B produced A’s identity certificate with her husband’s name erased as 
‘proof’ of her divorce. They were married by a cleric; A, unable to write her name, 
signed the marriage contract with a fingerprint. The pair lived openly as husband and 
wife, being acknowledged as such by locals. They produced a son who received 
identity documents, which can only be obtained by ‘legitimate’ children2, further 
contributing to A’s belief in the validity of her new marriage.  
                                                
2 See chapter 4, section 3.1. 
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During a visit to A’s original town, A and B were spotted by A’s first husband, who 
had them arrested. Under interrogation, A explained that she had divorced her first 
husband and married B. Her statements were used as ‘confessions’ to adultery. When 
the pair were tried, the judge combined these with the existence of their son to claim 
‘elm (‘knowledge’), and sentenced them to be stoned. It is unclear whether any 
confessions occurred in court (confessions out of court being invalid), or when the 
pair had access to their court-appointed lawyers. 
 
Following appeal, the ruling was overturned on the basis of non-investigation of 
ehsan, and sent to the same court for retrial. To investigate ehsan, the court 
interrogated B’s first wife, who said that she had never prevented B from copulating 
with her. This was used as evidence of B’s ehsan. A, interrogated again, said that she 
had not seen her first husband for eight months prior to departing with B and that her 
first marriage had been chaste because of mutual dislike and her husband’s illness. 
This was used as evidence that A’s prolonged chastity, being voluntary, did not 
remove ehsan, though the standard position among Shi‘i jurists is that intention is 
immaterial to loss of ehsan, and the codified law is silent on this point3.  
 
Another stoning sentence ensued. It was confirmed on appeal on the basis that ehsan 
had been established. A, awaiting execution in prison, was discovered by two 
lawyers who took her case. All ordinary appeals having been exhausted, they 
requested an extraordinary review as permitted by law (chapter 2, section 4). 
 
Their defence refers to Shi‘i concepts including the Imams’ lenience and treatment of 
hudud as mostly deterrents, the qa‘edeye darr’ (the axiom whereby ‘doubts prevent 
punishment’), and the principle of ‘caution in shedding blood’4. Concerning A’s 
erroneous but genuine belief in her marriage to B, they cited Khomeini’s legal 
treatise, the Tahrir al-Vasileh, which agrees with articles 64-6 of the penal code5 that 
punishment depends on criminal responsibility, including awareness that one’s acts 
                                                
3 Chapter 4, section 3.4; chapter 7, section 6. 
4 Chapter 3, sections 1, 3, 5, 6.4. 
5 Tahrir, volume 4, zena topics 7 and 8. Similarly, Montazeri, zena topic 3171. 
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are prohibited. They contested the judge’s illegal use of pregnancy as proof (chapter 
4, section 3.6), and cited Khomeini’s opinion that intention is irrelevant in losing 
ehsan. They argued that A had only confessed to copulating with B while farther 
than the ‘legal distance’ (4 farsangs, approximately 22km) from her husband, which 
removed ehsan. Furthermore A had lost ehsan by not copulating with him for eight 
months before departing with B, and their mutual hatred also removed ehsan6. 
 
The lawyers also submitted legal opinions (fatwas) from three Ayatollahs, 
confirming these arguments. Additionally they submitted new testimony from A’s 
and her first husband’s relatives confirming that A had not seen her husband for eight 
months before departing with B, and that mutual loathing precluded physical or 
emotional intimacy even while they lived together. 
 
Through a literate cellmate, A sent a pardon request expressing her repentance for 
acts that she had believed licit. She was pardoned five months later with no reason 
given (though her release was illegally delayed). Her lawyers speculate that the 
Ayatollahs’ input was crucial.  
 
These courtroom debates about ehsan and criminal responsibility, using Shi‘i 
concepts absent from the codified law, show how the vagueness of the codified law 
necessitates reference to the highly interpretable Shi‘i law. Similar mechanisms 
appeared in previous chapters, e.g. the uncertainty regarding penetration in sodomy 
cases. Other themes from previous chapters include contravention of laws (e.g. 
pregnancy as proof), institutional obstacles to lenience in the system (e.g. appeal 
bias, unequal divorce laws), and arbitrary use of ‘elm and evidence. These themes 
emerge in the following ways.  
 
1) The root of A’s problem was her inability to divorce her husband although his 
addiction and failure to support his family were legal grounds for divorce. If 
permitted to divorce her husband, she would have lost ehsan. Her new marriage 
would also have been valid, protecting her and B from stoning. Furthermore, if 
                                                
6 Chapter 4, section 3.4 (parameters of ehsan and their interpretations). 
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mothers and fathers had had equal child custody rights, the court’s argument that A’s 
divorce should be denied to avoid depriving her children of their mother would have 
been untenable. The civil code now awards mothers custody when fathers are proven 
unsuitable7, but A’s husband’s shortcomings were disregarded. This is an example of 
theoretical rights being denied. It also shows in action the institutionalised 
inequalities outlined in chapter 4, section 3.5. 
 
2) The appeal bias noted in previous chapters also appears here. By sending the case 
to be retried by the court which had already overlooked crucial issues to arrive at a 
stoning sentence, the authorities denied the pair a true, unbiased appeal. As explained 
in chapter 2, section 4, the law permits cases to return to their original courts if their 
sentences are overturned because of ‘insufficient investigation’. However, as 
observed in theft case 2, reasons for overturning the ruling may be classified as 
‘investigation flaws’ but in fact involve other issues which are thereby not subjected 
to a ‘second opinion’. Here, such an issue is ehsan. The original court’s ‘additional 
investigation’ of ehsan involved its unorthodox interpretation of ehsan depending on 
intention. The assessment of ehsan, criminal responsibility and other parameters did 
not involve only accumulation of additional data (‘investigation’) but also 
interpretation, and revision by the same court meant that these other crucial 
dimensions were not given a second opinion. As observed in sodomy case 1, appeal 
bias may also operate when cases go twice to the same Supreme Court branch: this is 
unrelated to the law about ‘insufficient investigation’. 
 
3) The courts repeatedly ignored portions of both Shi‘i and codified law regarding 
the role of awareness in criminal responsibility, though the evidence for honest error 
at least on A’s part was overwhelming, and Khomeini (also, incidentally, Montazeri) 
describes a similar situation – zena committed in the belief of being married – as 
removing criminal responsibility (as does article 224 of the 2012 penal code set to 
replace the 1991/96 penal code under which these cases were tried).  
 
                                                
7 Civil code, note to article 1169. 
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4) Different conceptions of ehsan confronted each other through the arguments of 
judges and lawyers. Three obstacles to ehsan were discussed: extended lack of 
copulation (as opposed to the impossibility thereof); distance, though the 4-farsang 
parameter is not in the codified law; and, most controversially, incompatibility 
between spouses, cited by the lawyers and posited by some jurists as a barrier to 
ehsan irrespective of copulation8. The judge declared intention relevant to loss of 
ehsan. The lawyers used the more common juristic opinion, seen also in judicial 
precedent9, whereby motivation is irrelevant to the evaporation of ehsan. 
 
5) Crucial debates between judges and lawyers occurred entirely in the arena of 
uncodified Shi‘i law, exemplifying the notion that ‘the shari‘a’ is the law, 
contravening the codified principle of ‘no crime without law’10. Here the debates 
even involved three high juristic authorities (the Ayatollahs), showing that 
interpretations coming from a purely Shi‘i standpoint can ultimately have more 
‘clout’ than codified laws. This displays the tension between the idea of interpreting 
scripture afresh in every case (continuous ijtihad) and the concept of a calcified law 
which crystallises one interpretation (chapter 1, section 5.1). 
 
6) ‘Elm bypassed many doubts regarding ehsan, criminal responsibility and proof. 
Pregnancy was illegally used as proof, and it is unclear whether A’s confessions 
occurred in court, as legally required. They also lacked the requirement of qasd – 
intention – because they were not intended as confessions (chapter 2, section 6.1). In 
other words, ‘elm was a tool to contravene laws. 
 
Case 2: interpretability of coercion in adultery. 
East Azerbaijan, 1997-2009. 
 
The previous case showed inequitable divorce and child custody laws (chapter 4, 
section 3.5) facilitating prosecution for adultery. This case continues that theme, 
showing how women can be condemned to death because of events over which the 
                                                
8 See chapter 4, end of section 3.4. 
9 Judicial precedent for this is described in chapter 4, section 3.4, and chapter 7, section 6. 
10 See chapter 2, sections 1 and 2. 
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law denies them control. In common with the previous case, it also illustrates the 
interpretability of ehsan and criminal responsibility, which here were assessed 
without considering psychological parameters and the lack of self-determination 
caused by divorce and child custody laws. 
 
The events of the case are reconstructed from court documents and additional 
information from the defendant’s most recent lawyer. According to these sources, the 
defendant confessed under interrogation to facilitating her husband’s murder, and a 
man confessed to the murder. Because the woman described, as extenuating 
circumstances, her forcible prostitution by her husband, enforced by violence against 
her and their children, she was charged with adultery. She was condemned to rajm 
(stoning) following incarceration for complicity in murder, while the man was 
condemned to qesas (retribution, here meaning execution) for murder but ultimately 
escaped execution because an agreement was reached regarding blood money.  
 
According to the materials available, the woman’s husband’s addiction made him too 
debilitated to contribute to the family’s expenses, which were significantly increased 
by the cost of his drugs. Therefore he prostituted his wife. Her prostitution was the 
family’s only source of income. He frequently beat his wife and children; his eldest 
daughter described the children’s mistreatment as ‘a tool to tame my mother’, 
suggesting blackmail. The mother had once left her husband, but returned fearing 
that, without his only source of income, he might prostitute the children: she 
submitted to prostitution to shield them. Her attempts to obtain help were 
unsuccessful because her husband came from a respected family and her claims 
about him were dismissed.  
 
The convicted murderer was one of the wife’s ‘clients’ who grew to love her and her 
children. As the husband’s violent outbursts escalated, the defendants decided that 
his murder was their only option. The wife lured him outside and her co-defendant 
murdered him and hid his corpse. 
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The following evidence was used against the woman: both defendants’ confessions 
before the police and in court; the statements of the woman’s children, made in 
defence of both suspects; the police report describing the scene of the crime; and the 
victim’s autopsy report. It is unclear how many confessions occurred in court, and 
therefore impossible to know whether they were valid. Considering the authorities’ 
propensity to gloss over the invalidity of confession, we cannot assume four 
confessions in court. The man’s confessions were illegally used against the woman. 
Her ‘confessions’ to zena were all presentations of extenuating circumstances made 
in pursuit of clemency, and therefore bereft of qasd – intention – which is legally 
required for confession. 
 
The children’s statements in favour of both defendants, whom they pardoned of the 
murder, were invalid as ‘testimony’ for various reasons including insufficient age11, 
but possibly used for ‘elm, though the ruling mentions neither ‘elm nor article 105 
which permits it. They could only have been legally used as sources of ‘additional 
information’, as allowed by law for disqualified testimony. However, this may not 
apply to hudud12.  
 
In court, the woman denied zena with the convicted murderer. The court conceded 
that she was therefore unpunishable for zena with him, but insisted that she had 
‘confessed’ to zena with large numbers of unknown men on her husband’s orders, 
and remained punishable for this.  
 
The woman was represented by a lawyer in court, but it is unknown whether the 
lawyer was available to her before the trial; previous chapters featured belated 
introduction of lawyers. The lawyer argued that the woman’s adultery was coerced 
by her husband. However, the court rejected this on the basis that although the first 
instance of prostitution might have been forced, the woman could then have gone to 
the authorities and sought recourse against her husband; while she admitted that the 
                                                
11 Penal code articles 74-5, 77, 117, 128; civil code articles 1210, 1313; PCCM article 155; penal code 
bill article 213-2 note 3; Hojjati, 362; Mo’meni, 103-5, 148-9, 161, 163; Nobahar, “Ahdaf”, 148-9; 
Khomeini, 306, 329-30, 342, 345; Mortazavi, 40-1; Zera‘at (1385), 45-8, 98, 104, 223, 243, (1383), 
211; Gorji, 20; Lom‘e (vol.1), 175, (vol.2) 235, 242; Sharh-e Lom‘e, 20, 59, 72. 
12 CPC article 146; PCCM article 156. 
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prostitution continued for ten years. This lengthy period afforded ample opportunity 
to escape, with the authorities’ assistance, and failure to do so implied consent. 
 
The court also rejected the idea that the husband’s narcotic addiction crippled the 
marriage, undermining the woman’s ehsan. In her confession, the woman had 
admitted to copulating with her husband on the day of the murder, thereby proving 
that he was able to copulate and she consequently possessed ehsan. 
 
The court, rejecting all defences, condemned the woman to stoning for adultery, and 
the man to death for murder plus a hundred lashes for fornication. He eventually 
escaped execution by agreeing on blood money (diyeh) with the victim’s brother.  
 
By the time the woman’s last lawyer harvested her case from prison, she had made 
three unsuccessful pardon requests. The lawyer lodged another. Its progress was 
followed by the prison authorities who, understanding her circumstances, did not 
wish her executed. After spending considerably more than her allotted eight years in 
prison, she was pardoned and promptly released by the sympathetic prison 
authorities (compare case 1, where release was delayed). The reasons for pardon are 
unknown because the Pardon and Clemency Commission did not reveal them. 
 
The main issues represented in this case are as follows. 
 
1) Iranian divorce and child custody laws discriminate against wives and mothers. 
Wives need either their husbands’ consent or a court order to secure a divorce. A 
court order requires grounds, and is more difficult to obtain in reality, as shown by 
case 1 and Mir-Hosseini’s study of Iranian divorces, than the law suggests13. 
 
The court rejected the claim of coercion (ikrah) by arguing that the woman could 
have escaped from the husband who prostituted her. However, given the difficulty of 
securing a divorce despite valid grounds, she was not free to leave. Even if she had 
obtained a divorce, her husband would have had custody of their children unless he 
                                                
13 See chapter 4, section 3.5; chapter 2, section 7.3. 
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were proven unsuitable (case 1, point 1), which is unlikely because his family’s 
prestige gave him credibility. Since his only form of income was prostitution and he 
regularly beat his children, his wife had reason to fear that if she departed, he would 
prostitute the children to support himself and his addiction. Therefore her choice was 
between enduring prostitution herself, and endangering the children. Even if she had 
fled without a divorce, she would legally have been guilty of nushuz, 
insubordination, and liable to be forcibly returned to her husband14.  
 
All these conditions mean that ‘adultery’ was not the result of free will (ekhtiar), 
which is a necessary component of criminal responsibility15. However, the court 
shifted the emphasis from whether free will was absent, to whether absolute coercion 
was present. The codified law does not clearly delineate the parameters of coercion, 
but Shi‘i jurists present a wide spectrum of interpretations thereof, including the 
purely psychological (e.g. threats). Furthermore, Shi‘i texts clearly describe another 
parameter which removes criminal responsibility: distress (ezterar), which is 
associated with the principle of ‘avoiding hardship and harm’ (nafi‘-e ‘osr va haraj), 
does not have the absoluteness which some attribute to coercion, and would more 
easily have exonerated the defendant. This concept, ignored by the court in this case 
and only vaguely described in current codified law, clearly removes criminal 
responsibility in the penal code bill but not in the 2012 penal code16. This shows how 
differing interpretations of Shi‘i sources can surface not only in court but in the 
‘cherry-picking’ process of legal codification. 
 
The woman’s predicament shows how divorce and child custody laws can remove 
self-determination, while restrictive interpretations of unclear codified criminal 
responsibility laws can convict as if self-determination had been present, excluding 
equally credible interpretations of free will derivable from Shi‘i texts. 
 
                                                
14 See chapter 4, section 3.5. 
15 Chapter 2, sections 7, 7.3. Qur’anic verses 2:173, 5:3 and 6:145 allow forgiveness of infractions not 
resulting from ‘wilful disobedience’. 
16 Chapter 2, section 7.3. 
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2) Ehsan was deemed present because the woman had copulated with her husband on 
the day of his murder. If the court’s interpretation was that the existence of 
copulation, rather than its possibility alone, maintains ehsan, then by the same token 
the woman in case 1 should have immediately been found bereft of ehsan through 
prolonged chastity. What the court did not say, however, is that ehsan depends on 
anything other than physical copulation, and specifically ‘healthy marital relations’, 
as argued by the woman’s lawyer17. If a marriage where the husband is addicted to 
narcotics, beats his wife and children, prostitutes his wife, and not only fails in his 
legal duty to support his family but is purely parasitic on them, still creates ehsan 
because the wife and husband copulate or can copulate, then ehsan has nothing to do 
with healthy marital relations. This is an example of how conceptions of ehsan differ 
widely, and how its more lenient interpretations, championed by lawyers, may not 
resonate in court. 
 
3) Evidence was used illegally. The woman’s confessions, like those of the woman in 
case 1, were intended as presentations of extenuating circumstances. Being therefore 
unintentional, they were invalid. The man’s confessions illegally incriminated the 
woman, and the legal value of the children’s statements is also dubious18. 
 
4) Like the woman in case 1, the defendant belonged to a linguistic minority. 
 
Case 3: confession motivated by promises of lenience. 
Fars, 2004-6. 
 
This is a third example of how divorce and child custody laws remove self-
determination, facilitating prosecution for adultery. It also illustrates the mechanism, 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6, of ‘reverse plea bargaining’, whereby interrogators 
extract confessions though false promises that this will be rewarded with lenience, 
but instead confession invariably incriminates the confessor. It furthermore contains 
                                                
17 The argument of ehsan depending on psychological factors echoes the lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi 
about stoning cases, already cited several times: chapter 2, section 6.1; chapter 4, section 3.4. 
18 Chapter 2, sections 6.1, 6.3. 
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the suggestion that stoning might be disregarded because of maslahat: the state’s best 
interests19. This mechanism appears even more forcefully in the next case.  
 
Ultimately, the case demonstrates how easily the law can be interpreted to favour 
defendants. Many conditions were identical to those in the previous two cases, but 
the defendant was exonerated on appeal, while the previous two were always found 
guilty by the courts though eventually pardoned. 
 
According to the case file, a man’s house was raided as a ‘centre of corruption’, here 
indicating a brothel. He confessed to forcing his wife into prostitution as part of the 
operation. Under interrogation she held out, refusing to confess until she was 
promised that if she did, she would be released. When she confessed, she said two 
things: “I performed acts against chastity to a small degree” and “my husband forced 
me to be at certain individuals’ disposal”. She claimed coercion and never mentioned 
zena or penetration. Furthermore the confession, already invalid because it occurred 
out of court, did not reach the nesab (legally necessary number) of four repetitions. 
Finally, she retracted it in court, citing the interrogators’ promises of lenience which 
had led her to confess. The court, considering her failure to report her husband as 
‘facilitation of vice’, used this as evidence of adultery, though ‘facilitating zena or 
lavvat’ is a separate hadd crime, namely, qavvadi (pimping). Combining this with 
her ‘confession’ and her husband’s, the court claimed ‘elm and sentenced her to 
death by stoning for adultery.  
 
As in the previous case, the woman’s husband, as both spouses described, beat her 
violently and prostituted her for profit, and she had repeatedly left home but always 
returned because of her two children. She knew that in the event of a divorce, they 
would go to their father, thereby risking prostitution.  
 
This woman was not from a linguistic minority. Both spouses described their acts as 
necessitated by extreme poverty. The woman’s ehsan was apparently never 
investigated. It is unclear whether she had a lawyer for her initial and appeal trials. 
                                                
19 Chapter 3, sections 6.2-3; chapter 4, section 3.7. 
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When the first ruling was issued, though the majority favoured stoning, a minority 
gave a different judgement: that in accordance with articles 68 and 71 of the penal 
code, since no confession had occurred in court and the confession had been 
retracted anyway, stoning was inapplicable. It is informative to see how easily a 
stoning sentence could have been avoided if the law had been followed literally.  
 
The sentence was confirmed on appeal with very little explanation, on the basis that 
the majority judges’ ‘elm was mota‘arref (obtained by acceptable means) because it 
was based on confessions and other evidence. Two new lawyers accepted the case 
and requested an ‘extraordinary appeal’, as in case 1, citing legal flaws. 
 
Their arguments were as follows. 1) The woman had never confessed to adultery, but 
only to unspecified illicit relations. 2) The confessions occurred out of court, fewer 
than four times, only following promises of lenience (therefore ‘unintentionally’), 
and were retracted in court; therefore they were invalid. The lawyers cited a circular 
of the Judiciary, judicial precedent, and juristic opinions regarding the invalidity of 
confessions made out of court. 3) The woman’s claim of coercion (through the 
husband’s physical violence) exonerated her. 4) The judges’ ‘elm was invalid, being 
based on legally inadmissible evidence. This contravened three fundamental 
principles, namely: a) the precedence of the particular (khass), here the action of 
enkar (retraction) and the confessions’ initial invalidity, over the general (‘amm), 
represented here by the general permission of ‘elm; b) the principle of interpreting 
laws in favour of defendants20, applicable because the lenient interpretation whereby 
‘elm cannot overcome enkar or depend on invalid evidence overrides the 
unfavourable alternative that it can; and c) the prohibition against interpreting penal 
laws broadly. (This axiom is not cited in other materials available, so its precise 
meaning is unclear). The presence of clear laws invalidating certain forms of 
evidence would be meaningless if they could simply be disregarded through ‘elm. 5) 
Jurists disagree regarding whether anyone other than the Ma‘sumin (‘infallible 
innocents’, i.e. the Prophet and the Imams; singular: ma‘sum), or at least mujtahids 
                                                
20 For these two principles, see chapter 3, sections 2 and 3. See chapter 7, end of section 5, for similar 
use of ‘general and particular’. 
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(jurists authorised to interpret the sacred law), can rule by ‘elm. Some declare that 
non-ma‘sum judges must rule by confession or testimony even after personally 
seeing the crime. Many narrations describe the Prophet and the Imams refusing to 
convict without valid evidence. By using ‘elm based on invalid evidence, the judges 
employed greater discretion than the Ma‘sumin, ignoring their lenient example. 6) 
The applicability of ‘elm in zena is debatable, which is why article 99 of the penal 
code, regarding the protocol for stoning, provides regulations regarding adultery 
proven by confession or testimony, but not ‘elm21. 7) The minority ruling, which 
followed the law in a straightforward manner, undermines the inevitability of the 
majority ruling. 8) Evidence of pimping cannot prove adultery. 9) Though ehsan was 
not investigated, there were barriers to it, including prolonged marital chastity caused 
by mutual hatred, also illustrated by the woman’s multiple escape attempts. 10) If the 
woman were stoned, not only would her children be orphaned, but they would be 
forever tainted by the opprobrium of having a mother executed for adultery. 
Considering their grinding poverty and addicted, criminal and violent father, this 
would probably destroy their chances of being accepted by society and making an 
honest living, leaving them no choice but to turn to crime. Therefore the judicial 
system would, ironically, create more criminals. 
 
Unlike similar defences (except the novel invocation of pragmatism in the lawyers’ 
final argument) from earlier cases, these were successful: the sentence was 
overturned and replaced with 99 lashes following retrial. 
 
The following are the major issues raised by this case. 
 
1) Many defences used here (e.g. invalidity of unintentional confessions, marital 
disharmony removing ehsan, psychological parameters for criminal responsibility in 
prostitution) are identical to those employed in the previous cases, yet they were 
successful here and not there. This demonstrates judicial discretion, not only at the 
local level but all the way up to the Supreme Court. Some of this discretion was due 
                                                
21 Chapter 2, section 6.4. 
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to differing interpretations of codified law, but in other areas the outcome depended 
entirely on interpretations of Shi‘i law, which varied between cases. 
 
2) This case manifests the possibility, seen in earlier chapters, of confession being 
extracted through fatuous promises of lenience. This highlights the difference 
between systems which reward swift confession through ‘plea bargaining’ and those 
in which it invariably dooms the confessor. 
 
3) Ehsan was initially not investigated. Chapter 7 suggested that this may be 
common, and other adultery cases will display the same tendency. 
 
4) As in case 1, ‘elm alchemically allowed unpromising material to transcend its 
limitations, overriding various Shi‘i and codified laws and principles.  
 
5) The minority ruling represents a literal, straightforward reading of the law, 
informed by the axiom of favouring defendants. Some judges do interpret the law in 
this way. This will also surface in the minority rulings in cases 4 and 8 and the 
outcome of case 12. The common disregard, observed throughout the case studies, of 
the lenient legal elements presented in Part I of the project is therefore not inevitable.  
 
6) The combination of this and the previous two cases should constitute solid 
evidence of a mechanism whereby the unequal rights ingrained in divorce and child 
custody law can deny women control over events for which they are later prosecuted 
for adultery. This is an intersection of an institutional obstacle to lenience – those 
legal inequalities – and the vagueness of laws governing criminal responsibility. The 
attribution of self-determination in such cases depends on the judge’s choice of 
interpretation regarding free will and coercion, drawing from the wide variety of 
options in codified and uncodified scripture and Shi‘i jurisprudence.  
 
7) The lawyers’ final pragmatic argument can be classified either as an irrelevancy 
entirely unrelated to the law, or as a masterful stroke of persuasion with the potential 
to alter judicial policy. The next case will show the same concept expressed more 
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explicitly as maslahat, enabling stoning to be commuted to hanging though current 
codified law does not allow this. 
 
Case 4: commutation of stoning to hanging because of maslahat. 
East Azerbaijan, 2009-10. 
 
This case displays the possibility, opposed to the inalterability of hudud as ‘fixed 
penalties’, of overriding codified law by commuting stoning to hanging for explicitly 
pragmatic reasons. It also continues themes already observed, such as the difficulty 
of shedding ehsan by divorcing, and the discretion to disregard flaws in evidence by 
using ‘elm. 
 
The defendant was a married woman whose husband was murdered. A man was tried 
separately for the murder, but his case file is unavailable. The woman was accused of 
adultery with him, and in her documentation he is referred to as ‘murderer and 
adulterer’, implying established guilt.  
 
The woman’s first-instance ruling shows a majority opinion from three judges, and a 
minority opinion, with only one signatory. The majority opinion states that she 
confessed, leaving out how many times and whether in or out of court; it also cites a 
video, showing the accused woman engaging in carnal relations with the accused 
man. It mentions her claims that her husband had refused to copulate with her for the 
past two years. However, it dismisses this claim because it occurred at an advanced 
stage of the trial and contradicted her co-defendant’s confessions. Claiming ‘elm, it 
sentences her to be stoned for adultery, immediately commuting this to hanging 
because of the Judiciary’s recommendation that stoning not be carried out in the best 
interests (maslahat) of the nation.  
 
The minority ruling, in sharp contrast, declares that the defendant never confessed. 
Since there were also no witnesses, the minority judge considered guilt as unproven 
and recommended acquittal of adultery but possibly trial for the lesser offence of 
‘illicit relations’ if sufficient grounds existed. 
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Unfortunately, further developments of this case are unknown. 
 
The themes outlined above are displayed by the case as follows. 
 
1) There is a serious contradiction between the majority and minority opinion 
regarding whether or not the woman confessed to adultery. Her attempts to exonerate 
herself by describing her enforced chastity were apparently deemed ‘confessions’, 
again showing that incidental statements can be used as confessions (as in fornication 
case 2 and all above cases) despite the requirement for intention in confession22.  
 
2) This ruling, like many others in the case-study chapters, was based on ‘elm-e qazi. 
However, by saying that in the absence of confession or testimony the woman must 
be acquitted of zena, the minority judge implied that only these two are valid proofs 
of zena, while conceding that the available forms of evidence might potentially prove 
the lesser misdemeanour of ‘illicit relations’. It is particularly interesting that in this 
case, exceptionally, there was evidence that might constitute solid proof of zena, 
namely the video. The minority judge implicitly dismissed ‘elm outright as proof of 
zena (a position discussed in chapter 2, section 6.4), displaying the uncertain position 
of ‘elm despite its permission in codified law.  
 
3) As in the previous case and several in chapter 7, ehsan was not thoroughly 
investigated. Furthermore, the woman’s claim of enforced chastity was dismissed 
through the unorthodox argument that it was made too late in the trial. It could have 
been argued, as in cases 1 and 3, that absence, not impossibility, of copulation 
removed ehsan. However, another interpretation23 has ehsan depending on a 
husband’s access to his wife, not vice versa. Accordingly, the non-performing 
husband placed his wife under ehsan by having the ability to copulate with her even 
if he chose not to. As explained in Mir-Hosseini’s Marriage on Trial, it is difficult 
for wives to obtain divorces without their husbands’ consent24, and therefore this 
                                                
22 Penal code, article 69. 
23 See chapter 4, section 3.4. 
24 See chapter 4, section 3.5. 
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woman had little or no chance to extricate herself from the marriage that forced 
ehsan upon her without fulfilling what a different system would consider her 
conjugal rights. Her options were, essentially, chastity or death. 
 
4) This case directly displays, in court documents, the possibility of subordinating 
scriptural commandments to maslahat. Stoning is considered potentially harmful to 
‘the interests of the nation’ as an internationally decried human-rights violation25. 
However, other executions for victimless or minor crimes have been internationally 
condemned, not only stoning. Therefore the same pragmatic rationale could be used 
to reduce executions overall. Substituting stoning with hanging is as much an 
abrogation of scriptural commandments, rationalised through maslahat, as replacing 
either with flogging or incarceration. 
 
5) The defendant came from a region whose autochthonous language is unrelated to 
Persian. It is unclear whether she knew Persian; still, this is another case involving a 
member of a linguistic minority. 
 
Case 5: hanging for rape takes precedence over stoning for adultery. 
Esfahan, 2000-1. 
 
The previous case showed stoning replaced by hanging for explicitly pragmatic 
reasons. Here this was also done, but without a reason given. A married rapist was 
sentenced to hang though the codified law does not specify an execution method for 
rape and the marriage element made stoning the legally correct method if ehsan were 
established. There are two possible reasons for the substitution. Either the law was 
simply ignored, or it was interpreted as prescribing a lighter sentence for adultery 
plus rape than for adultery without rape. As in theft and sodomy cases, this would 
indicate that intensity of punishment is unrelated to harm wrought by the crime, 
depending instead on technicalities (the ‘enclosure’ in theft, explicit proof of extent 
of penetration in sodomy, and here, the law’s arbitrary assignment of a lighter 
penalty for a more harmful act). 
                                                
25 See chapter 4, section 3.7. 
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Other previously encountered themes include the belated introduction of lawyers, the 
swiftness of legal process (fornication case 1, theft case 1), and the possibility, seen 
in fornication case 2, of defendants being ‘coached’ in prison to retract confessions. 
 
According to the case file, three men, incriminated by much forensic and medical 
evidence, were arrested for kidnapping and raping a woman. They confessed out of 
court, without lawyers who were only introduced during the trial, and in three court 
sessions, corroborating the details of the woman’s account. However, in the fourth 
session they claimed instead that she had voluntarily prostituted herself to them. 
Investigations showed that she was wealthy, with a spotless record, a high income 
and very long working hours at her aunt’s business, all of which made prostitution 
unlikely. The men, appealing to the court’s mercy, retracted their new confessions in 
a later session, attributing them to other inmates’ ‘coaching’ in prison to avoid the 
death penalty by ‘denying everything’. Though they later reiterated the prostitution 
story, they were sentenced to death by hanging, though one, being married, was 
legally eligible to be stoned for adultery. The ruling was based on ‘elm-e qazi 
obtained through confessions “fulfilling the nesab (necessary number) required by 
the shar‘ and the law, and made ‘end al-hakem (before the judge)” and additional 
evidence. It was confirmed on appeal 75 days after the men’s arrest. 
 
Several issues emerge from this case. 
 
1) The swiftness of the entire process (occupying 75 days) recalls other cases 
including theft case 1 and fornication case 1. 
 
2) As in several previous cases, including theft case 1, sodomy case 2, and 
fornication case 1, lawyers were only introduced once the trial opened, and pre-trial 
confessions contributed to ‘elm. Though there was other evidence in this case, it 
substantiates fears regarding belated introduction of lawyers. 
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3) Uncharacteristically, great care was taken to indicate that confessions fulfilled the 
nesab and occurred in court. There were four confessions in court, even in four 
separate sessions, meeting the strictest requirements, though pre-trial confessions 
were also used. The accumulation of forensic and other evidence resembles that seen 
in secular courts. 
 
4) The complainant, unlike rape claimants in earlier chapters, was apparently never 
tried for zena, and article 67 (acceptability of rape claims) was cited in the ruling. 
However, like the suspects, she underwent background checks. Had her record been 
less than spotless, would this have contaminated her rape claim? 
 
5) In retracting their ‘prostitution story’, the suspects invoked the court’s mercy. Two 
also spontaneously confessed to breaking the Ramadan fast, an action unrelated to 
their charges. Perhaps these were attempts to ingratiate themselves to the court in the 
erroneous belief that honesty and collaboration would be rewarded, suggesting belief 
in the possibility of ‘plea bargaining’ (case 3 and previous chapters) when the 
opposite mechanism operates. 
 
6) In fornication case 2, the girl’s new lawyer suggested (though not in court) that 
her brothers possibly retracted their confessions of rape after being ‘coached’ in 
prison to avoid execution by retracting their confessions. This case further supports 
this possibility. 
 
7) In chapter 7, end of section 1, it was mentioned that ‘death’ for rape apparently 
overrides stoning for adultery. In theft case 4 also, death sentences were issued for 
‘rape while possessing ehsan’, but ehsan and stoning were not discussed. Here, 
similarly, one suspect was married, but ehsan, adultery or stoning were never 
mentioned. Article 98 of the penal code (zena section) decrees that punishments be 
arranged to avoid undermining each other if possible. Unlike scripture, which 
specifies sword-related punishments for rape, article 82-d merely prescribes 
‘execution’ for rape. Achieving this by stoning would have obeyed article 98. It is 
 233 
possible that, despite the insistence elsewhere on stoning as a ‘divine penalty’, it was 
simply ignored here. 
 
However, Shi‘i and codified laws, which prescribe, respectively, death by sword and 
‘execution’ (by unspecified method) for rape, do not specifically mention married 
rapists. They can therefore be interpreted as excluding stoning for rape, assigning 
adultery with rape a lighter sentence than adultery without rape. Though in this 
particular case this caused comparative leniency, it also shows that more harmful acts 
are not necessarily connected with more severe penalties.  
 
This dissociation of harm inflicted with severity of penalty was also observed in theft 
and sodomy cases, where technicalities, not harm inflicted, determined the severity 
of penalties. It was also discussed in chapter 4, section 3.3, regarding the lighter 
penalty for raping underage girls than adult women. All this illustrates an important 
difference between legal systems where crime and punishment are associated with 
harm, and a system where acts are criminal and punishable depending on scripture, 
irrespective of harm caused. 
 
Case 6: widely varying judicial opinions. 
West Azerbaijan, 1998. 
 
Ehsan and ‘elm are governed by complex, interpretable parameters, and their precise 
nature is therefore debatable. Since neither is described in detail in codified law, 
courtroom debates regarding both often draw from current interpretations of Shi‘i 
law. The interpretability of ehsan is illustrated by cases 1-4 above, and the discretion 
characterising ‘elm surfaces in cases 1, 3 and 4 and in previous chapters. This case 
displays the multiplicity of opinions that judges can produce about both of these 
concepts in the course of a single trial. 
 
According to the available documentation, the defendant in this case was arrested 
following her husband’s murder. She confessed to the police, out of court, once each 
to four instances of zena with the confessed murderer. She was thrice condemned to 
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be stoned, the ruling being overturned each time. Finally her case went before the 
General Council of the Supreme Court, which overturned the stoning sentence for 
insufficient evidence of ehsan and invalid grounds for ‘elm, but again sent it for 
retrial. Further developments are unknown. 
 
During the first trial, the woman denied zena, retracting her previous confessions, but 
was sentenced to a prison term for complicity in murder and stoning for adultery 
with her co-defendant. He was sentenced to death for murder and 99 lashes for ‘illicit 
relations’ with her. The judge, who used the man’s confessions as part of the 
evidence against the woman, therefore had ‘certainty’ (yaqin) of her adultery with a 
man who had not committed adultery with her (only ‘illicit relations’). This evokes 
fornication case 2, where the girl was sentenced to death for incest with brothers 
cleared of incest with her. Furthermore, the judge referred to ‘four confessions to 
zena’, but they were one confession each to four different instances of zena: even if 
they had occurred in court, they would not have legally proven any single instance of 
zena. Confessions to separate instances of zena were similarly conflated in 
fornication case 2. Without valid confession or testimony, the ruling implicitly, 
though not explicitly, came from ‘elm. 
 
The Supreme Court overturned the sentence because retracted confessions averted 
rajm, and ehsan, never investigated or established, was questionable since the 
woman and her husband’s ekhtelafat (discord) had brought them close to divorce. 
 
The Supreme Court, therefore, not only allowed enkar (retraction of confession) to 
override ‘elm, but also posited ehsan’s disappearance through ‘discord’. This is 
noteworthy, being the only case available where judges, as opposed to lawyers, 
affirmed a necessary emotional component of ehsan (see cases 1-3 above and chapter 
4, section 3.4). 
 
The case was retried by a second court. It listed evidence which, apart from the pre-
trial confessions, was unrelated to carnal offences. It declared that the only possible 
explanation for the defendants’ cooperation in the murder was an adulterous relation 
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between them, and that the woman’s retraction of her pre-trial confessions could be 
dismissed as an attempt to escape stoning, presumably after being ‘coached’ about 
enkar in prison (see fornication case 2 and case 5 above). It continued that the 
woman possessed ehsan because she lived with her husband. It therefore reinstated 
stoning. This ruling, like several others, always referred to the defendants as zani 
(adulterer) and zanieh (adulteress), implying the presumption of guilt. 
 
This ruling was also overturned by the Supreme Court. Its reasons were: 1) the 
evidence was mostly unrelated to zena; 2) enkar averted the hadd; 3) the woman’s 
shared residence with her husband was unrelated to ehsan, concerning which she was 
never questioned. The court emphasised ‘discord’ between spouses, which reduced 
the possibility of ehsan. 
 
The case went to a third court, where the woman responded negatively to all 
questions, including obvious ones such as whether she had ever known her husband. 
The court attributed this to being ‘coached’, while in pre-trial detention, to ‘deny 
everything’. It used this to undermine her credibility and therefore all her previous 
denials. It also noted that when asked what relationship she had with her husband, 
she responded ‘normal’, which demonstrated ehsan; therefore it condemned her to 
rajm again through article 105 (permission of ‘elm) of the penal code.  
 
The ruling, appealed again, went to the same Supreme Court branch, which again 
declared it unjustified because confession had been invalidated through retraction 
(enkar). Discerning an insoluble difference between itself and the various branches 
of the local court whence the three rulings had originated, it referred the case to the 
General Council of the Supreme Court for an authoritative opinion. 
 
The diverse positions presented by members of the General Council informatively 
portray the interpretability of several parameters of this case (and therefore many 
other zena or hadd cases). The main arenas of difference between these judges were: 
1) whether or not ‘elm trumps enkar, and even if not, whether ‘elm with additional 
proof survives enkar; 2) whether ‘elm depends on provability or instead resides only 
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in the judge’s vojdan (conscience) and nafs (self) though inexplicable to others; 3) 
what is the nature of ‘elm, and whether the Ma‘sumin’s emphasis in many narrations 
on mercy, pardon and concealment of crimes, and various lenient principles, should 
always lead the court to favour lenience over ‘elm even where tenuous doubt exists; 
and 4) the nature and proof of ehsan. The judges made much use of Shi‘i law, in the 
form of narrations, fatwas of jurists including Khomeini, and axioms including the 
qa‘edeye darr’ (‘doubt prevents punishment’) and the hudud’s basis in lenience 
(chapter 3, sections 1, 3-5).  
 
Regarding the first point, some judges insisted that ‘elm can survive enkar especially 
if confession is not the only element of ‘elm. Others insisted, quoting narrations or 
axioms (e.g. the qa‘edeye darr’) urging lenience, that enkar takes precedence, 
especially since the default is non-punishment. They added that suspects might 
confess to zena without knowing its technical definition, only realising later that their 
act was not zena. (This happened in case 9 below).  
 
Regarding the second point, both positions appeared. Staunch opponents of 
provability insisted that when personally hearing a confession, judges develop 
insights which cannot be conveyed to others because they are not based on a simple 
computation of the relative merits of evidence – and therefore judges can derive ‘elm 
even from one confession. In other words, they advocated leaving death sentences 
entirely up to judges’ inexpressible subjective impressions. This is particularly ironic 
here because none of the three judges who condemned the woman to death 
personally heard her confessions.  
 
Other judges insisted that provability is necessary to avoid excessive discretion, that 
not even the infallible Ma‘sumin acted on their presumably superior capacity for 
insight until valid fourfold confession or testimony had been heard, that they 
frequently pardoned anyway, and that the law, by requiring judges to explain the 
sources of their ‘elm, establishes provability as a necessary characteristic of ‘elm. 
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Regarding the third point, the judges’ debates were a microcosm of the different 
possible positions regarding ‘elm as discussed in chapter 2, section 6.4. Interestingly, 
those emphasising lenience and advocating restrictions on ‘elm frequently cited Shi‘i 
law, while the proponents of unfettered ‘elm did not. This implies that the scriptural 
basis for unfettered ‘elm of non-mujtahid judges is weak, and that since the codified 
law gives immense discretion regarding ‘elm, one can only counteract it by resorting 
to Shi‘i law.  
 
Some judges insisted that confessions must occur not only before the judge, but in 
four separate court sessions (a requirement absent from the codified law). Some, 
drawing attention to the term hakem-e shar‘ (a judge of the shari‘a) present in the 
codified law’s permission of ‘elm, argued that only mujtahids fully qualified (jame‘ 
al-sharayet) for judgeship, therefore not all mujtahids and certainly not non-mujtahid 
judges, can rule by their ‘elm. The aficionados of ‘elm retorted that the law could not 
possibly have been referring only to this very small group. Some judges 
characterised ‘elm as the judge’s knowledge from personally seeing a crime; others 
pointed out that since this rarely happens, this was not the law’s intention.  
 
Some judges held the three first-instance judges in this case to have confused their 
zann, probable conjecture, with ‘elm, a superior form of insight26 that was merely 
claimed but not actually obtained. Instead, the proponents of ‘elm as an inherently 
superior form of knowledge made the nebulous argument that the details of the 
crime, even those unrelated to zena, were so hair-raising that they left little doubt 
about the pair’s thoroughly immoral disposition, so they must also be adulterers. 
They also insisted that the community must be purged of such a fased (corrupt) 
person – merely positing the defendant’s fasad (corruption) without proving it.  
 
Some opposed the requirement for confession used in ‘elm to be independently valid. 
Others emphasised (similarly to the Supreme Court branches that overturned these 
rulings) that the rule whereby enkar prevents stoning should be taken at face value 
irrespective of other indications of guilt. Opponents countered that only initial 
                                                
26 Use in court of this philosophical ranking of knowledge types is discussed in sodomy case 4, 
chapter 2, section 9, and chapter 7, section 5. 
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confessions (out of court) are reliable, because they occur before the defendant has 
had a chance to be ‘coached’. (This could also apply to the right to see lawyers, who 
can ‘coach’ clients to avoid, or retract, confession). 
 
Regarding the fourth point, some judges indicated that the defendant should have 
been thoroughly questioned regarding ehsan in the manner of Ma‘ez bin Malek27, but 
was not, her answer of ‘normal’ regarding her marriage being insufficient. Other 
judges emphasised the palette of indirect ‘evidence’ of ehsan: the woman was 
married, lived with her husband, and had admitted to ‘normal’ relations with him 
(without mentioning the technicality of penetration).  
 
Finally, of the 35 members of the Council, a majority of 19 voted to overturn the 
ruling for the following reasons. 1) The ingredients of ‘elm were only invalid 
confessions plus the woman’s contradictory answers, implying fear, confusion or 
‘coaching’ and therefore guilt, during her final trial. Doubt (shobhe) remained, 
undermining punishability. Furthermore, confession – the only basis of ‘elm – was 
retracted, precluding ‘elm. 2) Shared residence and some interaction with a spouse do 
not create ehsan. 
 
This case, despite its unclear conclusion, displays practically the full spectrum of 
opinions regarding ‘elm, ehsan and the role of lenience in deciding sentences. The 
vagueness of relevant codified laws necessitates frequent use of highly interpretable 
Shi‘i concepts, giving judges considerable discretion and militating against 
uniformity of sentencing. In this case, failure to mobilise fiqh and scripture to defend 
unassailable ‘elm by non-mujtahid judges also indicates its weak position in Shi‘i 
law and therefore the possibility of undermining it in future laws. Ultimately, 
through the General Council’s ruling, the case exemplifies the potential for lenience 
and favourable ‘nitpicking’ present in both Shi‘i and codified laws. 
 
                                                
27 A man who, having confessed to adultery before the Prophet, was exhaustively questioned about all 
relevant parameters including ehsan, criminal responsibility and penetration. This exemplifies the 
Ma‘sumin’s punctiliousness regarding applicability of hudud. 
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Case 7: stoning sentence based on co-defendant’s confessions. 
Khuzestan, 2005-7. 
 
In the previous case, multiple conceptions of ‘elm confronted each other in court, 
ultimately showing how interpretable ‘elm is and how uncertain its scriptural basis. 
Here, some of the same interpretations of ‘elm appeared, and the questions were 
raised of who is allowed to use ‘elm (chapter 2, section 6.4) and indeed who is 
qualified to be a judge (chapter 2, section 3). However, the lenient interpretations 
were unable to overcome the conception of ‘elm as giving the judge unassailable 
discretion to rule by his ineffable intuitions. 
 
The individuals involved lived in an area where some tribal customs persist. The 
accused woman had entered an arranged marriage at an early age, and had only one 
child, born in the first year of her marriage. Her husband’s employment kept him far 
from home for days at a time. What both defendants’ confessions describe is that the 
woman’s husband entered his house and found the murder suspect there, talking to 
his wife. The ensuing struggle caused the husband’s death. The suspects hid the 
body, escaped, and contracted a temporary marriage. The man also pursued a divorce 
‘in absentia’ (talaq-e ghiyabi) for the woman28, to marry her permanently – he was at 
this point maintaining the pretence that her husband remained alive. 
 
The pair were tracked down and arrested. The woman, under interrogation, confessed 
to collaborating in her husband’s murder. The man, expressing repentance and 
begging for help, confessed to the murder and to zena with the woman before her 
husband’s death. The woman confessed only to carnal relations with him after their 
temporary marriage, always denying any prior physical relationship. 
 
The awlia’-e damm (victim’s heirs) requested qesas (retribution for murder), and the 
man was condemned to public execution provided that the underage heirs’ diyeh 
(blood money) portion were paid, plus 100 lashes for fornication and assorted ta‘ziri 
(lesser ‘discretionary’) penalties for acts surrounding the crime. The woman was 
                                                
28 The idea of a divorce ‘in absentia’ also appeared in case 1, suggesting some level of popular belief 
in it, and rendering the male defendant’s good faith more plausible. 
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sentenced to stoning plus ta‘ziri penalties for acts related to the murder (collusion 
and concealing evidence). The grounds for convicting them were as follows: their 
‘true confessions’ to illicit relations and zena, both ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’; the 
deceased man’s autopsy, revealing causes of death corroborating these confessions; 
and the reports produced by the investigations involving the recovery of the corpse 
and the man’s capture. It is noteworthy that the pair’s confessions were assessed as 
‘true’ before the ruling was issued, and that some of them are described as ‘implicit’, 
indicating that intentionality is irrelevant to the efficacy of confession. ‘Elm-e qazi 
was not mentioned explicitly, but article 105 of the penal code was cited. 
 
The Supreme Court confirmed the ruling, declaring that the first court had received 
‘elm of the crimes. A new lawyer took the woman’s case (further developments 
regarding the man’s case are unknown) and, as in cases 1 and 2, requested an 
extraordinary appeal based on the first ruling’s contravention of the law. The new 
lawyer’s arguments were two. 1) The woman never confessed to zena, only 
acknowledging carnal relations with the man after being widowed and contracting a 
temporary marriage with him. The only confessions to zena before the husband’s 
demise were the man’s, incriminating the woman against eqrar al-‘oqala29 (Civil 
Code article 1278, expressing the same prohibition of using one person’s confession 
against another, was not mentioned). 2) Ehsan was not investigated or even 
mentioned, despite two potential obstacles. These were: a) the woman’s husband’s 
regular long absences; and b) the fact that, in a tribal society where it was the norm 
to produce many children, the couple only had only one son, born in the first year of 
their marriage, substantiating the woman’s claims of prolonged chastity caused by 
mutual dislike. The woman, furthermore, had a ‘forced marriage’ (ezdevaj-e ejbari). 
 
The lawyer concluded that it is illegal for judges to override the laws of evidence by 
claiming ‘elm through invalid evidence. This contravenes the spirit of lenience and 
prudence embodied by the qa‘edeye darr’ and the Imams’ caution in refraining from 
applying hudud through invalid evidence. If the infallible Imams did not use their 
‘elm in the presence of incomplete evidence, how, the lawyer asked, can non-ma‘sum 
                                                
29 The principle whereby confessions only incriminate the confessor (chapter 2, section 6.1). 
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and non-mujtahid judges30 do so? If judges can override laws regarding invalid 
evidence, why do those laws exist? 
 
The Supreme Court’s Discernment Committee (which assesses eligibility for 
‘extraordinary appeals’) overturned the stoning sentence and sent the case for re-trial 
– but only on a technicality31, without addressing the lawyer’s arguments. The retrial 
court contested this technicality. Because it thereby declared the Discernment 
Committee’s judgement erroneous, the case went to another Discernment Branch of 
the Supreme Court. It overruled the technicality. Its ruling was final, and further 
developments are unknown. Therefore, the new lawyer’s extraordinary appeal, based 
entirely on the content of the case, was undermined with unappellable finality 
because of considerations related exclusively to form, while the serious flaws related 
to content were entirely ignored. 
 
The following are the major issues raised by this case. 
 
1) This is another stoning sentence using ‘elm with legally invalid grounds. The 
lawyer asked why evidence is regulated if invalid evidence can be used anyway 
through ‘elm. The decisive factor is the judge’s discretion to decide whether or not a 
piece of invalid evidence gives him insight into the crime. This is akin to saying that 
the judge’s personal discretion overrides the law. In other words, this is the opposite 
of the rule of law. 
 
Failure to favour the defendant in instances of doubt also contravenes principles of 
lenience (the lawyer cited the qa‘edeye darr’) including innocence by default, 
embodied in article 37 of the Constitution. 
 
The lawyer interestingly pointed out that the judges were neither infallible nor 
mujtahids. This refers to the debate regarding whether individuals other than the 
Ma‘sumin are allowed to rule by their ‘elm, or if they are, whether non-mujtahids can 
                                                
30 Ma‘sum (innocent, infallible) here means the Prophet and the Imams (collectively known as the 
Ma‘sumin). Mujtahids are jurists authorised to interpret the sacred law.  
31 The reason given was that the initial trial had occurred in the wrong type of court. 
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do so32. Although the position in the penal code, almost certainly lifted wholesale 
from Khomeini’s Tahrir, is that “the hakem-e shar‘ … can rule by his ‘elm”, this is 
only one of many possible positions, and neglects to define the qualifications of the 
hakem-e shar‘. The phrase indicates a judge of the shari‘a, that is, a mujtahid, and 
Khomeini’s work from which the text is taken insists that only mujtahids can be 
judges33. In other words, article 105 derives from a work which only allows 
mujtahids to use their ‘elm, but is used by non-mujtahid judges as permission to use 
their ‘elm because the phrase hakem-e shar‘, taken out of context, is applied to any 
judge. By pointing out that the codified law contravenes Shi‘i law, the attorney 
illustrated the tension between the codified law and its acknowledged origin. 
 
2) Shi‘i law was invoked – but only by the lawyer. This reflects the vagueness of the 
codified law. The judges used that vagueness to give themselves ample discretion to 
the detriment of the accused. The lawyer, unable at times to locate well-known 
principles in the law precisely because of its vagueness, could only derive them from 
Shi‘i law. The problem with this necessity to rely on Shi‘i law is that paradoxically, 
uncodified portions thereof are not legally enforceable. Therefore, everything 
depends on judges’ personal discretion, again undermining the rule of law. 
 
3) This case contains no mention of ehsan or its investigation. As in the previous 
case, the lawyer emphasised the Ma‘sumin’s punctiliousness regarding ehsan, citing 
distance and chastity (the first more frequently accepted than the second) as obstacles 
to ehsan. However, the issue of which barrier was most acceptable was rendered 
moot by the judges’ failure to pay any attention to ehsan, and the later focus on 
technicalities overshadowing content. 
 
4) The clear legal flaws in this case were ignored when confirmation of the sentence 
was allowed to depend on technicalities. Once a Discernment Branch issues its final 
ruling, this cannot be appealed except by intervention of the head of the Judiciary. 
This can be considered an inherent obstacle to lenience in the system. 
 
                                                
32 See chapter 2, section 6.4. 
33 Khomeini, p. 245, requires judges to be mujtahids. 
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5) The man’s pleas for help during confession make it possible that he believed, as in 
cases 3 and possibly 5, sodomy case 4 and theft cases 1 and 2, that cooperation 
would be rewarded. 
 
6) This woman apparently had some literacy; it is unclear whether she spoke any 
Persian. Like so many other defendants, she belonged to a linguistic minority.  
 
Case 8: are ‘illicit relations’ and ‘adultery’ two different charges? 
East Azerbaijan, 2006-10. 
 
Here, as in the previous two cases, judges’ disagreements regarding ‘elm reveal its 
interpretability and uncertain footing. ‘Elm was again based on invalid evidence 
(mostly, as in other cases, invalid confession). This case also expands on the theme 
of double jeopardy which arose in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Again, the defendant was a woman accused of adultery, possibly with the man found 
guilty of her husband’s murder and two other men, and collusion in murder. A 
particularly intriguing element is that she received 99 lashes for ‘illicit relations’ with 
the two men other than the convicted murderer, and then was tried months later for 
the apparently separate crime of adultery, apparently with no partners named, in 
connexion with some or all of the events treated in her original trial.  
 
There was no valid confession. The complainant in the adultery case was, illegally34, 
the provincial prosecutor. The judges, as in cases 3 and 4, were divided into a 
majority who condemned her to stoning through ‘elm, and a minority supporting 
acquittal. The majority cited three interrogation sessions where she confessed to 
adultery; again, we have fewer than four confessions, taken out of court, used as a 
conduit for ‘elm. The confessions of her co-accused, the men flogged earlier for 
illicit relations with her, were illegally used against her. The majority judges also 
cited the woman’s ‘severe moral degeneration’ as additional fodder for ‘elm. The 
minority judges, however, declared that there was no valid proof of adultery 
                                                
34 See chapter 3, section 4. 
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according to Shi‘i and codified law, and that the ‘elm of the majority was not 
obtained az toroq-e mota‘arref (in the commonly accepted manner), echoing the 
vague wording of article 120 of the penal code (which is in the sodomy section). 
 
Another important point raised by the minority is that the woman had already been 
flogged for illicit relations, and that since nobody can be twice tried or punished for 
the same acts (a plea known in some systems as ‘autrefois convict’), her prosecution 
was illegal.  
 
The woman’s defence lawyer pointed out that there was no valid evidence against 
her, since her confessions had occurred out of court, fewer than four times; he also 
insisted that fourfold confession to zena requires four separate trial diets. He rejected 
the co-defendants’ confession as valid evidence. He pointed out the authorities’ 
failure to ascertain the defendant’s ‘aql (sanity) and ekhtiar (free will) when taking 
her confessions – the mention of ekhtiar may indicate the unreliability of confession 
taken out of court because it can be coerced. He cast doubt on the woman’s ehsan, as 
her husband’s narcotic addiction prevented copulation35. Finally, he appealed to the 
qa‘edeye darr’36. 
 
The Supreme Court confirmed her sentence on appeal. Only the appeal 
documentation reveals that the woman had not only never confessed in court, but had 
retracted her confessions in court, denying adultery; and furthermore that she never 
confessed, whether in or out of court, to any form of carnal relationship with the man 
found guilty of her husband’s murder (as opposed to the two involved in her trial for 
illicit relations). The very fact that these two important things were never mentioned 
by the majority judges in the first-instance court starkly exemplifies their selective 
use of evidence. Also, this is an example of judges’ frequent habit of mentioning 
confessions while leaving out crucial information about them: the first-instance 
majority judges did not specify that confession occurred only three times. They never 
mentioned retraction, and glossed over the fact that all confessions occurred out of 
court and were therefore invalid. 
                                                
35 As in case 1, a husband’s addiction legally justifies divorce. 
36 The ‘axiom of removal’, whereby doubt prevents punishability (chapter 3, section 5). 
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Confirming the stoning sentence, the Supreme Court raised no counterargument 
against the lawyer’s defences, merely pronouncing the first-instance majority judges’ 
‘elm to be mota‘arref without explaining why. The woman applied for a pardon, 
whose results are unknown. 
 
The themes delineated earlier are displayed by this case as follows. 
 
1) As in several cases, ‘elm rested on invalid evidence, overcoming numerous 
objections without the judges justifying this. The evidence consisted of invalid 
confessions, co-defendant’s confessions, and the judges’ impression of the woman’s 
moral character. ‘Elm overrode all this, and also doubts regarding ehsan, with no 
justification given. Though the law provides rules for correct confession and 
testimony, invalid versions thereof can become stepping-stones for ‘elm, because this 
is not explicitly forbidden.  
 
2) The authorities’ unaccountability is displayed by their failure to address the 
lawyer’s arguments or justify confirmation of the ruling. This, as well as their 
‘crusading’ attitude observed also in chapters 5-8, is illustrated by their illegal 
prosecution of a ‘crime against chastity’ and by their behaviour surrounding the 
husband’s murder. His heirs pardoned his confessed murderer and the woman 
(convicted only of complicity, which does not carry the death penalty). Facing an 
outcry against the stoning sentence, the authorities declared that her death sentence 
was for murder (not complicity!) and that she had received no stoning sentence. The 
documents available contradict these assertions. According to article 219 of the penal 
code, whoever executes a murderer without the consent of the victim’s heirs must be 
executed for murder. This would be the authorities’ position, according to their own 
laws, if they executed this woman for murder. 
 
3) It is unclear where the minority judges found the prohibition against double 
jeopardy, as they cited no laws to support it. Complainants’ permission to appeal 
acquittals has sometimes been interpreted as prohibiting other forms of double 
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jeopardy37. If the general prohibition on double jeopardy is entirely uncodified, its 
invocation as a disembodied principle indicates that alongside the readily identifiable 
origin of the codified law, namely Shi‘i law, there is another more nebulous one: 
either common sense, or a body of uncodified principles perhaps deriving from other 
legal systems (which could also explain belief in ‘plea bargaining’ although the 
opposite mechanism operates in hudud). 
 
4) The Supreme Court’s only engagement with objections was a statement that the 
minority judges, by opposing double jeopardy, were mistakenly treating zena and 
illicit relations as the same charge. Everything depends on whether the acts initially 
called ‘illicit relations’ were the same which were later called ‘adultery’. The 
confessions of the two men tried for illicit relations with the woman were used as 
proof of her adultery, making it clear that at least some events were the same. The 
question is whether there were other events not mentioned in the first trial, and the 
unavailability of all case documents makes this unclear. This is exacerbated by the 
fact that the stoning sentence was issued not for zena with particular individuals, but 
with unnamed ‘strange men’. The judges could therefore claim that the ‘strange men’ 
were not those with whom she had illicit relations, nor the convicted murderer, with 
whom she never confessed to carnal relations. In any case, the documents available 
indicate no proof of carnal acts other than those for which she was flogged. 
 
The law38 suggests that carnal crimes exist in two variants, one with, and one without 
penetration (which narrations, not the penal code, specify must conceal the glans 
entirely) and haddi proof; and that the first subsumes the second, cancelling its 
punishment as observed in some published sodomy and zena rulings (chapters 6 and 
7). Ta‘ziri carnal crimes are presented as lesser variants – either by nature or by 
insufficient proof – of haddi carnal crimes. To wit, article 68 prescribes ta‘ziri 
flogging for zena with fewer than four confessions: the act is acknowledged as zena 
but carries a ta‘ziri penalty in this instance. Sometimes it is advantageous for ‘illicit 
relations’ to be considered a variant of zena or sodomy, because punishment 
supposedly protects convicts against double jeopardy (a norm ignored in this case). 
                                                
37 See chapter 2, section 4; chapter 6, published rulings section 7; chapter 7, section 2. 
38 See chapter 4, sections 1, 3 and 4.  
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Other times it is disadvantageous because it allows flogging of potentially innocent 
individuals even if their original (haddi) charge is unproven. 
 
5) This woman, like those in cases 1 and 2, belongs to a linguistic minority and 
spoke no Persian when arrested and tried. 
 
Case 9: coerced confession. 
East Azerbaijan, 2000-6. 
 
Information about this case comes from its court documents viewed in the presence 
of the lawyer who eventually secured the defendant’s acquittal; this lawyer also 
supplied additional information. Because I could only see the documents in the 
lawyer’s office, I do not have every detail about chronology, bureaucratic protocols 
or laws cited in the rulings. Nevertheless, the case is noteworthy because it 
corroborates accounts of forced confession, seen in so many previous cases, with a 
specific account of how confession was coerced. 
 
Like the previous case, this one displays the authorities’ ‘crusading’ attitude in 
assiduously pursuing conviction, often by exploiting the discretion offered by ‘elm. 
This appeared throughout chapters 5-8. Also notable are the social dimensions of this 
case. The small-town environment where it occurred helped to spark the prosecution 
and meant that even the judge was prejudiced against the defendant. 
 
The defendant was another illiterate woman from a linguistic minority. A neighbour 
with a grudge against her husband murdered him during her absence. The wife and 
the neighbour were arrested as suspects. The neighbour confessed to the murder, 
leading police to the hidden murder weapon. The victim’s family, convinced of the 
woman’s adultery by local gossip, promised to pardon the murderer if the woman 
were executed, but to demand his execution otherwise. Since his life depended on her 
incrimination, he claimed that they were lovers and she had instigated the murder so 
they could marry. She was charged with adultery and complicity in murder. 
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The trial was conducted in Persian, of which she understood little. According to her 
last lawyer, gossip regarding the neighbour’s frequent presence in her house had 
spread throughout their small town to the extent that the judge himself was 
prejudiced against her. She denied adultery, only describing the neighbour as a 
nuisance who made unsolicited phone-calls and visits. However, the judge, 
producing a written ‘confession’ that she could not read, affixed her fingerprint to it 
by physical coercion. A prison guard witnessed this and later testified. 
 
The woman’s court-appointed lawyers were never allowed to be alone with her, as 
they later declared in court. The police station, court and prison being physically 
close together, the judge posted sentinels throughout the complex to alert him of the 
lawyers’ approach, and imposed his representatives’ presence whenever the lawyers 
met their client.  
 
In court, the woman always denied adultery, describing the neighbour’s unwelcome 
phone-calls, visits and unsuccessful physical assault. She declared her confessions 
false and forced. However, the judge overrode this with ‘elm, using her forced, 
retracted confession, the neighbour’s confession, his frequent visits and phone-calls, 
and his description of her white undergarments and mole-covered body to claim 
‘knowledge’ of her adultery. She was sentenced to five years’ incarceration for 
complicity in murder, plus hanging for adultery. The neighbour was sentenced to 100 
lashes for fornication, plus hanging for murder. The ruling was confirmed on appeal, 
though the woman’s hanging penalty was ‘corrected’ to stoning. 
 
Before the woman’s prison term had elapsed, an execution date was set and 
preparations were made for stoning. Alerted by the woman’s relatives, Shahrudi, 
then head of the Judiciary, faxed a last-minute stay of execution to the prison. 
 
The case was transferred to another judge who found the ruling unjustified by the 
available evidence according to the qa‘edeye darr’, and enumerated the following 
flaws. The woman’s confession, according to her own statements and those of the 
prison guard, was coerced and subsequently retracted. The neighbour’s descriptions 
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of her moles and underwear were irrelevant. Moles covered her face and visible parts 
of her body, making their presence likely elsewhere; and in rural areas, all 
undergarments are white. Hence these apparently intimate revelations demonstrated 
nothing. The neighbour’s vested interest in incriminating the woman prejudiced his 
testimony39. The woman spoke almost no Persian when tried, and was confused by 
the word ‘zena’. She vaguely associated it with touching or conversation between 
unmarried partners, therefore perceiving the neighbour's unwanted attentions as 
‘zena’. Furthermore, her only description of physical contact with him involved his 
unsuccessful assault, admitting no consent on her part. Finally, the first judge had not 
convincingly described how the evidence could produce ‘elm of adultery, against the 
requirement for ‘elm to be adequately justified.  
 
The case was taken by a new lawyer. Following a new appeal, the initial ruling was 
overturned and the case was retried by a third judge who decided on acquittal. 
 
However, the woman suddenly contacted her lawyer, saying that preparations for 
stoning were under way again. The powerful first judge had delayed the final issue of 
the new judge’s acquittal. The lawyer arrived in court and refused to leave until the 
acquittal was officially issued. To placate locals who considered her guilty, the 
defendant was fined for illicit relations and released. She moved to another city, 
finding herself ostracised by the townsfolk including her children, whom her 
husband’s family had in their custody and had prejudiced against her.  
 
Again, although some bureaucratic details of this case are unclear because of limited 
access to its documentation, it illustrates important issues.  
 
1) This is a documented instance of forced confession – a possibility discussed in 
other cases. The difference is that here, an official described the coercion.  
 
2) ‘Elm again transformed an amalgam of invalid evidence into a death sentence, as 
observed throughout the case studies in this and previous chapters.  
                                                
39 Civil Code article 1313; PCCM article 155. 
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3) Ehsan, never investigated, was perhaps assumed because the woman was married. 
 
4) Personal inclinations and social dimensions were paramount in this case. The first, 
hostile judge, whose role was conflated with that of a prosecutor (discussed in theft 
case 5), almost managed to stone the woman even after his ruling was overturned and 
an acquittal drafted. He also illegally attempted to stone her before her prison term 
had elapsed. The personal inclinations of public officials, including the sympathetic 
prison guard, the new judge, and even Shahrudi, were decisive in the woman’s 
eventual release. Influenced by gossip, her husband’s family convinced the murder 
suspect to incriminate her, sparking her prosecution for adultery. Though eventually 
acquitted, she was punished to placate local opinion, and her relationship with her 
children was destroyed by the townspeople’s prejudice against her. Her illiteracy and 
limited Persian, including her unfamiliarity with the term ‘zena’ (see case 6), 
facilitated her conviction. These things show that personal inclinations can be more 
important than law in determining the outcome of a case, which can also be crucially 
influenced by social context.  
 
Case 10: mahduroldamm status and the unreliability of confession. 
West Azerbaijan, 2006-8. 
 
Similarly to the previous case, this one displays the potential importance of social 
setting in court cases. It also reintroduces the concept of mahduroldamm (‘whose 
blood is forfeit’), seen in sodomy case 3. Legally, murder in the belief, whether 
correct or not, that one’s victim was mahduroldamm through commission of a capital 
crime does not carry the death penalty (chapter 4, section 2). Here, as in sodomy case 
3, the judge overrode this law by insisting that the truth of mahduroldamm status be 
demonstrated, thereby endangering the life of the victim’s alleged partner in adultery. 
 
The events of this case are reconstructed through court documents and extensive 
information from one of the two lawyers who took it to appeal. This lawyer believes, 
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against current legislation, that confession alone is insufficient proof of guilt in 
criminal matters because it can so easily be forced. This case exemplifies that danger. 
 
According to available documentation, a fully clothed man was found dead in the 
house of the woman subsequently tried for zena, who suffered stab wounds. The 
murder victim and the woman were neighbours whose houses were within earshot of 
each other. The woman’s brother and husband readily confessed to murdering the 
victim to clear their family’s honour. According to the men’s confessions, the brother 
first saw the murder victim in his sister’s house by looking through the window. He 
fetched the husband, who worked a considerable distance away, and they obtained 
knives, entered the house and attacked the pair. However, the victim’s relatives 
declared that the commotion accompanying his murder occurred approximately ten 
or fifteen minutes after he had left home, which did not allow time for the brother to 
fetch the husband, suggesting premeditation. Also, the men’s confessions describe 
the man as naked and caught in the act of zena, but he was found fully dressed, and 
there was no medical investigation of zena. 
 
The woman said that the men had attacked her and the victim in the act of zena, and 
that her misdeeds justified the attack. A court-appointed lawyer was only introduced 
after the third session of her trial. Her confessions to zena, accompanied at least once 
by a rape claim, in four court sessions (only two with a lawyer present) were used as 
proof of adultery. Ehsan was perfunctorily established because ‘she had a husband’. 
Her rape claim was ignored, as were her statements, concurring with those of her 
brother and husband, whereby the husband worked in a different village and usually 
slept at home only two nights a week (thereby removing ehsan from his wife). The 
woman was sentenced to death by stoning. Her husband and brother were deemed 
ineligible for qesas (retribution, here meaning execution for murder) because of their 
belief in the victim’s mahduroldamm status, and even diyeh (blood money in lieu of 
qesas), because the court considered mahduroldamm status proven. 
 
Two new lawyers appealed the sentence, which was overturned. They emphasised 
the inconsistencies between the confessions, describing the man as naked in the act 
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of zena, and the fact that he was found fully clothed. They indicated that the short 
time between the man’s departure from home and his attack undermined the men’s 
account. They drew attention to the woman’s ignored rape claim, and her loss of 
ehsan through her husband’s absence. They declared that the absence of lawyers in 
all but two court sessions contravened the legal guarantees of representation and 
rendered all confessions made without lawyers automatically invalid40, leaving only 
two potentially valid confessions made in court.  
 
Finally, they introduced a new element, namely, the woman’s claim that her brother 
had forced her to confess in court. In a letter dictated from prison (she herself, as in 
several previous cases, was illiterate and belonged to a linguistic minority) she 
explained that her brother had told her to prevent his and her husband’s qesas by 
confessing to zena, thereby transforming the murder into a justifiable ‘execution’. He 
had threatened that if she did not confess to zena, she would be killed upon leaving 
prison, either by him or, if he were executed, by other relatives. She also emphasised 
her unawareness of the punishment – stoning – that she risked by confessing to zena.  
 
Because of these conditions, the lawyers argued, the woman’s confessions were 
bereft of several necessary qualities. They were made without qasd – intention to 
confess – or ekhtiar – free will – which article 69 of the penal code requires for valid 
confessions. They included a rape claim, which according to article 67 averts the 
hadd. They were now retracted, thereby losing their validity according to article 71. 
Finally, the woman declared herself unaware of the punishment for adultery, which 
exonerated her by default through article 64. 
 
Most of these arguments (rape claim, retraction, possible coercion of confession, 
possible absence of ehsan) were accepted by the Supreme Court, which overturned 
the ruling and sent the case back to the first court (another example of appeal bias) 
demanding investigation of whether the distance between the man’s workplace and 
                                                
40 Constitution articles 35 and 161; PCCM article 186, particularly note 1 emphasising the 
obligatoriety of lawyers for those accused of crimes carrying penalties of ‘qesas-e nafs, e‘dam, rajm 
or life imprisonment’. The lawyers also cite a vahdat-e ravieh (uniformity of judicial procedure) 
ruling invalidating confessions made without lawyers to crimes carrying the death penalty. 
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home constituted the masafat-e shar‘i (‘legal distance’) of four farsangs which 
removes ehsan.  
 
However, the court also indicated that if the woman were acquitted of zena, the men 
would have to pay diyeh for the victim, whose mahduroldamm status would have 
been false. Furthermore, if they had not even believed him to be mahduroldamm, 
they could be executed. The problem is that article 630 of the penal code allows a 
man to murder another whom he sees committing zena with his (the murderer’s) wife 
(and also to murder the woman if he ‘has ‘elm’ of her consent to zena), while the 
men’s arrival at the house already armed indicates that the husband had decided on 
the murder before observing the couple in flagrante. The judges argued that only a 
husband, not a brother, can make this decision after witnessing zena. However, even 
if the men’s account was true, the decision to murder the pair had been made after 
only the brother had seen zena.  
 
The law does not clarify whether murder carries the death penalty if the victim is 
later proven mahduroldamm even though the murderer(s) did not ascertain this 
properly. If the pair had been committing zena but the husband’s knowledge thereof 
was incorrectly formatted because only the brother had seen zena, could the 
murderers nevertheless escape qesas? The Supreme Court allowed for this 
possibility. Consequently the men hoped to escape qesas through the woman’s 
conviction for zena: by this rationale, either they or she should be executed. 
 
During the retrial that followed naqz (quashing) of the original ruling, the woman 
retracted all her confessions and repeated all the statements made in her letter. The 
court ascertained that the distance between her home and her husband’s place of 
work exceeded four farsangs, and therefore broke ehsan whenever the husband was 
away (as he was when the murder victim entered their home – further impugning the 
brother’s ability to fetch him in 10 or 15 minutes). However, while the trial was still 
under way, the defendant explained to her lawyers that because of her brother’s 
threats, she must reluctantly fire them, since she would rather die than face her 
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relatives’ wrath. This recalls her brother’s statement: “where we come from, people 
believe that anyone with a shred of honour should kill someone like that”.  
 
The lawyers could only obey this extorted request, but wrote a letter to Ayatollah 
Shahrudi, then head of the Judiciary, explaining the reasons against stoning her. She 
was pardoned two years later.  
 
The important themes in this case are as follows. 
 
1) Again, the defendant was an illiterate member of a linguistic minority. As in the 
previous case, additional social dimensions proved crucial. The traditional 
environment in which the defendant lived meant that she was intimidated into 
sacrificing herself to save her male relatives, under threat of being killed anyway if 
they were executed and she were not. The intimidation was potent enough that she 
fired her lawyers, preferring to be executed rather than face her relatives’ revenge. 
 
2) As mentioned already, one of the woman’s lawyers believes that confession 
(though a mainstay of proof in Shi‘i law) cannot independently prove guilt in 
criminal matters, especially when the death penalty is possible, because it can easily 
be forced or distorted through intimidation. This case exemplifies this mechanism, 
reminding us that the authorities are not the only ones that can influence confessions. 
Not only are confessions out of court unreliable because of possible unrecorded 
coercion by interrogators, but confessions in court can also be psychologically 
coerced41. There is a known case42 where a woman declared that her husband had 
been visiting her in prison, pressurising her to confess, and had her stoning sentence 
overturned by the Supreme Court. This is therefore a documented mechanism, 
acceptable to the Supreme Court as a reason to overturn a sentence. 
 
                                                
41 See Dehghan, “Iranian woman”, and Mobasherat, “Final verdict”, where a woman sentenced to be 
stoned confessed on national television and Amnesty International declared that televised confessions 
are frequently coerced. 
42 Bazgir, 230-2. 
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The lawyer’s opinion regarding confession illustrates the tension between a model 
whereby law must comply with immutable scripture, and one whereby it 
accommodates human needs. Confession as proof has strong scriptural support. If the 
authorities insist that those scriptural commandments are non-negotiable, or 
mainstream interpretations thereof are binding, then even strong objections to this 
use of confession will be fruitless. However, concepts of legal flexibility, some of 
which are acknowledged by the regime43, could potentially promote reforms. 
 
3) As in cases 3, 7 and 9 and chapter 7, section 6, ehsan was initially not 
investigated, being assumed because of marriage, though this was rectified later.  
 
The treatment of ehsan is interesting. The Supreme Court clearly prioritised the 
distance-dependent concept of the boundaries of ehsan, rather than the time-
dependent parameter of access between spouses ‘morning and night’. Neither is in 
the codified law, and both originate from Shi‘i law44, illustrating the notion that it 
underlies and supplements the codified law. The temporal parameter, with a 
comparable scriptural pedigree to the distance parameter, would have instantly 
removed ehsan without any investigation of distance. However, as observed in 
chapter 7, section 6, in none of the published rulings available is the time parameter 
used, while the phrases ‘four farsangs’ and ‘masafat-e shar‘i’ make multiple 
appearances. Usage has allowed the distance parameter to overshadow the equally 
valid time parameter.  
 
This and earlier cases’ treatment of ehsan show how malleable the concept can 
become when the law describes it vaguely and varying interpretations of Shi‘i law 
are therefore mobilised in court. It is crucial, however, that such a flexible set of 
parameters can spell the difference between stoning and flogging. 
 
4) As observed in case 1 and chapters 5 and 6, appeal bias operated: the case went 
back to the originating court for retrial, negating the ‘second opinion’ of appeal.  
 
                                                
43 See chapter 3, sections 6.2-5. 
44 See chapter 4, section 3.4. 
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5) In some cases, documentation indicates that suspects had lawyers, but not when 
they met their clients. Here, the rulings indicate that the defendant had a court-
appointed lawyer, but other documents show that the two only met at the fourth trial 
diet, after she had already confessed twice to zena in court. This demonstrates that 
suspects without lawyers risk accidentally incriminating themselves (as in previous 
cases featuring incidental ‘confessions’). It also implies that whenever a ruling does 
not mention lawyers, or specify when they appeared, they may have been absent or 
arrived belatedly. 
 
6) This case juxtaposes the men’s execution if the woman is innocent, and the 
woman’s (by stoning) if the men are to escape qesas. This mirrors the similar 
juxtaposition possible in rape cases, where this impasse can be avoided by a dual 
application of the benefit of the doubt (chapter 4, section 3.2). As in sodomy case 3, 
the law’s insistence on belief, rather than truth, of mahduroldamm status was 
overridden, endangering the woman’s life. Instead, in the next case the same law was 
applied literally, showing how judges’ discretion can lead them to interpret laws 
differently or even override them. 
 
Case 11: belief in mahduroldamm status prevents qesas. 
Esfahan, 2004. 
 
As in the previous case, zena and murder were intertwined, because the murdered 
man’s mahduroldamm status depended on zena with the murderer’s wife. Here, 
however, the law was followed literally: the man’s belief in mahduroldamm status, 
not his ascertainment thereof, protected him from qesas, without thereby 
necessitating the woman’s execution. The events of this case, reconstructed from 
court documents, are as follows. 
 
A woman and four men were arrested after lengthy investigations into a man’s 
murder. The woman and two of the men, her husband and brother, confessed under 
pre-trial interrogation; the husband also confessed during one court session. 
According to all these statements, the woman had engaged in nazdiki (intimacy) with 
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the victim during her husband’s regular long work-related absences from home. 
Penetration, zena and the glans were never mentioned. The husband, discovering the 
affair, made his wife summon the victim and murdered him in collaboration with the 
other men. 
 
The trial spanned only twenty days. In his ruling, the judge cited various laws 
regarding zena, murder, attempted murder and diyeh, without mentioning ‘elm or 
article 105. The husband’s absence during adultery, if any, meant, according to the 
judge citing article 295, note 2, of the penal code, that he could not ascertain the 
victim’s mahduroldamm status in reality; therefore diyeh remained payable (it would 
have lapsed with proof of zena). However, his belief in the victim’s mahduroldamm 
status was sufficient to undermine qesas. The husband’s absences also deprived his 
wife of ehsan during zena, reducing her penalty to 100 lashes. She and the two men 
who never confessed (and whose denials the judge dismissed as ‘irrelevant’) also 
received prison terms, as did the husband for the ‘public disorder aspect’ of the 
murder45. The grounds for these sentences were given as the confessions of the 
woman, her husband and her brother, the victim’s autopsy, and his friends’ and 
workmates’ statements. Appeal status is unknown. 
 
The main issues raised by this case are as follows. 
 
1) Although ‘elm was neither directly nor indirectly mentioned, only the husband 
was found guilty by legal means, namely, one confession in court (sufficient to prove 
murder). The wife was convicted because of her confessions out of court and her 
husband’s and brother’s confessions; her brother, through his confessions out of 
court and the others’ confessions; and the other two men were incriminated 
exclusively by co-defendants’ confessions. All physical proof being related to 
murder, the only evidence with any plausible ability to prove zena was the wife’s 
confession, which occurred once, out of court, describing consent but not penetration 
of the glans. Instead, in some published rape and sodomy rulings (chapters 6 and 7), 
                                                
45 Penal code article 612, contravening the haqq al-nas (‘the right of humans’; see chapter 2, section 
8) nature of murder. 
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failure to mention the glans explicitly overrode substantial amounts of evidence far 
exceeding the proof of zena in this case. 
 
2) However, claims of physical separation were easily accepted as removing ehsan, 
and the woman was at least cursorily questioned regarding consent to zena.  
 
3) The swiftness of the trial recalls theft case 1, fornication case 1 and case 5 above. 
 
4) The husband’s belief in the victim’s mahduroldamm status undermined qesas, 
although he never claimed to have seen zena. This contrasts with sodomy case 3 and 
the previous case, where truth, not belief, was deemed necessary to counteract qesas. 
 
Case 12: a straightforward acquittal. 
Tehran, 2006-7. 
 
Many foregoing cases, in this and previous chapters, show how failure to apply the 
law literally facilitates conviction. In this chapter, cases 3 and 6, and regarding ehsan 
and mahduroldamm status, the previous case, display the potential for lenience 
offered by the law. This case demonstrates how the straightforward use of legal 
strictures regulating evidence, particularly confession, without incorporation into 
arbitrary ‘elm can easily prevent irreversible hadd penalties.  
 
The defendants were not members of linguistic minorities. 
 
According to the court documents and the accused woman’s two defending lawyers, 
a man reported his wife and her alleged lover to the authorities. Both were 
interrogated. The woman made detailed confessions, describing intimate parts of the 
man’s body; he denied everything. Both were tried, and represented by two 
competent lawyers. The woman retracted her confessions in court. The judges, 
declaring insufficient grounds for ‘elm, acquitted the pair. Their reasons were: the 
woman’s retraction of her confessions, which averted the hadd irrespective of the 
detail presented; the man’s denial; and the asl-e bara’at (presumption of innocence). 
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The woman’s husband appealed the acquittal, which the Supreme Court confirmed. 
To the first court’s reasons for acquittal they added the motive behind the woman’s 
confession, apparently caused by pangs of conscience. This implies the scripturally 
supported idea that confession demonstrates repentance46, rarely seen in court files.  
 
These are the salient issues of this case. 
 
1) The woman’s detailed confessions and additional, verifiable evidence might have 
yielded ‘elm, but did not, showing how easy acquittal can be if the law is followed 
literally and the vagueness of the ‘elm laws is not used to contravene other laws. 
 
2) The Supreme Court judges mentioned the woman’s motives for confessing as 
being relevant to her acquittal. Even relatively obscure scriptural concepts may 
resonate with judges. 
 
3) Both rulings in this case mention no laws apart from one procedural regulation. 
Concepts, not laws, are cited. The judges ruled according to known concepts of Shi‘i 
law, showing its independent authority in court. 
 
Case 13: a straightforward stoning sentence. 
East Azerbaijan, 2008-9. 
 
The main relevance of this case is to show that although straightforward use of 
lenient laws can easily produce acquittal, as in the previous case, nevertheless the 
law does allow stoning provided that certain conditions are met. In most cases 
analysed, execution or amputation sentences were only possible because the law was 
misused. However, as in this case, legal conditions may occasionally be fulfilled, and 
if this happens, irreversible hudud can be unavoidable (recall theft case 1). 
 
                                                
46 See chapter 2, section 9. 
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According to the available documentation, the defendants, a man and a woman 
married to each other, confessed in court more than the required four times. The 
woman confessed to prostitution motivated by extreme poverty. CDs of ‘obscene 
films’, apparently made by the husband in desperate pursuit of income, were used as 
additional proof. The couple’s ehsan was presumed because they were married and 
living together, and they were sentenced to stoning for adultery. The man was also 
sentenced to hang for sodomy, to which he had confessed in connexion with an 
episode of attempted extortion, again motivated by poverty. The ruling was officially 
based on ‘elm, and cited article 105, despite the valid confessions; possibly ‘elm was 
used to accommodate the additional evidence represented by the ‘obscene films’.  
 
The sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court on the basis that confessions in 
court exceeded the necessary four and the CDs provided additional evidence 
permitting ‘elm. The man was executed the same year, but it is unclear whether by 
hanging or stoning. Possibly hanging for sodomy was allowed to override stoning for 
adultery, as in case 5 with rape, though the codified law gives the judge discretion 
regarding execution methods for sodomy, and stoning is one of the scriptural 
punishments for it. Hanging possibly accorded better with maslahat, as discussed in 
case 4. Perhaps only the man was executed because his sodomy charge provided the 
alternative of hanging. 
 
The court documents never mention ikrah, although the couple’s activities were 
apparently prompted by desperate poverty. Need prevents the hadd for theft and, 
according to a famous narration, potentially for zena also47. It could have been 
argued that the pair’s illicit acts were performed under conditions of ikrah or distress, 
because their attempts to gain lawful income had all been thwarted. They lived 
without electricity or running water, owed ruinous amounts of money from failed 
attempts to make a living, and had no reliable method of obtaining food. 
 
This case demonstrates that stoning is legally enforceable as long as its requirements 
are met. Ikrah and ezterar, caused by poverty, were arguably present; this can be 
                                                
47 See chapter 2, section 7.3 (Ali acquitting a thirsty woman of zena committed to obtain water). 
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considered a legal flaw. However, the common legal flaws regarding evidence were 
absent, and therefore one can imagine instances where both flaws are missing. If, as 
in this case, defendants confess four times in court and possess ehsan, there is little 
recourse against their execution. 
 
No matter how frequently irreversible hadd penalties can be avoided by manipulating 
opportunities for leniency, their presence in the law means that they sometimes 
cannot be argued away. This can therefore be deemed a fundamental obstacle to 




These adultery cases reveal some issues already encountered in previous chapters 
and introduce new mechanisms. All of these combine with themes observed in 
previous chapters to consolidate the impression of major tendencies characterising 
the application of hudud in Iran.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, throughout the case-study chapters, and at the beginning 
of this chapter, four general patterns traverse the case studies. One is that the law’s 
considerable interpretability allows a high degree of judicial discretion. This occurs 
to a great extent because the codified law is vague, necessitating recourse to the 
underlying, but eminently interpretable, Shi‘i law. It also reveals that the discussion 
about how scripture and fiqh should be represented in codified law and thereafter 
interpreted, so prevalent among jurists as observed in Part I, also involves judges and 
lawyers who can use quite divergent interpretations. Another pattern is that judges 
often contravene laws outright, often, though not always, using ‘elm to facilitate this. 
A third mechanism is that social dimensions can often influence, or be revealed by, 
the development of these cases. Finally, the trials analysed show that under all the 
layers of interpretability, there are portions of the law which clearly oppose lenience. 
These can only be removed by radical reforms challenging the position whereby 
immutable scriptural commandments (and/or established interpretations thereof) 
override human requirements.  
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The themes found in these cases coalesce into the four broader patterns as follows – 
bearing in mind that these patterns are interlocking, and some mechanisms in the 
cases affect more than one of these. 
 
Interpretability and judicial discretion. 
 
Some areas of the codified law are so vague that they are open to a wide variety of 
interpretations or necessitate reference to Shi‘i law to make sense of them. This 
means that sometimes the courtroom debates about certain elements of a case will 
occur almost entirely in the arena of uncodified Shi‘i law. In these adultery cases, 
this was observed through judges’ and lawyers’ discussions concerning the 
parameters of penetration, ‘elm, ehsan, ikrah (coercion) or ezterar (distress), and 
criminal responsibility intersecting with awareness, intention, and various gradations 
of coercion. The discussion of ‘elm revealed its uncertain scriptural footing, in view 
of doubts about its use by ordinary judges and narrations limiting ‘elm to the 
Ma‘sumin or displaying the Prophet and Imams’ lenience. However, the use of ‘elm 
in this and previous case-study chapters revealed the almost unlimited discretion 
which some judges insist it gives them. 
 
The uncertainty of many parameters meant that sometimes radically different 
sentences were issued in cases with very similar circumstances. Minority rulings also 
showed how easy a lenient sentence would have been if the law had been deployed 
literally. In case 12, the evidence could have been used for ‘elm as in other cases but 
was not; the minority rulings in cases 3, 4 and 8 show the lenience promoted by 
straightforward uses of codified law; and cases 2 and 3 had almost identical 
circumstances but opposite results (though the defendant in case 2 was eventually 
pardoned). Invalid confession was routinely used, but occasionally (as in case 5) 
great care was taken to follow its regulations carefully. In most cases, a literal 
application of the codified law would have produced lenience, but ‘elm and judges’ 





Disregard for the laws of evidence, particularly confession, was common throughout 
the cases, and many featured failure to investigate ehsan, which can determine 
whether the defendant lives or dies. As in previous chapters, the authorities 
sometimes adopted a ‘crusading’ attitude which led them not only to illegally 
prosecute crimes ‘against chastity’ without complainants, but to contravene laws in 
their quest for conviction (e.g. in cases 8 and 9). Judges’ discretion is also displayed 
in their differing treatment of mahduroldamm status in sodomy case 3 and adultery 
case 10 compared to adultery case 11: where they contravened the letter of the law, 
this resulted in death sentences.  
 
Several defendants in the sample spoke no Persian, yet were tried without 
interpreters. This not only facilitated conviction but contravened the law48. 
 
Disregard for laws is apparently common outside criminal trials too: for example, the 
defendant in case 1 was denied a divorce despite legal grounds for it, resulting in 
stoning sentences for two people. This agrees with Mir-Hosseini’s findings in 
Marriage on Trial about judges’ discretion in divorce trials, sometimes leading to 
theoretical rights being overlooked. 
 
‘Elm, whose scriptural pedigree is shaky as discussed above, was often a tool for 
contravening laws, particularly those governing evidence. 
 
An interesting legal infraction is the substitution of hanging for stoning. Though in 
case 5 it possibly indicated a legal interpretation rather than disregard for laws, in 
cases 3 and 4 maslahat, meaning here ‘state interests’, was cited as justification for 
ignoring the scriptural penalty of stoning which has elsewhere been so vigorously 
defended precisely because of its scriptural origin (chapter 2, section 5.3; chapter 4, 
section 3.7). This is a precedent which could radically favour lenience even by 
                                                
48 Nine-article “Law concerning the translation of statements and documents in trials and offices”, 
ratified on 10 June 1937 but still in force, following several post-revolutionary amendments. 
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eliminating irreversible hadd penalties altogether while maintaining an ostensible 




The social setting of cases 9, 10 and 13 clearly affected the legal process. In case 9, 
the small-town environment allowed gossip to influence the initiation of prosecution 
and the judge’s pursuit of conviction, also displaying the arbitrary power that 
officials can have in a small community. In case 10, concepts of family honour and 
revenge led the defendant to make false confessions. In case 13, illegal activity was 
motivated by extreme poverty, and the defendants’ inability to find alternative modes 
of survival suggests possible inefficiencies in the welfare system49, though judicial 
discretion (as above) meant that this was not considered ‘coercion’ or ‘distress’, 
which remove criminal responsibility. Also suggesting problems with poverty relief, 
cases 2 and 3 combine with fornication case 2 to display the interaction of narcotic 
addiction, poverty, family abuse and prostitution. The forcibly prostituted women, 
prosecuted as if independently responsible for their ‘misdeeds’, were in the grip of 
deep-rooted social forces which they could not control. 
 
It is documented that poverty and the proximity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, having 
porous and lawless borders with Iran, have facilitated the spread of two intertwined 
problems in Iran: prostitution and addiction to narcotics (especially heroin and 
opium, which are widespread among the poor and in prisons, such that most Iranian 
AIDS cases are caused by sharing infected heroin needles). Studies have suggested 
that narcotics and poverty are overwhelmingly responsible for prostitution and that 
90% of prostitutes in Iran suffer from psychological infirmities often caused by 
abusive families – as observed in cases in this and the previous chapter. A 
reformulation of prostitution not as a crime but as a social problem deriving from 
poverty, narcotics and abuse, with prostitutes recast as ‘victims’ to be rehabilitated 
rather than ‘sinners’ to be punished, would reduce death sentences. To some extent 
this change from ‘sinner’ to ‘victim’ is observed in the authorities’ attitude to drug 
                                                
49 Payvand, “Iran’s Ministry”; Maleki, 3, 20-1. 
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addicts and HIV-positive individuals through recent programmes for their 
rehabilitation and containment of the AIDS epidemic50. 
 
Another social dimension revealed by these cases is the disproportionate 
representation of members of linguistic minorities, often illiterate, among stoning 
convicts. Limited availability of materials precludes investigation into whether this 
indicates a greater national tendency. However, seven of the nine available stoning 
(and 11 death) sentences for adultery originate from the two Azari provinces. The 
presence of so many stoning sentences from the same area may indicate a cultural or 
personal bias. Furthermore, illiteracy often correlates with poverty, which may not 
only facilitate illegal activity but also reduce undereducated people’s ability to 
defend themselves in court.  
 
Institutional obstacles to lenience. 
 
This sample of adultery cases displays institutional obstacles to lenience also 
observed in previous chapters. These include appeal bias (appealed cases tried twice 
by the same court), the phenomenon of ‘reverse plea bargaining’ whereby suspects 
may confess in the erroneous belief that this will help them, brief trials, double 
jeopardy, and belated introduction of lawyers, facilitated by the Constitution’s failure 
to specify when they must be provided. Double jeopardy, as in published sodomy 
and zena rulings, took the additional form of allowing multiple convictions (case 8) 
for the same acts under different names. These things could occur because the law, 
while permitting complainants to appeal acquittals, does not explicitly prohibit other 
forms of double jeopardy or multiple convictions for the same acts re-categorised 
with different names. 
 
Also surfacing in all case study chapters was ‘elm, which, only vaguely defined in 
the codified law, allowed judges the option of upending the entire structure of 
defendants’ legal safeguards, being frequently used as licence to contravene 
                                                
50 Nobahar, “Qachaq”, 204-6, 216-7; Samgiss, 68-73; Navai, 83-7; Kusha, 223-9; Abu-Raddad et al, 
119-26, 202; Keddie, 289; personal communication with HIV researchers at Shiraz University of 
Medical Sciences and Gerash HIV and Hepatitis Research Centre, November 2007. 
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practically any law. The permission of ‘elm in the law, especially to issue death and 
amputation penalties, can be construed as a fundamental obstacle to lenience. If 
alternative scriptural readings were codified, ‘elm could be circumscribed or even 
forbidden to ordinary judges (chapter 2, section 6.4). 
 
An additional institutional obstacle appeared in case 7, where technicalities diverted 
the case into a stage of irremediable finality despite multiple legal flaws which were 
not addressed. 
 
Case 10 raised the issue that confession may be inherently unreliable because it can 
be coerced not only by the authorities, but by other agencies including relatives. This 
recalls sodomy case 4, where testimony was possibly the result either of coercion or 
of conspiracy resulting from a private grudge. Allowing death or amputation 
sentences to depend entirely on these easily manipulated forms of evidence can be 
characterised as another inherent obstacle to lenience in the system. 
 
Cases 1-3 revealed a web of inequalities entrenched in the law. Women who were 
legally incapable of escaping their marriages, and who would in any case have had to 
abandon their children with abusive husbands, had little choice but to submit to 
enforced prostitution. However, other parts of the law, severely interpreted by 
judges, condemned them as if they had had full control over their actions, and 
consequently, criminal responsibility. Those inescapable marriages also placed them 
under ehsan, making their enforced ‘misdeeds’ punishable by death. (This becomes 
even more noteworthy considering interpretations of ehsan hinging on unilateral 
male conjugal rights: a woman can be placed under ehsan by a husband who does 
not, but could, copulate with her, and who can also take multiple wives51). If one 
factors in the prevalence of forced marriage, often early in life52, one can readily 
understand that some women have precisely no control over the events leading to 
their death sentences, and that the law perpetuates this to a large extent. 
                                                
51 Explained in chapter 4, section 3.4. 
52 Samgiss, 70-1; lawyers’ letter to Shahrudi, October 2006. Civil Code articles 1064 and 1070 make 
the validity of marriage dependent upon consent, but the right to annul vitiated marriages lapses if not 
immediately invoked (chapter 4, section 3.5). This too penalises undereducated women (as many of 
the defendants were in this sample). 
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The most fundamental obstacle to lenience regarding these irreversible hadd 
penalties is of course that they exist in the law. As demonstrated by case 13, though 
most stoning convictions can be argued away by pointing out legal flaws, especially 
the routine disregard for the laws of evidence, there can always be cases where the 
legal conditions, no matter how stringent, are met. In such cases it is nigh impossible 
to argue the penalties away. In case 13 as in theft case 1, there were perhaps legal 
flaws unrelated to evidence: the insufficiently protective ‘enclosure’ in theft case 1, 
and the diminution of criminal responsibility caused by poverty in case 13. However, 
the more commonly disregarded evidence protocols were followed. If a person freely 
undertook an extramarital affair and then, tormented by conscience, confessed four 
times to adultery in court, stoning might be legally unavoidable for that person. 
 
Considering this matter alongside case 5, one can discern an important issue. In case 
5, as in some published zena rulings in chapter 7, hanging for rape took precedence 
over stoning for adultery, though marriage made stoning a possibility. If this means 
that adultery plus rape has a lighter penalty than adultery minus rape, this indicates 
that harm wrought on other parties is unconnected to severity of punishment. This is 
further highlighted by the fact that in cases of coerced prostitution, the ‘victims’ of 
adultery, the husbands, had enforced the adultery, which was punished not because it 
harmed these ‘willing victims’ (indeed it provided them with financial support) but 
because it contravened the authorities’ interpretations of Shi‘i law.  
 
What all this means is that the law institutionalises irreversible penalties not in 
response to a rationale whereby harm correlates with punishment, but in deference to 
interpretations of scripture, sometimes displaying more lenience for more harmful 
than for less harmful acts. As with the lighter penalty for rape of underage girls than 
adult women (chapter 4, section 3.3; chapter 7, section 7), which some jurists 
powerlessly decry as perverse, this displays the difficulties in deriving laws from 






Hudud (singular: hadd; literally, ‘boundaries’) are ‘non-negotiable Islamic penalties’ 
for certain crimes. Some hadd crimes carry death or amputation penalties, and these 
are here termed ‘irreversible’ because they prevent the condemned from resuming 
their previous lives. This project was originally prompted by the question of how 
individuals tried in Iran for crimes carrying irreversible hadd penalties might 
preserve their lives or limbs by avoiding those penalties.  
 
To address this question, Part I (chapters 2-4) of the project presented a previously 
unavailable ‘compendium’ of relevant Iranian laws and contemporary Iranian legal 
specialists’ understanding of their Shi‘i origins, in whose light they can be 
interpreted or even modified. Part II (chapters 5-9) analysed recent Iranian trials for 
theft, sodomy, fornication and adultery, showing how the theory of Part I is 
interpreted and applied. By providing a detailed account of how hadd laws are 
conceived by the Iranian legal community (jurists, judges and lawyers) today, and 
through a systematic analysis of primary sources, notably court documents, the 
project attempted to fill a gap in the study of Iranian law. 
 
Severely limited access to materials (chapter 1, section 3) hindered a statistical 
analysis of the frequency of these penalties or the prevalence of any given legal 
mechanism. This is because criminal court files are not available freely in Iran. 
 
However, the available materials allowed some insight into what Iranian hadd laws 
are, how the contemporary legal community interprets them and their Shi‘i origins, 
and how in several instances they have been applied, and often reinterpreted, in 
court. Despite the limitations of source materials, the patterns revealed by the case 
studies became credible because they appeared repeatedly and were often traceable 
to assorted scholarly interpretations of laws described in Part I. These patterns fell 
into four major categories. 
 
 270 
The first is that the law is highly interpretable. This is observed through the multiple 
interpretations presented in Part I, displaying a lively scholarly debate regarding 
some topics. It may even affect legislators, as illustrated by the differences between 
the 1991/96 penal code and its proposed replacements, the penal code bill and the 
2012 penal code, and in the occasional amendment such as the conditional award of 
custody to mothers or the introduction of female assistant judges (chapter 2, section 
3; chapter 4, section 3.5). Interpretability resurfaces through the immense judicial 
discretion seen in Part II. To a large extent this interpretability is due to the fact that 
two legal systems operate simultaneously: Iranian codified law, and Shi‘i law, its 
ostensible origin, as understood by the Iranian legal community (chapter 2, section 
1). As observed throughout the project, this means that not only can lacunae in the 
often vague codified law be filled by referring to Shi‘i law, but sometimes the two 
systems come into conflict when scholars, lawyers or judges appeal to portions of 
Shi‘i law which appear to confound analogous parts of the codified law. However, 
both systems are sufficiently fluid to allow the widely varying interpretations 
observed in the case studies even when only one system is being used. 
 
The second pattern is that judges and other judicial authorities often contravene laws 
outright. This happens even for very explicit laws. 
 
The third pattern is that socioeconomic factors can affect, or be revealed by, hadd 
prosecution. This is manifested in various ways, ranging from judges’ anti-female 
bias, to the criminogenic effects of poverty or narcotic addiction, to the apparently 
high incidence of stoning sentences against illiterate members of ethno-linguistic 
minorities. Socioeconomic factors do not appear in all cases, but where they do, they 
seem to represent a notable characteristic of the system. 
 
The fourth pattern is that the legal system contains institutionalised obstacles to 
lenience. Some are procedural: for instance, double jeopardy is not clearly forbidden, 
there is uncertainty regarding when suspects must be provided with lawyers, and 
appeals can go twice to the same court, negating the ‘second opinion’ quality of an 
appeal. Others consolidate inequalities. These include marriage, divorce and child 
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custody laws which give women inferior rights and may force them into illegal acts; 
the definition of rape as ‘zena (fornication/adultery) plus coercion’, rendering rape 
claimants prosecutable if they cannot prove coercion; and the punishment of 
‘illegitimate’ children. Some, not all, of these obstacles have scriptural origins, 
making them difficult to abrogate without compromising the currently dominant 
view of scriptural immutability (chapter 1, section 5.5). 
 
Though a reliable statistical analysis was impossible, some inkling of patterns 
regarding incidence of penalties emerged from a combined study of unpublished 
court documents and published rulings. Since the question ‘how often do these 
penalties occur’ is among the first posed to me about this research, I shall begin this 
final summary by presenting, in section 1, these tentative patterns about incidence. 
 
Thereafter the four major patterns outlined above will be discussed, in sections 2-5, 
through representative examples from the ‘micro-patterns’ which emerged 
throughout the project. The minutiae of the cases analysed combined to yield these 
four broader patterns. Because of the large number of ‘micro-patterns’, not all can be 
recounted here, but some examples will show how the greater patterns emerge. 
 
Some of the micro-patterns cross boundaries. For example, ‘elm-e qazi, the ‘judge’s 
knowledge’ (chapter 2, section 6.4) which the law allows as grounds for conviction 
without defining or regulating it, manifests itself as a vague transfer from Shi‘i to 
codified law (pattern 1), allowing discretion, but also as a tool to contravene laws 
(pattern 2), thereby constituting a formidable obstacle to leniency (pattern 4). 
 
1. The incidence of irreversible hadd penalties. 
 
Though some unpublished cases, including all theft cases, came from courts directly, 
several were harvested from prisons (chapter 1, section 2), potentially over-
representing how easily hadd prosecution can lead to death sentences.  
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The 166 published rulings analysed may show a more reliable pattern. Half the 
sodomy and zena rulings contain death sentences issued by first-instance courts, but 
most of these were overturned on appeal by the Supreme Court. This is particularly 
visible in stoning sentences: they account for half the death sentences in the sample 
of 121 zena rulings, but two thirds of them were overturned on appeal. This suggests 
considerably greater lenience by the Supreme Court than first-instance courts. 
However, since overturned sentences are retried by another first-instance court, this 
possible greater lenience may be subsequently cancelled out. It is unclear whether 
this happened in the cases represented by published rulings, because retrial results 
were usually unknown. 
 
As for theft, none of the published theft rulings contain amputation sentences, mostly 
because collaboration in theft was held to remove a necessary condition for 
amputation: that the thief must have broken into the ‘enclosure’ (herz) surrounding 
the goods, and also removed them. Collaboration meant that it was uncertain whether 
one participant had performed both actions. This also happened in theft cases 4 and 
5, where collaboration instantly removed eligibility for amputation without further 
investigation, suggesting that courts may frequently be lenient in this regard. The 
judge in theft case 2 referred to the Supreme Court’s ‘tendency’ to overturn 
amputation sentences, which combines with the proportion of overturned published 
execution sentences to suggest possible comparative leniency by the Supreme Court. 
 
Nevertheless, in three unpublished theft cases judges insisted on amputation, and in 
one, it was implemented. Chapters 6, 8 and 9 show several confirmed death 
sentences, of which some were implemented. Reports of irreversible hadd 
implementation are rare, the Supreme Court may overturn most such sentences, and 
even first-instance courts may frequently avoid irreversible hadd sentences (as in 
theft cases 4 and 5). Still, the presence of several such sentences, some implemented, 




2. Legal interpretability and judicial discretion. 
 
Despite the principle of ‘no crime without law’ (chapter 2, section 2), Shi‘i law not 
only forms the theoretical basis of codified hadd law, but is viewed as the 
authoritative law (chapter 2, section 1). Therefore, as observed throughout the 
project, scholars and even legislators engage in extensive debate about how Shi‘i 
concepts should be interpreted and codified. The case studies show that Shi‘i law 
may supplement unclear codified laws, or even be used independently in court1. 
 
Furthermore, both Shi‘i and codified law are highly interpretable, the first because it 
involves differing readings of scriptural texts which are themselves interpretable, 
numerous and sometimes apparently contradictory, and the second because it is 
frequently vague and overly brief. (This suggests that it is a ‘shorthand’ for Shi‘i 
law). Therefore, contending interpretations can appear even when only one system is 
being used.  
 
In several cases, parameters determining the applicability of death or hand 
amputation were so vaguely defined in the codified law that courtroom debates about 
them occurred mostly in the arena of Shi‘i law. For example, in theft cases, the 
parameter of the herz (enclosure) whence goods must be stolen to activate the 
amputation penalty, and similarly what constituted removal of goods from the herz 
and when theft was ‘established’, removing the ability of repentance or pardon to 
prevent amputation, were subject to complex discussion during trials. Different 
judges’ interpretations of these crucial parameters varied greatly, and uncodified 
elements, for example Khomeini’s treatise of Shi‘i law Tahrir al-Vasileh, were 
mobilised in court. In adultery cases, ehsan, the condition of being married and 
having ‘access’ to one’s spouse, was similarly debated on the basis of differing 
interpretations of Shi‘i sources because it is only perfunctorily defined in the penal 
code. This meant that eligibility for stoning (which ehsan determines) depended on 
                                                
1 Mir-Hosseini’s Marriage on Trial likewise found codified and Shi‘i law operating in parallel in 
Iranian divorce cases. For example, on pp. 183-90, interpretations from Shi‘i law were crucial in 
determining whether a marriage remained in force. 
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judges’ choice of what uncodified material to use as the basis of their sentences, and 
how to interpret that material.  
 
Similarly, what constitutes ikrah (coercion) or ezterar (distress), which remove 
criminal responsibility according to Shi‘i sources (chapter 2, section 7.3), is not 
clearly explained in current codified law. Therefore such factors as narcotic 
addiction, psychiatric problems, extreme poverty, abusive families, and blackmail 
(for example in adultery cases 2 and 3 where mothers submitted to prostitution to 
protect their children from a similar fate) were overlooked in several cases when 
assessing criminal responsibility and therefore punishability. Many of these pressures 
would have easily fit into the definition of ‘distress’, which current codified law does 
not explicitly apply to hudud. The interpretability surrounding distress is further 
illustrated by the fact that though it is omitted from the hadd articles of the 1991/96 
and 2012 penal codes, the penal code bill cites distress as a remover of criminal 
responsibility in all hudud. 
 
‘Elm-e qazi, the judge’s ‘knowledge’ which allows him to convict, emerges 
throughout the case studies as probably the greatest obstacle to lenience in hudud. 
The codified law mentions it briefly, without describing, regulating or limiting it. 
Consequently judges use it with utmost discretion, interpreting it in many cases as 
licence to disregard legal strictures including those governing evidence. Several, 
even Supreme Court judges, characterise ‘elm as ineffable intuition which resides 
only in the judge’s mind and therefore cannot be questioned by anyone. (For 
example, see theft case 3 and an extract from its documentation in Appendix 1). 
However, this interpretation of ‘elm is only tenuously connected to scripture, which 
can readily be construed as limiting it to the infallible Imams or at most their 
representative (according to the regime’s doctrine, this is the Leader of the Islamic 
Republic, currently Ali Khamenei). This is why the case studies are replete with 
conflicting interpretations regarding ‘elm, its nature, and sometimes (as in adultery 
case 6), whether it applies at all. Lenient interpretations could have been used to limit 
‘elm in new laws, but the 2012 penal code fails to do this and instead potentiates ‘elm 
(chapter 2, section 6.4). 
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Shi‘i concepts treated as crucial in some cases, though uncodified, were ignored in 
other comparable cases as an effect of ‘elm. This was combined with great variation 
in the use of evidence. For example, the extent of penetration determines eligibility 
for the death penalty in sodomy and adultery according to narrations but not the 
penal code. Judicial discretion meant that in some (particularly sodomy) cases, both 
published and unpublished, there existed medical evidence of penetration, detailed 
confessions to penetration, or both, but the judge ruled against execution because it 
could not be proven that the extent of that penetration had been sufficient. Here, 
uncodified narrations overrode medical evidence or the codified norms for 
confession. In other cases, medical evidence did not prove penetration and suspects 
denied it, but judges claimed ‘elm, even going so far as to declare knowledge of the 
full extent of penetration, because the absence of medical evidence could not 
disprove penetration. Personal discretion overrode both codified and Shi‘i law. 
 
The discretion permitted by ‘elm promoted uncertainty even independently of 
whether Shi‘i sources were being used. For example, the codified norms governing 
proof were overridden by ‘elm in some cases and not in others.  
 
The common thread linking all these individual mechanisms is that they are evidence 
of a system in which personal discretion is paramount in determining whether 
defendants will be condemned to death or hand amputation. The fluidity of the 
system and consequent unpredictability of rulings and influence of extra-legal 
elements recalls Mir-Hosseini’s findings2 in her study of Iranian divorce cases, 
Marriage on Trial. As in that study, in criminal cases too the judge’s subjective 
impression of defendants was found to be crucial to sentencing. This was displayed 
for example in cases where judges and other authorities adopted a ‘crusading’ 
attitude against perceived ‘vice’, negating the judge’s role as an impartial arbiter. For 
instance, in theft cases 2 and 3, sodomy case 4, both fornication cases, and adultery 
                                                
2 For instance, on pp. 67-71, two cases are compared to show how important judicial discretion is in 
determining what constitutes ‘harm’, which legally justifies a divorce. The first divorce petition, citing 
regular physical maltreatment, was rejected partly on the basis of a Shi‘i narration. Instead, in the 
second case the judge accepted that the wife’s being made to work in a restaurant abroad constituted 
‘harm’, and granted the divorce. The previous footnote gives another pertinent example. 
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cases 8 and 9 as well as several published zena rulings, the authorities’ crusading 
attitudes led them to pursue conviction aggressively, even by illegal means. In theft 
case 5, the judge’s sympathetic attitude meant that crucial elements which could have 
determined amputation were not investigated. Whether to the defendant’s advantage 
or detriment, the system of hadd application in Iran does not represent the rule of 
law, whereby the result of trials depends on a uniform code of rules and similar 
conditions yield similar outcomes. 
 
3. Legal infractions. 
 
Throughout the case studies, codified (and Shi‘i) laws of evidence (chapter 2, section 
6 and subsections) were routinely disregarded. Almost all confessions used were 
legally invalid, and valid confession was a rarity in both published and unpublished 
cases. On the rare occasions where testimony was used, its protocols, such as the 
investigation of the witnesses’ qualifications including ‘righteousness’ (‘edalat), 
were ignored. Invalid evidence was either used in its own right, or as a conduit for 
‘elm. ‘Elm itself was often a tool for contravening laws, whether governing evidence 
or other areas of law, such as repentance, criminal responsibility, ehsan, or the 
technicalities determining hand amputation for theft (chapter 2, section 7 and 
subsections, section 9; chapter 4, sections 3.4, 5). Often conditions whose 
investigation the law demands (e.g. ehsan, collaboration in theft which may render 
amputation inapplicable) were left uninvestigated. This was frequently combined 
with claims of ‘elm focusing on other areas of the law, and therefore these ignored 
areas were sometimes not pointed out even on appeal. 
 
Legally, ‘crimes against chastity’ cannot be prosecuted without complainants 
(chapter 3, section 4). However, in several cases investigation for sodomy, 
fornication or adultery was initiated by the authorities. Authorities not only initiated 
prosecution but sometimes pursued it by appealing acquittals or sentences which they 
deemed insufficiently harsh. In some cases, sources suggest that the authorities 
fabricated complaints purportedly emanating from third parties. For example, in 
fornication case 1 prosecution was ostensibly initiated by a complaint letter from 
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local inhabitants, but it was unsigned and belied by two affidavits signed by local 
inhabitants requesting that prosecution be abandoned. 
 
Another legal infraction seen in several cases was the absence of lawyers, which 
contravenes the constitutional guarantee of legal representation (chapter 2, section 3). 
In some cases, such as theft case 1 whose amputation sentence was carried out, the 
absence of lawyers meant that legal arguments were not addressed which could have 
undermined irreversible penalties. 
 
Other, similarly explicit legal elements were ignored in several cases. These include 
stays of execution, execution protocols, the effect of appeal in suspending sentences, 
rape claims which legally prevented the claimant’s prosecution, the prohibition of 
using pregnancy as proof, and laws forbidding execution of underage individuals 
(chapter 2, sections 4, 5.3, 7.1; chapter 4, sections 3.2, 3.6). As mentioned already, 
the ‘crusading’ attitude adopted by some authorities prejudiced their impartiality and 
made them more prone to disregarding laws to secure conviction. 
 
An interesting legal infraction is the substitution of stoning with hanging in adultery 
cases. This notably occurred in case 4, where the sentence immediately commuted 
stoning to hanging because of maslahat (the state’s best interests). Pragmatic reasons 
were also suggested against stoning in case 3. It is documented that at least one man 
condemned to be stoned was in fact hanged; the penal code bill allowed stoning to be 
commuted to hanging or flogging in the nation’s interests, and the 2012 code refrains 
from mentioning stoning altogether (chapter 4, section 3.7). What this means is that 
despite the vigorous defence of stoning as a ‘divine penalty’ (see also chapter 2, 
section 5.3), pragmatic arguments have been given an Islamic pedigree that allows it, 
and other ‘problematic’ scriptural elements, to be disregarded. (Similarly, the 
scriptural penalties for sodomy and incest, though not in codified law, were almost 
universally disregarded in the cases analysed). Though most legal contraventions 
observed in the case studies were inimical to lenience, this one sets a precedent 
which favours lenience. It rests on arguments, drawn from Shi‘i law by 
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contemporary jurists (chapter 3, section 6.2), which could even permit irreversible 
hudud to be removed from the codified law altogether. 
 
4. Socioeconomic dimensions. 
 
Socioeconomic dimensions of prosecution were particularly visible in chapters 8 
(fornication) and 9 (adultery). In these cases, extreme poverty, addiction, abusive 
families, neglect, notions of family honour, and the prejudicial effects of small-town 
gossip were all seen affecting trials. For example, in adultery case 10 the defendant 
made false confessions to shield family members and escape her relatives’ revenge. 
In adultery case 9, prosecution was initiated because of local gossip, which had also 
prejudiced the judge against the defendant. Fornication case 2 showed the effect of 
addiction and poverty manifested in a family’s prostitution of their young daughter. 
Addiction and poverty were similarly seen causing forced prostitution in adultery 
cases 2 and 3. As observed in the conclusion to chapter 9, the interaction of poverty, 
narcotic addiction, psychological problems and prostitution is well documented. 
 
Male bias, the mechanism whereby judges might sentence females more harshly than 
males given the same circumstances, is another social force observed in chapters 7 
and 8. In chapter 7, section 7, a set of social tendencies emerged, including the 
frequency of relationships between much older worldly men, who could ‘work the 
system’ and be exonerated, and significantly younger, apparently gullible girls who 
were often condemned in the same cases. This was combined sometimes with the 
girls’ or their families’ mistaken belief that the law could bring refractory ‘suitors’ to 
heel. Subjective assessments of propriety and piety affected prosecution in several 
cases described in chapter 7, section 7, which sometimes involved hospitals, 
neighbours or relatives reporting individuals for ‘depravity’. Male bias can also be 
detected in both fornication cases. On the other hand, recent stoning executions have 
mostly targeted males (chapter 4, section 3.7), reminding us that irreversible hudud 
are not exclusively relevant to women’s rights but generally to human rights. 
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The sample of adultery cases displayed another social dimension, namely a strong 
prevalence of illiterate members of linguistic minorities among those sentenced to be 
stoned. Illiteracy often correlates with poverty and therefore an environment more 
conducive to addiction and crime. It was also associated in several cases with rural, 
comparatively traditional areas. The large proportion of stoning cases from the Azari 
provinces may indicate some level of provincial bias. It is very difficult to ascertain 
whether this is a sign of a greater national tendency, but lawyers harvesting cases 
from prison searched nationwide, not only in these provinces. It is possible that 
certain traditional norms made judges in rural areas or outlying provinces more likely 
to favour stoning. One cannot be certain with the limited information available. 
 
Theft cases contain another social dimension. Because the amputation penalty for 
theft depends, in both codified and Shi‘i law, on the thief breaking into a physical 
‘enclosure’ (herz) and removing its contents, the penalty applies only to physical 
theft. Therefore it targets petty theft (as in theft case 1, where the man suffered 
amputation for stealing a tape recorder) while sparing ‘non-physical’ theft, such as 
fraud or computer-mediated theft whose magnitude, unlimited by what can be 
physically carried from an ‘enclosure’, could be immense. 
 
5. Institutional obstacles to lenience. 
 
The case studies displayed several obstacles to lenience which are procedural or 
embedded in the law. These included appeal bias (whereby appealed cases went to 
the same court twice, negating the ‘second opinion’ of an appeal), the extreme 
brevity of some trials which precluded a proper defence, and the confusion between 
the roles of judge and prosecutor seen for example in theft cases 2, 3 and 5, adultery 
case 9 and fornication case 1. Another is the mechanism termed ‘reverse plea 
bargaining’ whereby confessions were made in the erroneous belief, sometimes 
encouraged by the authorities, that it would be rewarded with lenience (e.g. adultery 
case 3; theft case 2; sodomy case 4; chapter 7, section 5). Instead, because confession 
is a main form of proof in hudud, it invariably incriminated confessors.  
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Additionally, both confession and testimony can be the result of coercion, 
intimidation or conspiracy (e.g. adultery cases 3, 9 and 10, sodomy case 4). Because 
of this, their status as sufficient justification for death or amputation penalties 
represents another obstacle to lenience, as pointed out for confession by the lawyer in 
adultery case 10. However, their scriptural origin makes it very difficult to prevent 
their use as sole sources of evidence in hudud. 
 
The law permits complainants to appeal acquittals (chapter 2, end of section 4; as in 
sodomy case 1 where acquittal was replaced by a death sentence), but is silent 
regarding other forms of double jeopardy, e.g. whether non-acquittals can be 
appealed or non-complainants can appeal. This meant that in several cases, non-
acquittals were appealed seeking increased severity, or non-complainants appealed 
with the same goal. Legally, crimes ‘against chastity’ cannot be investigated or 
prosecuted without complainants, and the ethos of relevant Shi‘i sources is that such 
crimes should be concealed and efforts should not be made to uncover and prosecute 
them (chapter 3, section 4). However, the authorities frequently prosecuted such 
crimes without complainants and then appealed acquittals or light penalties in pursuit 
of the death penalty (e.g. chapter 7, section 2). In these cases, the authorities acted as 
complainants in crimes ‘against chastity’, and then used complainants’ appeal 
prerogatives to make sure these crimes were punished severely. This contradicts the 
ethos of those Shi‘i texts, but is made possible because the law does not make it 
absolutely clear that authorities cannot be complainants, or that non-complainants 
cannot appeal. 
 
Similarly, the law does not expressly prohibit individuals from being tried and 
sentenced for acts categorised under ta‘zirat (discretionary penalties lighter than 
hudud) and retried and sentenced again for the same acts reclassified under hudud. 
Therefore in adultery case 8, a person flogged for certain acts was later sentenced to 
death following another trial for the same acts reclassified from ‘illicit relations’ to 
‘adultery’. The lawyers argued against punishing a person twice for the same acts, 
even if reclassified from ta‘zir to hadd, but could not find a specific law to support 
this – another apparent lacuna in the law. 
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Also inimical to lenience is the definition of rape as ‘coercive zena’ or ‘coercive 
sodomy’. Though legally rape claims exonerate claimants by default (chapter 4, 
section 3.2), judges may use their discretion to decide that when the ‘coercion’ 
element of rape is unproven, the ‘zena’ or ‘sodomy’ element remains and the rape 
claimant can be punished. For example, in fornication case 2 the defendant was 
sentenced to death despite always claiming rape, and several published sodomy and 
zena rulings feature rape claimants prosecuted, including those who took the 
initiative in reporting rapes. 
 
Another obstacle to lenience is the fact that though the Constitution (article 35) 
guarantees legal representation, it does not specify when lawyers must be provided. 
This means that lawyers, even when they were provided (which did not always 
occur), were in several cases introduced only after suspects had incriminated 
themselves. Though confession is invalid in hudud unless made before the judge 
trying the case (chapter 2, section 6.1), confession taken during pre-trial interrogation 
was routinely (and illegally) used to condemn suspects. This is exacerbated by the 
possibility of coerced confession, seen clearly in adultery case 9 but claimed in 
several other cases. Lawyers were frequently introduced only at the trial, and when 
trials were brief, this did not give them the opportunity to familiarise themselves with 
the case and formulate a proper defence.  
 
The law’s omission of the time parameter for legal representation means that 
suspects can be denied lawyers until it is too late, while the authorities can claim to 
have fulfilled the law by eventually providing lawyers. ‘Elm-e qazi, which as 
discussed above is often used as licence to bypass laws, can contribute by allowing 
judges to claim that pre-trial confession, though invalid in itself, gave them ‘insight’ 
into the crime. Therefore conviction can be secured through potentially forced pre-
trial confessions by appealing to laws which give judges latitude (the permission of 
‘elm and the guarantee of a lawyer without a timing parameter). 
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This reintroduces the issue of ‘elm, which as a source of almost unlimited judicial 
discretion is a major obstacle to lenience contained within the system. Most of the 
death and amputation sentences observed throughout the project would have been 
impossible without ‘elm, because ‘elm was used to overcome the ordinary strictures 
of the law such as the invalidity of pre-trial confession or the ability of repentance to 
preclude the hadd in certain circumstances. As observed earlier and in chapter 2, 
section 6.4, there is little scriptural justification for permitting ordinary judges to use 
‘elm in this way. ‘Ordinary judges’ here means judges who are not infallible 
(ma‘sum) – a quality possessed only by the Prophet and the Imams, whose ‘elm is the 
only ‘elm expressly permitted in scripture. But judges in Iran are not only fallible but 
also mostly not even mujtahids (jurists authorised to interpret scripture), a 
qualification that Shi‘i jurists including Khomeini consider absolutely necessary in 
judges (chapter 2, section 3). Therefore the current use of ‘elm in Iranian hadd trials, 
one of the most formidable obstacles to lenience observed throughout the case 
studies, rests on multiple layers of uncertainty and could easily be prevented through 
legislation based on a different reading of the Shi‘i sources which are the law’s 
ostensible origin – though the 2012 penal code fails to do this. 
 
The inequalities inherent in marriage, divorce and child custody laws were observed 
as inimical to lenience in chapter 9. In cases 1-3, wives were sentenced to death 
partially as a result of these laws. In case 1 the court’s argument for denying the wife 
a divorce was that it would have caused her children to lose their mother. This would 
have been untenable had wives been able to obtain custody of their children without 
proving their husbands’ unsuitability. The difficulty in proving this is demonstrated 
by the fact that in case 1, the husband was indeed unsuitable given his addiction to 
narcotics and failure to support his family financially: both legal grounds for divorce 
and unsuitability for custody. Had the wife been able to divorce, she and her co-
defendant could not have been sentenced to death for adultery.  
 
Divorce and custody laws decisively affected cases 2 and 3, where wives could not 
leave husbands who forced them into prostitution, thereby causing them to be 
condemned to death for adultery. This was combined with the fact that even if 
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divorced, they would have had to leave their children with men who might have 
prostituted them, having no other source of income. Meanwhile their criminal 
responsibility was considered intact because judges used their discretion to decide 
that the wives’ and children’s abuse did not constitute ‘coercion’. However, 
especially given the prevalence of forced marriage in the rural areas where many 
defendants lived, it is clear that inequalities embedded in various laws can permit 
women to be condemned to death for acts over which they have absolutely no 
control, hence in some fundamental sense no criminal responsibility. 
 
Another inequality inherent in the law is the different age of criminal responsibility 
for males and females. This meant, as discussed in chapter 7, section 7, that in 
several cases girls aged barely over 9 were condemned, sometimes to death, for zena 
while boys barely under 15 were unpunished for rape, purely because of their youth. 
 
The most basic obstacle to avoiding death and amputation penalties in hudud is of 
course the fact that these penalties are enshrined in the codified law (through Shi‘i 
law) and are difficult to remove because of their scriptural origins. As discussed 
regarding adultery case 13, no matter how stringent are the conditions governing 
these penalties, while they remain in the law there is always the possibility that in 
some small proportion of cases all the legal conditions will be fulfilled, rendering 
these penalties inevitable.  
 
Furthermore, applicability of these penalties often depends on technicalities rather 
than the amount of harm inflicted, and increased harm does not necessarily correlate 
with heavier penalties. Amputation for theft, as explained earlier, depends on 
conditions which target petty theft while excluding potentially much larger corporate 
or governmental fraud or indeed the theft of irreplaceable works of art which are 
deemed ‘public’ (chapter 4, section 5; chapter 5, conclusion, ‘social dimensions’). 
Consensual sodomy carries the death penalty (chapter 4, section 4), while rape of 
underage girls (chapter 4, section 3.3) arguably does not. Also, rape of underage girls 
is punished more leniently than rape of adults because of prevailing interpretations of 
technicalities. Adultery carries the death penalty even if enforced by its ‘victim’, as 
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in adultery cases 2 and 3 where husbands forcibly prostituted their wives. Injured 
parties are in many cases powerless to pardon criminals because the crimes involved, 
including rape, are classified as ‘crimes against God’ (haqq Allah, literally ‘the right 
of God’). Punishability depends not on harm inflicted, but on contravention of 
scriptural interpretations and fulfilment of technical specifications. 
 
Many procedural obstacles to lenience are unconnected to scripture and could 
therefore be removed easily. However, the obstacles which derive from scripture 
(including reliable narrations prescribing stoning, or Qur’anic verse 5:38 which 
apparently mandates hand amputation for theft) are difficult to abrogate because of 
their scriptural origins. As explained in chapter 3, section 6 and subsections, some 
jurists have used scripture to argue that certain Islamic laws are permitted to change 
according to time and place, that some interpretations of scripture are the result of 
patriarchal or cultural bias, or that certain inequalities and penalties can justifiably be 
removed to benefit the community. Khomeini’s doctrine of the ‘absolute rule of the 
jurist’ (chapter 3, section 6.2) even declares it Islamically obligatory to disregard 
sacred laws if they endanger the community. The regime accepts this doctrine to the 
extent that there is a committee, the ‘Council for Discerning State Benefits’, whose 
task is to decree when state interests (maslahat, ‘benefits’) can override Islamic laws.  
 
Some jurists reject this mechanism because it substitutes divine with human laws. 
However, its existence as a current doctrine of the Islamic Republic means that 
potentially, any obstacle to lenience, even if scripturally based, can be removed on 
ostensibly Islamic grounds. 
 
Perhaps more radical is the idea (chapter 2, section 9) that during the Occultation 
(gheybat) of the Twelfth Imam, who is in hiding and therefore unavailable to 
legislate, hudud are in abeyance (suqut). Grand Ayatollah Sanei, for instance, 
believes that this is so and that crimes during Occultation are to be punished by 
ta‘zirat (discretionary penalties)3. This, he says, would be an easy way to resolve the 
                                                
3 Khezr Heidari. See also Gorji, 39-40; Modarressi (1984), 55-7; Cole in Keddie, 37, 39-40; 
Sachedina, 20-1; Momen, 127, 186; Hairi, 67; Halm, 57-8; Rippin (vol.1), 113-4; Akhavi, 230-2; 
Amnesty International, “Iran: end”, 4. 
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conflicts about stoning and other irreversible hudud. However, such a position might 
conflict with velayat-e faqih, the idea that during Occultation, it is licit for qualified 
Islamic jurists, or the most qualified individual jurist, to govern (chapter 1, section 
5.3). The existence of the Islamic Republic depends on this doctrine, which states 
that the Imam’s function of government is not lapsed but rather entrusted to qualified 
jurists4. Suqut, therefore, would have to be framed in such a way as to include the 
Imam’s function of implementing hudud but not that of government. The idea of 
hudud only being applicable in a society free of want (chapter 3, section 6.5) might 
circumvent hudud without jeopardising velayat-e faqih. 
 
6. Final observations. 
 
Iranian codified hadd law provides theoretical opportunities to avoid irreversible 
hadd penalties in almost all cases, and if it were scrupulously applied as it is written, 
lenience could easily follow. Even in the unlikely event of the required number of 
witnesses (two for theft, four for ‘carnal’ crimes) testifying, defendants with 
adequate legal representation could avoid irreversible penalties by declaring 
repentance before the testimony was finished. Self-incrimination through confession 
could, obviously, theoretically be avoided by simply not confessing, and if the 
authorities wished to maximise lenience, they could easily do so by not prosecuting 
carnal crimes without complainants, accepting rape claims as obstacles to 
punishment, refraining from illegally using pregnancy as proof, and employing the 
other manifold opportunities to avoid meting out irreversible hadd penalties. The 
complicated parameters governing such things as ehsan, criminal responsibility, 
penetration and amputation for theft, cursorily mentioned in codified law but laid out 
in great detail in Shi‘i scripture and juristic works, could likewise prevent almost all 
death and amputation sentences in hudud if used judiciously. 
 
However, this is not what emerges from the documents available. The cases 
reviewed suggest that because the law is unclear, complicated parameters for ehsan, 
theft and so on are sometimes interpreted in ways which facilitate conviction, or their 
                                                
4 Enayat, 160-3; Kelidar, 82; Momen, 190, 194-5, Halm, 56-8; Martin, Creating, 115-24. 
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subtleties are simply ignored. Suspects may not know their legally sanctioned 
opportunities to avoid punishment, because they commonly have no lawyers or are 
only given lawyers after having unknowingly incriminated themselves. They do not 
necessarily have the luxury of not confessing, because confession may be extracted 
out of court through intimidation, trickery or even physical coercion. The fact that 
this is technically illegal does not prevent it from happening, and some of the cases 
analysed (e.g. fornication case 1, sodomy case 4, adultery case 8) show judicial 
authorities engaging in very clear illegalities with impunity (e.g. executions despite 
stays of execution, or suppression of appeals as in fornication case 1). The cases 
reviewed suggest that the authorities, judges but also prosecutors, interrogators and 
other officials, sometimes do illegally prosecute carnal crimes without complainants, 
do illegally use pregnancy as proof, do illegally fail to provide lawyers, and 
contravene many laws no matter how explicit they are. Sometimes they break the law 
without providing an ostensible justification, and sometimes they rationalise this 
through ‘elm-e qazi, one of the most formidable tools for judicial discretion and 
obstacles to lenience in hudud. 
 
In addition to all this, the cases available suggest that other legally entrenched 
concepts, such as the inequalities embedded in divorce and child custody laws, can 
cause defendants to have no control over the circumstances that culminate in their 
prosecution. Furthermore, social forces may make prosecution or conviction more 
likely. Judges may be biased by cultural assumptions or local gossip, false 
confessions may be enforced by relatives, and poverty or abusive families may leave 
vulnerable individuals no option but to engage in illegal behaviour. 
 
In short, the available material suggests that although the Supreme Court may exhibit 
greater leniency overall than first-instance courts, by frequently overturning death or 
amputation sentences, the system’s potential for lenience is not always fully 
exploited. To a large extent, legal reforms with a solid basis in Shi‘i texts could 
easily reduce the outlets for discretion and minimise the applicability of irreversible 
hadd penalties without compromising Islamicity. This is observed through the 
scholarly debates about how Shi‘i concepts could be reinterpreted and codified, and 
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seen in the ways in which legislators codify alternative or even radical 
interpretations. For example, the supposedly non-negotiable scriptural penalty of 
stoning was rendered commutable in the state’s best interests (maslahat) in the penal 
code bill and omitted (though not abrogated!) in the 2012 penal code. This extensive 
discussion among Iranian scholars, legislators and human-rights activists could 
potentially promote the creation of more lenient, though still Shi‘i, laws. Enforcing 
compliance by judicial authorities is another issue altogether. It could be promoted 
by appeals to self-interest. If state policy were to avoid human-rights faux pas for 
diplomatic reasons or to reduce internal discontent, individual officials might be 
persuaded to behave in such a way as to comply with that policy, thereby 
safeguarding their positions within the system. 
 
Even if every law, and the behaviour of every official, were calibrated for maximum 
leniency, penalties with strong scriptural support would be difficult to abrogate 
outright without challenging the notion of eternally binding scriptural 
commandments. With those penalties enshrined in law, they could, however 
infrequently, still be applicable if their admittedly stringent conditions were fulfilled. 
 
The arguably radical concepts described in chapter 3, section 6 and subsections, 
could provide ways to avoid these penalties altogether while remaining within an 
Islamic framework5. Where possible, novel scriptural interpretations could be used. 
Where this presented problems, the concept of maslahat could be employed. After 
all, Khomeini’s doctrine of subordinating Islamic laws to state interests includes the 
proposition that it is Islamically obligatory to do so in defence of the Islamic state 
and therefore Islam itself. This doctrine is current (chapter 3, section 6.2), and could, 
at the regime’s discretion, be used to eliminate every possibility of irreversible hadd 
penalties without officially declaring ‘divine laws’ incorrect. Similarly, to minimise 
discontent nationally and internationally, it could eliminate various inequalities and 
limitations on harmless acts mandated by prevailing scriptural interpretations.  
                                                
5 The conundrum facing the Islamic Republic is aptly expressed by Olivier Roy: “how to secularize 
politics in a society which cannot afford to reject its heritage and origin: an Islamic Revolution” (“The 
crisis”, 215-6). See also Mayer, “Islamic rights”, 271, 291-3, and Martin, Creating, 199 (“without 




This could create a ‘bypass valve’ whereby a system which declares itself Islamic 
could justify side-stepping apparently ‘problematic’ portions of Islamic scripture, 
thereby potentially achieving the flexible responsiveness to changing circumstances 
available in humanistic law. This would be a more roundabout way of permitting 
flexibility than those employed by scripturally unconstrained systems. The 
theoretical and structural differences between these two models would remain, as 
would the constant danger of harsher scriptural interpretations re-emerging; but the 
end results, including the possibility of avoiding certain penalties, could converge.  
 
However, legal reform, whether based on literal or alternative scriptural readings or 
invoking justifications for greater flexibility, depends on whether the regime decides 
that reducing or eliminating irreversible hadd penalties is important enough to justify 
this endeavour. The regime’s failure to exploit lenient opportunities in the 2012 penal 
code, which in many ways is sterner than its predecessor, shows that the forces 
against such reform remain potent. So does the regime’s treatment of many reformist 
jurists whose ideas, discussed in chapter 1, section 5.5, propose paths for Islamic 
flexibility other than the ‘governmental’ tool of maslahat. 
 
Difficulties in obtaining primary materials prevented this project from making 
authoritative statements about all hadd cases or even a statistically significant 
number of hadd cases involving execution or amputation. This is regrettable and 
could not, given the circumstances, be helped for the time being. Later studies, 
unfettered by such limitations, could shed more light on whether the mechanisms 
exhibited by this sample of cases are prevalent or exceptional, and whether additional 
patterns exist. For now, however, we have at least a reasonable impression of what 
codified Iranian hadd laws are, how contemporary Iranian legal scholars, lawyers 
and judges understand them and trace them to Shi‘i sources, and some ways in which 
they have been applied in practice. The fact that the mechanisms displayed by this 
documentation reinforced each other across different cases suggests that even 
through this admittedly limited sample, some important features of hadd prosecution 
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The two appendices provided consist of scanned images of some selected original 
documents related to the cases, with salient portions translated (appendix 1), and a 
glossary (appendix 2) explaining specialised concepts or terms used in the main text 
as well as basic terms and ideas related to Islam or Shi‘ism, familiarity with which 
might help non-specialist readers to comprehend the entire text. 
 
Appendix 1 is provided to give readers at least a nonzero exposure to the primary 
materials analysed in the case study chapters; Persian speakers will be able to 
understand these primary texts themselves, but a translation of salient portions of 
each text is provided for those who cannot read Persian. 
 
Appendix 2 exists to allow readers to remind themselves of the nature of basic or 
specialised concepts whenever necessary. Its position at the very end of the entire 
text is chosen to permit easy reference to it by merely lifting the back cover thereof. 
Where applicable, indications will be given of what chapters and chapter sections 
explain each term or concept in the greatest detail. These indications are given in the 
format chapter:section, so that for example a concept explained in chapter 4, section 
3.4, will have at the end of its entry the numbers ‘4:3.4’, with the colon coming after 
the chapter number and full stops preceding subdivisions of chapter sections. On the 
last page of the glossary (appendix 2) is a list of acronyms used for Iranian law codes 





Appendix 1: images of selected original documents. 
 
This appendix consists of a small selection of images of original documents, offering 
one page for each of the twelve cases represented. Each image is preceded by an 
explanation of its nature and a translation of salient portions thereof, indicated by 
square brackets, arrows or lines, depending on the format of the original texts, in the 
images themselves. In conformity with the privacy and safety policies outlined in 
chapter 1, section 3 and footnote 6, all information, such as names, dates, places or 
case numbers, which could facilitate identification of individuals involved in these 
cases has been excised from the images presented here. It is hoped that the 
opportunity to see at least some original documents will compensate, however 
slightly, for the unfortunate lack of transparency necessitated by paramount 
considerations of safety and privacy. 
 
Since these documents often have little or no punctuation, this has been added into 
the translation where necessary, to render the texts comprehensible. It is noteworthy 
that sentences used in these documents are frequently long and convoluted. Where 
they do not close parenthetical clauses, the translated text has been edited to rectify 
this, again in the interests of comprehensibility. 
 
Any specialised terminology appearing in these texts is defined in the glossary which 
is positioned after this appendix; this is done to avoid cluttering the translations of 
these original documents. Readers are directed to refer to the glossary if they come 
across unfamiliar terms. All specialised concepts or terms appearing in these 
documents and their translations have also been explained in the main text of the 
project, and the glossary indicates which parts thereof, where applicable, explain 
each term or concept. 
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Theft case 1: amputation implementation report. 
 
Areas indicated by large square brackets and arrows read: 
 
“Qat‘-e yadd (amputation of fingers)” [and lower down] “Because of the 
confirmation of the sentence by the Supreme Court and the second qat‘-e yadd 
sentence, the aforementioned was transferred to the police for implementation of the 
sentence at [time] PM on [date], and the above sentence was carried out at [time] PM 






Theft case 2: excerpt from the first-instance ruling. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“In court sessions, the defendants denied most of the thefts, and although … they had 
personally led officials to the locations of the thefts and even shown them their 
methods in a detailed manner there, in court they utterly denied most of the thefts 
and although they had identified the locations thereof, they declared that they had 





Theft case 3: excerpt from second Supreme Court ruling. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“Before the case went to the later court, and before the second court had established 
theft carrying the hadd, the defendant in the case expressed his repentance, contrition 
and regret in the first court…. Therefore his declaration of regret and repentance 
occurred before establishment of the crime, meaning a theft which carried the hadd. 
Does the esteemed court, which has ‘elm of theft, also have ‘elm that the repentance 
of the defendant, Mr [name], was feigned and untrue? By al-hudud todra’ be’l-
shubuhat [qa‘edeye darr’], if it does not have ‘elm of the defendant’s insincerity in 
declaring repentance, condemning him to the hadd for serqat will have consequences 
in the afterlife. Therefore the esteemed court’s ruling is overturned, and the case is 
sent back to [it]; and if it has ‘elm of the defendant’s insincerity, it can again issue a 
qat‘-e yadd sentence on the basis of its ‘elm, and this [Supreme Court] branch is 





Sodomy case 1: excerpt from retrial ruling. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“Normally, when penetration occurs and the resulting abrasions and lacerations have 
disappeared, the muscle remains loose and widened…. The absence of lacerations 
and abrasions does not disprove penetration, though slender individuals’ muscles are 
generally more flaccid than those of more proportionate persons, and the sphincter is 





Sodomy case 2: excerpt from Supreme Court ruling. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“[Considering the complainant’s] declaration of unconditional pardon of [the 
defendant] after stating that he had no certainty that [he] had committed the crime 
which was the subject of the complaint and that there was the possibility that his son 
had mistakenly identified the defendant, and [also considering] the suspect’s 
defences during the preliminary investigations and in court, and his denial of sodomy 
with the complainant’s young child, the appealed ruling with respect to the 






Sodomy case 3: excerpt from first-instance ruling. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“Regarding the other charge against [name], son of [name], of aggression and 
disturbing the public peace, considering the comprehensive investigations regarding 
his character and behaviour in the area and the statements of [the murder suspect’s 
underage cousin], son of [name] (although the aforementioned, his natural guardian, 
did not lodge a complaint), describing the behaviour of the late [murder victim] and 
[the person charged with disturbing the peace] when, together with [name], they 
were riding a motorcycle along the river towards [location], and, after dismounting, 
they assaulted him with the intention of rape, though because of his resistance and 
the presence of several individuals, they released him… his guilt is established”.  
 
NB: the murder suspect claimed to have been raped on the riverbank by the same 
individuals, but though their attempted rape of his cousin was accepted by the judge, 




Fornication case 2: excerpt from first-instance ruling. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“She denied incest, but admitted to illicit relations, not amounting to zena, with her 
brothers. Her brothers, named [A] and [B], denied the charge (incest) in court, but 
admitted to illicit relations other than zena…. Notwithstanding the [female] 
defendant’s denial of incest in the court session on [date], [considering]… the fact 
that she produced three illegitimate children between the ages of 14 and 18,… her 
explicit and multiple confessions to zena, occurring more than four times, during the 
preliminary investigations and in court,… her implicit confession that ‘my brothers 
and I had illicit relations other than zena, [involving] touching of the body and carnal 
enjoyment, [but] no form of penetration occurred’,… and her brothers’ explicit and 
implicit confessions to incest (with her) before they retracted [those confessions], the 
court and the judge have ‘elm of incest… and her retraction of confession is 
disregarded and does not cause suqut of the hadd penalty because of the ‘elm 
obtained…. She is condemned to death for incest…. [As for] the second and third 
accused persons, [A] and [B], sons of [name], concerning incest, considering their 
retraction of confession in court, the legislator has decreed, through article 71 of the 
penal code, that whenever a person confesses to zena and then retracts that 
confession, if the confession was to a form of zena carrying the penalty of death or 
stoning, with retraction of confession the hadd of execution or stoning lapses; 
therefore, in this regard, the defendants’ penalty, namely death, lapses, and through 
article 37 of the Constitution, the narration todra’ al-hudud be’l-shubuhat [qa‘edeye 




Adultery case 1: excerpt from female defendant A’s pardon petition. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“I was a simple, illiterate country girl. When I was 13, I was married off to my 
cousin, who took me to [town] with him. He was an addict who made no financial 
contribution and did not discharge any of the duties of a husband. Several times I fell 
out with him and went to my father’s house. The last time, I went to court and 
requested a divorce. I was estranged from my husband for eight months, during 
which I awaited the court’s decision, and in those eight months I had no type of 
relation with him, as all our relatives knew. During that same time, Mr [B], a 
neighbour and friend of my husband’s, promised to help me to divorce my husband. 
He told me that in order to obtain a divorce ‘in absentia’, I would have to be ‘absent’ 
from home. He took me to [town] with him and two weeks later he showed me a 
paper and said: ‘I have obtained your divorce in absentia’. He later took me to the 
registry in the town of [name] and contracted a permanent marriage with me. Being 
illiterate, until our arrest I thought we were husband and wife. We lived for several 
years in [town] and my first son, [name], has an identity document [shenasnameh]”. 




Adultery case 7: excerpt from the lawyer’s petition for an ‘extraordinary appeal’. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“The most important point which was ignored by the first-instance judge and the 
esteemed Supreme Court judges is that my client not only never confessed to zena 
before her late husband’s death in any court session, but vehemently denied it. In the 
absence of any confession, even taken by the police, the esteemed first-instance 
judge used the confessions of [the co-defendant], the murderer of my client’s 
husband, combined with my client’s confessions to having contracted a shar‘iatic 
temporary marriage with [the co-defendant] 50 days after her previous husband’s 
demise and having subsequently begun a carnal relationship [with him], to obtain 
‘elm, and issued a stoning sentence. This justification, which is completely contrary 
to the two established axioms of fiqh eqrar al-‘oqala ‘alaa anfosehem ja’ez and 
todra’ al-hudud be’l-shubuhat [qa‘edeye darr’], not only cannot comply with legal 
requirements but contradicts the spirit which informs the penal code regarding zena. 
How can a legislator who in article 68 [of the penal code] decrees complete 
invalidation of the hadd (and not derivation of ‘elm) for those who confess fewer 
than four times, and who in article 71 mandates lapsing of death or stoning penalties 
for zena following retraction of confession, permit the issue of a stoning sentence 
based on the confession of someone other than the defendant? Given that the hadd is 
not established through the testimony of three witnesses or three confessions by the 
perpetrator, and that witnesses who are fewer than the shar‘iatic nesab [of four], are 
characterised as qazef [punishable slanderers], how, in such a situation, can a non-




Adultery case 9: stoning implementation announcement (though the defendant was 
ultimately reprieved). 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“For collaborating in the murder of the late [husband], [she] was sentenced to five 
years’ ta‘ziri incarceration…. The implementation of the incarceration penalty has 
caused the stoning penalty to be delayed, which is not legally permissible: 
imprisonment is not necessary in such circumstances. It has therefore been arranged 
that the stoning sentence of the condemned be implemented on Wednesday the [date] 
at 4 PM in the office of [locality] prison in the presence of those local authorities 




Adultery case 11: excerpt from first-instance ruling. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“It seems that the first defendant, according to his explicit statements in court and 
bearing in mind the murder victim’s rape [tajavoz] of his wife, believed the murder 
victim to be mahduroldamm. However, given his wife’s consent to zena, her 
husband’s absence during these acts, and the murderer’s inability to ascertain the 
victim’s mahduroldamm status, the court considers his case consonant with article 
295, note 2, of the penal code, according to which, as well as articles 297-8, 302 part 
a, 304 and 612 of that law, he is sentenced, regarding the personal aspect of the 
crime, to payment of the full diyeh to the victim’s awlia’-e damm, and regarding its 
public aspect, to eight years’ ta‘ziri incarceration. Regarding the charge[s] against 
the second defendant, considering that her acts of zena coincided with her permanent 
husband’s travels, she is acquitted of adultery on the basis of article 82 of the penal 
code, and sentenced to a hundred lashes as the hadd of zena and one year’s ta‘ziri 
imprisonment through articles 63-4, 68-71, 80 and 88-9, and the note to article 612, 




 Adultery case 12: excerpt from Supreme Court acquittal confirmation. 
 
Underlined portions read: 
 
“Considering the contents of the case file, particularly the statements, combined with 
denial of confessions, of [the female defendant] in court with regard to the charges, 
the motive and reason for her confessions in previous stages [of the case], and the 
male defendant’s denial [of the charges] in all stages… their acquittal contained no 
fundamental flaws with respect to the regulations and principles of the legal process, 
and the appeal of Mr [name], the female defendant’s husband, against the male 






Appendix 2: Glossary. 
 
Numbers indicate ‘chapter: section’ where each term is explained, where applicable. 
(Or, for case study chapters, ‘chapter: case’). 
 
 
Absolute rule of the jurist. Synonymous with velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih (qv). 
 
‘Adam. Absence. See asl-e ‘adam. 3:1. 
 
‘Adel. Righteous; possessing ‘edalat (qv; righteousness). 
 
Adultery. Zena while possessing ehsan (qv; being married and having ‘access’ to 
one’s permanent spouse). Its punishment is stoning to death. 2:5, 2:5.1, 4:3, 4:3.7. 
 
Agahi. Awareness. Sometimes considered necessary for criminal responsibility, for 
instance as awareness of the forbiddenness of one’s actions; see ‘jahl’. 2:7. 
 
Ahadith (singular: hadith). Narrations (qv). 
 
Ahkam (singular: hokm, qv). Commandments. 
 
Akhbar (singular: khabar). Literally, ‘reports’, ‘news’. Narrations (qv). 
 
‘Ali (ibn Abi Talib). The cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad; the first 
Shi‘ite Imam, and, through his wife, the Prophet’s daughter Fatima, progenitor of the 
line of Twelve Imams whom the Twelver (Ithna‘ashari) Shi‘a characterise as the 
rightful leaders of the Muslim community. ‘Ali is the source of many narrations (qv) 
used in Shi‘i law and therefore relevant to this project. 
 
Al-zarurat tubihu’l-mahzurat. ‘Necessities remove restrictions’. See qa‘edeye zarurat 
va ezterar. 2:7.3. 
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‘Amm. General, as opposed to the particular (khass, qv). Particular exceptions can 
modify general rules. 3:2. 
 
‘Aql. Reason; the mental faculties; mental sanity. In penal law, ‘aql is mental sanity 
and is a necessary condition for criminal responsibility and therefore punishability. It 
is also necessary for valid confession or testimony. In jurisprudence, it refers to 
reason, which in Shi‘ism is considered a valid source of law. 2:6, 2:6.1, 2:6.2, 2:7, 
3:6.1 and note 15. 
 
Asl-e ‘adam. The ‘principle of absence’, whereby all things are considered as being 
preceded by their absence, and therefore the absence, not the presence, of a condition 
must be presumed until its presence is inconfutably proven. Punishability and guilt 
are among those things which are presumed absent until proven present. 3:1. 
 
Asl-e ‘adam-e elhaq. Principle of non-association or non-transferability, whereby the 
fact that a commandment or condition applies to one crime or situation does not by 
itself mean that it should be extended to others. 2:4.1. 
 
Asl-e bara’at. The principle whereby there is no obligation unless established by 
(sacred) law. In penal law, the phrase is often used as ‘the presumption of 
innocence’. 3:1. 
 
Asl-e ebahe. The ‘principle of permissibility by default’, whereby all things are 
permissible unless the divine law specifically prohibits them. 3:1. 
 
Asl-e sehhat. The principle whereby transactions are presumed correct and valid 
unless proven otherwise. 3:1. 
 
Authority verse. Verse 4:59 of the Qur’an, which says “obey God and His Messenger 
and those in authority among you (ulu’l-amr)”. ‘Those in authority’ has been 
interpreted by the current Iranian regime’s doctrine of ‘velayat-e faqih’ (qv) as 
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indicating the Supreme Leader, who fulfils the Hidden Imam’s functions during his 
Occultation and is authorised to govern on his behalf. 1:5.3 and note 23. 
 
Avikhtan be dar. Hanging (literally, ‘hanging from the gallows’). 2:5.3. 
 
Awlia’-e damm (singular: vali-e damm). Literally, ‘holders of the blood’. The heirs, 
minus the spouses, of a murdered person, who have the right to exact qesas of the 
murderer, accept diyeh in lieu, or pardon the murderer. 3:6.5. 
 
Aya (plural: ayat). A verse of the Qur’an. 1:5.1. 
 
Ayatollah (literally ‘sign of God’). A title given to high-ranking Shi‘i mujtahids (qv). 
Above it is Ayatollah al-‘Uzma (Grand Ayatollah) or Marja‘-e taqlid (source of 
emulation; see ‘taqlid’), and below it is Hojjatoleslam (proof of Islam). 
 
Balegh(eh). A person who has reached the age of bulugh (balegh: masculine; 
balegheh: feminine). 2:7.1. 
 
Bara’at (‘exemption’). The idea that there is no obligation unless mandated by 
(sacred) law (see asl-e bara’at). 3:1. 
 
Bayyaneh, bayyaneye shar‘i. In hudud, testimony of the number of witnesses 
required to prove a particular crime (for example, four for adultery, fornication, 
lesbianism and sodomy, two for theft). See also ‘nesf-e bayyaneh’. 6.3. 
 
Bulugh. The age of legal majority. In Shi‘i and Iranian law, this is nine lunar years 
for girls, and fifteen for boys. It is necessary for criminal responsibility and therefore 
punishability, at least in hudud (a person possessing bulugh is punishable even by the 
death penalty). It is also necessary for valid confession or testimony. 2:7.1. 
 
Caution in shedding blood. The idea that death penalties are prohibited unless all 
doubt of their applicability has been removed. It is supported inter alia by a narration 
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saying ‘the hudud are grounded in lenience and prudence must be favoured 
especially where blood is to be shed’. 3:1, 3:3. 
 
Continuous ijtihad (ijtihad-e mostamarr). The notion that the legal opinions, based on 
the authoritative texts (nusus; plural of nass) of the divine law, of jurists must not be 
the subject of additional ijtihad by other jurists, who instead must formulate their 
own fatwas ‘from scratch’ with ijtihad based on those nusus in response to istifta’ or 
in rendering judgement. This is to avoid a ‘Chinese whispers’ effect whereby 
interpretations of interpretations are treated as if they had the same authority as 
original nusus, which are the only authoritative basis for action. 1:5.1. 
 
Damm. Blood. It appears in such phrases as ‘awlia’-e damm’ and ‘mahduroldamm’. 
 
Dar. Regarding execution, gallows (or cross, see ‘salb’). See ‘avikhtan be dar’. 2:5.3. 
 
Dhimmi. Member of a recognised religious minority (‘people of the Book’: Jewish, 
Christian, Sabian, or in Iran, Zoroastrian) in Muslim lands, protected and potentially 
eligible for Heaven (Qur’an 2:62, 5:69, 22:17) but lacking some rights. 2:5.1. 
 
Diyeh (plural: diyyat). ‘Blood money’ which injured parties or their heirs can claim 
for injuries or murder if they waive qesas. 2:4, 2:8, 4:3.3. 
 
Double jeopardy. Being tried twice for the same crime. Iranian law allows 
complainants to appeal acquittals, which in European-derived legal systems is double 
jeopardy; it does not explicitly permit or forbid other forms of double jeopardy. 2:4. 
 
Dukhul (literally, ‘entry’). Penetration of the male organ. This is necessary for 
consummation of marriage (hence ehsan), zena or lavvat to have occurred. 
Specifically, the male organ must have penetrated so that its glans is entirely hidden, 
or consummation, zena or lavvat has not occurred; and any evidence of these crimes 
must describe complete penetration of the glans. 2:5.1, 4:1. 
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Ebahe. Permissibility by default. See asl-e ebahe. 3:1. 
 
‘Edalat. Righteousness. It is required in witnesses, and arguably should be 
ascertained before their testimony can be accepted. 6.3. 
 
E‘dam. Execution. 2:5.3. 
 
Efsad, efsad fi’l-’ard. Vice, corruption; corruption on Earth. See ‘moharebeh’. 
 
Ehsan. The condition of being in a consummated (see dukhul) permanent marriage 
(see ‘temporary marriage) and having ‘access’ to one’s permanent spouse. ‘Access’ 
is a very contentious parameter, which at least involves the possibility of copulation 
(and therefore disappears with physical separation of spouses) but may involve other 
things such as healthy marital relations according to some lawyers or even jurists. A 
person who has ehsan and commits zena is guilty of adultery (zena 
mohsan/mohsaneh) and liable for the penalty of being stoned to death. A person who 
commits zena without having ehsan is only guilty of fornication (zena gheyr-e 
mohsan/mohsaneh) which carries the penalty of 100 lashes. 2:5, 2:5.1, 4:1, 4:3, 4:3.4. 
 
Ehteram. Respect. A reason given for the lighter penalty for rape of underage girls is 
that they are not due the same ‘ehteram’ as adults. 4:3.3. 
 
Ehtiat. Caution. Choosing the course of action most likely to be correct. 3:1. 
 
Ehtiat dar khunha/dama’. ‘Caution in shedding blood’ (qv). 
 
Ejbar. Coercion (also ‘onf, ikrah). See ikrah. 2:7, 2:7.3, 4:3.2. 
 
Ekhtiar. Free will. It is necessary for criminal responsibility and therefore 
punishability. Ikrah (coercion) is the removal of ekhtiar. Ekhtiar is also necessary for 
making valid confession or testimony. 2:6, 2:6.1, 2:6.3, 2:7, 2:7.3. 
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‘Elm. ‘Knowledge’, ‘insight’. It is a form of knowledge defined as higher than ‘zann’ 
(conjecture) on the scale whose apex is qat‘ or yaqin (certainty). In penal law, it is 
used as a shorthand for ‘elm-e qazi (qv), the ‘knowledge of the judge’. 
Unfortunately, since it is called ‘elm, a word associated with reliable insight, some 
jurists and judges claim that ‘elm-e qazi is by definition more authoritative than the 
mere ‘zann’ deriving from other forms of proof. 2:6.4, 2:9. 
 
‘Elm-e qazi. The ‘knowledge of the judge’, allowed by Iranian law and, arguably, 
Shi‘i law as a mode of proving hadd crimes. Being unregulated by law, it is very 
vague, which means that judges can define their most tenuous ‘gut feelings’ as ‘elm, 
and then ascribe to this insight the reliability of ‘elm (qv) as defined on a scale of 
certainty. 2:6.4. 
 
Enkar. Generally, ‘denial’, including denial of guilt of a crime. It also has the 
specific meaning of ‘retraction of confession’, which causes suqut (qv) of stoning, or, 
in Iranian law, any death penalty for zena and, according to some, for lavvat 
(sodomy) also. 2:6.2. 
 
Eqrar. Confession. 2:6.1. 
 
Eqrar al-‘oqala ‘alaa anfosehem ja’ez. See ‘qa‘edeye eqrar’. 
 
Estemta‘. A variant form of tamatto‘ (deriving pleasure, in this context, from 
marriage, thereby maintaining ehsan, qv). See tamatto‘. 4:3.4. 
 
Esteshab. The principle of assuming that the last known condition of things remains 
true. 3:1. 
 
Expediency Council. The council created after Khomeini’s promulgation of ‘velayat-
e motlaqeh-ye faqih’ (qv) to override the vetoes of the Guardian Council (qv) in the 
best interests of the state (maslahat, qv). Its Persian name is ‘Majma‘-e Taskhis-e 
Maslahat-e Nezam’ (the council for discerning the benefit of the State). 3:6.2. 
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Ezterar. Distress. It also means a condition whereby compliance with laws causes 
hardship. Jurists give it varying abilities to remove criminal responsibility, but 
certain narrations indicate that it does. 2:7.3, 4:3.5, 9 case 2. 
 
Faqih. A jurist of Islamic law, capable of fiqh (jurisprudence). Also, ‘the faqih’ is, 
according to the doctrine of ‘velayat-e faqih’, the head of the Islamic Republic. 1:5.1. 
 
Farsang (farsakh, parasang). An ancient unit of distance defined either as a multiple 
of other ancient units (cubits, royal cubits or stadia) or as an hour’s walk. Four 
farsangs are commonly called the ‘hadd-e tarakhos’, which removes ehsan among 
other things; this distance is given in contemporary Iranian sources as approximately 
21.5 or 22 km. 4:3.4. 
 
Fasad. Corruption, vice; see ‘moharebeh’. 
 
Fased. Corrupt, inclined to vice, possessing ‘fasad’. See ‘moharebeh’. 
 
Fatwa. The legal opinion of a scholar (mufti, mujtahid) qualified to issue them. 2:4. 
 
Fiqh. Islamic jurisprudence. 1:5.1. See ‘nusus’, ‘ijtihad’, ‘shar‘’. 
 
Fornication. Zena without ehsan (qv). It is normally punishable by 100 lashes, but on 
the fourth repetition it carries the death penalty, and incest and rape, also variants of 
fornication, carry the death penalty too. 2:5, 2:5.1, 2:5.2, 4:3, 4:3.2. 
 
Ghayba (gheybat, occultation). The doctrine whereby the Twelfth Imam is alive but 
in hiding; therefore we are in his reign but he cannot be consulted. 1:5.1, 2:9. 
 
Golpeygani, Grand Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi (b. 1917). A prominent religious 
scholar. His fatwa (qv) whereby ‘elm based on confessions lapses with their 
retraction (enkar) is sometimes cited in court rulings. 2:6.2, 7:5. 
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Guardian Council. A body whose task is to investigate the compatibility of any laws 
passed by the Iranian parliament (Majles) with Islamic law, and which can reject 
laws and demand their revision if they are insufficiently Islamic or contravene the 
divine law. Their veto, however, can now be overridden in the ‘best interests of the 
State’ (maslahat-e nezam) by the Expediency Council, created following Khomeini’s 
promulgation of ‘velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih’ (qv) in 1988. 5:5.2, 3:6.2. 
 
Hadar. Expendable. See ‘mahduroldamm’. 
 
Hadd (plural: hudud; literally, ‘limit’, ‘boundary’). Islamic ‘fixed penalties’ which 
the divine law determines for a certain group of crimes. See ‘hudud’. 1:5.1, 2:5-5.1. 
 
Hadd-e tarakhos. The ‘limit of permissibility’ after which ehsan is lost and a person 
officially becomes ‘a traveller’, being exempt from fasting and only obliged to 
perform the shortened ‘travellers’ prayer’. It comes from the word ‘rukhsa’ (licence). 
Some jurists hold the hadd-e tarakhos to be four farsangs (qv), and some hold it to be 
a point beyond one’s vatan (qv) when one can no longer see its inhabitants or hear its 
call to prayer. 4:3.4. 
 
Hadith. Synonymous with narration (qv). 
 
Hadith-e raf‘. Literally, ‘narration of exoneration’ (raf‘ meaning exoneration). It is a 
famous narration listing the nine things which remove criminal responsibility. They 
include coercion (ikrah) and distress (ezterar). 2:7, 2:7.2, 2:7.3. 
 
Halq-aviz. Hanging (literally, ‘neck hanging’). 2:5.3. 
 
Hanafi. One of the four Sunni schools of law, the others being Maliki, Hanbali and 
Shafi‘i. 2:5.3, note 47. 
 
Hanbali. See ‘Hanafi’. 2:5.3, note 47. 
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Haqq (plural: huquq). Right (e.g. human rights, ‘huquq-e bashar‘). 
 
Haqq Allah. The ‘right of God’. Crimes which are such because they break divine 
commandments, irrespective of whether they have injured parties or cause any harm. 
They are prosecutable without complainants (with the exception of crimes ‘monaffi-e 
‘effat’, qv), and pardonable by the vali-e amr (qv). Their victims, if any, do not have 
the authority to pardon. 2:8. 
 
Haqq al-nas. The ‘right of humans’. Crimes which are such because they have an 
injured party (saheb-e haqq, qv) whose initiative is necessary for prosecution and 
who can pardon the guilty party or, if applicable, accept diyeh in lieu of qesas. 
Theoretically not even the vali-e amr can usurp these rights, including that of pardon, 
though some argue that he can if it benefits the State (see ‘velayat-e motlaqeh-ye 
faqih’, ‘Guardian Council’). 2:8. 
 
Haraj. Harm. See ‘osr. 
 
Haram. Forbidden. See jahl. 
 
Herz. In theft (serqat), an ‘enclosure’ which can reasonably be expected to protect 
goods. A person who breaks into the herz and also removes the goods from it is 
guilty of serqat-e haddi (theft carrying the hadd) and eligible for hand amputation. A 
person who did only one of these things is not. 4:5, 5 (theft) cases 1 and 3. 
 
Hidden Imam. The Twelfth Imam of the Ithna‘ashari Shi‘a, believed to be in 
Occultation (hence the term ‘hidden’). 1:5.1, 2:9. 
 
Hojjiat. Proof-value. For instance, testimony is said to lose its ‘proof-value’ by being 
retracted and thereby invalidated, and proof generally loses hojjiat through 
contradiction with other proof. 2:6, 3:2. 
 
Hokm (plural: ahkam). Commandment or legal directive. 
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Hokm-e avvali. Primary commandment, corresponding to the ‘amm (qv). These are 
general commandments, which however may be suspended or modified in particular 
situations by ‘ahkam-e thanaviyyeh’ (secondary commandments) or ‘ahkam-e 
ezterari’ (rules applying to situations of distress). See hokm-e thanavi, ezterari. 3:6.2. 
 
Hokm-e ezterari. ‘Distress commandment’, which, in times of distress, overrides 
ordinary commandments. See hokm-e avvali, hokm-e thanavi. 3:6.2. 
 
Hokm-e thanavi. Secondary commandment, which in specific circumstances can 
modify or even suspend a hokm-e avvali (qv). For instance, consumption of normally 
forbidden food or drink (e.g. alcohol) becomes obligatory if it is necessary to save 
one’s own or someone else’s life; this is the hokm-e thanavi which in this instance 
overcomes the normal hokm-e avvali. 3:6.2. 
 
Hormat. Forbiddenness. See jahl. 
 
Hudud (singular: hadd; literally, ‘limits’, ‘boundaries’). Islamic ‘fixed penalties’ 
decreed by the divine law for a specific group of crimes. In current Iranian law, these 
crimes are zena (adultery or fornication), sodomy, false accusations of zena or 
sodomy, pimping, lesbianism, alcohol consumption, theft, and ‘insurrection and 
corruption on Earth’ (see ‘moharebeh’). Hudud by nature cannot be attenuated, 
commuted, bargained down or in any way altered. 1:5.1, 2:5-5.1.  
 
Idra’u’l-hudud be’l shubuhat. See ‘qa‘edeye darr’’. 
 
Ijtihad. Literally ‘effort’. In Islamic law, a qualified jurist’s independent reasoning to 
extrapolate laws and principles from the primary texts (nusus: Qur’an and narrations) 
of the divine law. A person qualified to perform ijtihad is called a ‘mujtahid’. 1:5.1. 
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Ikrah. Coercion (also ‘onf, ejbar). It removes ekhtiar (free will) and with it, criminal 
responsibility. Confessions taken under ikrah are also invalid. Rape is coercive zena 
(zena plus ikrah); sodomistic rape is coercive sodomy. 2:6.1, 2:7, 2:7.3, 4:3.2, 4:3.5. 
 
Imam. Literally, ‘leader’. For Sunnis this means prayer leader; for Shi‘ites it means 
one of a line of successors to the Prophet Muhammad as leaders of the Muslim 
community. Different Shi‘i groups posit different numbers of Imams; the largest 
group, the Twelvers (Ithna‘ashari), prevalent in Iran, believe in Twelve Imams. They 
are Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, and eleven descendants of 
Ali and the Prophet’s daughter Fatima, ending with the Twelfth Imam. 1:5.1. 
 
Isnad. ‘Chain of transmission’ of a narration (qv). It is the list of individuals who 
transmitted the narration from one to the other going back to the one who first 
witnessed the events it describes. The reliability of narrations therefore depends to a 
large extent on each transmitter’s reputation for memory, honesty and so on. 1:5.1. 
 
Istifta’ (plural: istifta’at). Soliciting fatwas (qv: legal opinions) from muftis (qv). 
 
Ithna‘ashari Shi‘a. Arabic for ‘Twelver Shi‘a’ (qv). 
 
Jahl. Ignorance. E.g. ‘jahl be mozu’, ‘ignorance of the matter’ (of the nature of one’s 
actions); ‘jahl be hormat’ (unawareness that one’s deeds are illicit); ‘jahl be hokm’ 
(ignorance of the commandment/law regarding one’s actions). These forms of 
ignorance can all be a defence in hudud. 2:7.2. 
 
Jarayem-e monaffi-e ‘effat. Crimes ‘against chastity’ (see ‘monaffi-e ‘effat’). 
 
Jorm. Crime (plural: jarayem). 
 
Khabar (plural: akhbar). Literally, ‘report’, ‘news’. Narrations (qv). 
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Khamenei, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini. Iran’s current ‘Supreme Leader’, after 
Khomeini; characterised as the ‘vali-e amr’ (qv). See velayat-e faqih. 2:1. 
 
Khass. Particular, as opposed to ‘general’ (‘amm, qv). 3:2. 
 
Khomeini, Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ruhollah Mostafavi Musavi (1902-89). The 
Shi‘i jurist who led the 1979 Iranian revolution that installed the present regime. He 
was the first vali-e faqih (qv) of the Islamic Republic, and his Tahrir al-Vasileh is 
extensively used in current law and trials. See velayat-e faqih. 1:5.1-4. 
 
Lavvat (lavvat-e ‘iqabi). Sodomy (punishable by death). 2:5, 2:5.1, 2:5.3, 4:4, 4:4.1. 
 
La zarar. ‘No harm’ – the principle whereby no harm is to be inflicted or suffered in 
Islam. It derives from a narration that says the same thing. 3:6.1-2. 
 
Lex talionis (literally, ‘the law of retaliation’). The principle of ‘an eye for an eye’, 
equivalent to qesas (qv), whereby murder or injuries are punishable by retribution in 
kind (execution for murder or infliction of equivalent injuries). 2:4, 4:3.3. 
 
Lunar years. Years determined by the phases of the moon rather than the position of 
the Earth with respect to the sun. The Islamic calendar uses lunar years, which are 
approximately eleven days shorter than solar years. Ages of bulugh (qv) are given in 
lunar years. 2:7.1; 2:6.1 note 57. 
 
Ma‘ez bin Malek. A man who, according to a famous narration, spontaneously 
confessed to adultery before the Prophet, who painstakingly questioned him 
regarding every parameter of his criminal responsibility, awareness of the forbidden 
nature of his actions, marriage, access to his wife, and crime itself including extent of 
penetration. The Prophet attempted to send Ma‘ez away, but Ma‘ez insisted on 
confessing four times, approaching the Prophet from different directions, to adultery, 
claiming that he wanted to be purified of his sin. When all doubts were removed, 
Ma‘ez was sentenced to be stoned to death. He escaped from the stoning pit but was 
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felled by a camel bone thrown by a member of the audience and lynched by the 
assembled multitude. When the Prophet heard of this, he lamented that this had 
happened, since his escape from the pit signified retraction of his confessions and 
therefore invalidated the death penalty. He therefore ordered the diyeh (blood 
money) for Ma‘ez to be paid to his heirs from the beitolmal (public fund). This 
narration is used to support many things, including parameters of criminal 
responsibility, ehsan, zena, penetration, confession, and the effect of its retraction or 
escape from the stoning pit in causing suqut (qv). Chapter 9, case 6. 
 
Maharem (nasabi, sababi, reza’i). Relatives (singular: mahram). Maharem-e nasabi 
are blood relatives, with whom incest carries the death penalty. Maharem-e sababi 
are relatives by marriage. Maharem-e reza’i are ‘milk relatives’, meaning those who 
have drunk the milk of the same person (with additional conditions), who become 
‘milk relatives’ to each other and to the producer of the milk. Marriage with all blood 
and milk relatives and most sababi relatives is forbidden; most jurists say that incest 
only carries the death penalty if committed with blood relatives. 4:3.2. 
 
Mahduroldamm. ‘Whose blood can be shed with impunity’. From ‘damm’, blood, 
and ‘hadar’, ‘expendable’. A person whose murder is not punishable by death 
because they merit death already, for example by having committed a crime carrying 
the death penalty. Iranian law forbids the death penalty even for those who kill 
someone in the mistaken belief that they were mahduroldamm, if that belief is proven 
in court. If the belief was mistaken, they must still pay diyeh, and if not, even diyeh 
lapses. 4:2, 6 (sodomy) case 3, 9 (adultery) cases 10, 11. 
 
Mahfuz. Literally, ‘protected’ or ‘hidden’. In theft, this refers to adequate protection 
of stolen goods by the ‘herz’ (qv). If they are not sufficiently ‘mahfuz’ by the herz, 
their theft does not carry qat‘-e yadd (qv; hand amputation penalty). 5 (theft), case 1. 
 
Mahqunoldamm. ‘Whose blood is protected’; opposite of ‘mahduroldamm’ (qv). 4:2. 
 
Majles (literally: ‘assembly’). The Iranian parliament. 1:5.2. 
 396 
 
Majma‘-e Taskhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam. Expediency Council (qv). 1:5.2-5, 3:6.2. 
 
Makarem Shirazi, Naser (b. 1924). Prominent Iranian Shi‘i jurist. Though 
conservative in some respects, he declared stoning commutable if necessary. 4:3.7.  
 
Malik Ashtar. A man whom ‘Ali (qv) sent to govern Egypt. In doing so he gave him 
a letter which, among other things, embodies the qa‘edeye darr’ (qv) and the concept 
of erring on the side of lenience rather than on the side of severity. 3:3, 3:5. 
 
Maliki. One of the four Sunni schools of law, the others being Shafi‘i, Hanafi and 
Hanbali. 2:5.3, note 47. 
 
Maqzuf. The victim of qazf (qv). 2:5.1. 
 
Masalih (singular: maslaha, maslahat). Benefits. 3:6.2. 
 
Masalih al-mursala. Unattested benefits; benefits for which there is no authoritative 
divine text (nass). The idea that when the divine law is silent on a particular point, it 
is licit to use the benefit of the community as a source of law. 3:6.2. 
 
Maslahat. Literally, ‘benefit’. It can refer to the idea that one rationale behind laws, 
which can be used if it does not contravene known divine injunctions, is the 
promotion of benefits and the reduction of harm. In recent parlance, following the 
promulgation of ‘velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih’ (qv) and the creation of the 
Expediency Council (qv), it can mean ‘the State’s benefits’, which must be sought, 
and its opposite prevented, even at the cost of contravening divine laws. ‘Maslahat 
sanji’, ‘assessing benefits’, means prioritising greater over lesser benefits. 3:6.2. 
 
Ma‘sum. Innocent, infallible. An epithet of the Prophet, his daughter Fatima and the 
Twelve Imams, termed the ‘Ma‘sumin’ (qv). 1:5.1. See ‘Sunna’. 
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Ma‘sumin. The Prophet, his daughter Fatima and the Twelve Imams (see Ma‘sum). 
 
Milk relatives. See ‘maharem’. 
 
Mofsed (f’l-‘ard). Person guilty of ‘efsad fi’l’-‘ard’, ‘corruption on Earth’. It is 
unclear whether this crime is the same as ‘moharebeh’ (insurrection) or a separate 
crime, and if so, whether or not it carries the same penalties as moharebeh. 2:5.1, 4:6. 
 
Mohareb. Person guilty of ‘moharebeh’ (qv), ‘insurrection’. 2:5.1, 4:6. 
 
Moharabeh va efsad fi’l-’ard. Insurrection and corruption in Earth. It is unclear 
whether this is one crime or two, and if two, what ‘corruption on Earth’ is and 
whether it carries the same penalties (execution, crucifixion which may be survived, 
amputation of right hand and left foot, or exile at the judge’s discretion) that Qur’an 
5:33 decrees for the crime interpreted as either ‘moharebeh’ or ‘moharebeh va efsad 
fi’l-’ard’. 2:5, 2:5.1, 4:6. 
 
Mohsan(eh). Possessing ehsan (qv). Mohsan is masculine, mohsaneh is feminine. 
 
Monaffi-e ‘effat. ‘Against chastity’. Crimes ‘against chastity’, meaning those with a 
carnal component such as adultery, fornication, sodomy or lesbianism, legally and 
according to the divine law cannot be prosecuted or investigated without 
complainants. However, this is often ignored. 3:4, 2:4. 
 
Monker. A person who denies a crime or retracts their confession to it. 2:6.1-2. 
 
Morsal (feminine: morsaleh). Having no supporting text; for instance, narrations (qv) 
without an isnad (qv). It is also in the phrase ‘masalih al-mursala’ (qv). 3:5, 3:6.2. 
 
Moshahede. ‘Seeing’. In hudud, having seen penetration of the male organ so that the 
glans is entirely hidden. If this has not occurred, zena or lavvat (and by extension 
qavvadi, qv) has not occurred either, because dukhul (qv; penetration) is part of their 
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essence. Testimony must be to having seen this extent of penetration, and testimony 
or confession must describe it. 4:1. 
 
Mosker. Alcohol consumption, punished by 80 lashes and carrying the death penalty 
on the third, not the fourth, repetition according to most jurists. Some posit the third 
repetition as normal and the fourth as exceptional; others, the opposite. 2:5.1, 2:5.2. 
 
Mufti. A person qualified to issue fatwas (qv). 
 
Mujtahid. A person qualified to perform ijtihad. Jurists mostly agree that only 
mujtahids can be judges. 1:5.1, 2:3. 
 
Muqallid. One who cannot perform ijtihad, and must therefore perform taqlid (qv). 
 
Mut‘a. Literally ‘pleasure’; often used to mean ‘nika mut‘a’ (qv). 
 
Mu‘tazila (adj. ‘Mu‘tazilite’). An Islamic school of thought which posits that God 
behaves reasonably, and therefore divine laws are compatible with reason. 
Mainstream Twelver Shi‘i thought is Mu‘tazilite, and accepts ‘aql (qv; reason) as a 
tool to discern correct sacred laws. See ‘qa‘edeye molazeme’. 3:6.1, note 15. 
 
Na’eb. Representative; according to velayat-e faqih (qv), the vali-e faqih (qv). 1:5.3. 
 
Naqz. ‘Quashing’ of a ruling. 2:4. 
 
Narration. A report of the actions or words of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams. 
Narrations are legally binding, and together with the Qur’an, they form ‘nusus’, the 
authoritative texts of the divine law, whose interpretation is ‘fiqh’ and ‘ijtihad’. 
Narrations are also known as ahadith or akhbar (singular, hadith, khabar). 1:5.1. 
 
Naskh. Abrogation; for instance, of earlier Qur’anic verses by later ones. 1:5.1. 
 
 399 
Nass (plural: nusus). Authoritative texts of Islamic law, namely, the Qur’an and the 
Sunna (as contained in narrations). Together these are ‘the shari‘a’ (qv). Fiqh is 
based on their study and extrapolation of laws and principles from them. 1:5.1. 
 
Nesab. Quorum. The minimum quantity necessary. It can refer, for example, to the 
number of confessions or witnesses required to prove a particular crime, or to the 
minimum value of stolen goods before qat‘-e yadd (qv) is applicable. 2:6.3, 4:5. 
 
Nesf-e bayyaneh (half testimony). Half the number of witnesses required to prove a 
crime (for instance, two witnesses to zena, which requires four). 6.3, note 65. 
 
Nika mut‘a. Temporary marriage (nika meaning ‘marriage’, and mut‘a meaning 
‘pleasure’). It is allowed in Twelver Shi‘ism though not in Sunni Islam. It is marriage 
with a fixed ‘expiry date’ which can be anywhere from an hour to 99 years from the 
date of the contract. It involves fewer obligations that permanent marriage; for 
instance, it does not have the same obligations of financial maintenance whereby the 
husband is responsible for financially supporting the wife. A man is allowed only 
four permanent wives contemporaneously, but as many temporary wives as his 
financial means allow (since he must pay dowries to them). 4:3.4 and note 26. 
 
No crime without law. The principle that no action is to be deemed a crime unless 
performed after being defined as such by law. It is known in European-derived legal 
systems as ‘nullum crimen sine lege’. 2:2. 
 
No punishment without law. The principle that no punishment must be implemented 
unless mandated by law for actions deemed criminal by laws which antedate them. It 
is often rendered in European legal systems as ‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege 
praevia’ (no crime or punishment without preceding law). 2:2. 
 
Occultation. The doctrine whereby the Twelfth Imam is alive but in hiding, and 
therefore we are in his reign but he cannot be consulted. A ‘lesser occultation’ 
(gheybat-e soghra) occurred in 874 AD; during this time, the Twelfth Imam was 
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reachable through four successive intermediaries (sofara; singular: safir) but could 
not be directly contacted. With the death of the fourth safir in 941 AD, the ‘major 
occultation’ (gheybat-e kobra) began, and there remained no way of consulting the 
Imam even indirectly. There subsequently developed doctrines of quietism, whereby 
in the Imam’s de facto absence, no government was legitimate and many of the 
Imam’s functions, including implementation of hudud, had lapsed (saqet, qv). This 
was gradually reversed, and the culmination of this process was velayat-e faqih (qv). 
It is believed that the Hidden Imam will eventually reveal himself again. 1:5.1, 2:9. 
 
‘Onf. Coercion. See ikrah. 2:7.3, 4:3.2. 
 
‘Orf, ‘adat, ‘orf va ‘adat. Custom. 2:7.3, 4:3.5. 
 
‘Osr: hardship, harm. 2:7.3. 
 
Penal code bill (Layeheye Qanun-e Mojazat-e Eslami). A proposed replacement of 
the 1991/96 penal code (Qanun-e Mojazat-e Eslami, ‘law of Islamic punishments’). 
The Guardian Council rejected it; it was superseded by the 2012 penal code. 1:5.4. 
 
Qa‘edeye eqrar (the ‘axiom of confession’). The axiom ‘eqrar al-‘oqala alaa 
anfosehem ja’ez’ (the confessions of legally responsible persons are valid against 
themselves). It gives validity to confessions while also limiting that validity to 
confessors, thereby prohibiting incrimination of one person through another’s 
confession. 2:6.1. 
 
Qa‘edeye darr’ (‘axiom of removal’). The axiom ‘idra’u’l-hudud be’l-shubuhat’ or 
‘todra’u’l-hudud be’l-shubuhat’ (doubt averts punishments). 3:5. 
 
Qa‘edeye hormat-e tanfir az din. The ‘axiom against causing hatred of the faith’, a 
principle of fiqh recently discussed in its own right. 3:6.3. 
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Qa‘edeye la zarar. The ‘no-harm principle’, whereby no harm is to be inflicted or 
suffered in Islam. It derives from a narration that says the same thing. 3:6.1-2. 
 
Qa‘edeye molazeme. The principle whereby divine laws accord with reason. Some 
even claim that if divine laws do not, they must be false. It is generally accepted that 
certain divine commandments, notably those in the realm of ‘ibadat (prayer and other 
acts of devotion), are exempt from being assessed through reason. 3:6.1. 
 
Qa‘edeye nafi-e ‘osr va haraj. The axiom of avoiding harm. It removes criminal 
responsibility for illicit acts (except murder) performed to avoid these. 2:7.3. 
 
Qa‘edeye tafsir-e maziq-e qanun be naf‘-e mottaham. The axiom of interpreting the 
law’s ambiguities in favour of the defendant. 3:3. 
 
Qa‘edeye zarurat va ezterar. The ‘axiom of necessity and distress’ whereby necessity 
renders permissible what would normally be forbidden. 2:7.3, 3:6.1-2. 
 
Qanun. (Codified) law. 1:5.1. 
 
Qanun-e Mojazat-e Eslami. ‘Law of Islamic penalties’; the penal code. 1:5.4, 2:4. 
 
Qasd. Intention. It is necessary for valid confession and criminal responsibility. 2:7. 
 
Qat‘. Certainty. See ‘elm. 
 
Qat‘-e yadd (‘hand-cutting’). The hadd penalty for theft. In the Qur’an (verse 5:38) it 
is ‘cut off their hands’; some schools of Islamic law interpret this as removing the 
hand at the wrist or even the elbow. Twelver Shi‘i and current Iranian law interpret it 
as amputation of four fingers, minus the thumb, of the right hand. 2:5.1, 4:5. 
 
Qatl. Killing; often used as ‘murder’ or ‘execution’. 2:5.3. 
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Qavvadi. Pimping; bringing people together, irrespective of payment, for zena or 
lavvat. It is punished by 75 lashes and, for males, also exile of three months to a year. 
Since it is facilitation of crimes involving penetration, its testimony must be based on 
‘moshahede’ (qv) and confession must describe penetration of the glans. 2:5.1, 4:1. 
 
Qaza’. Judgeship (see ‘qazi’). 
 
Qazef. A person guilty of qazf. 2:5.1. 
 
Qazf. False testimony regarding sodomy or zena (qv) or a false accusation thereof; 
punishable with 80 lashes; the only hadd which is entirely haqq al-nas (qv). 2:5.1. 
 
Qazi (plural: qozzat). Judge. Shi‘i jurists generally insist that only mujtahids (qv) can 
be judges, but this is not currently enforced in Iran. 2:3. 
 
Qesas. Retribution in kind for murder (qesas-e nafs) or injuries (qesas-e ‘ozv). The 
injured party or, in murder, their heirs can decide whether to exact qesas (infliction 
of equivalent injuries or, for murder, execution), accept diyeh (blood money) instead, 
or pardon the aggressor outright. 2:4, 2:5.3, 2:8, 4:3.3. 
 
Qesas-e nafs. Execution for murder. 2:4, 2:5.3, 2:8, 4:3.3 
 
Qesas-e ‘ozv. Retribution in kind for injuries by means of inflicting equivalent 
injuries on the aggressor. 2:4, 2:8. 
 
Qur’an. Literally, ‘recitation’. The most important text of Islam. It is believed to have 
been revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by God and the Archangel Gabriel, and it 
contains laws which are binding on Muslims as well as parables and stories. It is 
divided into chapters (suwar, singular: sura) which contain verses (ayat, singular: 
aya), several of which are of a legislative nature. Some verses abrogate (naskh, qv) 
others, eliminating their legislative force; therefore in order to discern laws from the 
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Qur’an one must, inter alia, know when and in what circumstances (because context 
can affect the meaning and interpretation of words) they were revealed. 1:5.1. 
 
Rajm. Stoning to death; the hadd penalty for adultery. 2:5, 2:5.1, 5.3, 4:3.7. 
 
Revayat (plural: revayaat). Narration (qv). 
 
Rukhsa. Licence. In the context of penal law it is relevant to the hadd-e tarakhos (qv) 
which is crucial, inter alia, to ehsan (qv). 
 
Rule of the jurist. Synonymous with velayat-e faqih (qv). 
 
Sabet. ‘Established’ (of a crime proven in court). See ‘sobut’. 
 
Saghireh (masculine: saghir). An underage girl, whose rape apparently does not carry 
the death penalty. 4:3.3. 
 
Saheb-e haqq. Owner of the right. An injured party in haqq al-nas, who has the right 
to initiate prosecution, pardon the criminal, and, if applicable, accept diyeh in lieu of 
qesas (qv). 2:8. 
 
Saheb-e mal. In theft (serqat), the owner of the stolen goods. 4:5. 
 
Salb. Crucifixion; one of the penalties for moharebeh va efsad fi’l-‘ard. It may, but 
does not necessarily, cause death. The term ‘dar’ (gallows) may also indicate ‘cross’. 
Persons crucified for three days must be released if they survive. 2:5.1, 5.3; 4:6. 
 
Sanei, Grand Ayatollah Yusef (b. 1937). A prominent Shi‘i scholar, liberal on many 
points and recently at odds with the Iranian regime. He has emphasised that coerced 
confession is invalid, and opposed halved blood money (diyeh, qv) for women and 
the use of ‘elm-e qazi (qv) in hudud. 1:5.5, 2:6.1, 2:6.4, 4:3.3. 
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Sangsar. Persian term for ‘rajm’ (qv; stoning to death for adultery). 
 
Saqet. Lapsed; having undergone suqut (qv). 2:9. 
 
Sareq. Thief. 2:5.1, 4:5. 
 
Serqat. Theft (punishable with amputation of 4 fingers). 2:5, 2:5.1, 4:5. 
 
Shafi‘i. One of the four Sunni schools of law; see Maliki. 2:5.3, note 47. 
 
Shahed (plural ‘shuhud’). Witness. 6.3. 
 
Shahrudi, Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmud Hashemi (b. 1948). The head of the 
Judiciary when most cases in Part II were tried. Sometimes politically conservative 
though often juristically liberal. For example, he opposes the use of ‘elm-e qazi in 
criminal law, and issued all the stays of execution mentioned in Part II, which were 
sometimes ignored. 1:5.6, 2:6.4, 4:3.7, 4:5. 
 
Shar‘, shari‘a (adjective: shar‘i, shar‘iatic). A term commonly used to mean ‘Islamic 
law’, but technically referring only to nusus (qv): scripture (the Qur’an and the 
Sunna/narrations) as opposed to fiqh, which is jurisprudence based on them. 1:5.1. 
 
Shehadat. Testimony. 6:3. 
 
Shi‘a. Literally, ‘faction’; in this context, the ‘faction of ‘Ali’ (Shi‘at ‘Ali), namely 
those who believe that the leadership of the Muslim community after the Prophet 
should have gone to his cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali, instead of being determined by 
consensus as the Sunnis (who favoured the leadership of the Prophet’s father-in-law 
Abu Bakr) believe. There are various Shi‘i (the adjectival form of Shi‘a) groups, 
positing various numbers of Imams (leaders of the community) who followed the 
Prophet and ‘Ali. Here, we are concerned with the Twelver Shi‘a (qv). 1:5.1. 
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Shorb-e khamr. Alcohol consumption, punishable with 80 lashes. 2:5, 2:5.1. 
 
Shuhud (sing. ‘shahed’). Witnesses. 6.3. 
 
Sigheh. Term indicating temporary marriage. See ‘nika mut‘a’. 
 
Sobut. ‘Establishment’ of a crime in court. It is also a crucial point in theft, since 
after sobut, the injured party can no longer pardon the thief. 2:9, 4:5, 5 case 3. 
 
Sodomy (lavvat). Penetration, to the extent that the glans is fully concealed, of a man 
by the organ of another man. It carries the death penalty. 2:5, 2:5:1, 4:4, 4:4.1. 
 
Sunna. Literally, ‘tradition’. The behaviour and words of the Prophet and the Imams, 
as recounted in narrations (qv). It can create precedents for law. The Prophet and the 
Imams (Ma‘sumin, qv), being both infallible and innocent, never contravened the 
divine law; therefore anything they did was indisputably licit, though some things 
they did were merely permitted, not obligatory. 1:5.1. 
 
Sunni. Literally ‘of the tradition’. The most numerous branch of Islam, itself divided 
into four schools of law (see ‘Maliki’). Though the matter is more complicated than 
this, one main division between the Sunnis (or ‘ahl-e Sonnat’, ‘those of the 
tradition’) and the Shi‘a (qv) is that the Shi‘a favoured ‘Ali as a successor to the 
Prophet for leadership of the Muslim community, and his descendants to succeed 
him in that role, while the Sunnis favoured selection of the Caliph (khalifa: 
successor, leader of the Muslim community after the Prophet) by consensus. Another 
difference is that while the Sunnis use only hadiths (qv) connected to the Prophet, the 
Shi‘a also use those connected to the Imams (qv). The fact that the Sunnis are named 
for ‘tradition’ does not mean that the Shi‘a do not also have their equivalent 
‘traditions’ (sunna, qv); indeed, many narrations (qv) of both schools overlap. 
 
Suqut. ‘Lapsing’, ‘abeyance’, ‘invalidation’, ‘inapplicability’. In penal law, it refers 
to the inapplicability of punishments caused by specific circumstances, including 
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repentance made at the right time, claims of coercion, or retraction of confession to 
zena punishable by death. In another context it refers to the abeyance of the Imam’s 
functions during his Occultation (ghayba, gheybat). 1:5.1, 2:9. 
 
Sura (plural: suwar). A chapter of the Qur’an. 
 
Ta’dib. Didactic or disciplinary penalties, similar to ta‘zir (qv) and sometimes 
identified with them, but with the express purpose of teaching the miscreant, usually 
a child or insane person, to behave properly. They are generally light. 2:7. 
 
Tafkhiz. Sodomy minus penetration, punishable with 100 lashes. 2:5, 2:5.1, 4:4. 
 
Tahrir al-Vasileh. A fiqh treatise written by Ayatollah Khomeini. It plays an 
important role in current Iranian law, though it also contains positions absent from 
codified law. Portions of the Tahrir are often cited in court whether or not they 
appear in current codified law. 2:1. 
 
Tamatto‘. ‘Gaining pleasure’. Ehsan (qv) depends on tamatto‘ between spouses. It is 
unclear if this means merely physical copulation or also additional forms of 
enjoyment including psychological ones, as some lawyers and jurists argue. 3:4. 
 
Taqlid. Deference to a mujtahid’s opinions regarding divine law by a person 
(muqallid) not authorised to perform ijtihad. 1:5.1. 
 
Ta‘zir (plural: ta‘zirat; adjective: ta‘ziri). Discretionary penalties (see also ta’dib). In 
the classical law they are at the judge’s discretion, but in Iranian codified law, each 
crime with a ta‘ziri penalty has a maximum and minimum sentence between which 
the judge can choose. Islamic penal law generally posits four categories of 
punishments: hudud, qesas, diyeh and ta‘zirat, the last referring to crimes and 
punishments not covered by the other three. 2:4, 2:5. 
 
Temporary marriage. See ‘nika mut‘a’. 
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Todra’u’l-hudud be’l-shubuhat. See ‘qa‘edeye darr’’. 
 
Twelfth Imam. The twelfth of a line of successors to the Prophet Muhammad as 
leaders of the Muslim community according to the Twelver Shi‘a. He is believed to 
be in Occultation (qv), and hence is also known as the Hidden Imam. 1:5.1, 2:9. 
 
Twelver Shi‘a. The Shi‘i group now prevalent in Iran, which posits a line of twelve 
Imams, beginning with ‘Ali, as rightful leaders of the Muslim community. 1:5.1. 
 
Ulu’l-‘amr. ‘Those in authority among you’ from Qur’anic verse 4:59; interpreted as 
the plural of ‘vali-e amr’ (see ‘authority verse’, ‘vali-e amr’). 1:5.3, note 23. 
 
Vali-e amr. ‘Guardian of affairs’. According to an apparently spurious interpretation 
of Qur’anic verse 4:59 (the ‘authority verse’) by the current Iranian regime through 
the doctrine of ‘velayat-e faqih’ (qv), the person who fulfils the Hidden Imam’s 
functions, including government, during his Occultation. 1:5.3 and note 23. 
 
Vali-e damm (plural: awlia’-e damm). See Awlia’-e damm. 
 
Vali-e faqih. ‘Guardian jurist’, authorised to rule on the Hidden Imam’s (qv) behalf 
as his na’eb (representative) according to velayat-e faqih (qv). 1:5.1. 
 
Vatan. ‘Homeland’; re: ehsan, one’s town of residence. See ‘hadd-e tarakhos’. 4:3.4. 
 
Velayat-e faqih. The ‘rule/guardianship of the jurist’; a doctrine developed by 
Khomeini, building on earlier developments in the same direction. It states that since 
the Hidden Imam is not available to discharge his functions, including that of 
governing the Muslim community, the best representatives to perform these 
functions during his Occultation are those most versed in Islamic law, namely, 
foqaha (plural of ‘faqih’, ‘jurist’). Furthermore, if one excels the others in learning, 
he is paramount among them. This doctrine, whose departure from earlier 
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mainstream attitudes has been discussed by scholars, is a keystone of the Iranian 
regime’s justification of its own existence: without it, the previous quietistic 
doctrines of the Imam’s functions being in abeyance (suqut) might prevail. 1:5.1. 
 
Velayat-e faqih-e motlaqeh. The ‘absolute rule of the jurist’. A fortified version of 
‘velayat-e faqih’, promulgated in 1988 by Khomeini. It states that since the Islamic 
Republic upholds true (Twelver Shi‘i) Islam, whose preservation is paramount, 
anything which strengthens the regime or prevents damage to it is Islamically licit 
and obligatory even if it contravenes other Islamic laws. 3:6.2. 
 
Yaqin. Certainty. See ‘elm. 
 
Zani, zanieh (masc, fem). Someone who has committed zena (qv). 
 
Zann. Conjecture. See ‘elm. 
 
Zena. Illicit carnal congress between males and females not married to each other. If 
married to someone else, they are guilty of adultery which carries the penalty of 
stoning to death, and if not, they are guilty of fornication, which carries the penalty 
of 100 lashes but the death penalty on the fourth instance. 2:5, 2:5.1, 4:1, 4:3. 
 
Zena ba maharem-e nasabi. Incest (with blood relatives), which carries the death 
penalty. See ‘maharem’. 4:3.2, 8, case 2. 
 
Zena be ‘onf, zena be ‘onf o ikrah/ejbar. Rape. See ikrah. 
 
Zena(ye) mohsan(eh). Adultery, punishable by stoning. Zena(ye) gheyr-e 
mohsan(eh) is fornication. See zena, ehsan, rajm. 2:5.1, 4:3, 4:3.4, 4:3.7. 
 
Zarar. Harm. See la zarar, qa‘edeye nafi’-e ‘osr va haraj. 2:7.3. 
 
Zarurat. Necessities. See ‘qa‘edeye zarurat va ezterar’. 2:7.3. 
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Acronyms for laws: 
 
CPC: Criminal Procedural Code (1911). 
 
DIRS28/70: Directive on the Implementation Regulations for Sentences of 
Execution, Stoning, Crucifixion, [and] Amputation or Disabling of Limbs, [being] 
the Subject of Note 1 of Article 28 of the law Establishing Criminal Courts One and 
Two (1991). 
 
DIRS293/82: Directive on the Implementation Regulations for Sentences of Qesas, 
Stoning, Qatl (execution), Crucifixion, E’dam (execution) and Flogging, [being] the 
Subject of Article 293 of the Procedural Code for the General and Revolutionary 
Courts in Criminal Matters (2003). 
 
FPL: Family Protection Law (1975). 
 
LECC: Law Establishing Criminal Courts 1 and 2 and Supreme Court Branches 
(1989). 
 
LEGRC: Law Establishing the General and Revolutionary Courts (1994). 
 
PCCM: Procedural Code for the General and Revolutionary Courts in Criminal 
Matters (1999). 
